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Since the Senegambia Confederation collapsed in 1989, The Gambia-Senegal 
interstate conflicts over the border have intensified. Irrespective of the recurrence of 
interstate political difficulties, people in the two countries nurture a popular belief 
that they are kinsmen and they have a shared culture. They describe themselves 
as “one people” and they use kinship metaphors to refer to each other. The two 
countries have made efforts to foster a closer relationship irrespective of recurrent 
political difficulties over the border. This thesis argues that shared culture, language 
and religion mediate the divisive power of The Gambia-Senegal border. It explores 
the historical, cultural, religious and economic factors that perpetuated the 
conditions of both conflict and cooperation in interstate relations from 1960 to 2015. 
It further argues that state and non-state actors (transporters, traders, religious 
actors and ordinary people) use the resources they have in the state, culture and 
religion to navigate the complex context of the border, which is a major source of 
tension in cross-border mobility and trade and in interstate politics.  
Senegal has had violent conflicts with two of its neighbours, Mauritania and 
Guinea Bissau, respectively, over their shared borders.  But it has avoided similar 
conflicts with The Gambia. The popular perception that Gambians and Senegalese 
are “one people” in two countries is partly credited for this situation. The two cultural 
notions of the “mother’s child” and “father’s child” expressed in the Wollof language 
as dome-ndeye and dome-baaye, are useful terminologies for understanding why 
interstate political difficulties never degenerated into violent conflict. The “mother’s 
child” represents cross-border relations of intimacy. The “father’s child” stands for 
cross-border relations of competitive intimacy.  When state and non-state actors 
are influenced by the former notion, they behave in ways that deflate conflict. They 
are motivated to resolve problems and de-escalate interstate tensions. But if 
notions of competitive intimacy influence them, kinship ties are disregarded and 
transactional attitudes that re-activate tensions are adopted. Consequently, when 
economic interests are threatened, cultural principles of cooperation and kinship 
models get abandoned for transactional behaviour and competitive attitudes.  
Case studies from the Amdallai-Karang and Farrafenni-Keur Ayib border 
settlements show that conflict decisions from the top are de-escalated by 
grassroots processes that are performed through language. State actors and non- 
state actors use language to negotiate and renegotiate the divisive nature of the 
border. The political economy of the border influences whether people prioritise 
kinship bonds or the escalation of tension in their interactions. Cross-border traders 
and religious actors have been more disposed towards fostering agreeable and 
cooperative relations. Transporters facilitate cross-border mobility and foster 
connections. They facilitated the joint transport network in the past. However, they 
subsequently devised plans that led to the disintegration of the transport network. 
Currently, they promote and sustain interstate disagreements on cross-border 
transport. They also contributed to the ongoing conflict on the border. State actors 
from both sides of the border have also demonstrated mixed goals towards the 
border. Notwithstanding, the use of kinship metaphors creates new continuities 
across the discontinuity of legal territory and this has prevented The Gambia and 
Senegal from veering into violent conflict. Thus, from 1960-2015, social relations 
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AFPRC    Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council  
APRC Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and 
Construction  
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ID     Identification Document 
MSF     Médecins Sans Frontières  
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Adiya (Islamic term) Gifts to holy men for their 
prayer and pastoral services 
Alhamdulillah   (Islaimc term) Praise be to Allah or God 
Anglais (French) Senegalese reference to The 
Gambia 
Apparante    (Mandinka & Wollof) Apprentice 
Auto “étrangère” (French) Foreign cars referring to 
Gambian cars. 
Ashobi (Mandinka and Wollof) The practice of 
identifying one cloth for all members of a 
group or community to buy and wear for a 
certain social event  
Askan (Wollof) A nation of people, a lineage or a 
huge embodiment of closely 
interconnected people that share social 
relations 
Attaya vous (Mandinka and Wollof) Green-tea drinking 
“communities” 
Attey borr fei (Wollof) The verdict of a debt litigation is 
payment. 
Baarki     (Wollof) Blessing 
Badinya    (Mandinka) Kinship 
Badenya (Mandinka) Kinship and submission to 
authority and cooperation 
Banta kunsal    (Mandinka) twins of the outside world  
Bantang    (Mandinka) Silk cotton tree 
Baranyini    (Mandinka) Labourers 
Beton (Uncertain source) Stones used for concrete 






Bour     (Wollof) King or royalty 
Bour ku buka bukacmoum 
nguurrram mu hanjn la sa jamm (Wollof ) A sovereign denies peace to the 
one seeking to share his 
sovereignty/power. 
Boutiques (French) Shop or business center 
Charraah    (Wollof) Flip-flops 
Chef de Bureau of the Douanes (French) The head of the customs office 
Chef de garage    (French) The chief of the garage 
Chef de Village   (French) Village head 
Chosannie Senegambia  (Wollof) Senegambian culture or traditions 
Chupp    (Wollof) Tie and dye or batik clothing.  
Cocksor    (Uncertain source) A garage functionary 
Dairas (plural, daira- singular) (Mandinka & Wollof) Local terms for 
Islamic community-based organisations 
attached to clerical establishments in 
Senegambia. 
Diplomatique geographie  (French) Regional diplomacy 
Doleku    (Wollof) To complement 
Dome-ndeye (Wollof) “Mother’s child” but metaphorically 
it means very strong, unshakable 
relational ties between people. It also 
refers to relations from the female line.  
Dome-baaye (Wollof) “Father’s child” which means 
relationships from the male line which is 
characterised by interpersonal competition 
Douanes (French) Customs, also used as the short 
name for Senegalese Customs 
Droits     (French) Taxes or duties. 
Fadenya (Mandinka) term for competitive behaviour 
whereas its complement Farolu – 
Mandinka name for rice fields  






Fenyo     (Mandinka) Tail 
Fibpuu     (Wollof) Protest 
Gambie nin Senegal mu ding 
kiling le teh, badinkhungl lem (Mandinka) The two countries are children 
to the same parents, they are relative 
 
Gamoo (Mandinka & Wollof) Islamic feast which 
celebrates the birth of Prophet Muhammad 
(SAW). It is also called Malud- El- Nabi. 
Garas     (Wollof) Motor park or garage 
Garaso    (Mandinka) Motor park or garage 
Goorgi    (Wollof) Honorific term for men 
Gorray (Wollof) A reciprocal sentiment from 
someone who has benefitted from another 
person’s benevolence. It is a combination 
of gratefulness, faithfulness and dignity 
Jali     (Mandinka) Griot or bard 
Jeli     (Mandinka) Griot of bard 
Jemal Keurgi    (Wollof) To enhance a home. 
Jinneh     (Wollof) Devil  
Jollof (Wollof) The Jollof kingdom, a historic 
dominion of the Wollof ethnic group 
Jollof (Wollof) A nickname for Banjul or The 
Gambia. 
Juula  (Mandinka) A trader or trading  
Juulo (Mandinka) It also a name given to a 
trader 
Hala mbologan   (Wollof) Traditional quiz 
Hijra Islamic term for the migration of Prophet 
Mohammad (SAW) and his followers from 
Mecca to Medina 
Huur     (Wollof) Thoroughfare. 
Kamanda wuloo   (Mandinka) Kamanda forest 






Khelifa    (Wollof) Grand or elderly person 
Kuu jupp tedah (Wollof) The person of virtues reaps 
grandeur. 
Loumas or lumos   (Wollof) Weekly markets in Senegambia.  
Mandaa    (Mandinka & Wolof) Commission 
Marché    (French) Market 
Marché market-man (French & English) An underground 
market 
Maam     (Wollof) Ancestor or grandparents 
Maulud Al-Nabi (Wollof) An Islamic and Arabic term which 
means the birth of the Prophet 
Mohammad (SAW) 
Mbadingho    (Mandinka) Kinship ties 
Mbokh    (Wollof) Kinship 
Mbobka    (Wollof) Kinsman or kinsmen 
Mbohko    (Wollof) Kinship relations. 
Mbolu muye dole   (Wollof) Togetherness/unity is strength. 
Mini-cars    (Wollof) Mini-buses. 
Nabangteh ak warrant (Wollof) Preaching and advising one 
another. 
Napp     (Wollof) Blackmail  
Ndimabalante   (Wollof) Assistance  
Nger Yallah    (Wollof) “For the sake of God” 
Njuula  (Wollof) trading 
Numerithe    (Uncertain source) Plates used for printing  
Nyo dema kafo   (Mandinka) Co-operative enterprise 
Oppa nalen xamxam  
wai oppu tolin ngorr (Wollof) “He was more knowledge but the 
people were equally honourable like him” 
 







Raang    (Wollof) Queue 
Ralluman    (Uncertain source) Garage functionary 
Rewi bukung    (Wollof) Two countries are not the same 
Roohe Diskett (Wollof) word which means a corner for 
fashionable ladies 
Quatre–cent mbarr   (French & Wollof) A car type 
Sans contrarier   (French) Without contradiction 
Secor (Mandinaka & Wollof) Groundnut buying 
sites in The Gambia. 
Sedda     (Wollof) Fish  
“Senegal sunugal”   (Wollof)“Senegal, our boat” 
Senegal bena bopela,”  (Wollof) “Senegal has one head” 
Sept-places    (French) 7-seated passenger cars 
Sharka    (Wollof) Fish  
Si anglais bi (Wollof) The English side- reference to 
The Gambia  
Sunyo Maami   (Wollof) The days of our ancestors 
Sutura    (Wollof) protection 
Suuw     (Wollof) The east  
Talibee (Wollof) A member of any of the Islamic 
brotherhoods in Senegambia. It is also 
used to mean a student studying the 
Quran. 
Talibee darrsu- (Wollof) Students who follow a marabout 
because of his teachings and his lifestyle  
Talibee daara   (Wollof) Students taught by a marabout  
Talibee tarikha   (Wollof) Followers of an Islamic sect. 
Tarikh     (Wollof) Islamic sect 
Tefess    (Wollof) Sea Shore  






Te sito (Mandinka) The development philosophy 
of the early years of the Jawara regime in 
The Gambia  
Tissu daroul hhodus (Wollof) Type of textiles used to show 
loose flowing gowns  
Tobaski (Wollof) Islamic Feast when Muslims 
slaughter a ram for sacrifice 
Toe     (Mandinka & Wollof) Toll 
Toumarankee (Mandinka & Wollof) A displaced person or 
a wayfarer 
Ujaama (Swahili) Julius Nyerere’s development 
philosophy in Tanzania. 
Umma (Islamic term) Global community of 
Muslims 
Waahalem    (Wollof) Bargaining 
Wullere (Wollof) Gratitude and the act of 
celebrating past social bonds by 
individuals 
Yabou     (Wollof) Type of fish  
Yalnanyu bur nyamal 
be nyu muna jamou Yalna (Wollof) Prayer- May the ruler give us 
peace for us to render well our devotion to 
God 
 
Yeremandi     (Wollof) Empathy 
Yunni aalla    (Wollof) Bush path 
Yunni kaw    (Wollof) Official route or road 
Yuni suff    (Wollof) Back road 
Wanteer    (Mandinka and Wollof) Sales 
Werse (Mandinaka & Wollof) The transfer of 
monies from driver to patron or the 
representative of the patron 
Wirrd (Wollof) The daily invocations followers of 






Ziarres  (Wollof & Mandinka) spiritual renewal 
events held annually in Senegambia 
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INTRODUCTION: THE GAMBIA-SENEGAL BORDER AND THE 
INTERPLAY OF SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE 
 
 “A fight each day exhausts love.” 
(Lalo Kebbeh Drammeh, late Gambian master Kora player). 
 
“The tongue and the teeth may crash on each other, yet they must remain in the same mouth.” 
(Mandinka Proverb). 
 
1.0: Introduction and Context: “We are one, but not that much”  
Senegal has had a violent border conflict with its neighbour Mauritania in 
1989. The conflict was sparked when communities at the Senegal-
Mauritania border fought for the control of their shared water resources. The 
two governments were embroiled in the communal violence, which led to the 
killing or maiming of hundreds of Senegalese, Mauritanians and even 
Gambians.1 Senegal has also had a long-running maritime border conflict 
with Guinea Bissau, another neighbouring country. The Senegal-Guinea 
Bissau shared maritime border conflict started around 1974 and went on 
until around 1990.2 In between these periods, the two countries engaged in 
various instances of military confrontation. However, Senegal has so far 
avoided a militarised border conflict with The Gambia, even though Gambia-
Senegal border tensions recurred from 1960 to 2015. This reality intrigues 
me to pose the following question: Why have the Gambia-Senegal relations 
over the border not degenerated into violent political conflict, in spite of the 
recurrence of interstate border tensions from 1960 to 2015?”   
My approach to answering the main research question is to study 
how The Gambia-Senegal border impacts bilateral relations between the two 
                                                            
1“Senegal observes a day of Mourning,” The Gambia Weekly, May 5, 1989, 1- 10. 







states. I also study how the border affects cross-border transport, trade and 
religious networks and also how these domains affect border dynamics. This 
research is therefore about relationships that happen at different levels of 
bilateral contact and cross-border exchange between the two countries. I 
study the language people use to describe or define different kinds of 
relationships. I also study how tensions in the different relationships manifest 
themselves productively or otherwise. Additionally, I study how different 
people use the resources they have in the state, transport, trade, religion 
and in other areas, to navigate the complex context of the border. I further 
study the nuanced nature of state-society relations to reveal the complex 
nature of The Gambia-Senegal bilateral relations and also relations that 
happen around the border in the domains I am interested in.   
My initial views are that the border affects the political, economic, 
religious and social domains. And the border, cross-border transport, trade 
and religious networks have a symbiotic influence on each other. Regarding 
trade, many goods are generally cheaper in The Gambia, than in Senegal, 
due to currency differences and national economic policies. There is an 
economic incentive for traders on both sides of the border to engage in 
cross-border trade. Although traders would benefit from supportive border 
crossing procedures, cross-border trade can still flourish (as full blown 
smuggling), without the approval of state authorities. Lack of transport, 
however, would definitely stall it. Success in both areas depends on what 
happens to, or, at the border. These symbiotic connections extend to the 
religious sphere. 
 In particular, religious solidarity exists between Gambians and 
Senegalese.  Cross-border religious groups have membership from both 
sides of the border. Also, there has been a longstanding practice where 
Gambians receive religious education in Senegal or Senegalese do the 
same thing in The Gambia. This practice ensures long-term 
intergenerational family links.  From the Trans-Saharan trade to modern 






Senegambia region.3 Cross-border mobility for religious reasons has been 
an important market for cross-border transport. Moreover, cross-border 
religious actors include cross-border traders, and /or transporters. Cross-
border economic and religious links are embedded in social bonds.  
Gambians and Senegalese commonly describe themselves as “one-
people” in two countries. They foster claims of kinship, blood ties, and a 
shared culture. Border communities redefine the border to suit their age-old 
networks of contact, exchange and communication.4 People cross the 
borders between the two countries freely—on foot, bicycle or donkey cart—
for social reasons like visits or for purchasing goods (small-scale and 
innocent commercial activities). In some areas, communities have their 
farmlands located a stone’s throw from the border. Different ethnic groups 
can live in opposite communities along the border.5 People from both 
countries can easily relocate, live and settle in the other country. Attending 
social functions like marriages, naming ceremonies, funerals, initiation 
events of relatives and friends across the border are frequent practices in 
both countries. Intermarriages, ethnic mixing facilitated by in-migrations, 
local hospitality norms, traditional bonding systems, inter-ethnic joking 
relations, language shifts and cultural assimilation created a people who are 
difficult to differentiate. People with pure-ethnic backgrounds are rare in this 
society. Most families consist of members from mixed ethnic backgrounds. 
Instead of ethnicity, the caste system serves as a point of benign social 
differentiation, with the exception of the Jola ethnic group.6 Of late, rigidities 
within that caste system are becoming more relaxed, as inter-caste 
marriages become common.  
                                                            
3 See Cheikh Anta Babou, Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadou Bamba and the Founding of 
the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853- 1913 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007). 
4The term “networks” is borrowed from Radcliffe- Brown and it is used here to mean “…the 
set of actually existing relations, at a given moment of time, which link together certain 
human beings.” A.R. Radcliff-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays 
and Addresses (New York: The Free Press, 1952), 192. 
5Ieuen Griffiths, “Permeable Boundaries in Africa,” in African Boundaries, Barriers, Conduits 
and Opportunities, ed. Paul Nugent and A I. Asiwaju (New York, London: Pinter, 1996) . 
6Godfrey Mwakikagile, The Gambia and Its People, Ethnic Identities and Cultural Integration 






Thus, irrespective of colonial rule, Gambians and Senegalese 
nurtured identical value systems with commonly accepted norms like 
“integrity and noblesse oblige (gor), self-respect (njom), politeness (Keursa), 
empathy and being one’s brother’s keeper (ndimbalante).” “These values 
are further reinforced and perpetuated in the extended family, kinship or clan 
organisation referred to as Keur in Wollof, Kabilo in Mandinka and Galle in 
Pulaar.” These peculiar features of Senegambian society make it easy for 
outsiders, including “migrant labourers (tilibonkas or navetanes) and itinerant 
Muslim traders and clerics” to settle down “temporarily or permanently in 
most areas of Senegambia.”7  
Cross-border ties between the two populations endure, reinforced by 
language, kinship ties, modes of economic exchange and lifestyles.8 Similar 
to the Lozi ethnic group straddling Namibia’s Caprivi Region and Zambia’s 
Western Province, colonial rule did not reconfigure in any major way long-
standing bloodlines, family-ties, the ethnic composition and shared cultural 
and religious value systems of Senegambia.  But social defiance against the 
border has not completely diffused the barrier symbols of the border.  
 
                                                            
7F. A. Renner, “Ethnic Affinity, Partition And Political Integration In Senegambia,” in 
Partitioned Africans, Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s International Boundaries 1884- 1984, 
ed. A. I. Asiwaju (London/ Lagos: C. Hurst and Company/ University of Lagos Press, 1985), 
73. 
8Wolfgang Zeller, “Neither arbitrary nor artificial: Chiefs and the making of the Namibia-







Figure 1: Map of Senegambia. Source: http://mapsof.net/map/gambia-political-map 
 
Separated by colonial rule, the populations of the two countries have 
been affected by their Anglophone and Francophone colonial heritages, 
respectively. The two countries speak common indigenous languages. 
However, The Gambia’s official language is English, while Senegal’s is 
French. Their colonial experiences shaped two major elite types who in 
language, behaviour, modes of thought and values took after the British and 
the French, respectively. Educational, judicial and administrative systems in 
both countries are also legacies of colonial rule.9  
 Irrespective of claims of one-ness, the border, a symbol of two 
political jurisdictions, affects the shared culture Senegambians claim to 
have. For example, to-date, ethnic communities such as the Wollofs, 
Mandinkas and Jolas of Senegambia remain separated by the colonial 
borders. The Wollof of Senegal argue their brand of Wollof is more authentic 
than the Wollof spoken in The Gambia. Urban Gambian Wollof has 
borrowed words from the English language. Similarly, urban Senegalese 
Wollof adopted some French words. These subtle differences in 
Senegambian Wollof dialects mean Senegambian understandings of one-
ness are not bounded, and are affected by the border. But culture also 
                                                            
9Jegan C.Senghor, The Politics of Senegambia Integration 1958- 1994 (Bern: Peter Lang 






affects the border since it provides the medium to apply kinship language to 
create continuities across the discontinuity of legal territory. Ethnic solidarity 
and social stereotypes are both facilitated by the border, too. 
Certain cultural notions have been used in Gambia- Senegal relations 
to de-escalate interstate conflicts on the border. These notions have 
transformative effects on interstate tensions. However, Senegambian 
discourses of one-ness have failed to foster a political union between the 
two countries. In 1982, the two countries formed the Senegambia 
Confederation, a political union that attempted to reclaim “Senegambia 
unity” and redefine the enduring political divisions that partition and colonial 
rule caused in Senegambia. Hughes and Perfect argued that there were 
Gambians, and of course Senegalese, who opposed the Confederation on 
the basis that the two countries were in fact different. These critics saw the 
Confederation as Senegal’s attempt to use ethnic affiliations as an excuse to 
dominate its smaller neighbour, The Gambia. This view fueled Gambian 
nationalist sentiments against the Confederation and paved way for its 
collapse in 1989.10 
The collapse of the Senegambia Confederation problematises the 
validity of Senegambian discourses of one-ness. Irrespective of claims of 
kinship bonds, the two countries have had recurring political conflicts over 
the border from the 1960s to 2015. But border tensions between the two 
countries have always stopped short of open and violent conflict. Unlike 
Senegal and Mauritania, or Senegal and Guinea Bissau, The Gambia and 
Senegal have resolutely avoided violent clashes over the border. I am 
interested in knowing what effects Senegambian claims of one-ness, their 
routine use of kinship metaphors, and social idioms of relations to describe 
each other, have on interstate conflicts over the border. I also wish to 
identify whether this discourse of one-ness and claims of a shared culture do 
or do not influence relations around the border. Additionally, I want to know 
                                                            
10Arnold Hughes and David Perfect, A Political History of the Gambia, 1816-1994 
(Rochester Studies in African History and the Diaspora), (Rochester: University of 






how cross-border transport, trade and religious networks affect interstate 
relations. And also, what really keeps the two countries from veering into 
conflict as interstate political difficulties around the border recur, especially at 
the Amdallai-Karang and Farafenni-Keur Ayib borders. 
The Amdallai-Karang and Farafenni-Keur Ayib border crossings are 
the main case study locations for this study. These borderlands play 
important roles in fostering or impeding the movement of cross-border 
transport, flow of trade and the outreach of talibee networks in Senegambia. 
Local level activities at Amdallai-Karang and Farafenni-Keur Ayib borders 
affect interstate and state-society relations in Senegambia.11 
In trying to investigate the research question, I assume that my 
findings may be useful for drawing new insights into The Gambia-Senegal 
relations, the Senegal-Mauritania and Senegal-Guinea Bissau border 
conflicts. I briefly discuss the latter two conflicts in this chapter, but this 
research primarily focuses on Senegal’s relationship with The Gambia. As 
such, in the rest of the chapters that follow, I will only make passing 
references to the two conflicts, where appropriate.  I hasten to add that the 
approach adopted here may not sufficiently account for the 1989 Senegal-
Mauritania border conflict, or even the long drawn Senegal-Guinea Bissau 
maritime border conflicts.  
I am interested in both historical and contemporary effects of cross-
border transport, trade and religious outreach, hence, the focus is from 1960 
to 2015. This timeframe is suitable for knowing why, since 1960, interstate 
political difficulties around The Gambia-Senegal border recurred without 
degenerating into violent conflict.  
Before proceeding, it is important to provide a broad definition of 
some of the terms or words used here to clarify the specific meaning(s) 
accorded to them in this enquiry. Other terms that are used in this work will 
be defined as we encounter them in the chapters that follow. 
                                                            
11In 2003, in a one to one discussion in Banjul, Boubacar Barry highlighted to me his 
concept of Senegambia, which includes The Gambia, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Guinea 
Conakry and Mali. But our definition of Senegambia differs from his. We apply the term 








Senegambia in this thesis is limited to the geographic area that represents 
the boundaries of present-day Gambia and Senegal. Senegambia will also 
mean the politico-economic union the two countries formed from 1982-1989, 
the Senegambia Confederation. Additionally, Senegambia is also used here 
as a metaphor for The Gambia-Senegal “one-ness” discourses and claims of 
a shared culture. It is interchangeably used to also refer to notions of 
collective identities that transcend the limitations of the border and the 
political quest for the reunion of Senegambia—The Gambia and Senegal.  
People engaged in cross-border trade means people who participate 
in any kind of economic activity connected to the border. People in 
transportation means people like car park attendants, drivers, and other 
transport owners who facilitate mobility across the border. Talibee or 
religious networks includes people who organise, facilitate, and conduct 
cross-border religious events. Representatives of the state means 
officialdom such as the police, customs officers, and other law enforcement 
personnel located at the border. It can also include village 
headmen/headwomen, district chiefs and other forms of traditional authority 
located in border communities. Political actors mean high-level government 
officials of The Gambia and Senegal, respectively. 
Cross-border relations refer to relations between social actors across 
the border, relations between traders, transporters, religious actors and 
ordinary citizens. Interstate relations refer to The Gambia-Senegal bilateral 
relations. State-society relations mean relations between the state and 
different social or economic constituencies, relations between transporters 
and the state, between traders and the state; and between citizens of The 
Gambia and Senegal with their respective governments or the two 
governments.  
Conflict is used here to mean subtle and outright economic, social 
and political disagreements, fragmentation or struggles generated by the 






or become indifferent to the border. These disagreements, tensions or 
fractures have both macro and micro-level dimensions, and are set “above 
and below the level of the nation-state”.12 Depending on the domain where 
such conflicts exist, they may or may not necessarily produce violence in 
cross-border or interstate relations. 
Culture is used here as an un-bounded phenomenon. It means 
different things to different people.  It is relational.  It changes and signifies 
an institution that shifts. It has legitimacy, a history and a context. It also has 
a moral ethos and an aesthetic and an emotional tone. This fluidity about the 
meaning of culture will be unpacked and problematised in the chapters that 
follow.  
There is a huge literature, which shows that the meaning of culture is 
fluid and well contested. However, I adopt Clifford Geertz’s definition that 
culture is a web of significations, which are to be interpreted for their 
meanings. This means culture is an interpretative rather than an 
experimental science.13 Geertz’s definition captures the essence of the 
creativity and contingency Gambians and Senegalese demonstrate in 
applying different cultural notions to describe or idealise social relations. It 
also captures the nuances of Senegambian kinship discourses, bilateral and 
state-society relations and the multiple ways people use the tools they have 
in culture, the state and other resources to navigate the complex context of 
The Gambia-Senegal border. However, where appropriate, I would 
substitute culture with other terms like deep-rooted societal or social and 
religious values to minimise the ambiguity the use of the word entails.  
The first part of this thesis introduces border conflict dynamics in 
Senegambia, which include Senegal’s border conflict with Mauritania and 
Guinea Bissau and its border tensions with The Gambia. It introduces the 
                                                            
12The quotation is borrowed from Danielle Beswick and Paul Jackson, Conflict, Security, 
and Development: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2011), 8. This work defines 
conflict as “From the Latin for “to clash or engage in a fight,” a confrontation between parties 
aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or end. Conflict may be violent or non-
violent, and essentially all societies contain some form of conflict,” 149. 






main research question, Senegambia’s one-ness discourse and the 
interconnections between trade, transport and religion in Senegambia. This 
is followed by the definition of key concepts and how they relate to kinship 
discourses. Then, indigenous kinship theories are explained and the role 
language plays in Senegambia is also discussed. The chapter further 
discusses creativity and contingency in the use of cultural tools to promote 
different forms of cross-border relations. It also discusses the intersections 
between the border, conflict and culture. The part on methodology and the 
thesis outline follow that section.  
1.2: The Politics of Senegambian Kinship Discourses 
In February, 2013, Barbie Toure, President of the Senegalese Transport 
Association, Keur Ayib Branch, told me “Senegal and The Gambia are to 
each other dome-ndeye (children from the same mother). We live together. 
We share a sociality. We marry each other. We worship together. ” Toure 
added, “... Mam Abdul Aziz Sy fondly asked communities of worshippers: 
‘Have you ever seen the front of a fabric existing without its back?” Sy was a 
Grand Marabout, a well-loved and charismatic Tijanniyya Sufi leader. He 
hailed from Tivaouane, the heartland of the Tijanniyya brotherhood in 
Senegal. For Sy, religious gatherings such as gamoo,14 ceremonies bringing 
together Senegalese and Gambian Muslim worshippers, were apt moments 
to remind people of how “Senegal and Gambie constitute the same piece of 
fabric.”15 In another interview, Dembo Mane, the aged Imam of Karang, 
repeatedly told me in Mandinka that, “Gambie nin Senegal mu dingkiling le 
teh, badinkhungl lem,” which means: the two countries are children of the 
same parents, they are relatives.16 
Toure’s words and Mane’s statements, like Sy’s fabric metaphor, are 
relevant anecdotes to this thesis. They are part of Senegambian popular 
discourses of one-ness. The metaphor, “a fabric with two sides”, 
                                                            
14Gamoo is the name given to the religious celebration marking the Prophet Muhammad 
(S.A.W)’s birthday in Senegambia. 
15Interview with Barbie Toure, Keur Ayib, Senegal, 12th February, 2013. 






communicates indivisibility of Senegambia as a historical community, where 
kinship ties endure and are beyond the reach of the state. The fabric 
metaphor has cultural salience. It is a powerful framework for popularising 
Senegambian kinship bonds. 
Traditional cloth remains a highly valued material in life course rituals 
like naming ceremonies, funerals and marriages. Historically, too, cloth was 
also a medium of exchange (cloth currency) in Senegambia.17 Additionally, 
Senegambian culture views cloth or textile as a symbol of sutura, (which 
means protection or a shelter), adornment, beauty and social morality. 
Furthermore, it protects the individual from the elements. Thus, the fabric 
metaphor reminds society of the different uses Senegambian kinship 
connections can be put to. The metaphor can also be extrapolated to signify 
the social meanings and values associated with kinship ties.  
Cloth has symbolic and rhetorical power and has different shades of 
social meaning.  It expresses or conceals certain principles and emotions. 
“Through their capacity to symbolize a social order, what is or what should 
be, clothes are related to social action and communication in a dynamic 
way.”18 Dressing communicates mood, or personal philosophy, and/or 
ethical stance. It is an aesthetic act that is imbued with language and 
meaning and is acquired from other individuals. “Aesthetic acts do not grow 
out of a vacuum, but from what is learned from others.”19  As such, the fabric 
metaphor is a political and social symbol, and proof of affiliation and location 
for the individual in the house of power.20 The fabric consists of multiple 
threads tightly woven together. The threads are metaphors for multiple 
cross-border and intergenerational connections between Gambians and 
                                                            
17For trade across indigenous currency zones, see Guyer, Jane I., Marginal Gains: 
Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa (Lewis Henry Morgan Lecture Series) 1st Edition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
18 Ronald A. Schwarz, “Uncovering the Secret Vice: Toward an Anthropology of Clothing 
and Adornement,” in The Fabrics of Culture: the Anthropology of Clothing and Adornment, 
Justin M. Cordwell, and Ronald A. Schwarz, ed. (Berlin: De Grupter Mouton, 2011), 29. 
19Mary Ellem Roach, and Joanne Bubolz Eicher, “The Language of Personal Adornment,” in 
The Fabrics of Culture: the Anthropology of Clothing and Adornment, Justin M. Cordwell, 







Senegalese. Therefore, it is an apt metaphor for Senegambian social 
relations. 
The use of the fabric as a symbol of cross-border social cohesiveness 
sheds new light on the anthropological value of cloth. Anthropological 
studies on African societies have not given textile, cloth or dress, the same 
attention as other aspects of material culture in Africa. Therefore, there is a 
need for further research on the important roles dress, fabric or textiles, play 
in African social processes.  
The physical attributes of the fabric problematises the fabric 
metaphor. As a material item, the fabric can be subject to wear, tear and 
disuse. Therefore, it connotes transitory and fragile relations, embodied in 
the vicissitudes of the political economy of the border. The fabric metaphor 
is also symbolic of human life, in which dying, an inevitable life course, 
brings separation between relatives, lovers, friends and foes. As such, it 
contradicts the implied solidity of cross-border bonds.    
Moreover, the fabric has a right and wrong side. This implies 
uniqueness, differentiation and borders within a cohesive or unified piece. 
But the borders of the fabric collapse into a whole to become a complete 
piece of cloth that could  be designed or  cut into patterns. Reading from 
history, this image of the fabric represents the colonial history. The British 
and the French cut Senegambia into two states- The Gambia and Senegal.  
The fabric creased, setting the stage for different forms of interstate rivalries 
in Senegambia. 
Politically, creases require ironing for a better look and smooth feel. 
There are two approaches to ironing: first, political relations can be 
negotiated through official and formal diplomatic channels. Second, social 
and religious actors like Mam Abdul Aziz Sy, ordinary people, civil society 
groups such as the Senegalese-Gambia Association for Integration and 






peacefully negotiate interstate relations.21 Their acts constitute the selvedge 
holding together the fabric. As a sewing project, the fabric needs to be cut 
into the most desirable pattern and then be sewn to become a complete 
piece, again.22  
We can further tease out the fabric metaphor based on the monetary 
value of a particular fabric. A particular segment of society can monopolise 
the access and use of a rare, expensive fabric. Such a fabric may attract 
social admiration. It becomes a marker for economic or social status in 
society. However, it becomes a symbol of social divisions since not 
everyone can afford it in society. In contrast, a fabric that is affordable for 
different people in society serves as a symbol of unity and inclusion. 
Consequently, the fabric metaphor both supports and contradicts kinship 
discourses and highlights the complex nature of The Gambia-Senegal cross-
border and interstate relations. 
Other less nuanced views of kinship ties also feature in some 
academic discourses and in the media.  In September 2013, Ibrahim Thioub, 
Senegalese historian and a professor at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop, 
Dakar, stated that Gambians and Senegalese are one people and they need 
to “...remove the artificial feeling of being in different countries.” He was 
speaking in Mbour, a Senegalese seaside resort town, where SGAISD was 
being launched.23  Thioub’s statements re-echoed the concerns of some 
Senegambian media outlets, which pride themselves as champions of 
Senegambia unity.   
     Jollofnews.com, a popular local news source, stated on its website: 
“Arguably, no two people are more so [sic] closely related than those in the 
                                                            
21 SGAISD is known in French as L’Association Sénégalo-Gambienne pour L’intégration et 
le Développement Socio-Économique, or ASGIDS, It is a Senegal-Gambia friendship civil 
society and bilateral grassroots organisation that seeks to socially integrate Senegal and 
The Gambia. 
22Selvage, also selvege- means the borders of the fabric that prevents it from fraying or 
unfurling, allowing for a better handling of the fabric. 







Senegambia region...”24 JollofNews.com declared that its ideals are Pan-
Africanist. Its slogan is: “A Greater Senegambia - Towards Regional 
Integration.” Its mission statement encourages the- “integration of the 
cultural identities that hold a promising bounty for the two peoples of The 
Gambia and Senegal.” Jollofnews.com calls itself the “... first and exclusive 
website to provide news in English on Senegal,” in addition to covering news 
on The Gambia. Askani Senegambia, another Gambian-owned online 
newspaper, wrote on its website, “Askani Senegambia believes that we are 
the generation that must respond to the call of one Senegambia and one 
people. This is our vision and the principle guiding our aspirations.”25  
Both Askan and Jollof are Wollof words. The former means a nation 
of people, a lineage or a huge embodiment of closely interconnected people. 
The latter derives from the name of the Jollof kingdom, a historic dominion of 
the Wollof ethnic group, which included modern-day Gambia and Senegal. 
However, in Gambian youth slang, Jollof means Banjul or the country itself. 
“Askani Senegambia: United, Inseparable and Indivisible,” is the stated 
slogan of the newspaper, which further states: 
Askani Senegambia believes that with the emergence of social media, there is a 
good opportunity to help pave this way (to unity). This is why Askani Senegambia 
would endeavour to serve as a forum for the interests of one Senegambia, one 
people and one nation. Like many nations that came before us, they realise that 
peace cannot be achieved without unity. Too often the call to unity falls on deaf 
ears, ignored by the same people who are in charge for whatever reasons.26 
 
Askani Senegambia supports a united Senegambia and globalisation.  But it 
doubts if leaders have a genuine interest in pursuing unity at both levels. 
However, the existence of The Gambia and Senegal mbokh ties is a source 
of hope for its unity dream. 27   
Pro-Senegambia integration advocacy is embedded in cross-border 
social and ethnic attachments, which seek to ameliorate the effects colonial 
partition has had on The Gambia’s and Senegal‘s political identities.  The 
                                                            
24See Jollofnewspaper accessed June 13, 2013, www.jollofnews. com. 
25See Askanisenegambia accessed June 13, 2013, www.askanisenegambia.com. 
26Ibid. 
27Mbobk or Mbobka is Wollof kinship terminology which means kinsman or kinsmen. The 






social logic and aspiration that frame cross-border kinship discourses 
reconceptualise the border as a bridge that creates continuities amidst the 
discontinuities of territory.  The enduring importance of collective identities in 
The Gambia-Senegal relations challenges views in social anthropology that, 
The identification of another person as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a 
sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement. It thus entails the assumption that 
the two are fundamentally ‘playing the same game’, and this means that there is 
between them a potential for diversification and expansion of their social relation to 
cover eventually all different sectors and domains of activity. On the other hand, a 
dichotomization of others as strangers, as members of another ethnic group, 
implies recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria 
for judgement of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of 
assumed common understanding and mutual interest.28 
While Gambians and Senegalese can interact and exchange in a variety of 
platforms as one people, the border between the two countries can limit their 
interactions and exchanges. Powerful cultural ideas exist that integrate 
notions of one-ness in society, but kinship carries its own risks. 
Consequently, Senegambian kinship theories can serve as medium  for both 
inclusions and exclusions in social relations, as demonstrated in the next 
section.   
 
1.3: Senegambian Kinship Theories 
Researching The Gambia-Senegal relations unavoidably leads to a variety 
of anecdotal conversations. For example, in conversations during my 
fieldwork, border community elders who witnessed independence from 
colonial rule talk of si anglais bi when they make references to territories in 
The Gambia. In Wollof, si anglais bi means “at the English-speaking side.”  
The unconscious use of this loaded phrase orally re-enacts and reframes 
memories of the colonial history, histories of blood relations, ethnic ties, 
migrations and social dispersions in Senegambian history. It also makes a 
muted reference to a divided identity and the effects of the colonial partition 
on indigenous social processes. However, it also serves as an inclusive 
                                                            
28Fredrik Barth,“Ethnic Groups and Boundaries,” in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, ed. 






reference that reaffirms enduring kinship and social connections amidst the 
discontinuities of territory.  
 “Si anglai bi” embodies a part of the organic and favourite Wollof 
kinship terminology mbokh (kinsman), an endearment term and a long-
standing common reference Gambians and Senegalese use to refer to each 
other.  Other language groups in Senegambia like the Mandinka also use 
similar kinship terms for cross-border relations. Two other forms of Wollof 
kinship terminologies dome-ndeye and dome-baaye are used in this thesis 
as the backbone and the broad motif for decoding cross-border relations in 
Senegambia. Dome-ndeye means “children from the same mother.” Used 
narrowly, it means relations from the female line, which contrasts with 
relations from the male line, dome-baaye (children from the same father). 
Metaphorically, it signifies deep kinship bonds. Its power derives from the 
womb as a nest of reproduction - but also as an intimate and unbreakable 
accommodation that carries all children born to one woman, irrespective of 
whether they have different fathers or not. Culturally, sharing a womb means 
a firm willingness to take a bullet for the dome-ndeye.  This communicates a 
relationship of unending love, sacrifice and protection. When used broadly, 
dome-ndeye signifies all intimate social relations. This is why metaphors and 
idioms of cross-border relations invoke the close ties of relations through the 
female. However, often, there are many acts in social and political life that 
illustrate more the competitive struggle associated with relations from the 
male line, dome-baaye.   
Dome-baaye is the opposite terminology of dome-ndeye. It defines 
relations from a paternal or male line, and it is characterised by loaded, 
over-amplified interpersonal competition that is believed to exist between 
half-brothers and half-sisters. However, dome-baaye ties also involve mutual 
help and interdependence.  But there is a social perception that dome-
baaye-based assistance is self-serving and lacks the sincerity of a dome-
ndeye driven one.  It flaunts benevolence, while dome-ndeye -based help is 






outcome the helper seeks to achieve also determines whether the 
assistance given is discrete or indiscrete.   For example, dome-baaye social 
help is flaunted to show unequal status and unequal blessing. This idea is 
eloquently conceptualised in a Wollof proverb, which says: “the dome-ndeye 
will fix shame within the house. But the dome-baaye only settles it when it 
gets to the edge of the street.” The logic of the statement is that ties from the 
female line protect ugly matters in the family to preserve family secrets, 
honour and social reputations. In contrast, the dome-baaye aims to bring 
public attention to scandals and other issues that cast the other individual in 
a negative light.  
The conduct of a mother or a parent, generally, is thought to be a 
source of blessing for her or his children. Therefore, if a woman has good 
conduct, her children will have a good future. This idea frames the behaviour 
of individuals in matrimonial life, particularly, women, especially in 
polygamous contexts. It is thought that a married woman who keeps her 
marital vows solemn, fulfils her expected social roles, sacrifices for her 
marriage and observes social norms in her relations, will have children 
endowed with baarki, or blessing. In contrast, the less-dutiful or bad 
housewife will have children who would either be failures, or who would at 
least be less successful in life, when compared to the children of dutiful 
wives.  
In polygamous contexts, the children of less-dutiful mothers are 
thought to depend on the children of the dutiful co-wife or co-wives. The 
child of the former faces a “social curse” exemplified by his/her dependence 
on her dome-baaye. These moral judgments play didactic social functions 
and regulate marital relations and polygamous family-life by prescribing 
“acceptable” or “unacceptable” behaviour in marriage and society. It has to 
also do with how people share and access resources within family or other 
social settings. Therefore, these prescriptions resonate with Berry’s idea that 
economic struggles in African agrarian settings can play out as “culturally 






relations, and changing conceptualization of people’s relations to the 
environment and one another.”29 
Similarly, dome-ndeye and dome-baaye concepts are also used to 
“prescribe” the meanings, dos and don’ts in social relations. For example, a 
Wollof proverb says that, “a mother’s work feeds the child.” This means a 
woman’s deeds shape her child’s future.  
Dome-baaye ties are considered as both relations of intimacy and 
competitive intimacy. It would be erroneous to perceive all dome-ndeye and 
dome-baaye relations as strict reflections of their definitions. Subject to 
individual differences, family backgrounds and other social realities, each of 
these relationships can be manifested in the other way round. They can 
have multiple meanings. They can also be multidimensional and lack 
definitive black and white distinctions.30 Therefore, both dome-ndeye and 
dome-baaye ties constitute relationships of dependability and subversion. 
These terms have similar conceptual space in Mandinka culture, too. 
Quoting Bird and Kendall, Eric Charry observed, “Mande epics are driven by 
opposing forces of fadenya and badenya, typically marked by conflicting 
claims of inheritance between fadennu.”31 Fadenya is termed as a force for 
competitive behaviour whereas its complement badenya is considered an 
integral force that encourages submission to authority and cooperation. “The 
relationship between fadenya can be marked by extreme competition, 
reflecting the sometimes strained relations between co-wives .”  
In fadenya like in dome-baaye ties, the father is the benchmark that 
shapes personal ambitions in society and thus structure different forms of 
social competition among individuals. This is particularly true in Manding 
society where Mandinka Jeli communities encourage a child to start his 
                                                            
29 Sara Berry, No condition is permanent: the social dynamics of agrarian change in sub-
Saharan Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 14 
30 On ambiguity in African economic and social processes, see Ibid. 
31Bird and Kendall, 1980, 56 quoted in Eric Charry, Mande Music, Traditional And Modern 
Music of The Maninka and Mandinka of West Africa (Chicago/London: University of Chicago 






competitive zeal with subtle rivalry with his father because he (child) is 
expected to surpass the achievements and reputations of his father.32  
Although the examples given here are limited to Wollofs and 
Mandinkas, other Senegambian ethnic groups like the Peul, Serere and Jola 
use similar social concepts to set standards for social norms, interpersonal 
and cross-border relations. Thus, these theories of kinship crosscut social 
barriers and glue together different segments of Senegambian society. 
These theories are propagated through language, the medium for 
entrenching social narratives about collective identities and kinship bonds. 
The next section explores the role language plays in fostering cross-border 
ties in Senegambia.  
 
1.4: Sengembian Kinship Discourses and the Power of Language 
Senegambian cultural identity is largely performed through language, the 
medium employed to (re)create and (re)enact social narratives about 
memory/heritage, contact and bonds. The language of kinship triggers 
strong cognitive reactions among Senegambian social groups, but its 
effectiveness can vary from setting to setting.33 
Language is used here to mean a system of institutions and the 
medium through which culture is partly expressed. It plays a central role in 
constructing social narratives and cognitive reactions to social experiences. 
Even at interstate levels, language plays a critical role in how the Gambian 
and Senegalese states respond to the political economy of the border, 
especially during tensions.34 Therefore, it aids bottom- up and top-down 
socio-political and economic processes in society.35  
                                                            
32Ibid, 55-56.	
33 This statements support Berry’s and Guyer’s notion that social concepts can have 
changing meanings in society. See Berry, No condition is permanent… 1993; Guyer, 
Marginal Gains… 2 
34 In both The Gambia and Senegal talibee is the local name for followers or students of a 
religious leader or scholar. 







Senegambia has a longstanding oral culture. The ability to use 
language to reproduce, recall and sustain kinship discourses, memories of 
past and everyday social encounters and narrations about economic and 
political relations, is deeply embedded in social processes.  Cross-border 
transporters, traders, talibee or religious networks and state agents can 
make multiple use of the resources they have in language to advance their 
economic and other interests in society.  
Pamela Kea’s study of the customary practice of entrustment (karafo) 
in customary land management in The Gambia demonstrates the effective 
use of language to structure and sustain social and economic relations. 
Senegalese female migrants (called “strangers”) who come to Brikama, a 
major town in The Gambia, rely on karafo to access farmland from their 
Gambian female “hosts.” As a metaphor, karafo has been used in Mandinka 
society to structure various forms of relations, especially fictive kinship and 
stranger-host relations.  It helps individuals to fulfill their material, social and 
spiritual needs in their host community. It is therefore a strategy  people can 
use during periods of transitionin order to achieve long-range stability in their 
lives. 
Kea’s case study shows that even with the commodification of the 
Gambian economy and urbanisation, karafo created an effective framework 
for migrant Senegalese women and their Gambian hosts to share land and 
labour. In the process, migrant women can enjoy secure livelihoods in their 
new communities. Karafo weaves new forms of social bonds between them 
and their hosts, thus deepening cross-border social ties. As such, Kea’s 
portrayal of agrarian clientelism in Brikama, resonates with some of the 
ways different people in Senegambia can use tools from culture to navigate 
different complex situations. 36   
The use of metaphors like karafo in social communication has 
political relevance in Senegambia. Metaphors enhance social 
communication and intergroup solidarity by directly appealing to socio-
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psychological phenomena and are, therefore, effective cognitive strategies 
in social, political and economic communication.37 When used in social 
communication, metaphors can provide the moral ground for individuals to 
adhere to social norms and values, and ensure that individuals are loyal to 
their social systems. Conceptual metaphor theory further validates that 
metaphors are effective communication tools, which solidify intergroup 
relations. They make allegiance to social ties binding on individuals.38  
Allegiance towards a social system fosters social cohesiveness. It is a 
contrast to the political allegiance to the state. Williams argues that “Political 
loyalty to the state is… morally arbitrary, and thus, non-binding.”39 Therefore, 
individuals can have different forms of allegiance to their social and political 
systems.  
The contrast between allegiance to a social system and allegiance to 
a political one has much to do with the varying degrees to which these two 
systems integrate language to create and sustain people’s attachment to 
them. So, the creative appropriation of language and the contingency in its 
use will determine the kind of loyalty people show to a social or political 
system.  Since Senegambia has a strong oral culture, it is understandable 
that language is used as a key resource to navigate the border between the 
two states and also negotiate different forms of relational ties in society.  
The overriding impression is that language is a unifying force in 
Senegambia. But this may be looking at only one side of the story. In pre-
existing national social stereotypes, Banjul’s Wollof speakers are thought to 
resist speaking other national languages in the country. Non-Wollof 
speakers assume that speakers of Wollof favour their language, and 
consider it the authentic national lingua franca. Additionally, urban-based 
                                                            
37Mark J. Landau, Michael Robinson and Brian P. Meier, ed, The Power of Metaphor: 
Examining its Influence in Social Life (Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association, 2014). 
38Conceptual metaphor theory is also referred to as cognitive metaphor theory and comes 
from the field of cognitive linguistics. For more on the concept of metaphors see George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We live By (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1980.  
39John Williams, The Ethics of Territorial Borders, Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sand 






Wollofs have been branded as people who take pride in their urban 
lifestyles, to shun rural or semi-urban people and their lifestyles.  In return, 
non- speakers of Wollof and people from semi-urban, semi-rural and rural 
parts of the country also emphasise excessive pride in their languages and 
semi-urban or rural heritage. This pride of language script has a broader 
resonance in Senegal, where Wollof has become a national lingua franca, 
instituting different forms of language shift and resistance in non-Wollof 
populations of the country. From one end, language constructs a barrier, 
and from the other, it builds a bridge, and this is why it can effectively 
mediate The Gambia-Senegal interstate tensions around the border. These 
dynamic effects the use of language can have in society are explored in the 
border crossing stories in chapter 2.  
If language is seen to trigger cooperative attitudes in Senegambia, 
and yet interstate political difficulties over the border have recurred from 
1960 to 2015, we can deduce that there are limits to how language can 
effectively bridge interstate divisions over the border.  Sure, language might 
incline people to develop cooperative attitudes; people who speak the same 
language may be driven to cooperate.  Miles offers a good example of this 
fact in his work on Hausaland. He shared a story that his radio set was 
stolen from Niger and it was traced across the border in Nigeria. There were 
two options to recovering it: one option was to use the bilateral Niger-Nigeria 
diplomatic channels, which would have been cumbersome and time-
consuming. The second one, which he used, was using local channels. The 
local Hausa chief in Niger contacted his fellow Hausa chief in the village 
where the radio was traced. Thanks to the intervention of both chiefs, his 
radio set was recovered and returned to him. Miles’ anecdote alludes to the 
effectiveness of various kinds of cross-border social connections.40 But we 
can assume that shared language also eased the cross-border cooperation 
on recovering the stolen radio.  
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However, other stories around the world can confirm that people who 
speak the same language can still fight.  Rwanda offers a good example 
here. Both Hutus and Tutsis speak Kinyarwanda, yet this fact never averted 
the Rwandan genocide. If there are limits to the effectiveness with which 
language can be a source of cooperation, then it is understandable that The 
Gambia-Senegal kinship discourses are contradicted by the recurrence of 
interstate border tensions. Notwithstanding, the fabric metaphor and other 
cross-border social idioms of relations are used in different contexts for 
different reasons in cross-border and interstate relations.  Under strenuous 
situations, language has been used to rescue interstate relations from total 
collapse.41 The next section explores how people use creativity and 
contingency to navigate the complex context of the border.  
 
1.5: Politics, Contingency and Creativity 
In Senegambia, culture is used in creative ways and it means different things 
to different people.  Kinship metaphors and social idioms of relations are 
therefore not bounded. But culture is the main medium, which validates, 
channels and re-channels Senegambian cross-border discourses of one-
ness. It entails changes in societal values and processes. It also 
accommodates constant shifts in the interpretation of Senegambian bonds, 
which reflect the continuous evolution of what Bayart calls “relationships of 
production.”42 
Thus, people are continually reformulating (or reaffirming) their preferences, 
strategies, and understandings on the basis of their experience- both at and beyond 
specific “points” of production, consumption, or exchange. Culture and politics 
neither imitate nor distort economic activity: all three are interrelated dimensions of 
social processes.43   
 
Berry’s assertion confirms that culture is dynamic and it intertwines 
economic and political processes in society. The selective appropriation of 
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culture has been a defining feature of post-colonial African politics.44 For 
example, after being voted into office in 1965, Sir Dawda K. Jawara’s 
development philosophy was te sito, a cultural notion that embodied both 
socialist and capitalist concepts of work and progress in Mandinka society. 
But in the 1980s, Jawara abandoned te sito in order to benefit from IMF-
sponsored structural adjustment programmes.45 Julius Nyerere’s ujaama 
policies in Tanzania were another example of this inconsistent appropriation 
of indigenous values and practices, which defined how African elites relate 
to traditional culture. Claude Ake also noted that African elites use culture in 
an instrumental way. They “…appropriate selectively from African traditional 
institutions and culture, using what served them best to maintain and exploit 
power and discarding the rest.”46  
Similarly, social, political and economic actors at The Gambia-
Senegal border selectively appropriate both the border and culture to suit 
their various objectives. Given this reality, this research is situated within the 
broad field of border studies, but it adopts a broadly “culturalist” approach to 
study how border practices of transporters, traders, religious actors and 
state agents relate to what we call culture here. Culture transcends the 
border, but the border also transcends culture. And since culture is dynamic, 
there is latitude for the flexible use of different kinship terms to depict cross-
border relations. But the possibility to do that problematises Senegambian 
kinship discourses.  
The aim here is to identify how people and the states “worked with 
kinship” and social idioms of relations to either limit or enhance their 
incompatible positions on the border.47 Geschiere’s phrase is used here to 
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mean people’s ability to flexibly use resources at their disposal based on 
existing needs. The flexible use of cultural concepts can either induce 
stability or fuel conflict in interstate and cross-border relations. However, 
both state and non-state actors are aware that they can employ them to 
mediate the barrier functions of the border and to settle interstate political 
difficulties over the border. This means deep-rooted societal and religious 
ideas can be used in different contexts for different purposes and for various 
ends.  Culture, like the border, is rooted in conflict. But both can bridge 
social and other human divisions. Hence, the next section explores the 
intersections between the border, culture, and conflict in Senegambia.   
 
1.6: Intersections: The Border, Culture and Conflict  
Kinship is a useful tool.  It mediates competing interests that flourish, interact 
and retract around the border, which unfurls different forms of tensions, but 
also various opportunities for compromise.48 Senegal’s border conflict with 
Mauritania, and Guinea Bissau, respectively, show how border-level politics 
can influence center-level politics. Thus, as Williams argued, the triggers of 
warfare come from the interactions of micro-level political dynamics, national 
and transnational factors, and state-society relations.49 This is why resource 
scarcity, bad governance, threats to sovereignty, ethnic and religious strife 
can powerfully trigger armed conflict.  However, the recurrence of The 
Gambia-Senegal conflicts over the border has failed to catapult into 
interstate warfare.  
Senegal has been grossly dissatisfied with The Gambia’s control and 
management of both overland and river crossing routes to Casamance, its 
restive southern region. The Gambia has also been unimpressed with 
Senegal’s resolute tactics to frustrate its re-export trade, the lifeline of the 
Gambian economy. In 2010, there was a rare verbal confrontation between 
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the two countries when an arms shipment from Iran was intercepted in 
Nigeria. The Senegalese government believed the arms shipment which was 
allegedly destined to The Gambia, was for Casamance rebels. The 
Senegalese government nurtures suspicions that The Gambia supports 
Casamance rebels’ secession struggle. The Gambia also alleges that 
Senegal harbours and supports Gambian dissidents who plan to unseat the 
Jammeh government.50  
Strong economic and political concerns have contributed to the 
recurrence of interstate political tensions over the border. However, the two 
countries have so far resolutely avoided using military force in their border 
conflicts, and this puzzles the validity of William’s theory of conflict. It also 
defies Zartman’s assessment that:  
Conflicts tend to become regionalized, not by unbridled aggression but by 
“contamination,” where violence overflows boundaries and neighbors seek allies, as 
in West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Central Africa 
(Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Central Africa Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad), the 
horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan), Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Chechnya, Ingushetia, Armenia), Eastern Mediterranean (Israel, Palestine, 
Lebanon, Syria), Central Asia (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Kurdistan, Iran, 
Iraq), Central America (Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador), and the 
Balkans.51 
 
The histories of the Senegal-Mauritania and Senegal-Guinea Bissau 
conflicts do not also validate the ‘contamination’ effect Zartman identified. 
The former conflict happened when the Senegambia Confederation was on 
the brink of collapse. Around the same time, civil wars broke out in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, respectively. But none of these conflicts caused The 
Gambia-Senegal interstate tensions to escalate into a war.  This makes The 
Gambia-Senegal case an exception to Zartman’s contamination effect 
theory for the regionalisation of conflicts. 
                                                            
50  L. B. Darbo, L. B., “Senegal-Gambia border, other issues top assembly adjournment 
debate, The Point Newspaper, (2011) (Online) 11 April, Available at: 
(http://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/senegal-gambia-border-other-issues-top-
assembly-adjournment-debate    (Accessed 11 April, 2012). 
51 I. William Zartman, “ Introduction, Toward the Resolution of International Conflicts,” in 
Peacemaking In International Conflict, Methods & Techniques, Revised Edition, ed. I. 






 However, the dynamics of The Gambia-Senegal interstate border 
tensions suit Zartman’s views that the roles actors in a conflict play 
determines how easily it can be resolved, transformed, managed or 
prevented. The values and interests that parties to a conflict have, affect 
engagement, transformation and mediation of that conflict. Conflict 
transformation means, “…replacing conflict with positive relationships, such 
as satisfaction, cooperation, empathy, and interdependence between 
parties.”52 The roles cross-border transporters play in The Gambia-Senegal 
border tensions partly reinforce Kaldor’s views that “new wars” are mainly 
started and fueled by non-state actors, who seek to capture or access the 
state in order to exploit its resources for specific groups.53  
Using the concept of “new war” with caution, transporters have been 
generally driven by a desire to protect and pursue their economic interests 
around the cross-border transport links. They pressure the Gambian state to 
make certain tax /duty/ fee concessions on the ferry crossings and the 
cross-border routes to reduce their financial liabilities to the state. Their 
strategies to reduce their financial obligations to the state also fit Kaldor’s 
views that in “new wars” non-state actors seek to monopolise the resources 
of the state and challenge the authority of the state for the interests of 
specific groups. 
But there is a further caveat here: The transporters in The Gambia-
Senegal border conflict do not belong to the state (Gambian); they are 
outsiders, and “foreign” to the state.  As non- Gambian citizens, their conflict 
with the Gambian state cannot be termed as an intrastate conflict. They are 
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However, most transporters have cross-border social ties in both 
countries. There is a long-standing practice where people across both sides 
of The Gambia-Senegal border crisscross the border. They access public 
and social services such as health care, education and agricultural services 
from across the border. It is also common for people to randomly move 
border pegs from place to place. This has aided a random ability to belong 
to two countries. There are also strong perceptions that people from both 
countries originate from the same bloodlines but have been separated by 
borderlines. They share ethnicity and they have common first and last 
names. They also share religious beliefs, cultural practices and languages.  
A “patchy” border and negotiated border practices aid transporters  
and other Senegambians to belong to both sides of the border even with the 
prevalence of “border enforcement or surveillance tools,” between the two 
countries.54 Transporters’ cross-border identities and social networks can be 
described as transnational. But the ways they use their cross-border social 
ties deviates from some of the things Kaldor associates with non-state 
actors engaged in new wars. She notes that such actors are motivated by 
ethnic, religious or tribal influences. They are implicated in the formation of a 
war economy characterised by organised violence, illegal trade in weapons, 
drugs, diamonds or oil.55 As primary actors who directly trigger The Gambia-
Senegal border conflicts, transporters seek to protect and entrench their 
economic interests in the cross-border transport sector. But their goals do 
not appear to be influenced by ethnic, religious or tribal reasons.  Moreover, 
so far, there is minimal “violence” in The Gambia-Senegal interstate border 
conflicts. Cross-border and interstate transport tensions have no trappings of 
a war economy, too.  
Moreover, going by the conspiracy theory that Senegalese 
transporters front for the Senegalese state, in its “wars” against the Gambian 
state, they can be considered as Senegal’s part-time “mercenaries.” But the 
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validity of this conspiracy theory is questionable. Transporters’ acts exhibit 
mixed motives and can be self-serving and therefore present further 
difficulties for Kaldor’s thesis. Notwithstanding, their creative and contingent 
use of the border, and the resources they have in the state and in culture, 
have had transformative effects on The Gambia-Senegal border conflict. 
Analysing The Gambia-Senegal border crisis presents various theoretical 
difficulties, and this is why it makes sense to use an interdisciplinary and a 
culturalist approach to study it.   
This study is not necessarily concerned with notions of conflict that 
are associated with violence. Rather, it is interested in highlighting how 
conflict can lead to positive outcomes in society.  As shown in the various 
chapters of this work, people on both sides of the border found new sources 
of livelihoods from The Gambia-Senegal border crisis. That means the 
border conflict has productive outcomes for the state and for society. Thus, 
from the colonial period, the border intersected with culture and conflict to 
create new economic opportunities in society. As such, the next section 
explores how the colonial history still has relevance to The Gambia-Senegal 
border tensions.  
 
1.7: Faulting the Border:  a Social Pain  
A recent line of “dissenting views” about the colonial borders in Africa 
absolves European colonisers from bearing the full blame for the burden of 
borders in postcolonial Africa.56  Paul Nugent argues that the Africans were 
accomplices in the delineation of the colonial borders because partition 
followed, to some extent, the historic patterns of trade and the politics of the 
environment.57   
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In postcolonial Africa, colonial-era maps are enduring vestiges that 
help the postcolonial state lay claim to territories within its jurisdiction, 
especially in places with imprecise boundaries. Therefore, the modern-day 
justification of borders takes its spirit from maps, colonial tools that regulate 
claims and counter-claims on African territories in the nineteenth century. 
Sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction have been intimately linked with maps. 
The postcolonial boundaries can best be termed as discordant, since they 
were superimposed on already existing cultural landscapes.58  
This dissenting discourse on the logic of the post-colonial African 
borders is a long way from being settled. But it means that there is still more 
to learn and more to discover about African borders—especially in the post-
colonial context, where sustainable development is an important part of the 
global and African agenda. A critical concern about the borders remains the 
fact that the nation-states that emerged as today’s African countries 
represent European colonial rivalries, political and trade interests in the 
continent. This has resulted in geographic and institutional borders - territory, 
language, law and national administrative systems, inherited at 
independence and mostly maintained favourably in modern-day African 
countries by the political elites.59  
 To some extent, the dissenting discourse on the African borders 
largely supports the ingenuity to study long-term continuities and 
discontinuities in social and political relations in Senegambia. However, this 
discourse does not use primordial arguments from the sociological literature 
as the basis for understanding The Gambia-Senegal cross-border and 
interstate relations.  It focuses on collective identities and not ethnic 
affinities. Senegambia has historically been and remains a region where 
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ethnic pluralism is a defining feature. Thus, the culturalist approach adopted 
here encourages the mainstreaming of culture in studies that make the 
postcolonial territorial borders a key object of research in Africa. Using a 
culturalist approach also helps us to juxtapose the historical and cultural 
factors that have created continuities and discontinuities in cross-border and 
interstate relations in Senegambia.  Thus, the next section looks at how 
culture and border studies theory blend to help us understand the 
peculiarities of The Gambia-Senegal border, cross-border and interstate 
relations.  
 
1.8: The Gambia-Senegal One-ness Discourses and Border 
Studies Theory 
The vicissitudes of The Gambia-Senegal bilateral relations over the border 
are shaped by two different national agendas:  an agenda for independence 
for The Gambia and an agenda for “unification” for Senegal.60 These 
respective agendas are partly driven by the colonial history. However, 
postcolonial developments have maintained the relevance of both agendas, 
which are embodied in the forms and types of institutions that define 
statecraft in each of the two countries. Consequently, each country’s agenda 
is manifested in the way it performs statehood at the border between the two 
countries. The border is a selective filter that enforces statehood, but socio-
psychological dynamics transform The Gambia-Senegal border into a 
community one. The border agents of both countries act in two different 
capacities at the border: first as officials that enforce the state’s authority at 
the border and second, as the social state actors, who are ambassadors for 
cross-border cordiality. Their mixed roles come from the fact that state 
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actors are both political and social beings and consequently they are subject 
to both state and non-state values and practices of society. 
 The political, economic, social, cognitive and religious processes that 
define The Gambia-Senegal bilateral relations are located within and outside 
state institutional frameworks. Therefore, it is important to use institutional 
lenses to analyse how activities at the border influence processes at the 
centre and how actions at the centre also influence practices at the border. 
However, I have no intention to stray into institutional theory as a core theory 
for this work.  But since “political boundaries are human institutions,” and  
“[i]nstitionalist theory provides a natural way to think about political 
boundaries,” I indulge my understanding of the border as an institution to 
better re-evaluate  the roles the colonial borders play in interstate political 
discord in Senegambia.61  
Borders are sites for changing interactions, growth areas for 
alternative markets and new irregular economic clusters in society.  
State-society complexes are also well pronounced at borders.62 Therefore, 
their social and political dimensions can exude different forms of conflicts in 
society as various actors use them for various ends.63 This is why since the 
mid-1990s, borderland theorists study borders to redefine ideas about state-
formation and power relations between the centre and the peripheries of the 
state. Accordingly, recent developments in Borderland Studies investigate 
borders as “social constructions,” that exercise the control, protection and 
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the barrier functions of the state.64 This view of borders has implications for 
various academic disciplines.  For instance, in geography, the concern is 
about the interaction of territories.  In anthropology, the focus is on identities, 
in sociology, it is about social relations and in economics, markets.  In 
environmental studies, the concern is about environments and in political 
science it is about governance.65 Broadly speaking, these disciplinary 
concerns about borders generally concentrate on border-centred systems, 
norms, practices and behaviour modes, which define institutionalised 
appropriation of borders.  
There is a tendency to use an interdisciplinary approach to studying 
borders. This broadens our perspectives about them, however, this 
approach constraints the development of a rigorous border theory. But after 
careful analysis of The Gambia-Senegal border, it is justified to use an 
interdisciplinary approach to understand its complex nature. This can help us 
to better appreciate the social and political dimensions of the border.  
Attempts to build-theory in Borderland Studies largely focus on the 
governance aspects of the border. This approach centers on the 
“Institutional management of actors” and on “markets and identities.” It also 
looks at social processes in cross-border cooperation or competition, market 
relations, trading networks, social relations and identities.66  “The focus of 
governance-based theories is, in fact, the relationship between actors and 
institutions in border integration processes.”67  But this theory-building 
attempt has been criticised by some scholars who note that it is informed by 
a narrow and a subjective view of borders. However, irrespective of the 
disciplinary lenses one uses to study borders, the fact remains that borders 
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create different interests. They also create a sense of difference between 
communities divided by the borderline. At the same time, they can also 
nurture a sense of sameness among cross-border communities. For 
instance, Englund discovered that populations located at the Dedza-Angoni 
borderland villages considered the displaced persons they assisted during 
the RENAMO-FRELIMO Mozambican war, as their kinsmen, and used 
kinship terminology to refer to them.68  This resonates with Miles’ view that in 
most African contexts, the border assumes a kind of impermanence in the 
minds of populations. Thus, it contests the territorial agenda of the state.69  
As political space, the border classifies populations in order to govern 
them by demarcating competing spheres of authority. Oscar J. Martinez 
argued that, “at the level of international relations, boundaries have always 
been a source of trouble, although the nature and degree of conflict have 
varied from border to border.”70 There are old notions that borders are “front 
lines.”  They must be guarded against the intrusion of undesirable people 
and influences.  But this view of borders has gradually receded.71 
 However, the impression that the world is rapidly moving towards 
globalised interdependent systems is an incomplete description of the world. 
Different countries have imposed different restrictions on the movement of 
goods and people within and outside their borders. The on-going “backway” 
phenomenon continues to claim the lives of countless numbers of West 
African youths, who strive to migrate to Europe through the Sahara Desert 
and the Mediterranean Sea. This shows that borders are still important tools 
used to exclude other people from given territories or spaces. The “backway” 
migration has had disastrous outcomes for many African youths. But people 
continue to embark on “backway” migrations in order to get to Europe. For 
globalisation theorists, this confirms that the future of the nation-state is 
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threatened and borders are meant for crossing.  
 Postmodernist thinkers celebrate the end of borders as it signifies 
globalisation.72 But in postcolonial Africa, like in most other parts of the 
world, borders continue to proliferate. They hold vast significance for 
populations and states they separate.  What matters in the state derives 
from the borders and what passes through borders end somewhere that 
matters. As such, borders deserve critical attention irrespective of the 
disciplinary lense one seeks to use in understanding their functions and 
roles within the state and in interstate relations. 
“Border studies have become significant themselves because 
scholars and policy-makers alike have recognised that most things that are 
important to the changing conditions of national and international political 
economy take place in borderlands.”73 But whether scholars continue to 
study borders or not, daily, ordinary people face the impacts of the border 
and they devise strategies to encounter it. This is why it is relevant to 
understand borders for: 
“their political nature and their depth. Political means their relation to the power 
centre, the strength of the force and authority behind them, the degree of 
enforcement that sustains them, the will and capacity to maintain the artificial 
division running through a populated area.74 
 
 In terms of depth, the border elicits different responses from individuals and 
the state and it can be subject to various border-bending practices. Thus, 
this research situates itself in border studies and appreciates a broad sense 
of borders as zones of interaction and cooperation.75 It also views borders 
as contestations and markers of political sovereignty of the state.76 
Additionally, it nurtures a sense of borders as frontiers of circulation and 
flows and sites of inclusion and exclusion within the state.77  
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 These different descriptions of the border make it a resource and a 
site for conflict. Its political economy can either promote or impede relations 
of production. The borders also signify contestations of material and 
conceptual boundaries where state, national and local identities converge.78 
In border settings where kinship ties frame social and economic relations, 
deep-rooted social and/ or religious values can shape people’s perception of 
it. Thus, in Senegambia, the natural links between The Gambia and Senegal 
lessen the pain of the border.  
The border cuts through “culture areas” but a fluid cross-border ethnic 
identity has forged economic, social and political citizenship in 
Senegambia.79  Individuals re-conceptualise their political, economic and 
social systems to create continuities across the limitations of the border to 
milk opportunities from it.80Thus, social citizenship overrides the divisive 
nature of the border. It reflects power dynamics in society and the different 
power relations among different actors.  
 Power relations like social ones, are also fluid.  Using them to better 
understand the border is not helpful for our case here. Therefore, it would be 
instructive to use Berry’s approach to studying African agrarian change, by 
using historical and anthropological reasoning, which better reflect fluidity of 
social processes, and in this case, the fluidity of the border and relations 
connected to it. Hence, we should note that law is social process and border 
administration rules are subject to different interpretations (see chapters 2 & 
6). Transactions also have multiple meanings and exchange “can be 
 open-ended and multidimensional rather than single-stranded and 
definitive,” (see chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7).81 We focus on the historical and the 
cultural factors that frame people’s understanding of the border and the 
practices of the state at the border to show that the border like culture is 
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dynamic. People constantly revisit their relations to both the border and 
culture as they confront their daily realities.  
Culture like the border stands for many things and provides 
convenience for different people to anchor their actions or practices in ways 
that can connect them with other people. Social practices promote claims 
that de-legitimise the barrier functions of The Gambia-Senegal border. 
These practices compete with the state’s territorial agenda but the mind-set 
behind them is also inherent in the state. This is why in border disputes, 
states marshal useful technical, historic, economic, legal and cultural 
arguments to lay claim on disputed territories or conduct bilateral 
negotiations to settle border disputes.82  Human agency and choice shape 
the political economy of the border and relations around it. This is reflected 
in Williams’ idea that in international politics,  
[P]olitical structures are importantly, if not almost entirely, ideational, rather than 
material, and thus, the product of human agency…If the nature, meaning and role 
of, for example, territorial borders are not determined by some material structure, 
but are instead the result of a long series of human choices and decisions, …it is 
both reasonable and necessary to examine the thinking that saw some choices 
taken over others…83   
 
Social ideas about the border are embedded in deep-rooted social and 
religious values, which rationalise social interactions.  They shape the 
latitude to freely draw meaning from culture, which offers a pragmatic way of 
theorising the ways Senegambian social practices challenge “the 
established roles and functions of territorial borders.” 84 The way social ideas 
are put to practice makes it useful to use institutions, as a concept, for 
understating how culture and history interact with The Gambia-Senegal 
borders to create conditions of harmony and conflict in cross-border, 
interstate and state-society relations.  Here, the term “institutions” stands for 
organisations or other more formalised arrangements within and of the state, 
and includes “social institutions such as behavioral norms, routines, and 
                                                            
82 Prescott outlined processes of boundary negotiation; see Prescott, Political Frontiers, 24 
and 198. 







various forms of relational interdependencies,” which Koff terms as 
informal.85 Institutional change affects political and economic relations in 
society. Change upsets organisational processes, some people gain and 
others lose from it and this causes conflict among people, as evident in the 
cross-border realm (see chapters 4 & 5). 
In an institutional setting where rational choice theoretical 
assumptions shape behaviour and economic decisions such as in cross-
border transport, cooperation and conflict exist in social interactions as 
actors compete to make more profits. Douglass C. North observed that in 
the transport, agriculture and banking sectors, groups can cooperate to 
benefit from prospects for higher profits and higher returns on their 
investments.86 Thus, individuals seek to optimise their utilities during 
transactions. North’s view resonates with the neoclassical and Marxist 
theory, both of which treat culture and power “as exogenous or subordinate 
to economic systems and processes.”87 The unbridled market competition in 
Senegambia’s cross-border automobile transport, Jakarta, and border 
foreign currency trade sectors’ validate these views (see chapters 4 & 5).  
This implies that there are limits to using a culturalist approach to 
understand how the political economy of The Gambia-Senegal border 
affects interstate relations in Senegambia. However, economic relations in 
the cross-border fisheries trade and in the cross-border trade sector 
indispensably embed themselves in socio-cultural processes and norms and 
thus sustain the validity of the culturalist approach employed in this research 
(see chapter 6). From this perspectives, we can argue that “Culture and 
politics neither imitate nor distort economic activity: all three are interrelated 
dimensions of social processes.”88  
Social processes rationalise human interactions and the market. They 
provide the institutional bases for economic relations in society. As such, we 
                                                            
85Giles et al, ed., Theorizing Borders,  17. 
86Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
87See  Berry, No condition is permanent… 1993,11. 






should understand institutions to mean “…the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction.”89 As “humanly devised constraints,” institutions produce 
cognitive reflexes manifested in decisions, behaviour and choices of 
individuals engaged in social transactions.  But this view, like theories of 
political behaviour since the 1950s, ignore the roles of non-economic moral 
sentiments that influence certain normative standards in societies like the 
Senegambia, where deep-rooted indegeneous understandings of 
relatedness shape social attitudes.90  
To understand The Gambia-Senegal relations, it is necessary to 
enquire what roles institutions play for the individual, group or society. In 
other words, what are politicians, transporters, traders and religious 
networks trying to accomplish in cross-border relations and why? This view 
can offer answers to why tension and harmony exist side-by-side in cross-
border and interstate relations. Paul Nugent and Alice Bellagamba both 
observed that in Senegambia, social alliances override political fractures.91 
This observation captures how basic cultural principles deployed through 
language overcome the barrier functions of The Gambia-Senegal border. As 
such, the next section identifies the ways the approach adopted in this study 
makes contributions to academic debates.  
 
1.9: Contribution to Academic Debates 
By answering the broad questions about The Gambia-Senegal cross-border, 
interstate and state-society relations, this thesis contributes to academic 
debates on how the political economy of the border interacts with local 
cultures to shape various experiences of the border. Parts of the work 
reinforce neoclassical and Marxist views that culture and power are 
                                                            
89 North, Institutions…1993, 3.  
90James C. March, and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational 
Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989). 
91See Nugent, “Border Anomalies…2008; Alice Bellagamba,“On the Virtue of Margins - A 
Story of Conflict between Government and Muslim Leadership in Post-1994 Gambia, in 
Beside the State Emergent Powers in Contemporary Africa, ed. Alice Bellagamba and 






subordinate to economic systems. However, it argues that culture provides a 
more practical way of theorising how Senegambian social practices 
challenge the functions and roles of the border as a political structure. The 
thesis is organised around three main assumptions. First, people adopt 
creativity and contingency to use the resources they have in culture, the 
state, trade, and religion to navigate the complex context of The Gambia-
Senegal border. Kinship metaphors and social idioms of relations are carried 
over in cross-border relations, feeding notions of reciprocity in different forms 
of relations. Secondly, different forms of nuances shape state-society 
relations in Senegambia. Thirdly, tensions over the border can have 
productive outcomes. Border closures hinder cross-border mobility, but 
evidence shows that their effects contribute to the growth of new cross-
border or border-based economic opportunities for people.  
Critically, this research is about relationships. It studies relations that 
have different goals and happen in different contexts. The findings of this 
work can therefore be redefined to fit a number of theories on social and 
interstate relations in Africa.  In particular, the focus on religious networks 
provides new insights into the worldviews of the Tijanniya sect and how their 
religious practices foster cross-border bonds in Senegambia. The focus on 
cross-border trade also provides insightful knowledge on how traders who 
trade in different goods relate to the border, society and the state.  
Research on border transport in Africa has been rare. One of the 
most notable scholarly works that looks at transport infrastructure and its 
relations to borders is Joann McGregor’s book, Crossing the Zambezi, The 
Politics of Landscape on a Central African Frontier.  My work similarly 
discusses transport infrastructure and crossing the Gambia River; however, 
its central focus is on automobile transport. McGregor’s work is based in 
Central Africa; mine is situated in West Africa. Focusing on the automobile 
sector as an institution that interacts with other institutions like trade, religion 
and politics also sets my work apart from hers. The workings of the cross-






sometimes have greater influence on people’s behaviour when compared to 
cultural ones and power dynamics in society. 
The focus on bilateral relations and the state also provides insightful 
knowledge.  It identifies that the interests and the agenda of the state hardly 
change. However, the means of pursuing the almost “permanent” interests 
of the state keeps evolving. This has implication for international relations 
theory since the agenda of the state is fairly stable over the long term. 
Therefore, this insight offers new understandings into social conduct, 
economic and political behaviour, social and interstate political relations in 
Africa. It contributes to debates on the relationships between borders, 
politics, power, culture and economics. By revisiting claims of sameness and 
differences that are played out in The Gambia-Senegal relations, it takes the 
Senegambia discourse a step further and has wider implications for the 
wider Senegambia region. But the research methodology employed 
determines to what extent the goal of this research has been achieved with 
much success.  
 
1.10: Methodology 
The data for this thesis was drawn from a broad range of sources. The 
purpose of adopting a multi-sited mixed research method is to capture both 
qualitative and quantitative data on trade, transport and in other domains. 
These sources included a multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork, in which I used 
formal and informal interviews. I also used written sources such as 
newspapers and relevant official state documents. Additionally, I captured 
personal data on some of our interviewees such as their age, gender, origin, 
the frequency of trips individuals make across the border, their final 
destinations and the reasons for their travel. The reason for using this 
approach is for me to effectively capture level-one phenomena (lower 
politics). Hence, I focused on people engaged in cross-border trade, 
transportation and religious networks, state and local authorities at the 
border and also cross-border religious sites and events in Senegal. My 






targeted political actors in Banjul and Dakar, respectively. Border level and 
national level data have equal validity for this research. If we are to fully 
understand the dynamics of The Gambia-Senegal cross-border and 
interstate relations, the dynamics of conflict and how people use creativity 
and contingency to navigate the complex context of the border, we need 
data from these two levels.  
The tools I used included participant observation, questionnaires, 
small-scale quantitative surveys on transport, and structured and semi-
structured interviews, which included the collection of the life stories that are 
reflected throughout the thesis.  
The research strategies were both inductive and abductive.92 The 
inductive strategy usefully described and identified patterns of relations 
among individuals and socio-economic and political phenomena in transport, 
trade, religious networks and the border itself. Since abductive research 
strategies unlike the inductive research, can accommodate both “what” and 
“why” questions and can explain social phenomena, it was useful for my 
focus on the use of language in cross-border relations.   
I interpreted metaphors and social idioms to penetrate meanings, 
behaviour, motives and intentions in cross-border communication. These 
helped me access the “largely tacit mutual knowledge, the symbolic 
meanings, intentions and rules, which provide the orientations for their 
actions” (transporters, traders, politicians, religious and other actors). It also 
justified the culturalist approach and the research methodology that guided 
this work.93 Using institutions to guide my understanding of social and 
political processes, gives this research a potential to generate theory, 
although this is secondary at this stage.  
                                                            
92Blake notes that the inductive research strategy may establish patterns in the data but 
may not give explanation to social phenomena. See Norman Blaikie, Designing Social 
Research, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Robert K.Yin, Case Study Research 
Design and Methods (London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, International Educational and 
Professional Publisher, 1994). 






Ethnographic data for this research was collected during a six-month 
long fieldwork at the Karang-Amdallai, Farrafenni-Keur Ayib borders (main 
study sites) and in Dakar and Kaolack. The fieldwork was from January- 
June, 2013. Additionally, ethnographic data was collected at the Seleti-
Giboroh border areas of the two countries. My six-month field visit started in 
Dakar, where I spent the second week of my arrival developing contacts with 
relevant Dakar-based government officials, and through Dakar contacts, with 
state border agents and also some key community leaders at the border 
study sites.  
 The border fieldwork component started in earnest at the Karang-
Amdallai borders. I was more familiar with this border site and starting there 
helped me to compare what I discovered there with what I found at the other 
case-study sites- the Keur Ayib-Farrafenni and Seleti-Giboroh borders.  
Amdallai-Karang like Farrafenni-Keur Ayib is a high-density border 
site that directly connects to the two capital cities, Banjul and Dakar. 
Giboroh-Seteti has significant traffic too, as the major transit point that 
connects the B3 axis - Banjul, Bignona and Bissau. From Casamance and 
through the Gambian border village of Giboroh, it connects to Brikama, the 
second most populous town in The Gambia, located about thirty-five 
kilometers from Banjul.  
I spent my first two days trying to meet the head of the Senegalese 
Douane post located in Karang, but kept missing him.  I was obliged to 
spend most of my time with the Deputy Mayor of Karang, whose boss, 
Mayor Ousmane Sene, was my “host.”  Deputy Mayor Diop helped to link 
me up with interviewees and he also accompanied me to conduct interviews 
where possible.  After I felt comfortable with my new surroundings, I 
independently arranged to have interviews with people. Border state agents 
at Karang were also very helpful in linking me with other interviewees. This 
connection gave me full access to officials, official data on the borders and 






 From January to early mid-February 2013, I used a mini-digital tape 
recorder to conduct interviews. I also used garage band from my MacBook 
Pro laptop to back-up the interviews. But after my laptop crashed, I 
depended on the recorder and the field notebook I used to write field 
observations. I spent many hours at the Karang and Keur Ayib police posts 
interviewing selected border crossers and recording data from their travel 
documents. I also accessed the daily official records on border crossers, 
which included European tourists who crossed the border. Additionally, I  
accessed records on the categories of vehicles that crossed from both 
directions of the border. I also distributed questionnaires to interested 
members of the Association of Jakarta drivers/riders in Karang and they 
completed them. These questionnaires were intended to elicit “trip 
diaries,”from drivers. 
For a week, they recorded the number of trips they undertook daily, 
and the gender and the age of the person(s) they carried for each trip. The 
diaries were useful for knowing how much money Jakarta drivers made daily 
and for knowing the categories of people who generally used Jakartas in 
Karang. The results and quality of the trip diaries were mixed. But I was able 
to collate some kind of data from them.  
Initially, I spent three weeks at each of the three case-study sites 
(Karang-Amdallai, Farafenni- Ker Ayib, and Seleti-Giboroh, respectively), 
rotating from one site to the other. The Seleti-Giboroh border was rich with 
exciting data. However, after evaluating the security risks involved in doing 
research there, and the difficulty of travelling there through Tamba Counda 
and Kolda, I regretfully dropped this case study after my initial visit there. But 
I resolved to use some of the interesting data I collected from there, when 
applicable in this study. 
The fieldwork also took me to periodic and daily border and 
“underground” markets in the border Town of Kaolack and in Dakar, 
respectively. I visited private houses of cross-border traders, back-roads 






residences of some border enforcement agents and formal and informal 
local authority at the borders, border car parks and Pompier, the main car-
park for cross-border transport in Dakar. I also attended religious events 
held at religious communities at the border. Additionally, I visited the 
Niassen community in Kaolack, too.   
Due to personal safety issues, I could not go to The Gambia side of 
the border to personally conduct interviews there. But with the permission of 
my supervisors, I hired the services of a Gambia-based research assistant 
to assist with the data collection on The Gambian side of the border. From 
October- December 2012, I designed some research questions, which he 
administered to transporters, traders and religious actors on the Gambian 
side of the border.  I also gave him a mini-digital tape recorder with which he 
recorded interviews with relevant individuals on that side of the border.  We 
had two meetings in Karang and Dakar respectively, in order to review the 
questionnaires and the interviews he had conducted.   
However, a good part of the data he collected was problematic.  Most 
interview dates and place of interview were not recorded during interviews. I 
ended up having data that was almost useless for my purposes. However, 
because of the enormous amount of data I collected during my fieldwork, the 
research assistant’s botched data collection did not obstruct this research.  
My research also made significant use of archival materials on The 
Gambia and Senegal. In the summer of 2012, I conducted initial archival 
research on The Gambia-Senegal relations at the British Newspaper Library 
in Colindale, London. This research was complemented with archival 
research on both The Gambia and Senegal at the National Archives in 
Dakar, in 2013, and at the Boston University African Studies Library 
collections. Relevant archival documents were also accessed through 
interlibrary loan facilities between Boston University and other institutions 
namely, the Library of Congress, Northwestern University and Stanford.  
Through the research assistant, I also received copies of relevant 






contacts, too, I was able to also access some internal documents of some 
relevant government institutions in The Gambia, which were scanned and 
emailed to me. I also read relevant public records and documents such as 
cross-border trade statistics from governments, minutes and memoranda 
from inter-governmental bodies such as the Senegalo-Gambia Permanent 
Secretariat, and ECOWAS, the sub-regional body that supports free-mobility 
and free-trade. 
From 2012- 2014, in various instances, I had used Skype, email and 
face-to-face interviews with relevant informants on The Gambia-Senegal 
relations. These interviewees included B.B. Darboe, the former Vice 
President of The Gambia. For most part of this research and with a few 
exceptions, it has been difficult to get government officials on both sides of 
the border to openly share their views on The Gambia-Senegal relations. 
For example, attempts to interview officials of the Senegalese ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Finance and Economic Affairs, respectively, failed. An 
official of the Foreign Ministry offered a classic excuse that: “relations 
between Senegal and The Gambia are very sensitive.”94 However, I was 
able to discuss The Gambia-Senegal relations with some government 
officials and some notable Senegalese citizens. These people included 
former officials who served as ambassadors to The Gambia, or who worked 
as Senegalese government officials during the confederation. But they 
asked to be anonymous.  I also faced similar reluctance from Gambian 
officials. However, I was able to have a Skype interview with an official of the 
Gambian Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs- in 2012.  
Finally, since my enrolment in this study programme in 2011, I have 
consistently followed online media, paying attention to issues relating to The 
Gambia-Senegal relations. As a whole, the different approaches to getting 
data for this research were effective for analysing The Gambia-Senegal 
relations. 
                                                            






1.10.1: Strengths and Limitations  
A major strength of this study is that it provides a systematic analysis of the 
political economy of The Gambia-Senegal border. It further studies the 
nuances of The Gambia-Senegal relations over the border and state-society 
relations. It also looks at relations among transporters, traders and religious 
actors. It offers insightful knowledge on Senegambian culture and it draws 
from deep-rooted social and religious values to strengthen its analysis. It 
used appropriate research methods to satisfactorily explore, describe and 
explain different social phenomena that are observable from the different 
case studies cited in this work. Irrespective of all these strengths that this 
work has, it is not without limitations. For example, as a Gambian citizen, I 
was not able to enter my country throughout the period of this research for 
personal safety reasons. I used a research assistant to collect data on the 
Gambian side of the border, but the data collected was not very useful for 
my purposes. This has limited my ability to extensively share stories from 
both sides of the border. But hopefully, this limitation can be addressed in 
future research on The Gambia-Senegal relations.  
 
1.10.2: Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 has dealt with the introduction, research questions and rationale, 
conceptual frameworks, literature review and the methodology. Chapter 2 
looks at bilateral relations and why there has been interstate 
misunderstanding between The Gambia and Senegal. It also describes 
border-crossing encounters and how they’re shaped by Senegambian social 
thoughts. It introduces the Amdallai-Karang and Keur Ayib-Farrafenni border 
areas. After that, it discusses religious solidarity in Senegambia and the use 
of language. It also highlights how both state and non-state actors use the 
resources they have in culture, the state and in other domains to navigate 
the complex context of the border. The chapter prepares us for discussing 
the empirical chapters that follow. Chapter 3 discusses how state and non- 






kinds of relations. It discusses the joint-transport network and its cross-
border impacts.  It also introduces the conflicts that would eventually lead to 
the break-up of the joint transport network.  It flows into Chapter 4, where 
the break-up of the joint- transport network is highlighted.  Chapter 5 
discusses some of the productive outcomes of the break-up of the joint 
transport network.  It shows how different non-state actors benefited from 
the break-up. It also discusses some of the tensions associated with the 
outcomes of the break-up.  Chapter 6 provides case-based examples of how 
traders used the resources they have in the state, culture, transport and in 
other domains to enhance their cross-border trading interests.  It also 
discusses some of the inherent tensions in trading and how traders 
creatively navigate those tensions, especially when they concern the border. 
Chapter 7 discusses how religious networks also creatively use the different 
resources at their disposal to entrench a sense of community across the 
border.  It defines the meaning of community among religious networks and 
also the forms of social attachments that shape interpersonal and 
intergeneration connections among religious groups. This chapter, like all 
the other previous chapters, also discusses the nuances of state-society 
relations in Senegambia. Finally, chapter 8 is the conclusion of the thesis 





















THE BORDER, INTER-STATE RELATIONS AND SOCIO- 
RELIGIOUS NOTIONS OF COMMUNITY 
 
                                                              “Blood bonds have a strength that is never lost.” 
 (Wollof proverb). 
 
“Those who are neighbours for long enough turn into kinsmen.” 
(Wollof proverb). 
 
2.0: Inter-State and Social Relations: Reasons for 
Misunderstandings  
The Gambia-Senegal economic conflicts have colonial legacies. The British 
and the French had different economic policies in the two countries, both of 
which were peanut exporting economies.95 In the post-colonial period, this 
interstate economic rivalry continued, fueling mistrust and competition 
between the leaders of the two countries. Hence, The Gambia-Senegal 
political difficulties over the border have recurred from 1960 to 2015. 
 In 1969, an editorial of The Gambia Echo Newspaper decried the 
unexplained postponement (for numerous times) of the Inter Ministerial 
Conference of The Senegalo/Gambian governments. Frustrated by its failure 
to drag The Gambia into establishing a Customs Union, Senegal imposed 
rigid border restrictions on goods from the country in order to cripple 
Gambian re-export trade. Additionally, it restricted Senegalese from 
travelling to The Gambia without authentic documents, which, according to 
the editorial, were hard to obtain in Senegal at that time. 96 These 1969 
border policy restrictions appeal to a “Weberian sense…” that the state has 
“…routine capacity to exercise ultimate authority within the territorial domain 
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Conquest (New York: Diaspora Africa Press, 2012). 






of sovereignty.”97 This implies the Senegealese state can impose within its 
borders, rules and regulations that can hurt its neighbour, The Gambia. 
However, the later also has the capacity to retaliate in response to such 
acts, or even to initiate similar acts against Senegal. But the impact such 
unfriendly bilateral acts can have may be different from country to country. 
 The Senegalese state was the source of the 1969 border restrictions. 
However, from the year 2000 to 2015, we see that the Senegalese 
Transport Association was the source behind almost all border restrictions 
imposed on The Gambia-Senegal border (see chapters 3 & 4).  The power 
to close or to open the border seemed to have shifted, with or without the 
Senegalese state’s support, and this created new conflict dynamics in The 
Gambia-Senegal relations.98  But even in the midst of these new changes in 
bilateral relations over the border, the Senegambian social habit of using 
kinship language to articulate The Gambia-Senegal relations persists. 
The recurrence of the interstate conflicts over the border implies that 
there are limits to the effectiveness of Senegambian one-ness discourses. 
State logics, and sometimes language itself can undermine the effectiveness 
of kinship discourses.  As part of this chapter, I share border-crossing 
attitudes I witnessed at the Karang-Amdallai border in 2013, to show how 
both state and non-state actors use different resources to navigate the 
complex context of the border. The stories I will share also show the 
nuanced nature of state-society relations. Additionally, they show how 
conflict can have both productive and non-productive outcomes in society.  
This chapter juxtaposes the way state logics have influenced the 
political economy of the border and the recurrence of interstate political 
difficulties side-by-side with social attitudes towards the border. The aim of 
taking this approach is to reveal the complex nature of interstate and state-
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98Kaldor notes that conflict dynamics can change and depending on the motivation of the 
different actors, the conflict might take on new features. This can also be observed in The 
Gambia-Senegal border conflict dynamics. See Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized 






society relations to highlight that The Gambia-Senegal bilateral and cross-
border relations are complex and dynamic. 
The chapter also introduces the main border case study sites of 
Amadallai-Karang and Farrafenni-Keur Ayib, respectively. The main themes 
- transport, trade and talibee (religious) networks are also introduced here. 
Each of these themes will be discussed in-depth in the subsequent chapters. 
The chapter also highlights how wullere or kullere has been useful in 
sustaining inter-personal, inter-group, intra-state and interstate relations in 
Senegambia. Wullere is a Senegambian socio-religious cultural idea that 
complements dome-ndeye and dome-baaye relational ideas. Dome-ndeye 
and dome-baaye ties are used as the background motif for analysing the set 
of relations that define Senegambian ties. As The Gambia-Senegal relations 
erratically move back and forth between phases of good and bad relations, 
wullere can be an additional glue to keep it from disintegrating. The 
reflections on wullere or kullere connect chapter 2 and chapter 1, where 
dome-ndeye and dome-baaye notions were introduced. 
Chapter 2 poses two questions: what institutional systems structure 
conflict and cooperation in interstate relations? What continuities and 
discontinuities influence Senegambian cross-border social and political 
systems, and The Gambia-Senegal political difficulties? These questions 
aim to identify the historical sources of cooperation and/ or conflict in cross-
border, interstate and state-society relations. It argues that culture, trade and 
religion are domains where tensions can occur. However, these tensions are 
managed and handled well, and hardly produce violence. It further argues 
that transport connects goods and people together and therefore it promotes 
cross-border social harmony. But it is more disposed to causing interstate 
conflicts when compared with culture, trade and religion. How conflicts and 
cooperation play out in the domains of transport, trade and religion will be 
discussed in the subsequent parts of this chapter and in the rest of the 






Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are concerned with how the cultural and 
religious “theories” of social relations discussed in chapters 1 and 2 work or 
are manifested in practice. Some theories of social relations are contradicted 
by some practices in social and political exchanges.  But this does not 
invalidate the essence of these theories. Instead, it points to the dynamism 
of human relations.  It is helpful to keep in mind that as Berry suggested, in 
most economic and social exchanges in Africa, law is part of social 
processes, transactions can have multiple meanings and exchange can be 
multidimensional, open-ended and not definitive.99 Thus, social theories can 
evolve. The focus on social theories and their practices make the chapters 
of this work, a body of related knowledge.  
From the above introduction, the next section of the chapter 
discusses the state logics, which framed the national border policies of The 
Gambia and Senegal. Then, we discuss how state logics interact with social 
ones and the political economy of the border. After that, the chapter explores 
how the border settlements of Amdallai, Karang, Farrafenni and Keur Ayib 
were founded, to show how claims to community reified the international 
boundary. These new settlements became sites for the broadcasting of the 
state’s authority and reinforced the state’s territorial agenda. Their 
implications for interstate political conflicts are discussed before the 
conclusion of the chapter.   
 
2.1. State Logics and the Border 
When The Gambia and Senegal gained independence from British and 
French rule in 1965 and 1960, respectively, the two countries continued the 
colonial search for a solution to the two-country situation in Senegambia. 
The Gambia is wedged between Senegal and the Casamance. It 
inconveniences Senegal-Casamance communication and restricts Senegal 
from the full use of the waterways of the Gambia River. 
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The two countries commissioned the 1964 Van Mook study to advise 
them on their plan to reunite. The Van Mook report outlined three possible 
alternatives for the reunification project. But in the end, The Gambia and 
Senegal both decided to stay as separate countries. However, they signed a 
Treaty of Association, which established the Senegalo-Gambian Permanent 
Secretariat and an Inter-Ministerial Committee. They also signed a common 
agreement on Defense and Security (1965), which established a Joint 
Committee on Defence. These agreements and bodies framed interstate 
cooperation and ministers and the heads of state of the two countries met 
annually to discuss interstate issues.100 
Senghor argued that the colonial experience in The Gambia and 
Senegal shaped two major elite types who in language, behaviour, modes of 
thoughts and values took after the British and the French, respectively. The 
colonial experience also brought about differences in institutions- 
educational systems, administrative and justice systems, economic 
structures and policies.101 Both countries have mono-crop economies, where 
tourism is a major contributor to their GDPs. The Gambia has a modest 
industrial capacity. On the other hand, Senegal has made significant 
attempts to industrialise and has a growing production base in agriculture, 
industry, and services.102 In essence, the two countries have different state 
logics.  
At independence, the Senegalese government monopolised its 
peanut trade, but this had a disastrous economic outcome.  In 1968, France 
withdrew its subsidies to Senegal’s peanut sector, which saw a 25 percent 
decrease in the producer price of the crop.103  This harmed rural 
populations, who experienced low prices for their peanuts. Rural people 
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were also affected by the lack of interest free loans, debt forgiveness and 
subsidised tools. Senegal suffered an economic crisi: a national budget 
deficit, increases in the price of basic food stuff and increases on duties on 
imports all contributed to the country’s decision to reschedule Senegalese 
debt repayments from 1981-1984. The IMF sponsored a Medium-Term 
Economic Recovery Plan (EFRP) for the country, to ensure fiscal stability 
and sustained growth.104 
 The Gambia’s experience was similar to Senegal’s, but it adopted 
policies that were different from the latter’s. It crafted a re-export and a 
donor-driven economy, but that did not insulate it from the hash economic 
realities of the early and late seventies.105 In spite of the country’s agenda 
on economic justice and equity, allegations of corruption in “high offices” and 
the 1972 butut scandal gradually eroded confidence in Jawara’s 
government. Revolutionary elements and opposition parties protested the 
worsening and unstable economic conditions and called for the overthrow of 
the Jawara regime, for its failure to guarantee people‘s welfare and 
wellbeing.106 
In 1980, the Jawara regime faced threats from revolutionary 
elements. It invoked the 1960 defence pact under which the two countries 
agreed to defend each other against threats and Senegal deployed its 
soldiers under Operation Foday Kaba I, to maintain order in the country. The 
Gambia did not have a standing army at this period, but it had a sizable field 
force and a small police population.  Again, in 1981, under Operation Foday 
Kaba II, Senegalese soldiers were deployed to repel rebels who attempted 
to overthrow Jawara. 
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Economic and political insecurity in Senegambia brought the two 
countries closer. Senegal was an indispensable ally for Jawara’s political 
survival. Senegal also hoped closer cooperation with The Gambia would 
appease its declining economy and the political unrest in Casamance.   
In 1980, before political disturbances started in The Gambia, riots and 
student demonstrations broke out in Zinquinchor, the regional capital of 
Casamance. The region was seeking independence from Senegal based on 
a claim that in 1960, President Senghor promised to grant that to 
Casamance, after 22-years of nationhood with Senegal. They argued that 
the region has been disenfranchised by its nationhood with Senegal. It 
suffered massive economic problems, too. But there was a heavy-handed 
repression of demonstrators, which intensified the conflict.107 An armed 
rebellion was full-blown with the establishment of the separationist rebel 
group the Movement for Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), which 
demanded independence from Senegal.   
When Senghor resigned as president of Senegal in January 1981 and 
Abdou Diouf succeeded him, the bad economic and political situation in both 
The Gambia and Senegal deepened. After the July 1981 military bailout of 
Jawara, the two countries formed the Senegambia Confederation in 
December, which was effective by February 1982.108 This was at a time 
when both countries were affected by a debt crisis and serious budget 
deficit. Senegal also suffered from the significant number of Senegalese 
military casualties, who lost their lives in the process of restoring Jawara’s 
rule. The Gambia paid one million dollar compensation to the families of the 
fallen soldiers, but this payout failed to improve the political dynamics in 
Senegal. The Confederation caused new expenditure lines for both 
governments. However, it was an expedient political move for the moment.  
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Senegal’s “economic housecleaning” that resulted from structural 
adjustment caused substantial pain among its population. Its textile industry 
failed.109 There were mass retrenchments from public and private 
enterprises. About 5,000 to 20,000 Senegalese became jobless overnight.110 
The country faced increased pressure to stabilise its economy. The 
Senegalese soldiers who were deployed and later stationed in The Gambia 
restored order and subverted the agitation of revolutionary elements in the 
country, but Gambians continued to be disillusioned with Jawara.  
Additionally, Casamance separatist rebels continued their separatist 
agitation.  
 To respond to rising economic hardship, which was worsened by 
rapid population growth, Jawara’s regime shifted its heavy investments in 
physical infrastructural projects to investments in productive sectors like 
agriculture.  In the 1983 census, The Gambia’s population totaled 696,000.  
Between 1973 and 1983, the population in Banjul doubled. Rapid rural-
urban migration and migration from neighbouring countries like Senegal, 
shifted the country’s demographics. By 1984, 20% of the population was 
concentrated in Banjul.111 In 1985, under the Confederation, economic 
difficulties mounted in both The Gambia and Senegal. The latter kept 
pushing for the adoption of a custom union and a unified Senegambian 
government. 
Publicly, the Senegalese government presented economic union with 
The Gambia “as a cost to it, rather than a benefit to itself.” But in reality, if 
tariffs were equalised through the proposed customs union, The Gambia 
would lose significant customs revenue on imported goods. This would 
reconfigure the country’s re-export trade. It would also raise the cost of living 
in The Gambia.112 
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 As both countries faced their respective economic and social 
troubles, debates about the Confederation were heightened. Some leaders 
of the Peoples Progressive Party (P.P.P.- Jawara’s party) criticised the 
Confederation for imbalance. They argued that the prediction that The 
Gambia would gain economic and social benefits from it was erroneous.113 
 Some Senegalese were also unhappy about the Confederation. In 
structural adjustment debates, they expressed dissatisfactions on how The 
Gambia‘s exchange rate was free of the restrictions of the Franc zone. They 
also queried that its trade policy amounted to an illicit free transit of trade to 
Senegal. They further argued that between 1986- 1989, The Gambia’s 
economic policies had made Senegal to lose about CFAC 20 billion per 
annum. But in real terms, this figure was about one percent or even less of 
Senegal’s GDP.114  
Irrespective of national resistance to the Confederation, the economic 
conditions, which prevailed in both countries, made it difficult for the two 
countries to adopt common economic policies towards unification. The 
implementation of structural adjustment policies led to a drastic devaluation 
of national currencies. There was inflation in each country and this led to 
import liberalisation and consequently, indigenous industries degenerated. 
The cost of imports was high. There was capital flight and the retrenchment 
of traditional exports. All these perpetuated dependence on foreign imports 
especially for basic commodities.115 Amidst such economic chaos and as life 
prospects continued to dwindle in Casamance, The Gambia became more 
and more disillusioned with Senegal’s push for economic integration and 
unification. Gambians were further disenchanted with the Confederation 
when in 1985 the Senegalese high commissioner in Banjul ordered 
Senegalese forces to use force to crush disturbances at a football match at 
the Independence Stadium in Bakau. The Jawara regime was offended by 
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this lack of respect and it immediately asked for the recall of the Senegalese 
ambassador.116 From Gambian perspectives, the Bakau incident, the 
economic uncertainties and the lingering rebellion in Casamance were 
strong signals that it was a bad idea to unify with Senegal.  
In short, The Gambia and Senegal adopted different measures to 
confront their national economic and political difficulties. Their bilateral  
relations were affected by their national concerns. Consequently, each 
country adopted policies that were designed to protect its interests. Those 
policies were sometimes in direct opposition to the other country’s goals.  
This reality caused a series of misunderstandings in interstate relations. In 
addition to economic and political misunderstandings, historical pressures 
also lingered in bilateral relations further deepening interstate 
misunderstandings. The next section explores those historical pressures that 
undermined interstate relations.  
 
2.2. Pressures of History in Senegambia 
Colonial governance in The Gambia and Senegal created serious ruptures 
in interstate relations. In the postcolonial period, these ruptures were 
exacerbated by national economic hardships and the introduction of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in both countries. Like most adjusting 
African economies, the Gambian and Senegalese economies contracted in 
the 1980 and 1990s. Population growth and a declining economy caused 
social strife in both countries.117The hardship that came with adjustment had 
a human face. It impacted social relations and the political systems of 
adjusting countries. Popular demand for improved economic conditions were 
common in almost all adjusting countries. As the agricultural sector slumped, 
rural-urban migration increased. In Senegal, this led to rural people moving 
to Dakar and its suburbs to seek better economic prospects. Other 
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Senegalese also migrated to other countries in the sub-region notably The 
Gambia and Ivory Coast.118  
Due to the effects of demographic transition, Senegal experienced 
more crisis than The Gambia. It had a larger population and a bigger 
discontent in its population. Hence, when adjustment hit Senegal hard, some 
Senegalese including prostitutes migrated to The Gambia. The Gambia 
implemented various social solidarity initiatives that effectively kept rural 
people in rural areas.119  
For long, Gambians were worried that Senegal’s economic crisis and 
the Casamance rebellion may spillover to their country. They were also 
worried about losing the economic edge the re-export trade had given them 
over Senegal and other West African countries. Hence, the country was 
reluctant about forming a customs union with Senegal. The country’s 
security concerns were activated as its border communities suffered from 
the hit and run activities of the Casamance rebels. It was also affected by 
the huge influx of refugees in the country. Moreover, in 1989, Senegal had 
border conflicts with both Mauritania and Guinea Bissau, respectively. She 
expected The Gambia to be an ally in these conflicts. But the Jawara regime 
sought to be a neutral party in these conflicts. It viewed that Senegal and 
Mauritania should engage in dialogue and not use military confrontation to 
settle their border dispute.  
 When the conflict broke-out between Senegal and Mauritania, The 
Gambia gave refuge and assistance to nationals of both countries affected 
by the conflict. It was under these circumstances that Senegal unilaterally 
withdrew its soldiers that were stationed in The Gambia as part of the 
Confederation agreement. This paved way for the collapse of the 
Confederation. The Gambian decision to be a neutral party in the interstate 
conflicts was part of a broad national policy, which saw the Jawara regime 
play the role of a bridge to West Africa’s language blocks. It adopted a 
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middle-way, non-aligning approach to international relations; the country 
also nurtured “long-established relations with leaders across the ideological 
and linguistic divide.”120 Its foreign policy was the clear opposite of 
Senegal’s, and this became another source of misunderstanding in 
interstate relations.   
Geographic concerns were also a dilemma for The Gambia-Senegal 
bilateral relations, in addition to concerns over economic situations, security 
issues and foreign policy directions. The constraints The Gambia’s 
geography caused to Senegal-Casamance communication, made it hard for 
Senegal to effectively tackle the insurgence in Casamance. This issue 
became a serious dent in interstate relations as The Gambia opted for a 
neutral role in the Senegal-Casamance conflict and resisted any attemps by 
Senegal to use its territory to fight rebels. The relationship was further 
complicated by the fact that, as a political ruse, Casamance rebels identify 
themselves more with The Gambia, especially under former president Yahya 
Jammeh.   
Many people from The Gambia and Casamance share deep social 
and language ties. Kolda, Seydio and Pakaaw regions of Senegal speak the 
same Mandinka dialect like the one spoken in The Gambia. Mandinkas are 
the dominant population in The Gambia.This sense of Mandinka kinship ties 
is similar to the kinship ties between Jola populations in the two countries. 
The Jolas are the majority population in Casamance, and also in The 
Gambia’s Foni region. As such, Casamance shares stronger language and 
ethnic ties with The Gambia, than with north-west and east Senegal, even 
though Malinke, another Mandinka dialect, is spoken in eastern Senegal. 
However, ethnic differentiation is not a useful marker for analysing 
Senegalo-Gambian political dynamics, but it is important to flag out these 
cultural and linguistic dynamics, to show the complex nature of The Gambia-
Senegal relations.  
                                                            







The Gambia and Casamance have also had a long enduring history 
of socio-cultural exchange between their peoples. Seydio band, like Lalo 
Kebba Drammeh, are cultural symbols for both Gambians and Casamance 
people and by extension for other Senegal, too. Both The Gambia and 
Casamance were also part of a powerful Mandinka dominion called the 
Kabu Kingdom, which extended to territories in modern-day Guinea Bissau. 
Moreover, “Casamancais and dissidents in The Gambia have often 
collaborated in the past, and are more likely to do so if they feel mutually 
oppressed.”121 These past ties between the people from the two places 
endure to the present times. 
 Different narratives of local oral histories have been useful in 
fostering a sense of unity between Gambians and people from Casamance. 
But besides social identities, colonial rule had left obvious dents in the way 
people perceive their political realities. “The separate political identity of 
these peoples…” caused an “… unavoidable interference with otherwise 
similar economic interests…” in Senegambia.122 But given that colonial rule 
has not upset social relations among the people of Senegambia, the 
Casamance conflict has become a political dilemma for interstate relations.  
The Gambia-Casamance close relations have been motivated by 
economic logics, too. The porous border between the two countries makes it 
easy for the latter to import cheap goods from The Gambia. It also markets 
its agricultural products there. As a region, Casamance is rich in agricultural 
and other resources. It is of great economic value to Senegal, too. But the 
rebellion has made it difficult for Senegal to exploit Casamance’s full 
potential. Therefore, it has been in dire need for The Gambia’s cooperation 
in aiding its way against the Casamance rebellion.  
As a self-declared neutral party in the Senegal-Casamance conflict, 
The Gambia cannot let Senegal use its territory to tackle rebels. This 
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relucntance and other issues have made Senegal to be suspicious of 
Gambian intentions in Casamance. The Gambia’s positions on the 
Casamance rebellion and other political concerns in interstate relations 
linger and torment The Gambia-Senegal relations.  
The attempt to identify how the logics of the two states affect their 
bilateral relations show that The Gambia-Senegal interstate 
misunderstandings are complex and multifaceted. This further justifies the 
use of the culturalist approach to determine the nature of interstate conflicts 
over the border and the effects the use of kinship metaphors and social 
idioms of relations have on interstate relations. To that end, the next section 
will focus on interstate cooperation to show that amidst conditions of conflict, 
the two states can still cooperate in recognition of the deep social bonds 
between their peoples. In the next section, we will also discuss 
contemporary state-society nuances to show that both interstate and state-
society relations are complex.  
 
2.3. Nuances of State-Society Relations: the Power of Shared 
Meanings  
In the previous sections, we’ve discussed how state logics contributed to 
interstate misunderstandings that survived the colonial, independence and 
postcolonial periods. In this section, we will discuss how different levels of 
contemporary state-society relations thrive through both misunderstanding 
and compromise. The interactions between border administrators and 
border crossers at The Gambia-Senegal border provide insightful examples 
of the nuanced nature of state-society relations. We will discuss some 
border crossing stories, their effects on cross-border solidarity and on 
conflict and compromise in state-society and interstate relations.  
David Coplan argued that attitudes that border crossers show to 






and to enact attitudes border officials want to see.123  These selected 
border-crossing stories I share below confirm Coplan’s view that border 
administration and border crossing are performative acts. The stories, all of 
which took place at the Karang-Amdallai border, were witnessed during my 
2013 (January- June) fieldwork at The Gambia-Senegal border. The stories 
begin: 
It was a humid early afternoon in March. I was at the Amdallai-Karang 
border, sitting under the veranda of the Senegalese border police’s office in 
Karang. The tropical sun glared outside, its heat intense, overpowering.  
Beads of warm sweat trickled down my face, like a dripping fountain. The 
crowd that earlier hustled and bustled and flowed through the border 
checkpoint suddenly vanished, their faded presence now a dull mirage. The 
heat seemed to drain people’s keenness to cross the border. A group of five 
Gambian girls between the ages of 18- 22 suddenly emerged from the 
Gambian side of the border. They walked into Karang, resolutely avoiding 
the Senegalese border police officer, who stood in front of the police post, 
checking the identity cards (IDs) of the few crossers who slowly filed through 
the border.  
In a husky male voice, the police summoned them in Wollof to come 
check-in with him. The girls made an abrupt turn to the left side of the road 
where the police post was located. Standing in front of the police, one of 
them said,  
Girl 1: “We are from Keur Sanyang (a Gambian border village about five 
kilometers from the border). We are going nowhere, just stopping in 
Karang to get our clothes from the tailor. We have a wedding.” 
Police: “You have to show your IDs, if you do not have them, you will not go 
anywhere.” The police was firm.  
Girl 2: “No problem. If you prevent us from going, we’ll wait for your lunch.”  
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In one heavy heap, the girls sat on the long wooden bench, which was 
stationed on the left side of the main entrance to the police post. They 
giggled among themselves. Without second thoughts, the officer asked them 
to proceed, but warned them to have their IDs next time.  The girls happily 
walked away towards the center of town (end of story). 
     Another day in March. The dull flicker of the early evening sun and its 
mild heat gradually gave way to nightfall. A group of middle-aged Gambian 
and Senegalese women were crossing the border from Karang to Amdallai. 
They were part of a large group of crossers who activated the sluggish mid-
afternoon traffic. Some of the women crossed the border without problems. 
But a few of them did not have IDs to pass. Their excuse was that they 
hastily left their homes to attend a funeral in Dakar. The police let them pass, 
but warned them to bring along their IDs next time. One of the women said 
to him: 
Woman: “You are right. We need to carry our IDS with us. However, we too 
belong to the country. We share it with you,” she explained that she 
was a Gambian-born daughter of Senegalese parents who migrated 
to The Gambia (end of story). 
Another border-crossing incident: A Senegalese man between the 
ages of 29-33 came to the Karang border. He stood watching the police as 
people showed him their IDs. The police caught his guile. 
Police: “Where is yours?” The police lightly waved a Gambian ID card he 
has finished checking towards the Senegalese man.  
Senegalese man: “This is my first travel to Gambie. I went to visit my sister. 
She was afraid that I would lose my documents in Banjul. She took 
them from me for safekeeping until when I am returning home. But 
when I got up this morning to return to Senegal, she could not find the 
bunch of papers she took from me. She misplaced them in the house. 







Police: “You said your sister lost your papers. How will you get another 
receipt to collect your dentity when it is ready?” 
Senegalese man: “I have an Uncle who works with the Maire (mayor’s 
office) in Dakar, he will legenty (work out) another receipt for me.”  
People present burst into laughter. (Legenty in this context means a corrupt 
maneuvering by the uncle to get him another receipt).  
Police: “A big man like you is not ashamed of creating stories here. Go 
away.”  
The man scurried away, thankful of his easy escape from the annoyed 
police officer (end of story). 
It is a few minutes past 6.00pm. The border traffic was lean. A 
Senegalese man was redirected by one of the police officers to come to the 
police post to present his ID.   
 Man: “I live in Samba Nosso (a Senegalese village about six kilometers 
from the border). We crossed earlier to go to Fass (a Gambian village 
about three kilometers from the border), just Fass,” he repeated. 
Police: “So if you went to Fass, you need not show us your ID?”  
Man: “It is not like that.” Then he laughed and said, “forgive me this time.” 
Police: (hesitantly) “You may go.” And the man left (end of story). 
The Senegalese police inspected the ID card of a Gambian Sarahulli 
man travelling with his wife. The man explained in Mandinka that his wife 
had no ID. The police returned his ID to him and said in Wollof:  
Police:  “Say what you want to say in Wollof.” But the Sarahulli man 
repeated his narration in Mandinka. Infuriated, the police shouted, 






Sarahulli man: “I am from Bollongkonoo (upper river region of The 
Gambia.). If you want to force me to speak Wollof, you will cause 
disaster. I don’t know how to speak that language.”  
The police turned his face away from the man, who jumped on the 
opportunity to escape with his wife. As the retreating figures of the couple 
receded towards the border, the infuriated police soliloquised: 
Police: “They are like that…” he heaved, “…They want to force people to 
speak their language, but they never speak other people’s language.” 
(end of story). 
The final story: A Gambian woman, aged about 36, arrived at the Karang 
border. She is married to a Senegalese and lives in Mbour (a Senegalese 
city located about 80 kilometers south of Dakar). The police asked her to 
show an ID.  She explained that she is Gambian, but forgot to bring along 
her ID. 
Police 1: “Ok, if you are a Gambian, go to them (Gambian Immigration 
across the other side of the border) and get a laissez passer in order 
for you to pass. When a Senegalese does not have a dentity, they 
send him or her to us to get a laissez-passer. Why can’t they do the 
same? Are they better than us?” 
The police officer was apparently moody. Meanwhile, the woman called 
someone from her cellphone to see if they could bring her ID for her 
(apparently she was among a first party of a group travelling from The 
Gambia to Senegal). A second police officer at the scene opined to his 
colleague that:  
Police 2: “She does not look Gambian, she looks Guinean. Perhaps she is 
Sousou or Peul.” 






Gambian Woman: “I am Gambian cent percent (100 percent).”  She turned 
back to go to Gambian Immigration.  
Some minutes later, she returned with a laissez-passer for the Senegalese 
police. And as the police officer inspected the paper, she re-launched her 
protest.  
Gambian Woman: “My husband is Senegalese like you.”  
Police 1: “Then tell you husband to find you Senegalese papers,” the police 
officer replied, as he returned the laissez-passer to her. 
Gambian Woman: “Never!” the woman retorted. “I am Gambian. The 
Gambian papers are enough for me.” 
The police silently watched her turn her back to him, as she walked 
away towards the open makeshift garage where intermediate transporters 
park their transports in Karang.   
Each of these border-crossing stories leaves us with their own lessons. 
However, there is a central lesson in each of the stories which relays that 
Senegambians across both sides of the border share a sense of cross-
border relatedness. Irrespective of the nuances in state-society relations, as 
state border agents conduct border administration, they can decide to 
prioritise social concerns above the state ‘s requirements. In fact, during 
my fieldwork, Senegalese border police defined The Gambia-Senegal 
border as a “community border.” Their community border concept has 
nothing to do with ECOWAS’ description of borders between member states. 
Instead, it is a metaphor that alludes to the deep social and cultural ties 
between Gambians and Senegalese. This is why in their border 
administration procedures they use their discretion to redefine the border’s 
role as a “selective filter.”124 Some of the stories showed how border 
administration roles were downplayed for other considerations. Yet, some of 
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the stories also saw the rules being fully enforced by state border agents. 
Border agents’ decision to grant excused passage to some of the crossers 
who did not have the required documentation was motivated by certain 
social values. For example, the rapid ease with which the police excused the 
women and the girls to cross the border without the required documentation 
was rooted in yeremenda (empathy). Yeremenda has both a moral and a 
social recourse and it guides social exchange and interactions in 
Senegambia. It ensures privileged treatment to people who face one form of 
inhibition or another, as a result of social status, income, age, gender, 
disability and other forms of restrictions. Its central tenet derives from 
cultural perceptions about relatedness.  
It is therefore perceivable that the different border crossing stories 
manifested different notions of kinship and relatedness. For example, the 
young girls dipped into Senegambian joking relations to pave their passage. 
Kinship ties and age were useful tools for the women. The man from Samba 
Nosso mediated his own wrong by employing baluu (a Wollof term which 
means to seek forgiveness). From these stories, border administration is a 
flexible process and border police are complicit in undermining the border, 
albeit inadvertently.  
 The exchanges between the police and the border crossers 
simultaneously exude references of sameness and differences. One of the 
five Gambian girls who told the police “We are going nowhere, just stopping 
in Karang to get our clothes from the tailor” trivialised the border’s functions 
as a tool for excluding people or goods from given spaces. In reality, the 
girls were going somewhere: they crossed two different territorial and 
political jurisdictions - Amdallai (in The Gambia), to Karang (in Senegal). 
This instrumental use of proximity resonates with Geschiere’s observation 
that in Africa “…often proximity seems to create kinship and thus becomes 
expressed in kinship terms.”125 Trivialising space is one way of invoking 
cross-border bonds to redefine the sense of separate political territoritores to 
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suit broad notions that Gambians and Senegalese are inter-related. 
Therefore, in the minds of the girls, the short distance between Amdallai and 
Karang is in fact a political “fiction” that is socially irrelevant. 
The apparent unequal treatment of border crossers also highlights the 
dilemma in considering the border on its political merits and denouncing it 
based on social values. Consequently, in exercising their personal prejudice, 
the border administrators revealed the bifurcated characteristics of the state. 
Thus, they depicted Mamdani’s view that  under the bifurcated African state, 
power is exercised differently and rules are applied in a variety of ways on 
citizens, (though technically, this case concerns citizens and non-citizens of 
the Senegalese state.)126 This non-uniform application of rules resonates 
with Bayart’s concept that the African state is a rhizome state and as such 
political behaviour within the state is embedded in social relations.127 Hence, 
the mixed responses the police manifested towards the different border 
crossers are part of what Bayart considers as normal political behaviour in 
which the “big man” and the “little man”’s actions come from the same  
motivations given the political context of their realities. Like Mamdani’s 
bifurcated state, Bayart’s rhizome state deviates from classical 
understandings of the state as a superior entity of power and authority in 
society. 
 In contrast to Bayart, Pierre Englebert views that post-colonial 
African states, “are not the endogenous creations of local history. They are 
not embedded in domestic power relations,” and consequently the 
“imported” origins of many African states…created structures that conflict 
with pre-existing political institutions, underlying norms of political behavior, 
and customary sources of political authority.”128 For Englebert, the state has 
an inside and outside quality to it. It is influenced by at least two systems of 
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institutional frameworks (endogenous and exogenous ones). To survive, it 
has to implant itself in domestic power relations, which usually have 
endogenous roots. In that sense, Englebert’s concept of the state shares 
some similarities with Bayart’s concept of the state since in both cases the 
state sources its power from local processes.  
However, Englebert’s argument helps us to understand why state 
border agents display both the culture of the state, the Wesphalian origin of 
which created interstate borders, and the culture of the people. The mixing 
of these two institutional systems causes both conflict and harmony in cross-
border and interstate relations. Consequently, the different reactions the 
police demonstrated in these border-crossing encounters denote a practice 
of using “a case by case” decision-making and approval process to.enforce 
or relax border administration rules and regulations based on various 
dictates about social relations in Senegambia.  
The border crossing exchanges can also be used to draw from 
Gramsci’s concept of how the integral state works as an entity that consists 
of state forces and civil society that reinforce and contest each other’s 
hegemony in society.129 The inadvertent state-society complicity against the 
border re-echoes how these two entities “co-extend” to link political power 
and civil society within the state. But this complicity is rooted in tension and 
adversarial attitudes and as such the state and civil society are both allies 
and opponents within society. 
The different attitudes highlighted in the border crossing stories both 
validate and invalidate cross-border kinship discourses. The confrontational 
exchange between the Gambian woman and the Senegalese police 
appeared to be interpersonal. However, the words they threw at each other 
bore the footprints of interstate disputes. When Gambian woman retorted to 
the police that, “I am Gambian cent percent (100 percent).  “The Gambian 
papers are enough for me,” she echoed her pride in her identity with a subtle 
rejection of Senegalese stereotypes about Gambians. But when we 
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compare her words with the police’ statements that, “When a Senegalese 
does not have a dentity, they send him or her to us to get a laissez-passer. 
Why can’t they do the same? Are they better than us?” we can compare how  
their words mimic competitive kinship models and interstate rivalry.  
The verbal exchange communicates a sense of separateness, which 
stood out when the Gambian woman added, “My husband is Senegalese 
like you.”  Her words drew a border between her and her husband, and the 
police. When the police responded that, “Then tell your husband to find you 
Senegalese papers,” he reinforced that personal border. His words also 
implied preference for the Senegalese-issued documents over Gambian 
ones, which is understandable, even if they had a hint of prejudice. The 
police‘s resentment against his cross-border Gambian colleagues further 
adds to the complexity of relations. 
The border crossing vignettes highlight appreciable tensions in even 
intrastate relations, which is implicit in the Sarahuli man’s assertion that, “I 
am from Bollongkonoo (upper river region of The Gambia.). If you want to 
force me to speak that language, you will cause disaster. I don’t know how 
to speak that language.” His statements introduced nuanced tensions 
around language and rural- urban distinctions in The Gambia. The police’ s 
query that “they” (not sure whether he meant Gambians in general or just 
the Sarahuli man and his wife) resist speaking other people’s languages, but 
want other people to speak theirs, shows language creates barriers. The 
Sarahuli man’s words also revealed tensions about gender, too. These 
encounters reveal a mélange of attitudes towards the border and towards 
social and interstate relations.  
Different attitudes towards language can lead to different outcomes.  
However, it will be misleading to think that the implicit antagonism in the 
police officer’s remarks about his cross-border counterparts defines relations 
between the two sets of police. It turned out during my fieldwork that the two 
sets of police were also intimate accomplices who subverted the laws of 






subsequent chapters, state-society relations are as complex as interstate 
relations. They keep evolving like people’s understanding and use of the 
border.  
The erratic application of notions of sameness and difference in 
cross-border exchange reinforces Dickson Eyoh’s observation that the 
colonial project has disrupted African social and political organisation. 
Hence, the postcolonial situation gives all Africans the latitude “…to engage 
(re) inventions and manipulations of cultural identities for economic and 
political reasons.”130 Kinship, pride of place, country and language do 
simultaneously reinforce and contest one another in social and political 
relations as people explore what works for them in different contexts.   
The conflicted encounters at the border prevail within a social 
environment that promotes mbokh or mbadingya or communal cross-border 
lifestyles (see chapters 6 & 7).131 This means social claims compete with 
political ones in Senegambia. Cross-border claims to community predate the 
“…stronger institutions and stronger “in-group” feelings necessary for 
cohesiveness of states.”132 Depending on how one defines state 
cohesiveness, Senegambian social systems can redefine political leanings 
in society. Senegambian oral traditions - stories, fables, creation myths, 
proverbs, songs and poetry and other cultural and religious symbols existed 
before the state. These perpetuate a sense of an “imagined community,” for 
a culture that is not dependent on print capitalism.133 This is why 
Senegambian values and virtues “provided stability, continuity, and change 
in Senegambian societies for many centuries.”134 Thus, cross-border social 
communication fuses history, culture and religion to construct enduring ideas 
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of oneness.135 However, society’s socio-religious and economic life is 
connected to the political.136 The state and society co-extend into each 
other, leaving an untidy separation between the two spheres (see chapters 
4, 5, 6, & 7). This implies Senegambian concepts of community can evolve 
depending on the goals individuals seek to achieve in their social, economic 
and political relations. This is why transporters can ignore community in 
favour of their economic ambitions (see chapters 3, 4 & 5).  
Shils defines community as a group of concrete and particular 
persons who acquire their significance by embodying common values that 
transcend their individuality, and are the source of their dignity. 137 This 
means ideas of community come from psychosocial attachments. Not every 
Gambian has blood relatives in Senegal, and vice versa, but the power of 
psychosocial attachments enabled society to reinvent and recreate a sense 
of enduring cross-border ties. Cultural and socio-religious forces -”norm 
entrepreneurs”, initiate the processes that foster feelings of a cross-border 
community. These norm entrepreneurs attract other actors to their values. 
More and more people adopt those values, which reach a “tipping point,” 
before cascading within society to become common social values or 
prescriptions.138 
The process through which community is built is relevant to theories 
about how state formation is related to conflict. Herbst, Bates and Tilly argue 
that external conflicts are essential for state-building, creating good 
institutions and accountable state processes (the “bellicist theory”). But The 
Gambia-Senegal interstate conflicts have had no positive effects on their 
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statehood, as both states are not well-built states.139  As such, the state is 
not autonomous from social systems. 
Senegambian social systems consist of tacit mechanisms that 
undermine state autonomy. Autonomy is used here to mean the state’s 
ability to independently create its structures and policies without any social 
interference.140 Additionally, it means the state’s exclusive right to make and 
unmake policies that mediate and balance different interest groups to 
entrench state power and authority in society.141 Ghai defines autonomy as 
a quest of a group within the state, but this is not how the word is being used 
here.142  
However, if we consider historical happenings like the collapse of the 
Senegambia confederation, we can argue that the ability of Senegambian 
social systems to effectively undermine the state is debatable. The collapse 
of the Senegambia Confederation suggests that Senegambians never fully 
reclaimed their unity, irrespective of the enduring discourse about 
sameness.143 Political attempts to unify Senegambia failed. However, 
arguably, there is a genuine sense of community that transcends space. 
Formal state institutions exist but cross-border bonds emptied them of their 
substances. But amidst this reality, the state’s bordering processes also 
constraints social bonds. Therefore, state-society relations like the one-ness 
discourse, are complex and multidimensional. Wolfgang Zeller’s study of the 
Namibia-Zambia and Uganda-South Sudan borders suggests the same 
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complexity in the relationship between borderland people and state 
authorities.144  
We can use concepts of how social relations work to argue that the 
inherent contradictions in Senegambian one-ness discourses come from the 
dynamics that govern social interactions in society. According to Castoriadis, 
Marxism and Revolutionary Theory believe social change cause radical 
discontinuities in society and these disruptions can interfere with the nature 
of social relations.145 This implies the contradictions in Senegambia’s one-
ness discourse comes from the natural processes of social change, which 
causes discontinuities in society. Migdal also argues that societies thrive 
with multiple systems of rules (competing sets of rules) that invite 
negotiation, interaction and resistance. Groups in society promote multiple 
sets of “formal and informal guideposts for how to behave.”146 This means 
some practices may be abandoned for new ones. As “there is no 
uncontested universal code – in law, religion, or any other institution, in any 
society for guiding people’s lives.”147 Through “subtle and not-so-subtle 
rewards and sanctions,’’ “loose-knit informal collections of people as well as 
highly structured organizations with manifold resources at their disposal,” 
are formed. This implies social battles about how people should behave are 
constant. “The nature and outcomes of these struggles give societies their 
distinctive structure and character.”148 Thus, Senegambian social systems 
continuously evolve and their growth is marked by inherent contradictions, 
which nonetheless can maintain the essence of discourses about 
Senegambian one-ness. 
We will explore, in the next section, how the creation of the border 
settlements of Amdallai, Karang, Farrafenni and Keur Ayib, respectively, are 
examples of how social stabilities and ruptures led people from both sides of 
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the border to cooperate in building border settlements and new spaces for 
social exchange.  
 
2.4. Border Settlement Creation at The Gambia-Senegal Border  
2.4.1. Amdallai 
Separated from Karang by an invisible borderline upon which sit rows of 
canteens, stalls and hawkers, the Gambian border village of Amdallai, Lower 
Nuimi District, North Bank Region, is located 23 kilometers from the 
Gambian capital, Banjul. Save for the sign board which reads “Welcome to 
Amdallai” and the different state symbols on site, there is no other way of 
differentiating it from Karang, which borders it. According to oral sources, 
Amdallai derived its name from migrants fleeing French colonial rule in 
Senegal. After they crossed into British territory, they thanked God for their 
escape with the worshipful exclamation, “Alhamdulillah,” (praise be to God). 
This Arabic word was corrupted to “Amdallai,” the place name for the 
settlement. The north bank trunk road connects Amdallai to Banjul through 
Barra, a wharf town and terminal point for the Banjul-Barra ferries servicing 
north-south river crossings. The Gambia Department of Immigration, The 
Gambia Police Force, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the 
National Drugs Enforcement Agency (NDEA), all have offices in Amdallai. In 








 Figure 2: Where the children and the bicycle are located is almost the borderline and all 
territory in front of it is in Senegal. Source: http://www.globalwheeling.org/wp-




Karang is located about 72 kilometers from Kaolack and 165 kilometers from 
the Senegalese capital Dakar. It falls under the department de Foundiougne, 
Fatick and, delta de Saloum region of Senegal.149 Historically, Karang was 
known as Kamanda wuloo (the Kamanda forest in Mandinka). The place 
was traditionally owned by the people of four associated islands – Ginack, 
located in the north bank of The Gambia River. Two of the Islands are in The 
Gambia, and the other two in Senegal. 
 Karang was once a farmland site for the Senegambian marabout 
Sheikh Mass Kah, a relative of Serign Bamba Touba, founder of Senegal’s 
Mouride brotherhood. Kah fled his native Senegal due to repressive French 
rule. He first settled at the border - in Karangbaa, “the original or bigger 
Karang.” A dispute with colonial Senegalese border customs agents there 
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led Kah to move to Karang. 150  But he later crossed the border into The 
Gambia, where he founded settlements along the border. He eventually died 
there.151 
In 1952, Karang was a village of only six compounds. The village 
chief, Matarr Mboum, arrived there around the same time as the Islamic 
cleric Kah. Colonial Karang was part of the arrondissement de Touba Couta. 
But in 2008, Karang became an independent commune. In 2009, it elected 
its first mayor Ousmane Sene, son of a retired Gambian Police Officer, who 
settled in Karang.152  
Before 2002, the Senegalese border Police and the Douanes 
(Senegalese Customs) offices were located at the centre of Karang, about 2 
kilometers from the border. But in 2002, in line with President Abdoulaye 
Wade’s policies to redefine cross-border exchange with The Gambia, the 
Offices relocated closer to the border with Amdallai.  From this new site, 
border agents could better control border flows and monitor evaders of 
border control.  
Karang’s police office comprised regular border police, plain clothes 
and intelligence personnel. The Customs office includes undercover 
economic intelligence personnel used for spying across the border. A 
Senegalese Gendarme camp stands close to the border at Touba Couta, a 
community with a nature reserve park for tourists. Karang is also known as 
Poste Karang, a reference to the border control offices located there.153 In 
2013, its population was about 13,000 people.  
Situated on north Gambia and northwest Senegal, the Amdallai-
Karang border directly links Banjul and Dakar through Kaolack -a 
Senegalese town-, Route Nationale No.5, the north bank trunk road and the 
Banjul-Barra ferry crossing. The Amdallai-Karang border is a popular border 
crossing point in Senegambia. There are villages on both sides of the 
border.  But there are no visible buffer zones that separate most of these 
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border communities. Normally, the travel time from Banjul to Dakar is six 
hours. People can use private, commercial and public transportation for this 
journey.  
The Amdallai-Karang border has been a major route for the re-export 
trade, which enabled The Gambia to be a “coastal warehouse state” which 
fed off frontier economic disparities with its neighbours, especially 
Senegal.154 Today, the Amdallai-Karang border’s role as the conduit of trade 
has diminished, validating claims that cross-border trade is prone to various 
shifts.155 However, it is still an important transit point for a considerable 
volume of trade (see chapter 6).  
Since 2000, Senegalese transporters have used Karang to stage 
border protests against Gambian authorities. Border protests, political 
hooliganism and the vandalisation of public property have become new 
narratives in Amdallai-Karang border experiences. 
 
2.4.3. Farrafenni 
Farrafenni is located in the North Bank Region of The Gambia, along the 
Bamba Tenda-YelliTenda ferry crossing. The Trans-Gambia Highway, which 
runs across the centre of The Gambia, cuts through it and connects it to 
Jarra Soma, another important Gambian commercial town in the Lower 
River Region. Farrafenni is strategically located. It is an important regional 
commercial hub and communication junction for cross-border and sub-
regional exchange. Hence, it’s more popular than the North Bank’s regional 
capital Kerewan. Senegal’s Route Nationale No. 4 links Kaolack, Niorro and 
Keur Ayib and connects to the Trans-Gambia Highway at Farrafenni. These 
road connections go further down to Bignona and Ziguinchor (Casamance) 
through The Gambia.  
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Farrafenni (the tail of the rice fields) derived from two Mandinka terms 
Farolu (the rice fields) and fenyo (tail). The settlement’s name came from a 
re-naming of an earlier settlement named Chaku Bantang, which was 
founded by a legendary Mandinka man Walimang Dibba. Chaku Bantang 
was located about two kilometers away from the rice fields of the Mandinka 
women on the south bank of The Gambia River.156 The name is a 
combination of the Dibba protonym (praise name) Chaku Dibba and the 
large Bantang (silk cotton) tree that stood in the vicinity of the original 
settlement.  
Before 1952, Farrafenni was insignificant. It had no shops; no 
groundnut purchasing secor and was hardly listed on the map of The 
Gambia. Its people only farmed and sold their groundnuts and shopped at 
Ballinghor, the nearest wharf town located 3.5 kilometers away.157 But the 
construction of the north bank trunk road, which transected the Trans-
Gambia Highway at Farrafenni, changed the destiny of the settlement.158 It 
attracted trade as river transport declined and wharf towns in The Gambia 
collapsed. From the ashes of Ballinghor, Farrafenni rose. Ballinghor’s 
traders and shops relocated there. The settlement became a convenient 
market town for traders from Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Mali 
and Mauritania.159 The name Farrafenni replaced Chaku Bantang and was 
featured in the late colonial and post-colonial maps of The Gambia. 
Today, Farrafenni’s population is about 30,000 people. It has a lumo 
(weekly market) and an Anglican Mission secondary technical school. This 
school was for many years, the most highly sought after secondary school in 
North Bank and Central River Regions of The Gambia. The town also has 
telephone networks, clinics, a bank, a major military barracks of The Gambia 
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National Army, a major referral hospital constructed by the Jammeh regime 
and a mini stadium. In the past, it also hosted a National Trading 
Corporation (NTC) wholesale depot. The Gambia Immigration Department, 
the Gambia National Police, the National Intelligence Agency and Drug 
Control Enforcement Agency all have their divisional headquarters in the 
town. In 1995, armed rebels who wanted to overthrow the Yahya Jammeh 
government attacked the Farrafenni barracks. However, they were repelled. 
Farrafenni links with Keur Ayib, a neighbouring Senegalese border village. 
2.4.4. Keur Ayib 
Goorgi Ayib Gueye, a Gambian Islamic scholar founded Keur Ayib after he 
returned from his cleric’s sojourn in pursuit of Islamic education (see chapter 
7). The place name is from Keur (home, in Wollof) and Ayib, the founder’s 
name. It means “home of Ayib, or “Ayib’s settlement” or “Ayib’s community.” 
The word Goorgi is an honorific term used before the names of respectable 
male personalities in Wollof society.160 Ayib mobilised labour from relatives 
and well-wishers to clear the thick bushy land inhabited by hyenas and other 
species of wild animals, which became his settlement. After constructing 
residential structures there, relatives and other people moved in with him to 
scare away the wild animals. He established an Islamic school in the 
community, and taught students the Quran. Ayib’s community survived 
through farming.161  
Across the border from Keur Ayib is Keur Aly, a Gambian border 
village founded by Ayib’s father, and the original home of Ayib. The two 
villages are considered “twin” villages and their communities have strong 
kinship bonds. Both communities bury their dead in one cemetery and 
worship in the same mosque in The Gambia.  
Keur Aly is the immediate Gambian border village to Senegal (Keur 
Ayib), but Farrafenni is considered the border “post,” due to its commercial 
importance in cross-border exchange. The village of Medina Sabakh, also 
                                                            








founded by Gambian families who moved across the border into Senegal, is 
located about 2 kilometers from Keur Ayib. It was an important 
administrative post for the French colonial government. Both Keur Ayib and 
Medina Sabakh benefit and survive from the border. The border 
enforcement agents are located in Keur Ayib, whereas the regional 
administrative office is located in Medina Sabakh.  
Keur Ayib was opened up by a road network that was initially planned 
to pass through Medina Sabakh, but was re-routed to the village after 
Medina Sabakh protested about the initial plan.162 Keur Ayib became 
connected to major urban and cross-border economic centres and became 
an important thoroughfare for cross-border communication and exchange, 
ending its isolation.   
 From Farrafenni, going into Keur Ayib, a Senegalese Gendarmerie 
camp is noticeable. Its wall/fence stands almost neck-to-neck to the barrage 
that separates the two countries. To the left, a small mosque stands in-
between the Gendarmerie and the Douanes offices. The Gendarme camp 
also serves as the residences for staff from both offices. The Chef de 
Bureau of the Customs lives in a well-guarded and restricted residence next 
to the Customs Office. The Senegalese Border Police post is located about 
0.5 kilometer away, to the right when facing the border. The Senegalese 
Border Forestry Office is also located a short distance away from the police 
station. It is the first Senegalese government agency one encounters on the 
way to exiting the border.  Keur Ayib’s population was about 1153 in 
2015.163  
Keur Ayib, Farrafenni, Karang and Amdallai were all founded by 
families who sought to isolate themselves from the colonial administration. 
These “self-contained” sites of refuge were symbols of indigenous 











irrespective of the dome-ndeye solidarity highlighted in the deep politics of 
these communities, the border has also been a source of dome-baaye 
sentiments in The Gambia-Senegal  interstate relations. 
 
2.5. The Border and Interstate Dynamics 
The border has been a resource for both indigenous people and for the 
state. The border community building projects made use of cultural 
resources such as kinship. Through various support systems, the founders’ 
of these communities relied on their social networks to achieve their 
settlement creation ambitions. Inter-ethnic mixing was also facilitated as new 
settlements opened up to other people from other ethnic groups. This 
reinforced Senegambia’s tradition for mixed settlements. These communities 
adopted a common body of rules, which blurred ethnic identities. They also 
promoted common values and a shared culture, and thus created cohesive 
communities.  Local people also used the border to distance themselves 
from colonial rule and oppression. The border offered quick exit and flight, to 
escape political threats from the opposite side of the border. But the colonial 
government also formulated strategies to exploit the political economy of the 
border.164 The road networks it built around the border and administrative 
agencies established in the border communities were intended to enforce 
the colonial agenda for taxation, wealth extraction and economic competition 
in Senegambia. These colonial legacy gave birth to the postcolonial policies 
that restrict the cross-border mobility of certain goods and even humans. 
Colonial road networks faciliated mobility, contact and economic 
competition  within and between The Gambia and Senegal. So colonial 
policy entrenched dome-ndeye ideas across the borders. But it also 
promoted dome-baaye sentiments through the economic rivalry that defined 
British and French economic policies in Senegambia. The way local people 
used the border to create settlements and new economic opportunities for 
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themselves and the way the colonial government used the border to gain 
economic benefits from it connected  the “deep politics of society” and the  
“high politics of state” in colonial Senegambia.165 These connections 
endured and are part of postcolonial border dynamics in Senegambia.  
The developments at the border also implied tensions in state-society 
relations.  The conflicts between the indigenous people and the colonial 
administration resulted in the creation of some of the border settlements and 
also new border administrative outposts. Medina Sabakh resisted French 
plans to build a road through its community. But Keur Ayib became the new 
location for the road, which made it an economically viable community. 
These border dynamics highlight how communities, like the state, creatively 
use the resources at their disposal to tackle their constraints.  It also shows 
that conflicts can have productive outcomes, if not for all, but for some 
people. These colonial border dynamics would shape The Gambia-Senegal 
postcolonial relations over the border. They also shaped the nature of cross-
border ties and the kinship and religious links between the two countries. 
Since religious ambition has significantly contributed to border settlement 
creation, the next section explores how religious and kinship values 
interconnect to shape Senegambian kinship discourses and interstate 
relations over the border.   
 
2.6: Religion and Cross-Border Solidarity  
Religion brought new values to The Gambia-Senegal border through the 
creation of Amdallai, Karang, and Keur Ayib settlements, which were 
premised on logics of a model cross-border community. 166 These religious 
settlements were embedded in cross-border social and religious life and 
easily drew membership from both sides of the border. Religious 
infrastructure such as Quranic schools and mosques were provided in the 
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community to support spirituality.167 The border was therefore shaped by 
religion. 
The border too has had a formative effect on cross-border religious 
attachments. Generally, most Gambians and Senegalese are Muslims or 
Christians. But they could belong to different sects and denominations that 
have different spiritual practices. Senegalese are more embedded in 
religious brotherhoods. They display their religious attachments as part of 
their everyday practices. They can swear in the name of their spiritual 
guides, or praise them in their everyday conversations, or use their images 
and posters in homes, offices, markets, streets, and so on. In contrast, 
Gambians are less integrated into religious brotherhoods, except for groups 
like the Nema Nasiru community. However, there are Sufi communities in 
both countries. But they are more predominant in Senegal than in The 
Gambia or in other neighbouring countries.168 However, the differences in 
the way Gambians and Senegalese manifest their religious attachments to 
brotherhoods does not undermine cross-border religious and interfaith 
solidarity (see chapter 7). 
Predominantly Muslim Senegal elected a Christian, the late Leopold 
Sedar Senghor, as president at independence and he ruled the country for 
about two decades. This religious tolerance also features in Gambian 
political life.  Sir Dawda K. Jawara, who ruled the country for about thirty 
years as president converted to Christianity but later returned to Islam. This 
                                                            
167Ibid; Charlotte A. Quinn, Mandingo Kingdoms of the Senegambia (London: 
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was never an obstacle to his political career in predominantly Muslim 
Gambia. President Jawara was deposed in a military coup in 1994.169 
Islamic and Christian religious holidays are officially recognised and 
celebrated in both The Gambia and Senegal. During these occasions, 
Muslim and Christian religious leaders “exchange messages of goodwill 
punctuated by statements of mutual respect and recognition of their 
respective prophets and faiths. Religious leaders of both faiths also stress 
the need to maintain religious harmony” for social peace.170 Believers of 
non-monotheist religions also share these values with the rest of 
Senegambia.  
Cross-border social and inter-religious solidarities are offshoots of 
Senegambian ‘theories” about spirituality. Briefly, these theories center on a 
belief in the existence of a supreme God who sanctified human relations. 
God rewards individuals for strengthening ties and He punishes them for 
severing and desecrating family bonds. He also rewards good and punishes 
evil, which is part of a belief in an afterlife, and a judgement day. 
Senegambians also believe that God’s reward to individuals starts in the 
present life. God is a merciful God who listens and satisfies the needs of 
individuals who pray to Him. Prayer is a power link that connects man to 
God. It brings good fortune and controls supernatural forces that affect man 
(see chapter 7).  These theories about spirituality shape social behaviour 
and practices among religious communities and inter-generational relations 
among different social groups in Senegambia. 
The spiritual quest is to attain nearness to the divine and to have that, 
one must continuously journey on the Creator’s path. Historically, 
Senegambian men of piety who desire spiritual elevation and closeness to 
God embark on literal and metaphorical Journeys of Piety. These involve 
physical displacement to other places to study under reputed scholars of the 
time and to “discover” and learn through devotion, esoteric spiritual 
knowledge. Such an aspirant voluntarily gives up the comfort and familiarity 
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of his home to seek God in the insecurity of the “wilderness.” He 
experiences hardship, loneliness, hunger, suffering and many kinds of 
tribulations that “un-toughens” the heart for it to accommodate God. These 
experiences help the individual to gain wisdom—the outcome of tough life 
experiences endured during these spiritual projects. They also cleanse the 
individual, ridding him off arrogance, bad manners, greed and all other 
behaviour that a pious heart cannot accommodate.171  
Exile was a path to piety for people on religious projects. Thus, many 
of Senegambia’s fabled men of piety suffered displacement and exile - from 
Sheikh Amadou Bamba, to Bai Ibrahima Niass, to Sheikh Mass Kah and Ma 
Ansou Niang, to name a few. Bai Ibrahima Niass, Sheikh Mass Kah and Ma 
Ansou Niang had all lived some of their displacement and exile in The 
Gambia. The well-loved Gambian religious scholar Austas Omar Bun Jeng 
spent many years in Senegal before finally returning home to The Gambia.  
People embark on these journeys by personal choice, but the journeys have 
broad social outcomes that resulted from that person’s/ wayfarer’s 
interactions with people and communities he encountered while on this 
journey.  
Senegambian culture and humanitarian values require that people 
show kindness and support to displaced persons or the wayfarer, or 
toumarankee, especially those seeking God. They should provide them with 
housing, food, hospitality, guidance and so on, as a matter of right. Helping 
a toumarankee is considered a devotional act that has a trickledown 
effect.172 Individuals who help strangers are divinely rewarded for their 
kindness and that reward extends to other family members like children. 
This implies the kindness a parent shows to the wayfarer guarantees that his 
or her children will never want or despair while in the “wilderness.” Helping 
strangers also signifies sharing the bounties of God, which is an important 
Islamic injunction. 
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Senegambian culture expects the wayfarer to show gorray in return 
for people’s generosity. Gorray is a reciprocal sentiment from someone who 
has benefitted from another person’s benevolence. It is a combination of 
gratefulness, faithfulness and dignity.173  Gorray leads to sentiments of 
wullere or kullere, the bases for enduring social relations. These terms (both 
used here to mean the same thing) refer to an inter-generational sense of 
gratitude and positive association that derives from long-standing ties and 
past positive encounters, experiences of mutual assistance and other kinds 
of social engagement that connect members of a community (see chapter 
7). Wullere concerns both interpersonal and collective relations of the past 
based on host-guest, teacher-student, fellow traveller, companionship, or 
prayer service ties among individuals. Senegambia inter-ethnic joking 
traditions also derived from sentiments of wullere based on social contacts 
during displacement, exile, trade and other journeys or encounters of the 
past. It serves as the social infrastructure for ongoing and future relations 
among persons, between families or social groups. Individuals or groups 
connected through it are expected to protect it. It structures social solidarity 
and civic engagement in ways that are beyond the reach of the state. 
Wullere/kullere structures social communication among 
Senegambia’s talibee networks. They routinely invoke past generosities, 
solidarities and companionships among major religious figures to sanction 
their later offspring to honour, respect and be loyal to each other. It is a 
common practice among Senegambian religious groups to say “from the 
times of the Maams, or Sunyo Maami,” which means from the time of our 
forefathers. In Senegambian social thought and communication, such an 
oral reference emphasises the historicity and authenticity of an act, or a 
relationship. Wullere can be used to invoke and retell relationships that 
originate in the past. Retelling long memories of social encounters 
cognitively conditions social behaviour and configures longue durée social, 
intellectual and symbolic capital in society.  
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Wullere reconstructs Senegambian heritage. Its function as heritage 
is beyond the commemorative status given to physical space. People 
respond to it cognitively. It is self-regulating and self-referential, and 
connects diverse individuals who understand and engage with the present 
through the past. They share values and meanings and a sense of 
belonging.174 Heritage aids continuity in social relations and it can be 
reclaimed to sooth both social and political ruptures in society. 
 Wullere has similar symbolic meanings to dome-ndeye and dome-
baaye, since all three words derive from relations of the past. Together, 
these words embody the fabric metaphor, which is also a symbolic 
patchwork for cross-border ties. It is thus meaningful to understand wullere 
as heritage, which fosters continuities in social and economic relations 
beyond the limitations of territory.  Like most Senegambian kinship 
metaphors, wullere can fill political gaps in interstate relations, too. It can 
harmonise social, economic and political objectives. It offers religious 
communities a protected space where religious leaders can prevail on 
political elites to safeguard interstate relations when it is threatened. 
Islam and society have similar attitudes towards social bonds. Hence, 
Senegambian society did not find it difficult to be receptive to Islam.175 Islam 
became a resource for pursuing the social agenda, contributing to 
institutional stability in society. As The Gambia-Senegal relations meander 
between phases of harmony and discord, Senegambian religious sites 
largely work as “peace-building” spaces for cross-border and interstate 
relations. Islam has been a mediator of peace, stimulator of order, harmony 
and friendship in cross-border, interstate and state-society relations in 
Senegambia. It provides an avenue for social actors to interact with political 
ones and reduces the barrier functions of the border (see chapter 7).  
However, subject to changes in social and political processes, 
religious and kinship ideals may not be observed. They could be ignored or 
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misused to breach social, economic and political relations and thus pose a 
danger to relations. In the next section, we explore how the state, like 
people, demonstrates creativity and contingency in the use of religious, 
kinship and other resources to foster its political agenda.   
 
2.7: Learning from the Grassroots: The Gambia-Senegal Political 
Relations 
Senegambian religious and kinship ideas have political uses. Politicians 
selectively use them in interstate relations. The presidents and ministers of 
The Gambia and Senegal routinely referred to each other as dome-ndeye, 
natangho or “brother” and “friend” even while communicating in English or 
French. The use of such egalitarian language reaffirms equality between the 
two countries, irrespective of size differences. Some observers, who frame 
these words within global political exchanges, may argue that they are 
“standards” for international political communication. Politicians are usually 
swayed by sentiments of international law and politics. Their public remarks 
are influenced by norms in international political communication, and 
“brother” and “friend” are a common reference in most bilateral gender-blind 
political speeches.  
However, the words Gambian and Senegalese politicians use to talk 
about interstate relations are carefully chosen and are embedded in socio-
religious attitudes. As such, the terms “brother” and “friend” have grassroots 
social significance. They embody traditional camaraderie language that 
celebrates relations among age-sets in village or community contexts, 
among leaders of neighbouring communities, or among people connected 
through different forms of lateral bonds. When used to denote interstate 
relations, they signify mbokh and dome-ndeye relatedness. 
From the 1960s to the late 1980s, interstate communication and 
cooperation symbolically integrated the fabric metaphor, wullere, dome-
ndeye and dome-baaye ties.176 Religious and kinship ideas like the 
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“friendship bonds” have been used to foster a shared “Senegambian 
identity,” and to promote the Senegambian “re-unification” agenda. The 
twinning of Banjul and Dakar in 1967 came out of these desires. The 
establishment of “friendship” bonds between individuals and between 
communities has been a longstanding practice in Senegambia. Based on 
ideas of friendship, Mandinkas, for instance, name two people who share a 
reliable amity as banta kunsal - twins beyond/outside the womb.177  The 
description of this relationship, like the twinning project, mirrored society, 
forged stronger interpersonal or inter-community ties and where applicable, 
gave legitimacy to the integration agenda. 
 The two states initiated Penchum Chosannie Senegambia (The 
Cross-Roads of Senegambian Culture or Traditions), an annual cross-border 
and interstate celebration of Senegambian culture. A joint committee of the 
two states organised and funded indigenous arts and craft competitions, 
games such as wrestling, hair plaiting, poetry, music, group performances 
and hala mbologan (a traditional quiz). Politicians and ordinary citizens 
attended these events. By 1979, Penchum Chossanie Senegambia was 
officially celebrated for the fifth time since independence.178 These 
celebrations were part of joint interstate cultural programmes, which 
included youth exchange visits between the two countries and the 
establishment of the Senegalo-Gambian Advisory Committee on Education, 
Culture, Youth and Sports. 
The interstate cooperation on education led to the establishment of 
the Senegalese high and primary schools in The Gambia. The schools 
offered bilingual instruction in French and English, to both Gambians and 
Senegalese. A joint Senegalese-Gambian management committee 
managed these schools, which had two streams.179 
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The political use of religious and kinship resources to further the 
state’s agenda extended to the economy. The two countries collaborated in 
agriculture, economic planning, crop protection, forestry, animal health and 
production, posts and telecommunication, civil aviation, meteorology and 
public health. In posts and telecommunications, they negotiated the direct 
exchange of money orders. In health, they harmonised “health legislations, 
control of endemic diseases and social evils such as uncontrolled sale of 
drugs, alcoholism, “xessal” and improper use of narcotics.” They also 
exchanged doctors and public health technicians and together reviewed the 
state of primary health care in both countries. They supervised contagious 
diseases and coordinated border vaccination campaigns. They had regular 
consultations on health matters.180 In tourism, they collaborated and 
published a Senegalo-Gambia Bilingual Tourist Guide. By 1980, the two 
countries collaborated on the Dakar-Banjul-Bissau road project. They 
amicably re-demarcated their land boundary through a friendly reallocation 
of territory between them. The negotiations for all these initiatives were 
framed by dome-ndeye and wullere sentiments.   
Interstate cooperation in these areas happened in a cross-border 
cultural and social environment where people conducted cross-border and 
cross-ethnic marriages, celebrated each other’s joys, mourned each other’s 
deaths, traded with each other, helped each other on the farms, shared 
farmlands and worshipped together, among other things (see chapters 1, 3, 
4, 5, 6 & 7). Integrating the political agenda with the social one was also 
facilitated by the cultural system: the two states share wullere, they 
constitute a fabric and they are dome-ndeyes. 
 However, there is another side to interstate relations. The two 
countries can be dome-baayes too, when state logics dictate that (see 
chapters 4 & 5). Policy statements on interstate relations were at times not 
honoured, due to reluctance and policy differences. For example, plans to 
construct a bridge across The Gambia River to “end the use of ferries,” and 
                                                            






also to construct a barrage and dams to facilitate the development of 
agriculture in both countries under The Gambia River Basin Organisation 
(OMVG) never materialised, due to political reluctance and differences in 
policy goals.181 While serious interstate policy challenges failed to be settled, 
interstate cooperation in foreign affairs was promising. The erratic nature of 
interstate cooperation symbolises the longstanding mistrust and competition 
between the British and French in Senegambia. Former colonial rivalries 
influence the attitudes of the political elites; however, personal agendas as 
well as political ones have had defining influences on interstate relations. In 
that sense, politicians and ordinary citizens draw from the same script, and 
can be both cooperative and prone to conflict depending on what is at stake.  
M'bai also observed that from 1969-1971, the relationship between 
the two countries was turbulent and since then, the relationship continued 
towards a distant path.182 Like the border, interstate relations were subject to 
shifts but reflect the social idiom that irrespective of how much the tongue 
and the teeth clash, they must learn to live in the same mouth (see chapter 
1). The tongue and teeth metaphor excuses fighting, but they must make-up 
again. Making –it up again has been an enduring feature of interstate 
relations.  
Some observers of The Gambia-Senegal relations praise the Jawara-
Senghor era as the apex of cordial interstate relations. The two countries 
signed numerous treaties of friendship and cooperation during this time. 
They also conducted a friendly demarcation of the border with dome-ndeye 
and wullere style. The Jawara-Diouf era was utopian and was marked by 
Diouf’s ambitious re-unification agenda.  It led to the Senegambia 
Confederation, which eventually collapsed (see chapter 1). The Jammeh-
Diouf period was marked by uncertainty in interstate relations. Diouf thought 
he could use his mature political experience to lure young Jammeh and his 
government to come back to his integration project, but Jammeh and his 
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fellow young officers had no interest in “handing over” their country to 
Senegal. Interstate relations erratically shifted between periods of good and 
acrimonious relations. The Jammeh-Wade presidencies were also an 
uneasy time for bilateral ties. Interstate suspicion was high and at times the 
two countries engaged in verbal confrontations. The border between the two 
countries was closed several times during their rules (see chapter 3). 
President Macky Sall inherited the uneasy interstate relations Wade left 
behind. The Jammeh-Sall relation was the worst time for interstate relations 
as the two countries constantly fought over the border, which was at one 
time, closed by the Senegalese transport association, for almost five months 
(see chapter 4).   
State logics and leadership have equally contributed to the escalation 
of The Gambia-Senegal political tensions over border. M’bai viewed that 
proposals for unification in Africa have been problematic. “Neither cogent 
economic and geographic factors (as in Senegambia), nor a fervent belief in 
African unity (as exemplified by the members of the Ghana-Guinea- Mali 
“Union of African States”) appeared sufficiently strong to overcome the 
centrifugal forces resulting from independence.”183 Therefore, centrifugal 
forces contributed to The Gambia-Senegal political conflicts. However, if 
interstate territorial pressures cause tough interstate struggles over transport 
and other issues that lead to “a cold war” between the two countries,” the 
two countries swiftly attempt to improve relations.184 This makes interstate 
relations fascinating.  
Interstate cooperative and uncooperative acts existed side by side. In 
1980, when Senegal had to close 23 missions abroad including those in 
Guinea Bissau and Mali due to economic crisis in the country, it maintained 
its mission in The Gambia.185 The two countries also sought to harmonise 
their positions at meetings of regional and international organisations. But 
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amidst these events, they failed to come to terms on whether to construct or 
not to construct the Trans-Gambia Bridge.186 Interstate relations are clearly 
complex and dynamic, as we will see in the other chapters that follow this 
one. Next, we conclude this chapter before moving to chapter 3.   
 
2.8: Conclusion 
This chapter explored how institutional systems structured discord and 
harmony in interstate relations. It also explored how continuities and 
discontinuities in cross-border social and political systems reinforced 
interstate political difficulties or harmony in The Gambia-Senegal relations. It 
has discussed the nuanced nature of state-society relations. It also 
introduced the border areas, which are the case study sites for this study. It 
also briefly introduced the themes of transport, trade and talibee or religious 
networks to prepare us for engaging with them in subsequent chapters. It 
gave examples of how metaphors and social idioms of relations were 
integrated in the practices of ordinary people and politicians as they work 
around cross-border, interstate and state-society dynamics in Senegambia. 
Thus, the chapter sets the ground for discussing chapter 3, which explores 
how cross-border transport was anchored in cultural and religious values 
and how that helped to advance the interests of both state and non-state 




















TRANSPORT, CROSS-BORDER PRACTICES AND 
INTERSTATE POLITICAL RELATIONS 
 
“May the spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness that has always characterised the 
relationship between our two peoples continue to grow from strength to strength.”187 
(Gambian President Sir Dawda Jawara wrote to Senegalese President Abdou Diouf, April 
1990). 
 
“The chauffeur is never dependable.” 
(A Wollof saying). 
 
3.0: Interstate Relations and Transport  
From an empiricist viewpoint, conflict and cooperation in the cross-border 
transport sector embodies the intermingling of what Lonsdale called the 
“high politics of the state” and the “deep politics of society.”188 Economic and 
interpersonal transactions in the sector are complex. Transporters’ everyday 
practices and attitudes are anchored in Senegambian culture, traditional and 
modern economic motives and state-centric ideas.189 Thus, the cross-border 
transport sector embodies the co-extension between Senegambian social 
spheres and the political domain. This hybridised character of the sector 
partly explains why it is both a source of friction and cooperation in interstate 
relations. 
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This chapter studies how cultural norms are embedded in interstate 
and cross-border relations around transport. The main question it explores 
is: how did cross-border transport historically adapt to cultural and religious 
structures in Senegambia to promote cross-border and interstate 
cooperation, and how did this degenerate causing political difficulties for The 
Gambia-Senegal relations? Chapter 2 highlighted how state logics 
intersected social rhetoric and indigenous principles of cooperation in 
interstate relations. This chapter discusses how transporters and politicians 
instrumentalised cultural norms and practices to promote cross-border and 
interstate relations. 
In other to understand the history and changing conditions in cross-
border transport in Senegambia, it is useful to draw from some of the ideas 
Berry used to explain how African agrarian systems work. She argued that in 
most parts of Africa, access to resources (means of production) and the way 
these resources are used depend on power dynamics. In turn, power 
dynamics depend on how cultures define rights and obligations in social, 
economic and political relations.190  
Similarly, cross-border transport relations in Senegambia are steeped 
in social, religious, political and economic philosophies. And the sector 
thrives at the intersection of culture, religion, politics and economics. These 
domains create a fertile ground for transporters to use multiple resources 
that are at their disposal to pursue their economic interests. This flexibility 
reflects in the inconsistent attitudes and practices in the transport sector. It 
also underpins how state logics interact with transporters’ economic logics, 
which leads to both conflict and cooperation in the sector.  
The mix-matching of attitudes and practices in the transport sector 
replays how Gambian and Senegalese states routinely use kinship ideas in 
interstate communication, even though states talk to other states using 
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formalistic language.191 This process is also connected to a more extensive 
practice in which both politicians and ordinary Senegambians use kinship 
language to foster relations that happen in other contexts. The use of 
cultural tools can be circumstantial. But this does not imply that these 
cultural resources are always subject to daily changes and redefinitions.192 
People can use kinship language in different contexts. However, terms like 
dome-ndeye, dome-baaye and wullere have bounded meanings. They 
signify familial and social bonds and denote lateral or hierarchical social 
relations and/or power structures (see chapter 1). They also sanction cross-
border mbohk ties and the privileges that grow from them. For example, in 
1967, Senegalese authorities officially appealed to Gambian authorities for 
“sympathetic consideration” to bring at par fare tariffs on the Trans-Gambia 
ferries with those in Senegal.193 The phrase “sympathetic consideration” 
comes from the social value ndimbalante, the corner stone of dome-ndeye 
ties and relations inspired by wullere. It means empathy and being your 
brother’s keeper. In a prototypical response, Gambian authorities consented 
to the Senegalese request. This example historicises the contemporary use 
of kinship metaphors in interstate political communication and how cultural 
resources are used flexibly. Notwithstanding, the meanings associated with 
these typical Senegambian kinship terminologies leave little or no leeway for 
reinterpretation.  
We can contextualise some historical and socially-contingent 
practices in the transport sector to show that although culture is dynamic,  
there are however, some cultural forms and institutions in Senegambia that 
do not seem to change. For example, Senegambian Muslims use cola nuts 
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to negotiate and tie marriages. This practice has been going on for several 
generations and there is no indication that “modernity” will change it. The 
practice for a man to offer bridal gifts to his new wife or wife- to-be also 
endures. Joking relations have similarly endured in Senegambia. These 
facts imply culture can be both bounded and unbounded depending on the 
durability of certain practices which social groups consider as core to their 
uniqueness as a people. The above vision of culture is well-articulated by 
Kluckhohn’s point that:  
Culture consists of patterns, explicit, and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and 
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, 
including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached 
values.194 
 
Cultural practices may change or endure depending on the values attached 
to them.  The way some Senegambian cultural ideas endure over others 
reflects this reality. Evans- Pritchard argued that to understand social 
change, we must engage with history, which mirrors social change.195 As 
such, it is useful to identify the practices and behaviour of transporters under 
the joint transport network and under the disintegrated transport system in 
order to know how history, culture and social change affected relations in 
cross-border transport, transporter-state and interstate relations in 
Senegambia. 
 Irrespective of the enduring quality of kinship discourses, 
Senegambian culture has not prevented interstate transport cooperation 
from degenerating into acute rivalries. Therefore, we can use the transport 
sector to identify the complex nature of state-society and interstate relations 
in Senegambia. We can also identify how personal logics can also contribute 
to conflict in society and how conflict can sometimes yield positive outcomes 
in relations.  
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The first part of the chapter discusses how politicians utilised cultural 
resources to structure the joint cross-border transport network in 
Senegambia. In return, transporters also appropriated similar resources to 
guide their economic relations.  The second part of the chapter details an 
ethnography conducted on the cross-border transport sector. It shows how 
transporters’ practices complemented interstate cooperative policies on 
transport and contributed to a stable cross-border transport market and to 
predictable economic relations.  It also identifies some conflict-prone 
practices that contributed to the disintegration of the joint transport network. 
This is followed by the chapter’s conclusion.  The historicising of conflict-
prone and cooperative attitudes in interstate and cross-border transport 
relations guides us to chapters 4 and 5. These two chapters deal with more 
contemporary issues in cross-border transport and interstate relations. 
We dedicate chapters 3, 4 and 5 to transport since it has shaped 
interstate relations in a major way from colonial times to contemporary life. 
Additionally, the political struggles in the sector provide good examples of 
how dome-ndeye and dome-baaye sentiments are manifested in socio-
political and economic relations. The sector also embodies a more nuanced 
representation of Senegambian socio-political, economic and religious 
contexts.  It also straddles the public-private domain. Conflicts in the sector 
relate to both government (public) and private-operated (individuals) 
commercial transport modes. Issues about transport have a greater potential 
to shift interstate relations when compared to the domains of trade and 
talibee (religious) networks. These two domains are the subject of chapters 
6 and 7, respectively.196 Transport also mediates economic relations, 
interstate politics and grassroots engagement in Senegambia. The next 
sections identify the ways the sector has acted as both a cohesive and a 
divisive political instrument in Senegambia.  
                                                            
196See, Jean- Marie Cour and Serge Snrech, introduction to Preparing for the future, a 
vision of West Africa in the year 2020, West Africa long-term perspective study, ed. Jean- 






3.1: Interstate Routes: Connecting Cross-Border Communities 
The Gambia-Senegal policy cooperation on roads fostered dome-ndeye ties 
in Senegambia. The 1965 Agreement on Road and Transport and the 1970 
agreement on Road Transport, created nine inter-state routes, which 
connected cross-border communities and transit traffic in Senegambia. Five 
of these routes were located along the Banjul-Barra (Karang-Amdallai) and 
Trans-Gambia (Farrafenni-Keur Ayib) border areas.197 Overall, these roads 
redefined the barrier functions of the border. People located on both sides of 
the border could easily and frequently travel across it.  
Good roads promoted cross-border sociality, trade, and outreach. 
Cross-border road connections embodied the Senegambian Wollof social 
dictum that “tangh moi dox mbokh,” (the feet strengthen kinship or the feet 
walk kinship). This Wollof saying expresses the importance placed on social 
visitations and outreach in society. Therefore, the location of interstate 
routes followed Senegambian cultural logics of exchange and outreach and 
were a symbolic articulation of Senegambian one-ness. They mimicked the 
moral drive behind the creation of Karang, Amdallai, and Ker Ayib border 
settlements (see chapter 2). Infused with the language of unity and 
togetherness, the roads were also a coded representation of the 
Senegambian social order and social institutions. Thanks to the roads, 
cross-border economic and social activities flourished for the mutual benefits 
of people on both sides of the border.  As a political feat, the interstate road 
building partnership was rooted in state logics, too.  
The lack of a 50-50 distribution of the cross-border roads for either 
side of the border was at face value an unequal standard of distribution. But 
in spirit, this act was equitable. The location of the new road networks and 
vehicle access rules were also informed by longstanding patterns of mobility, 
social contact and exchange. Instructively, these rules communicated the 
                                                            
197 Before the 1965 Agreement on road and transport, there was the 1956 Trans-Gambia 
Road and Ferry: Agreements with the Government-General of French West Africa (March 






cultural ethics for sharing, values for equity, compromise and safeguarding 
the collective interest. 
 Based on culture-driven strategies, Gambian commercial vehicles 
were authorised to ply between three interstate traffic points namely, 
Kaolack–Farrafenni-Kaolack and Farrafenni-Zinguinchor-Farrafenni. 
Senegalese vehicles ran traffic from Kaolack-Zinguinchor-Kaolack, 
effectively connecting North Senegal to Casamance via River Gambia. 
Consequently, cross-border road networks linked different cross-border rural 
communities. These communities were also connected to urban centers in 
both The Gambia and Senegal.  The two countries blended the culture of the 
people and the culture of the state to negotiate the transport partnership and 
route distribution. 
They also cooperated in building transport infrastructure such as 
roads. This eased border administration, opened up isolated border 
communities and created new economic opportunities for border 
communities. It also strengthened existing indigenous modes of habitation 
and production (see chapter 2).  
For the state, and as shown in the next section, it facilitated 
institutional adaptation, which helped to control the territorial pressures the 
border created in The Gambia-Senegal relations.  Additionally, it enabled the 
state to better perform its statehood at its margins through the establishment 
of new sites for border administration. Thus, interstate road construction 
appropriately reflected dome-ndeye sentiments of rule. It promoted 
uniformity, cooperation and at the same time diversity in the pursuit of state 












3.2: Documentary Requirements, Institutional Arrangements and 
Road Safety Policies 
Indigenous and state-centric institutional forms and techniques of operation 
guided The Gambia-Senegal transport cooperation. Mbokh and dome-ndeye 
sentiments provided fitting foundations for formulating policies that are 
mutually beneficial for people in both countries. However, interstate 
transport arrangements were also informed by international standards. The 
policies were a“…progress in defining the international system of road 
routes.”198 For example, cross- border drivers from both countries were 
required to obtain: 
 A three-year valid government authorisation issued by the Motor 
Licensing Authority, for The Gambia, and Services des Transports 
Routier, for Senegal. 
 Registration numbers (Gambian vehicles, Gambian registration 
numbers and same for Senegalese ones) 
 A driving license, or permit de conduire, patente, insurance and road 
tax. 
The two states also set rules on maximum authorised load sizes for 
vehicles, the carrying / seat capacity for each type of vehicle, road 
worthiness tests, roadworthiness certification, motor vehicle insurance and 
third party insurance.  
The documents drivers were required to obtain were all state-issued, 
except for the insurance, which was provided by private insurance 
companies. The two countries also ensured that state-issued documents 
could be obtained from either side of the border, through an inter-state 
processing system.199 The Gambia’s Motor Licensing Authority collaborated 
with the Senegalese High Commission in Banjul to facilitate the interstate 
processing system in the country. In Senegal, Services des Transports 
Routier also collaborated with the High Commission of The Gambia in 
                                                            
198Howe, “The Future of Surface…” 1975, 322. 






Dakar, for the same purpose and in mbokh style.  The road networks 
supported Senegambian cultural ambitions, social thoughts and the united 
Senegambia dream. 
If the roads had social motivations, they never lacked political goals, 
too. Cross-border roads facilitated border administration for the state and 
were important tools for pursuing the state’s political interests. That meant 
Senegal could better police its borders in protecting its national economic 
interests. For The Gambia, the ease of mobility resulting from the roads 
boosted its re-export trade, which has long been disapproved by Senegal. 
The roads like the border were simultaneously symbols of solidarity and 
division for Senegambia. Berry has similarly identified that policies of 
colonial governments in Africa also had such double-edged effects like these 
interstate roads. Colonial policies sought to dominate and economically 
exploit the colonies. But in the process, these policies co-opted and 
restructured African cultural experience and expression, “traditional” African 
systems of power, and production.200 Interstate road networks bridged 
Senegambia, but at the same time, they created barriers. State border 
administration created new havens for controlling cross-border traffic and 
this fueled smuggling of controlled goods from The Gambia into Senegal. As 
reflected in the next section, such effects of interstate road cooperation gave 
rise to new opportunities and complexities in interstate relations (see also 
chapter 4 & 5).   
 
3.3: The Effects of Interstate Cooperation on Transport 
The Gambia-Senegal 1970 Agreement on Roads and Transport and 
interstate transport policies created new economic opportunities for cross-
border transport in Senegambia. Senegalese citizens were quick to start 
cross-border and domestic transport businesses in The Gambia. By 1982, 
the Senegambia Confederation also made it easy for diverse corps of 
Senegalese migrant workers, including transporters, to make a “mass 
                                                            






exodus” to The Gambia. Gambia-based Senegalese transporters operated 
vehicles that were registered in The Gambia. They monopolised both 
domestic and cross-border transport in the country.201 The Gambia 
government-owned transport company, The Gambia Public Transport 
Corporation (GPTC), became the only competitor to Senegalese 
transporters in the cross-border market. GPTC operated bus services 
connected rural and urban Gambia and also Banjul-Dakar. 
The joint transport network also created interconnected motor park 
facilities (also known as garages), that linked Senegambia’s domestic and 
cross-border traffic, Banjul and Dakar. The Banjul-Barra ferry crossing 
connected Banjul and Barra, with cross-border motor park located in Barra. 
Cars from there connected traffic on the north and south banks of The 
Gambia River. They also connected traffic to the Amdallai-Karang border 
through the north bank trunk road. This traffic went as far as Kaolack, Dakar 
and to other places in Senegal. In Dakar, Pompier was the official location 
for cross-border transport to The Gambia. 202  Farrafenni linked the north of 
the river to the south, and it boosted the cross-border traffic as a center for 
both domestic and cross-border traffic to Casamance. 
The interstate transport cooperation had geographical, cultural and 
economic significance. Cross-border road networks and motor parks created 
overlaps and intersections for cross-border traffic and eased economic and 
social outreach.  Social familiarity deepened. Economic transactions also 
increased. The two countries also harmonised their fare systems, which 
reduced travel costs and enabled passengers to pay lower fares to their 
destinations. The interchange facilities also reduced passengers’ travel time. 
For example, a vehicle can directly travel from point A (Barra) to point B 
(Dakar), without encountering obstacles at the border and passengers can 
pay only one fare for the whole trip. Cheap fares encouraged more cross-
                                                            
201My own father migrated from Senegal to The Gambia and invested in transport 
and hotel related businesses in the country. 







border travel on both sides of the border. Investors responded to the rising 
demand for transport services. They bought more cars for commercial 
transport and thus increased the fleet size of the cross-border network.  
Transporters, other citizens and politicians shared the benefits of the 
interstate political alliance on transportation. But some of the social gains the 
interstate transport cooperation yielded had negative effects. People from 
both sides of the border increased their knowledge of each other. But too 
much sociality and political camaraderie burdened Senegambian relations 
lending credence to the English proverb “familiarity breeds contempt.” 
Dome-baaye sentiments gradually took root from the social and economic 
benefits of the transport alliance. Eonomic competition intensified in the 
cross-border transport sector.  
State logics depleted the goodwill for interstate transport cooperation. 
However, conflicts of interests in political and economic goals never stopped 
the two countries from moving towards closer ties. Political turbulence in The 
Gambia in 1980 and 1981, created the opportunity for the two countries to 
try political integration. In 1982, without holding a referendum in both 
countries, Presidents Sir Dawda Jawara and Abdou Diouf signed a hasty 
treaty which establishment the Senegambia Confederation (see chapters 1 
& 2). But the political returns of the Confederation were short-lived. 
Interstate political disputes were augmented, leading to the collapse of the 
joint transport network (see chapters 4 & 5). But before discussing interstate 
transport conflicts, we will discuss the ethnography below to identify the 
outcomes the joint transport network and interstate transport cooperation 
have had, at grassroots level.  
 
3.4: An Ethnography of Cross-Border Transport 
In previous sections of this chapter, we argued that cultural ideas have been 
used to maintain an enduring claim that Gambians and Senegalese are one 
people, irrespective of the colonial history. These cultural ideas, which 
fostered the economic goals of different Senegambians,  also promoted the 






historical changes like the partition and the linking of cross-border 
communities through the construction of road networks transformed 
Senegambian social structure. Structure is used here to mean “an historical 
expression to denote a set of relations known to have endured over a 
considerable period of time.”203 The road networks signified changes in the 
transport sector and in the Senegambian social structure. But the dynamic 
nature of both the transport sector and the social structure is muted in the 
kinship discourses. The ethnography on the working of the transport sector 
therefore highlights the nuances of the sector and interpersonal relations.  
First, the two countries built roads that connected cross-border 
communities. Secondly, they established a uni-modal transport sub-system 
that operated through joint cross-border motor parks. These motor parks 
served as terminal points for domestic and cross-border automobile 
transport. Cross-border motor parks were constructed on communal land 
and were strategically located and easily accessible for the cross-border 
traffic. Communities benefited socially and economically from hosting motor 
parks, symbols of the Senegambian idiom “mbolu muye dole,” (unity is 
strength). This   sentiment made the border a line of continuity.204 The use of 
communal land to host social projects has been part of Senegambian 
culture. Adopting this practice in the transport sector reinforced local 
people’s agency to have a say in the local-level operations of the sector. 
Local people adopted local names and local knowledge in identifying these 
public motor parks. Cross-border motor parks, like domestic ones, were 
locally known as garaso or garas (both words are corrupted versions of the 
English word garage).205 
The internal rules each motor park devised were based on the 
collective inputs of drivers who operated from there. The chef de garage (the 
chief of the garage) was chiefly responsible for the organisation, operation 
and management of the garage. Garage functionaries locally called cocksor 
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or ralluman assisted him. Attempts to find out the origins of both words did 
not yield any definite answers. However, cocksor sounds like the English 
word cock-sure. Perhaps, the word derives from Pidgin English and might 
come from a colonial source. It could have been used to depict the over-
zealous confidence garage functionaries exhibit in their work.206   
Drivers in the motor park can be categorised into two, based on the 
ownership of the transport they operated. The first were entrepreneur drivers 
who acquired their cars through personal savings, loans from financial 
institutions, or through funds from family sources. They oversaw and 
controlled the operation of their vehicles. Barbie Toure and Pa Ibrahima 
Toure both belong to this category.207 The second category consisted of 
patron-hired drivers, who were employee drivers operating vehicles 
belonging to a patron. The patron remunerated their services based on a 
salary or a weekly pay. Depending on arrangements in place, patron-hired 
drivers remitted trip monies to the patron daily, weekly (Sundays), or 
monthly. 208 This remittance of trip monies is known as werse.  Each driver 
had a male assistant locally called apparante, a corrupted version of the 
English word apprentice. This person was usually an aspiring future driver. 
Each driver was therefore a patron to an apprentice. 
The driver-apprentice relationship is an example of how 
Senegambia’s commercial automobile sector adopted socially embedded 
practices. Formalities observed in traditional Senegambian occupational 
apprenticeships were used for negotiating the relationship between the two 
individuals. Traditionally, a parent, guardian or other senior representative of 
the prospective apprentice presented cola nuts to the desired patron, to 
introduce and negotiate the apprenticeship.209 If the patron accepted the 
                                                            
206 The Gambia was a former British colony and Senegal was colonised by the French. 
However, due to the intimate social environment, words and terms are borrowed and 
adopted from one side of the border to the other. There needs to be further research to 
identify the true origins of these words.   
207 he former is the president of the Senegalese Transport Association, Keur Ayib branch 
and the latter is a retired cross-border driver from Keur Ayib, Senegal. 
208 Sundays were generally times for rest for most commercial drivers. 






cola nuts (which was usually the case), the “contract” for a patron-apprentice 
relationship was endorsed. This is a common way of formalising new social 
ties, including marriages, affective parent-child or sister-brother relations in 
Senegambia. These relations were expected to endure based on wullere 
(see chapter 2). 
The apprentice learned from his patron. His tasks included collecting 
fares during trips, cleaning the car (sometimes daily), learning to fix small 
mechanical problems on the car and running errands for his patron. In return 
for these services, the patron gave him scheduled driving lessons, meals, 
sometimes accommodation and a token amount daily, weekly, or monthly, 
depending on the preferences of the patron. 
Patron-apprentice ties usually endured after the end of the 
apprenticeship. Due to wullere, the apprentice and his family showed honour 
and regards to the former, even if he failed to offer any post-apprenticeship 
assistance like helping his former apprentice to acquire a car and set up a 
new transport business. The relationship between the two endured as an 
inter-family bond that developed into mbohko.210 If a patron and an 
apprentice came from different sides of the border, this further reinforced 
cross-border ties.   
The garage or motor park operated along a network of relations, 
defined by solidarity and kinship considerations. It had a system of income 
redistribution and informal social insurance for different members working 
there. Drivers paid toll fees (referred to as toe) to the garage. Additionally, 
they paid maanda (commission) on each trip loaded from the garage. Other 
forms of duty payments were imposed too, depending on internal 
arrangements within a particular garage. These monies contributed towards 
administrative taxes, remuneration for garage officials, funds for garage 
development initiatives and sometimes towards internal driver assistance 
programmes during somber moments (e.g. funerals) or for celebratory 
personal events such as weddings, and naming ceremonies. Drivers also 
                                                            






paid road-user fees to the state as well as daily duties to the local 
administration (government). These monies are expected to fund garage 
and other local development initiatives in the community. 
Senegambian social value for age was also reflected among garage 
communities. Garage functionaries usually consisted of retired drivers and 
senior members of the garage. Drivers who were no longer active on the 
roads, either because they lost their car or for other reasons, were also 
employed as functionaries, to help them get by financially. This practice, like 
the practice of pooling money to remunerate the chef and his assistants, 
were rooted in Senegambian social ethics. 
The day-to-day running of the garage mixed traditional consensus 
building mechanisms with rudimentary modern techniques of administration. 
For example, cars were scheduled on first come bases. Upon arrival at the 
garage, a driver joined the raang or queue, to register a turn for another trip 
with the cocksor or ralluman. The different queues were differentiated by the 
destination of the vehicle. A small enclosed space with a window wide 
enough for transactions or a shade within the garage, served as the office 
space for registrations. A ledger book and a pen or sometimes a chalk and 
an erasable board were used to enter the vehicle numbers based on the 
sequence of arrival. The cocksor, ralluman and other functionaries helped to 
direct passengers to the next car in line. Passengers paid their fares to one 
of these garage officials who were responsible for loading the car, assigning 
tickets and seats to passengers. At full board, total fare monies were 
calculated and paid to the driver who paid duties owed to the garage, from 
the amount. Depending on internal garage arrangements, paid luggage fees 
went to the “account” for the remuneration of officials. But at times, the driver 
took half of it and the other half went to the garage coffers.  
Garage-based social ties were modeled on culture-embedded 
relations of intimacy that endured. Old or retired drivers had claims to the 
resources of the garage community in the same way older children assume 






the garage was a site that fused history, culture and modernity to achieve or 
sustain its goals and objectives. It maintained certain cultural practices in its 
administration. It also adopted modern rudimentary administrative 
techniques in its management practices. In short, the garage was a dynamic 
site that had a rolling culture. Transporters’ shared experiences of the border 
exemplified the hybridised attitudes in the transport sector, which yielded 
both dome-ndeye and dome-baaye dynamics, as elaborated in the next 
section.  
 
3.4.1: Transporters’ Shared Experience and the Border 
The interviews I conducted to collect life histories of transporters showed 
that a thread of a shared cross-border past runs through the life histories of 
transporters.  All interviewees have lived, at one time or another, on both 
sides of the border as a driver or apprentice. Most of them also shared other 
forms of associative life such as being talibee or members of the same 
clerical establishments, former apprenticeship comrades, former roommates, 
friends and some served as emissaries for the marriage proposals of their 
colleagues. The nature of the driving profession (the spirit of the road) too, 
further cemented ties among them. Therefore, inter-driver solidarity was 
natural and their practices from the garage to the roads were embedded in 
dome-ndeye attitudes. 
Cross-border routes pass through isolated, bushy or uninhabited 
spaces as much as they do through towns and villages along the routes. 
Road practices among drivers included making brief stops along the road to 
share information like road conditions and check points mounted by state 
security agents. Drivers also provided mechanical support to each other like 
lending spare tyres, small equipment to fix punctures, or getting mechanics 
to each other, especially at isolated places. Driver peer-support also had 
monetary aspects. For example, if one driver suffered a major breakdown on 
the road, other drivers passing along the road with unoccupied seats, 
stopped to take his passengers at a reduced fare. This enabled him to keep 






happened close to the final destination of the car, passengers would be 
taken for gratis. These “brother and friend” considerations helped drivers 
during breakdowns on trips, to avoid unnecessary monetary losses. 
Cross-border drivers also shared the common practice of acquiring 
the national papers (national IDs) of both The Gambia and Senegal. For 
example, Barbie Toure, president of the Senegalese Transport Association 
in Keur Ayib, has family on both sides of the border. When he retired from 
his driving career, he returned to his other family in Senegal and became a 
unionist. His Gambian-born family remained in The Gambia. In 2013, his 
eldest Gambian child was going to senior secondary school and he hoped 
that, after he completed school, he would find a job in the country.211   
Cross-border drivers were also subjected to social stereotypes in 
Senegambia. For example, driver stereotypes are prominently articulated in 
the saying “the chauffeur is not dependable.”212 This saying reflects how 
many people in society see drivers as self-interested, self-centered or egoist 
people who could vandalise social solidarity to safeguard narrow economic 
goals. There is a widespread social view that drivers constantly victimise 
passengers by overcharging fares, especially during periods of high demand 
for transport services. Commercial drivers who went on long-haul trips, are 
considered to be the most “un-dependable.” Their fortune hunting spirit 
makes them prioritise personal gains over all other things.   
But driver social stereotypes ignore the useful roles drivers play in 
society. Transporters make immense contributions to social outreach. Cross-
border and other long distant drivers acted as trusted message bearers 
between urban and isolated rural settings. They provided reliable courier 
services for monies, gifts and other unescorted commodities during their 
trips. Therefore, they facilitated social needs, exchange and outreach among 
different individuals. The interplay of these two narratives about drivers, like 
many other stories in Senegambia, create a mélange of narratives, which 
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contribute to the contested nature of cross-border, interstate, transporter-
state and state-society relations. Such narratives also show that culture is 
dynamic and change can alter social practices. 
The negative social impressions of drivers derived from popular views 
that the garage is a notorious space and community where, both the young 
and old cross all red lines of social taboos. The garage culture embodied a 
“rogue culture” which encouraged exploitation of travelers and female petty 
traders (girls and women) trading there. Individuals whose daily lives 
revolved around the garage were termed as deficient in values of self-
restraint, civility and respect. They were considered ruthless, aggressive 
fighters with little or no moral inclination.213 
However, garage people challenged these negative social views of 
their space. For example, 39 year-old Aly Sall, a garage functionary at the 
Seleti garage, has a different view of the garage and driving careers.214 He 
argued in an interview with me that, 
The garage is not just a place for getting a means of livelihood. It is also a place 
which instills certain qualities in the individual to help him better navigate social 
relations. Garage functionaries come across or receive all kinds of people in the 
garage- the khelifa (a grand or elderly person in Wollof), or even a jinneh (a devil in 
Wollof). This is why workers need to have certain qualities.215   
 
Sall dropped out of school and frustrated by his inability to find a “proper” job 
in Senegal, joined the garage located literally in front of his family home’s 
doorstep. He sustains his wife, children and old mother from working there.  
Irrespective of his view about the cultured nature of the garage, his mother 
Mere Fatou Sall wishes her son had a better job than the one he has. 
Fundamentally, the different social representation of the garage carry 
insightful views of how community “values, practices and meanings are 
shared, albeit contested.”216 Like the different views of the garage, 
Senegambian kinship theories can be contested on the basis that not every 
                                                            
213I got this from a conversation I witnessed many years ago while in The Gambia. A group 
of women at the Brikama market shared their views about the garage following a fight 
between two apprentices.  
214 Seleti is in Casamance, Senegal. It is the border with Giboroh in The Gambia. 
215Interview with Aly Sall, Seleti, Senegal, 25th February, 2013. 
216Elizabeth Frazer, The Problems of Communitarian Politics, Unity and Conflict (Oxford: 






Gambian is related to a Senegalese by blood. But restricting the definition of 
kinship to blood ties means denying Senegambian kinship theories their 
extensive and varied essences. Consequently, this would hinder our 
understanding of why people work with kinship under different contexts and 
circumstances and why kinship discourses have endured for generations. 
Implicitly, social thoughts like social practices are dynamic and their 
dynamism makes them part of a living culture, the essence of every thriving 
society.   
Transporters’ self-perception has interesting dimensions, too. They 
consider themselves as constant victims of the state that wishes to exploit 
them through transport-related tax regimes. Cross-border drivers therefore 
see themselves as members of the same family, who are subject to the 
same cruel rules of the state. This is why routinely during border blockades 
on The Gambia, Senegalese transporters argued that their unilateral border 
closure was against the Gambian state and security forces and not against 
Gambian drivers, their purported dome-ndeyes (see chapters 4 and 5).217 
This argument is hard to rationalise. But it is the usual addendum to cross-
border conversations on transport difficulties. Driver-passenger relations can 
be bordered like driver-state relations, but transporters present cross-border 
inter-transporter solidarity as uncontestable. However, the disintegration of 
the integrated transport network after the year 2000, questions the validity of 
the resilient solidarity among Senegambian drivers.  The next section 
explores the bases of transporter solidarity, recollections of the integrated 














3.4.2: Personal Recollections of the Integrated Transport Network 
Personal memories of the integrated transport network manifest how kinship 
ideas defined the workings of the cross-border transport network. They also 
help us trace how the transport sector evolved to incorporate dome-baaye 
practices. Those behaviour models created conditions for its disintegration 
and fueled recurring interstate difficulties over The Gambia and Senegal 
border (see chapters 4 & 5).  
From the memories of both drivers and non-drivers (users of transport 
services), the integrated transport network was boosted by mbokh and 
dome-ndeye attitudes. I share below the accounts of two women who I 
interviewed during my fieldwork. Both women are extensively familiar with 
life at The Gambia-Senegal border.  
Mere Olu Fatou Sall, Aly Sall’s mother, was 80 years old at the time 
of my interview with her in 2013. Her neighbour and best friend, Mere Fatou 
Jarjue, was 5 years younger than her. The two women came to Seleti (Mere 
Olu was only 14), as newly married young brides to their douanes husbands, 
who lived in the village of only two compounds. Seleti then was like no-
man’s land and they were among the first people to settle at the douane 
post, which comprised residences for 4 douaniers and their chef de poste.218 
The douane post is located about a kilometre away from Giboroh, the 
Gambian village bordering Seleti. Both villages are on the main road to 
Brikama, the regional headquarters of The Gambia’s West Coast Region. 
Traffic from Casamance usually passes through Seleti and Giboroh, to other 
parts of The Gambia.  
The two women recalled that vehicles with Gambian registration 
numbers dominated cross-border traffic between Brikama and Casamance. 
“In those days, Senegalese chauffeurs were rare here. Only the ones from 
Gambie came here. They drove to Diouloulou, Bignona and Zinguinchor.”219 
“Seleti never had a motor park. The cars used to stop- by, pick passengers 
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and continue on their journey.  From Gambie, they only stopped in 
Diouloulou which had a garage.”220  As “Gambian” cars dominated the 
cross-border routes, the integrated transport network and the Senegambian 
automobile sector inadvertently groomed a future source of jealousies and 
fierce competition. 
Barbie Toure‘s personal recollections validated the women’s 
memories of the integrated transport network. Toure started driving on the 
interstate routes in 1979. He recalled that, “…cars were not plenty. The 
buses and the bigger cars were not running. Only the small and medium 
cars served transport. The roads were good. The sector was great. Between 
1986 and 1987, more cars came and we started experiencing more 
accidents. And now, the roads are very bad.”221 
At the height of the motor park sharing, “…the 400 (quatre–cent) 
mbarr was one of the popular car brands in the market. Subsequently, the 
sept-places (7-seated passenger cars) and the mini-cars (mini-buses) 
became favourites in the market.222 Pa Ibrahima Toure, a retired driver at 
Keur Ayib also shared his nostalgia about the integrated transport network. 
I drove at the frontier on the Dakar-Karang- Banjul route for 20 years. I also drove 
Zinguinchor–Dakar for about 10 years. In the past, authority on the roads - whether 
the gendarme or the police - made us observe road safety and security measures. 
Those were days of professional regulation and professional conduct across the 
board. No one dared override the law or the other person. For example, you could 
never drive in worn-out tyres.223 
These memories of the joint transport network reveal an orderly, trustful and 
a professionally regulated interdependent transport environment reminiscent 
of the fabric metaphor. Cross-border transporters’ ability to indiscriminately 
access credit facilities to finance their transport entrepreneurship also 
indicates the sector comprised cooperative and trustful attitudes. These 
opportunities would however dry up as interstate transport and political 
difficulties escalate in Senegambia.  
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In the past, you could get a brand new car on credit. Enterprises like Madi (in The 
Gambia) brought cars to Kaolack, (Senegal) and drivers bought the cars on credit 
basis. Other Lebanese businesses provided similar facilities. 224 We advanced part 
of the payment. The rest of the money was paid by installments. At full payment, the 
documents you provided as collateral were returned to you. Your ownership of your 
car is confirmed and you continued your business. You were able to make profit out 
of it and then you can buy another new car. Transport was profitable then.225 
As a whole, the integrated transport network was a low risk project even for 
private creditors who loaned cars to transporters. There were racial and 
cultural differences between Lebanese creditors and their Senegambian 
debtors. However, their creditor-debtor relation was mutually reassuring. 
Arguably, this creditor-debtor relationship transpired within Senegambian 
cultural values, in which debt and debt defaults have negative status. The 
Wollof proverb “attey borr fei,” which means, the verdict of debt litigation is 
payment, reaffirms Senegambian views about debt and debt default. The 
practice of enquiring if a deceased Muslim has debtors during funeral 
proceedings also provides another interesting ethnography on social 
perceptions about debt and how that is relevant to our understanding of 
relations under the integrated transport network.  
Like in other cultures, Senegambian culture and Islam consider debt 
as a burden to be avoided or minimised, at best. From religious and social 
views, an unpaid debt bars the dead from transitioning to heaven. Usually, 
Senegambian Muslims would conduct a pre-burial public inquest for their 
dead. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the deceased was 
indebted to people. If so, creditors were paid from his or her estate or 
through family contributions, before burial. Creditors may also opt to forgive 
their debt, a sign of Islamic charitable act towards the deceased.  
The cultural and religious spirit that recommends forgiving the dead their 
debt, resonates with aspects of global debt relief agenda. The global 
sustainable development agenda includes debt relief or debt forgiveness for 
countries overburdened by debt. Even though a state hardly dies like the 
individual, debt forgiveness for the dead in Senegambian practice is in synch 
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with international debt relief normative standards. Irrespective of the 
similarities between Senegambian cultural and Islamic attitudes towards 
debt and the global agenda for debt relief, Senegambian cultural and 
religious views of debt contrasts with the state’s attitudes towards it. Both 
the Gambian and Senegalese states have been sustained through debt 
piled unto debt. At the individual level, social morality dictates that a highly 
indebted person should frown on taking more debts and should actively work 
towards settling his/ her creditors to maintain human dignity. But this is not 
the case for the state. However, like kinship discourses, these values can 
also be contested even though they can possibly pass for universal norms.  
Transport sector creditor-debtor relations reveal how culture and 
religion provided important resources for the sector to pursue its economic, 
social and political agenda in Senegambia. The sector reflected the co-
extension between state and society. The deep politics of society and the 
high politics of state intermingled and created an enabling environment for a 
thriving, profitable and orderly cross-border transport network. 226 However, 
over time, these dome-ndeye oriented institutions and practices 
degenerated and that led to intense rivalries in the sector (see chapter 4 and 
5). By 2000, dome-baaye models of behaviour boosted competitive 
transactions and tense relations jeopardised the fabled cooperation among 
transporters and between transporters and other actors.   
The struggles that emerged in the post-2000 cross-border transport 
sector were instigated by economic difficulties as the “disposal of scarce 
resources” led to intense competition among different interests. Thus, 
economic insecurities altered practices in the transport sector and kinship 
sentiments degenerated. Interpersonal exchange in the sector became 
transactional as different actors sought to protect their interests in the 
market. The next section explores the stresses that led to the crisis, which 
eventually disintegrated the joint transport network.227  
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3.5: Stresses on Interstate Cooperation: Emerging Transport 
Crisis 
The Senegambia Confederation created a population surge in The Gambia 
as more Senegalese settled in the country. The country also hosted other 
migrants from other neighbouring countries (see chapter 2).228 Migrants into 
The Gambia mainly stayed in urban centers, causing high demand for urban 
transport services. There was also more pressure on transport infrastructure 
as the number of cars increased in the country. The government imposed 
new road user policies, which sparked protests from the sector amid 
widespread disillusion about the Confederation, which later collapsed in 
1989.229 Domestic protests kick-started The Gambia-Senegal transport 
difficulties. The crisis later blew over the border, affecting interstate relations.  
Dome-ndeye attitudes receded, and dome-baaye sentiments took over 
interstate relations.230 By 1989, grassroots transporter protests and bad 
economic situations in both countries intensified, and not even wullere and 
mbokh could pacify the turbulence of interstate relations.231 
The transport crisis has been a good example of how state logics 
impacted interstate relations. National policies are formulated to respond to 
national needs. However, if those needs conflict with the needs of other 
states, implementing those policies may create political disenchantment in 
relations with those states. The transport crisis began as local reactions to 
government policies, but from 1989, it transformed into The Gambia and 
Senegal political difficulties. 
In October 1989, transporters between Banjul and Serekunda (mostly 
of Senegalese origin) went on strike after Banjul City Council (BCC) 
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introduced new tolls and taxes on commercial transport along the Banjul-
Serekunda route. The new tariffs were designed to raise 3 million dalasi to 
finance the Council’s development budget to fund improvements to public 
motor parks and other infrastructure in the city. Transporters rejected the 
City’s new tariff plans. They argued they were not consulted about it and the 
tariff was unfair because different vehicles with different tonnage were 
required to pay the same fees. They further argued that public motor parks 
were in bad state and this was another reason why new tariff policies should 
be dropped. Some members of the Gambian parliament lobbied for and 
supported the transporters. They urged the city to revoke its new plans since 
bad road conditions caused rapid wear and tear to transporter cars. They 
also requested the city to formulate more favourable tax policies for 
transporters.232   
Transporters blocked the city’s plans, the city council cancelled the 
new tariff, and the drivers ended their strike. Transporters’ victory against 
the city set a precedent in transporter-state relations and in the struggles 
between low and high politics in Senegambia. This crisis signaled the future 
troubles that would beset the transport sector, transporter-state and 
interstate relations. The next section explores the future stressors in these 
different relations.  
 
3.5:1. Post Confederation Interstate Relations 
The crisis in the transport sector loomed as crisis in The Gambia-Senegal 
relations. The border between the two countries hardened after the break-up 
of the Senegambia Confederation. By 1990, presidents Jawara and Diouf 
were strongly suspicious about each’s intentions and interstate relations 
spiraled downwards.233 President Jawara’s memoire revisited the difficult 
interstate relations. He recounted that President Diouf’s dome-baaye driven 
anti-Gambia policy gimmicks sought to destablise The Gambia’s re-export 
                                                            







trade and handicap cross-border mobility.234 He imposed a currency 
restriction on border crossers and Senegalese border enforcement agents 
harassed Gambian travelers. They also intercepted and seized goods 
crossing the border.235  
With a thoughtfulness of a mbokh and wullere, Jawara made personal 
overtures of a dome-ndeye, and a “friend” towards Diouf, to end his anti-
Gambia campaign. 236 By August 1990, the two countries signed a protocol 
of friendship and cooperation. But political turmoil in Senegal made it difficult 
for the two states to consolidate this agreement. Anti-Diouf rule 
demonstrators launched street protests, burnt cars, destroyed private 
properties and looted businesses.237 By 1994, young officers of The Gambia 
National Army staged a military coup and deposed Jawara. President Diouf 
courted The Gambia’s new military leaders. He hoped to get through them 
what he failed to achieve in his relationship with Jawara, but with hindsight, 
his efforts would be in vain. 
With military rule in The Gambia, Diouf initiated a new strategy to 
pursue Senegambia integration through harnessing the support of Gambian 
military personnel and artists. He sidelined intellectuals. Selected Gambian 
army officials were invited to Dakar and awarded with Senegalese national 
honorary medallions. Gambians artists, Musa Ngum (in 1999), who was 
notable for his pro-Senegambia activism and Laba Sosseh (earlier), who like 
Ngum, made Senegambia reunion the mission of his arts, were both 
awarded “National Order of Senegal” medals. 238 Opposition parties in 
Senegal keenly followed and supported Diouf’s agenda. But the mbokh or 
one-Senegambia agenda failed to resonate with the military. It was only a 
matter of time before Diouf realised that like Jawara, the military had no 
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plans to compromise The Gambia’s independence or help Senegal take 
over the country in the guise of Senegambia reunification.239  
By August 1994, opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, who was 
recently released from detention in Senegal, declared his support for the 
coup in The Gambia and planned a visit with the new military leaders in 
Banjul.240 In April 1997, Jammeh visited Dakar, and he and Diouf signed an 
agreement to reopen The Gambia-Senegal border.241 Shortly after the visit, 
a Gambian trade delegation also visited Senegal to follow-up on the 
agreement to liberalise the borders for transit trade.242 Chairman Jammeh’s 
visit also yielded a new bilateral agreement - to cooperate in disease control 
and health.243 To demonstrate commitment to the renewed zeal for bilateral 
cooperation, an inter-ministerial conference was convened in Banjul, in 
October 1997. This was a nice wrapping for their dome-ndeye rhetoric. 
Senegal’s attempt to court the Gambian military ignored the fact that 
military regimes in Africa were notorious for being “…counterproductive to 
democratic governance…” and can “…undermine stability and economic 
development…” with cross-border effects.244 But as the gains in bilateral 
cooperation were consolidated, new threats confronted cross-border 
mobility, transport and The Gambia-Senegal interstate relations. These 
threats opened doors for dome-baaye struggles in cross-border transport 
and in interstate relations, as seen in the next section.  
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3.5.2: Conflicts in West Africa and The Gambia-Senegal 
Relations 
The civil wars and conflict in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea 
Bissau and Casamance, exerted new pressures on The Gambia-Senegal 
relations. Many refugees from these troubled areas crossed into The 
Gambia, leading to a refugee crisis in the country. In the midst of the crisis, 
local media sources reported there was growing crime in the country. They 
condemned frequent murder cases, armed robbery, drug trafficking, 
counterfeit currency production and prostitution in urban Gambia. The 
sources claimed that these crimes were related to the influx of foreigners 
into the country. They argued that until this huge influx of “foreigners”, the 
country has been a peaceful one and that before the 1990s, The Gambia 
was an almost crime-free state.  
The Gambian military regime responded to the crisis with “new” 
foreign policy measures.  The policy measures sought to rid the country of 
“bad elements.” Towards that direction in 1998, a court in Banjul tried and 
found 30 Senegalese nationals in The Gambia guilty of “roguery and 
vagabondage,” while resident in the country. The Senegalese pleaded guilty 
to the charges. The court ordered their deportation to Senegal.245 After these 
deportations, a new policy to eject Senegalese prostitutes from Serekunda, 
Brikama, Soma and Farrafenni, followed. As structural adjustment took its 
toll on Senegalese society during the 1980s, huge numbers of Senegalese 
prostitutes migrated to these Gambian cities and towns. The Confederation 
increased the numbers of Senegalese prostitutes in the country as more 
Senegalese migrated to The Gambia. With a resolute goal to stem out 
prostitution, the military government also banned skin bleaching, which was 
a common practice among prostitutes.  
Senegal was not impressed with Jammeh’s “new” foreign policy. It 
saw it as anti-Senegal and a direct confrontation and a grossly un-mbokhly 
act from The Gambia. What started as domestic transport crisis in The 
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Gambia took on new dimensions. The two countries headed towards a 
collision course.  The military’s political strategy caused a dull lull in efforts to 
mend The Gambia-Senegal relations. It also affected The Gambia’s 
mediation efforts in the Casamance. Dome-baaye rivalries took the best of 
interstate politics. In the end, the initial efforts to mend interstate relations, 
took one step forward only to recede many steps backwards.  
National security concerns also continued to plague interstate 
relations after dissident officers of The Gambia National Army attacked the 
Kartong military barracks, located in the border village of Kartong. The 
village is right at the frontier with Casamance and hosts one of the key 
military installations in The Gambia. A rivulet, the Allahein Bolong, borders 
Kartong and Casamance. The attackers attempted without success to 
depose the government of Yahya Jammeh. They were subdued, arrested 
and taken to court.  
During their trial, the rebel soldiers pleaded that their aim was not to 
carry out a military coup d’états. They claimed they wanted to steal weapons 
from the Kartong armouries to sell them to Senegal. The pleas of the rebel 
soldiers gave the Gambian state more reasons to be suspicious of the 
intentions of the Senegalese state. This suspicion was heightened when 
Gambian military intelligence sources disclosed that the Senegalese 
government housed and assisted the attackers to plan and mobilise for the 
Kartong attack. The Machiavellian hint of this incident spat more fuel to the 
fire, re-igniting dome-baaye rivalries, and the two states overtly and covertly 
competed against each other. The fact that some of the attackers were first 
generation Gambians born to migrant Senegalese families, or had other 
family connections to Senegal, did not help the situation. Diplomatic attempts 
to pacify the interstate “misunderstanding” failed to dissipate the suspicion 
which hung over interstate relations.246 Thus, difficult politics froze interstate 
rhetoric of mobkh and dome-ndeye.  
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However, ordinary people continued to enjoy their cross-border 
mbokh ties as interstate relations continued to be unpredictable following the 
Kartong attack. The Gambian state’s internal security concerns shaped its 
attitudes towards Senegal. However, international relations and regional 
concerns have also affected interstate relations. As shown in the next 
section below, The Gambia’s policy towards its neighbours was different 
from Senegal’s and this fact has also created numerous transport and /or 
mobility related tensions in interstate relations.  
 
3.5.3: Senegal’s Relations with Other Neighbouring Countries 
Senegal and Guinea Bissau have had a long-standing animosity over their 
shared maritime border and they have clashed militarily over the border. 
Senegal had also had a violent confrontation with Mauritania over their joint 
border (see chapter 1, 6 & 7). Its frosty relations with Guinea Bissau and 
Mauritania affected its relations with The Gambia.  
Given the close social ties between The Gambia-Senegal, Senegal 
expected The Gambia to be its ally during these conflicts. But The Gambia 
opted to be a neutral party and a mediator in these conflicts. Annoyed by 
The Gambia’s decision, Senegal was uncompromising. It adopted measures 
against these countries, which also directly hurt The Gambia.  For example, 
during its conflict with Guinea Bissau, the humanitarian relief agency 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) alleged that the Senegalese government 
closed its border with The Gambia, to prevent the transit of humanitarian 
relief heading to Guinea Bissau. This was supposed to be a “punitive” 
measure against Bissau, but it directly harmed The Gambia’s re-export trade 
to Bissau. The Senegalese government issued a press release denying 
MSF’s allegations. However, the feeling that Senegal’s acts intended to 
cause harm to The Gambia, was not consoled.  Shortly after this incident, it 
refused transit to re-export goods heading to Bissau from The Gambia. The 
Gambian state saw the transport blockade on the goods as both a direct and 
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indirect pay back measure from Senegal. It became part of the catalogue of 
the country’s “unneighbourly” acts against The Gambia.  
 Senegal’s policies towards its neighbours came from concerns to 
protect its various interests during their conflicts. The Gambia’s policies were 
also designed to protect its interests with one of its major trading partners- 
Guinea Bissau. Both countries acted in ways that were distasteful to the 
other country. But irrespective of whether their respective state logics were 
self-interested or not, The Gambia -Senegal relationship was also vulnerable 
to internal political conditions in the other country, as seen in the next 
section.  
 
3.5.4: Political Transition in Senegal and Interstate Relations 
The border incident with Guinea Bissau and the Kartong attack happened at 
a time when there was political transition in Senegal. In March 2000, Abdou 
Diouf and his Parti Socialiste (PS) lost elections to Abdoulaye Wade’s Parti 
Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS). Like his predecessors, Senghor and Diouf, 
Wade’s first official visit was to The Gambia, sealing the visit as a must do 
“ritual” for any new Senegalese president.247 Apart from their geopolitical 
merits, these visits were held to reaffirm mbokh and dome-ndeye ties 
between the two countries and were occasions for the renewal of one- 
Senegambia brotherhood and solidarity rhetoric. Given the new political 
changes in both countries, the year 2000 was significant for interstate 
politics. Cross-border and interstate transport difficulties that started as 
domestic transport problems at Barra spread to cross-border routes. 
Protests became constant. The political economy of the border was affected 
as transporters in Senegal adopted new measures against the Wade 
government, and by extension, against the Jammeh government in Banjul. 
Local transport problems in The Gambia shaped the new measures 
Senegalese transporters adopted. This further shows how the two countries 
have an interconnected economy as exemplified in the next sections, which 
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deal with how transport crisis in The Gambia became a cross-border and 
interstate transport crisis in Senegambia.   
 
3.6: Internal Gambian Politics and Cross-Border Transport 
Practices 
Protests and anger over cross-border transport have their antecedents in the 
Gambian transport market. From June to October 1997, commercial 
passenger transporters and taxi drivers went on strike in The Gambia. The 
drivers, who were mainly Senegalese citizens, opposed new traffic laws 
designed to regulate a growingly dysfunctional urban transport sector.248 
Internal divisions in the local transport market showed when, Daddy Sowe, a 
senior retired driver and president of The Gambia Transport Union, publicly 
condemned the strike action.249 In June, the government took 35 striking 
drivers to court, accused of illegal action.250 More protests followed: in 
August 30 commercial drivers in Serekunda’s popular and high traffic zone 
Bartese protested against the new regulations.251 They too were dragged to 
court for illegal action. With this crisis, Serekunda became a major focal 
point for interstate transport disputes. This budding crisis became a fully-
fledged conflict. It spread to Barra, the Trans-Gambia routes and the ferries.  
In the next section, we explore the cross-border and interstate ramifications 
of the Serrekunda transport crisis. It serves as another good example of how 
state logics contributed to dome-baaye oriented attitudes in interstate 
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3.6.1: Serekunda Transport Crisis 
Serekunda is the most populous town in The Gambia. It is also a major 
growth center with central routes to Banjul and other areas of Kombo, The 
Gambia’s major urban region. Serekunda’s population has more than tripled 
since the 1970s, when many people from the sub-region migrated to The 
Gambia and settled in the city. Serekunda’s strategic location was also 
socially attractive for many migrants. It enabled individuals to adopt “dual-
residential strategies” which made it possible and easy for many migrants in 
The Gambia “to maintain close touch with family members left behind 
through visitation and remittances.”252  Migrant transporters and their 
families many of whom lived in Serekunda constantly moved back and forth 
across the border. Cross-border trade grew, as Serekunda became a major 
trading hub like Banjul. The demand for transport services there and the 
Greater Banjul area increased. Consequently, throughout the week, traffic 
around Serekunda jammed especially between 7am and 10am, 5pm and 
7pm and Sundays, from 4pm and 9pm. Serekunda’s central location has 
made it a transit space for passengers from other areas of the Kombos, 
heading to Banjul, the Greater Banjul area and Kombo Saint Mary’s. These 
added to Serekunda’s oversized passenger traffic, intensifying peak hour 
transport shortages.  
Serekunda’s weekly passenger traffic included commuter employees 
(including government employees), students, and other people on other 
businesses or needing to catch up with time-sensitive appointments. Its 
traffic was also busy on weekends as people returned home from weekend 
visits.  
The shortage of peak hour transport services caused mini-stampedes 
as individuals rushed in frenzy to get into cars. Due to the perpetual traffic 
jam on the city’s routes, individuals avoided the traffic-clogged roads leading 
                                                            
252Aderanti, Adepoju, “Migration and social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa”(paper for 






to the usually overcrowded Serekunda motor park, which was the official 
start and end points of passenger vehicles in Serekunda. Instead, 
passengers waited at Bartese, a narrow strip of road located at the edge of 
the Serekunda main market, along the major highway that ran from Banjul 
into Serekunda. This practice gave rise to what was called “in service” as 
passengers met vehicles half way at Bartese. Drivers picked passengers up 
from pedestrian sidewalks, unmindful of the unsafe vehicle–passenger peak 
hour interactions. Thus, transporters short-circuited the traffic by avoiding 
the main motor park as they loaded and offloaded passengers around 
Bartese. From Bartese, they managed to waggle out of the congested traffic 
to head back on the highway to Banjul or to other destinations.  
On a regular scale of Serekunda traffic, driving from Bartese to the 
motor park took about ten minutes, at most. However, during dense traffic, 
this took at least twenty minutes with cars crawling behind each other in a 
snail-paced traffic. It was faster to drive to Banjul from Serekunda during low 
peak traffic, than to get to the Serekunda motor park from Bartese during 
high peak traffic. The distance between Banjul and Serekunda is about 13.8 
kilometers via the Banjul-Serekunda highway, whereas the distance 
between Bartese and Serekunda motor park is about a kilometer.  
Bartese saved passengers and drivers the time-wasting delays of 
Serekunda peak hour traffic. The Gambia government traffic control 
department or traffic police initially ignored practices of “stealing the road” at 
Bartese - the local term for such unauthorised acts by transporters. These 
practices flourished and became the new rule for traffic in Serekunda. 
Bartese became a popular spot for both high and low peak Serekunda 
traffic. Taxis for hire also clustered around there, worsening the troubling 
traffic scenario.  
Bartese frustrated planned traffic flows in Serekunda.  But it was an 
economic boon for transporters. Short-circuiting the end and start points of 






trip operation cost. It reduced the amount of time spent in traffic for standard 
journeys from Banjul- Serekunda while increasing their per trip earnings. 
But for commuters, it was a costly practice. Transporters 
circumvented traffic laws and charged unauthorised extra fares to 
passengers wishing to be taken to the motor park from Bartese. Most 
passengers obliged, though not without complaining about how drivers were 
financially exploiting them. Not designed for the traffic imposed on it, Bartese 
traffic caused lot of trouble to the public and Gambian traffic control agents 
took initiative to sort it out. They tried to redirect traffic from there but this 
attempt directly conflicted with the operational logics of transporters and 
people’s logic of securing their transport needs. The new policy the Gambian 
state tried to implement to re-organise traffic in Bartese created a political 
storm locally and across the border. The next section further discourses how 
experiences of the traffic at Bartese highlighted how the social and political 
spheres co-extended into each other. It also showed how the deep politics of 
society was invariably linked to the high politics of state, in Senegambia.  
    
3.6.2: Bartese Traffic Troubles and the Outcomes of Regulation  
For many years and irrespective of its imperfections, Bartese facilitated 
commuter access to public transport. It helped individuals to optimally 
negotiate transport supply constraints. But over time, traffic around Bartese 
grew more complex, disorderly and dysfunctional, creating an unavoidable 
need for authorities to regulate it. A new traffic regulation redirected all 
commercial transport in Serekunda to the main motor park. It banned traffic 
from converging at Bartese, to the dismay of drivers and commuters. 
Worried about congestion and the deteriorated facilities at Serekunda motor 
park, drivers mobilised against the regulation, triggering the 1997 Serekunda 
transport crisis in The Gambia.253  The new regulation protected passenger 
rights to be taken to the motor park without any extra charges imposed by 
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drivers.254 But both passengers and transporters were angry about the new 
regulation. The dismay the public expressed about this new regulation 
meant the public supported transporters against government and this gave 
transporters power to challenge government on the new regulation. 
 
3.6:3. Local Echoes with Cross-Border Expressions over 
Transport 
When traffic at Bartese was re-directed to the Serekunda motor park, there 
was a public outcry against the move.  This drew the country’s attention to 
both local and cross-border transport crisis. The Gambian National 
Assembly debated on the problems with ferry services on The Gambia 
River, raising public awareness on inadequate ferry services, too.255 This 
further encouraged and conditioned cross-border transporters to mobilise 
against dissatisfactions on the cross-border routes. What started as a local 
transport crisis transformed into a cross-border one. By 2000, Barra as the 
centre of cross-border traffic flows from Banjul to Dakar became a hot spot 
for an emerging transport crisis. From Barra, cross-border transporters 
mobilised for future activism about the interstate routes. It also set the tone 
for future interstate dialogue over transport as both Banjul and Dakar were 
caught up in the transport crisis. 
 
3.7. Barra Transport Crisis, 2000: Fighting Gambia Government 
“Over Taxation” 
The Banjul and Serekunda transport crisis were antecedents of Barra and 
the other cross-border transport crises that beset The Gambia-Senegal 
interstate relations.256 The Barra crisis started in August 2000, when 
Senegalese transporters operating both domestic and cross-border transport 
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services, including taxis, went on a sit-down strike. They claimed that they 
were being over-taxed by Gambian authorities. Cross-border transport was 
completely paralysed with hundreds and hundreds of people stranded in 
Barra.257  Frustrated passenger mobs attacked a Gambian Public Transport 
Corporation (GPTC) bus at the company’s interstate bus terminal in Barra, 
close by the motor park. GPTC suspended its Banjul-Dakar bus services as 
the strike raged on.258 Transporters later blocked GPTC interstate bus 
services to Senegal. 
The Barra strike was distinctive. Gambian authorities capitulated and 
gave in to the demands of the striking drivers as Banjul City Council has 
done during the 1997 transporter protest in Banjul. This marked the first 
victory Senegalese transporters gained against Gambian authorities. It was 
also the beginning of formal aggression against Gambian interstate buses. A 
Gambia government and a GPTC delegation traveled to Dakar to negotiate 
with officials of the Senegalese Transport Association, for transporters to 
end their strike and to remove the blockade against the GPTC buses. 
Transporters claimed that they were protesting over their dissatisfactions 
with road user and  ferry crossing fees. They also claimed that they were 
against government plans to increase ferry crossing fees. These 
dissatisfactions became the cornerstone of transporter “policies” against The 
Gambia.  They also became the centre of transporter advocacy for improved 
conditions on the cross-border routes.  
The effects peer influence had on the transport sector were evident 
after the Barra crisis. In April 2001, rural Kombo drivers unilaterally 
increased fare prices for local shared taxis in Brikama. Commuters 
boycotted taxis and walked to their destinations. The Kombo Central 
transport crisis was born. Eventually, local authorities negotiated between 
drivers and passengers to resolve the crisis as low and high level politics 
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struggled against each other.259 But the impacts of the Barra crisis continued 
to unfold as interstate relations faced new challenges, which are discussed 
below. 
 
3.7.1: Barra Transport Crisis and Interstate Relations   
Even before the dust settled down on the Barra transport crisis in 2000, 
newly elected president Abdoulaye Wade rejected The Gambia’s ongoing 
mediation in the Casamance conflict. He argued that Senegal could resolve 
its own internal conflict, and no external mediators were needed. Wade’s 
decision was one glaring example of how state logics could take precedence 
over Senegambia’s one-ness discourse and kinship rhetoric. The Gambia 
has a bona fide stake in the Casamance conflict. People in the country have 
family ties to Casamance. The country’s border villages have suffered from 
hit and run attacks from Casamance rebels. Casamance has been an 
important trading partner, too (see Chapter 1 and 2). Given these realities, 
Wade’s stance on The Gambia’s mediation in Casamance indirectly refuted 
the purported dome-ndeye ties between the two countries. It symbolically 
inferred that the fabric of interstate relations was to be redesigned for the 
two sides to exist separately (see chapter 1). It reaffirmed the two countries 
were different. This was a temporary boycott of the Senegambia integration 
agenda. 
The Gambia withdrew from the Casamance peace talks in October, 
2000. By December, the transport crisis was resolved. In a U-turn, shortly 
before this, Wade re-invited The Gambia to mediate in Casamance, re-
igniting once again intergovernmental collaboration.260The turn of events 
and the lessons of these incidences reveal that transport issues can affect 
interstate relations. Kinship discourses are volatile and there are limits to the 
practice of employing cultural resources to appease interstate relations.   
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In Senegambian social practices, both family members and 
neighbours are allowed to initiate reconciliation in family, interpersonal or 
social disputes in the community. The neighbour, especially the long-time 
neighbour, is considered a member of the family. By rejecting The Gambia’s 
mediation effort, Wade froze those family and neighbourly privileges that 
gave The Gambia legitimacy to participate in the Casamance peace talks. 
Wade’s statements and actions also implied The Gambia was an un-
welcomed stranger in the Casamance peace talks.  
However, after Wade declined The Gambia’s mediation efforts, the 
behind the scenes interstate negotiations continued to use kinship rhetoric 
as they tried to solve the political misunderstanding that ensued.  It was no 
surprise then that after the two countries reached a deal, President Jammeh 
was re-invited by President Wade to continue the mediation.  
The greater lessons these political maneuvers show is that state 
logics influence political relations in Senegambia. But grassroots efforts and 
low politics can shape negotiations over those state logics. Therefore, 
kinship was a political tool that can be used expediently when the situation 
calls for it.  There was a creative appropriation of notions of a shared culture 
and relatedness, which transformed the political crisis. But even with this 
development, the Barra transport crisis continued to shape interstate 
relations. The next section therefore reflects on how it did that.   
 
3.7.2: Significance of Barra Transport Crisis for Cross-Border 
Transporters 
The Barra strikes represented the beginning of complex interstate political 
difficulties around transport.  As already discussed, transport plays a 
significant role in society and as such tensions around it can have serious 
socio-economic implications. Conley and McLaren observed that the social 
advantages automobile transport enjoy have become a curse to society 






environmental, health and institutional externalities for society.261 Uplifting 
the curse of the interstate transport sector meant supporting the state’s 
ideals for welfare-based transport pricing. It also meant ensuring that 
transporters achieve their aim to have lower tax liabilities and greater returns 
on their operations. Creating a balance between these two goals required 
dome-ndeye cooperative attitudes as well as dome-baaye adversarial 
tendencies. Ensuring a middle ground between the two positions reechoed 
the fabric image. It implied cross-border social and economic systems and 
political life are interdependent on each other. But politicians and 
transporters adopted different approaches to pursuing their goals relating to 
cross-border transport and interstate relations. This posed a risk and 
escalated interstate transport conflicts. On the other hand, it also offered 
opportunities for the two sides to sit down and revisit their 
misunderstandings. As a whole, the 2000 Barra crisis gave rise to a new 
phase in transporter-state relations. It authored a whole new agenda for the 
Senegalese Transport Association and this agenda shaped interstate 
relations from 2000 to 2015 (see chapter 4 and 5). 
 
3.8: Conclusion   
This chapter explored how values of a shared culture created institutional 
harmony in cross-border transport and interstate relations. Transporters’ 
practices and the practices of other people engaged in the sector helped 
make cross-border transport a lucrative, stable enterprise. The Gambia-
Senegal cooperation to build roads and their support to establish automobile 
transport infrastructure promoted the Senegambian unification agenda. The 
two states connected cross-border communities and the roads built were 
symbolic of social ties and kinship sentiments. And thus, the two countries 
relied on both state logics and cultural resources to establish a transport 
sector that worked for both sides of the border.  
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But interstate cooperation has had different phases and different 
outcomes. Divergent interests promoted interstate conflicts. Social and 
political pressures contributed to The Gambia’s domestic transport crisis. 
The crisis spread to the border and this showed that the economic, social 
and political spheres are interconnected.  
As people become more and more insecure about economic 
conditions, they adjusted their attachment to kinship ideas and values for 
social relations.  Similarly, when state logics were at stake, the state also 
adopted other behaviour modes to protect its interests. Transactional 
practices affected the resilience of social ones, leading to a rapid switching 
between dome-ndeye and dome-baaye behaviour modes.  
Creativity and contingency have been important in defining and 
redefining interstate politics, transporter-state and state-society relations in 
Senegambia. The two states creatively responded to new political 
conditions, brandishing kinship rhetoric when appropriate or ignoring it as 
unfolding circumstances dictated. Transporters also showed the same level 
of creativity as they formed alliances and counter-alliances to foster their 
economic interests. Even society itself dynamically pursued its interests and 
willingly compromised to foster those interests. The mix-match of strategies 
and attitudes exemplify that cultural resources can be used towards various 
ends and their effectiveness depends on what was at stake and who was 
using them for what goals. Whatever the case, the fact remains that kinship 
is something state agents and citizens can both fall on, in response to 
different dynamics of production, social and political life.  The social order is 
not static and so are attitudes and practices. This chapter leads us to 
chapter 4, which highlights how cultural norms of cooperative behavior 
receded in transporter-transporter and transporter-state relations, creating 









                                                                                                                                                                               
CHAPTER 4 
POLITICS AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE 
COMMON TRANSPORT NETWORK, 2000 - 2015 
 
 
“To say that we have mutual ownership of something does not mean we have equal rights 
to it.”  
(Mandinka Proverb). 
 
“What belongs to the monkey must be kept close to its cheeks.” 
(Wollof Proverb). 
 
4.0: Changes in Cross- Border Transport  
Following the Serekunda and Barra transport crisis, and by the year 2000, 
multiple forms of tensions existed in cross-border transport in Senegambia 
(see chapter 3).  Both external factors (e.g. developments in Senegal’s 
national politics) and internal factors (e.g. developments in the Senegalese 
Transport Association) affected the sector. In 2000, President Abdoulaye 
Wade was elected president of Senegal. His election victory marked the first 
time in Senegalese history when the ruling party which led the country to 
independence in 1960, lost elections to the opposition (see chapter 3). In the 
same year, Wade’s long-time confidante Alassane Ndoye was elected as 
the president of the Senegalese Transport Association. These developments 
created new dynamics in transport-state, transporter-transporter and 
transporter-society relations as both Wade and Ndoye pursued a new 
political agenda to disintegrate the interstate transport network. The 
disintegration agenda subtly challenged the notion that a powerful bond that 
transcends vested interests unifies Gambians and Senegalese (see 
chapters 1, 2 and 7). It exemplified that Senegambian kinship theories can 






advance or stall different agendas or goals. Thus, this chapter explores the 
question: How did cross-border transport change from a sector of 
cooperation to a sector characterised by conflict, which led to the 
disintegration of the common transport network?  
The first part of the chapter identifies interests in cross-border 
transport and highlights how conflicts in the sector emanated from these 
interests. An overview of cross-border transport conflicts follows. This 
section shows the linkages between domestic and interstate politics and the 
interface between the “deep politics of society” and the “high politics of the 
state.” 262 The section also discusses wider societal values for cross-border 
cooperation. This is followed by a discussion of the strategies the 
Senegalese Transport Association employed to disintegrate and restructure 
the common transport network. After this, the chapter identifies the 
outcomes of the restructured cross-border transport sector. It also discusses 
how transporters have used the border, the ferry problem, practices on the 
road and the benefits associated with the joint transport network, to achieve 
their goals.  It also discusses transporter-state (Gambian) conflicts and 
responses and counter-responses to the conflicts. Further, it identifies 
controversies in interstate dialogue over the border and cross-border 
transport. This is followed by an analysis of how ferry privatisation intensified 
the cross-border transport crisis, fueling transporter-state tensions and 
undermining interstate solidarity. Next, the chapter discusses how bad 
ferries helped to entrench militant behaviour from transporters and 
widespread calls for the Trans-Gambia to be bridged. The conclusion of the 
chapter follows and this connects to chapter 5 where the outcomes of the 
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4.1: Interests in Cross-Border Transport 
State and non-state actors operate at multiple levels in Senegambia’s cross-
border transport sector. As such, the multiple interests in the sector overlap. 
This situation creates both productive and non-productive tension for the 
border and its political economy.  However, the way the different interests in 
the sector interconnect also creates opportunities for negotiations in the 
sector.  Both state and non-state actors employ creativity and contingency in 
pursuing their interests in the transport sector.  
Usually, the state provides transport infrastructure, other public goods 
and it is responsible for protecting public welfare.  Based on these expected 
roles of the state, The Gambia and Senegal have a common goal for the 
transport sector. One such shared goal is the desire to exercise control over 
the sector. Their strategies for attaining these goals may not be effective. 
Historically, both states have failed to provide adequate transport services to 
their citizens.263  This partly explains why private actors dominate both 
domestic and cross-border transport in both countries.  These actors, even if 
they are held to the ideals of “social responsibility,” aim to maximise the 
returns on their investments. They may not always share the state’s welfare 
concerns. Hence, in most societies, motorists have been critical of the 
state’s transport policies such as road user fees and taxes, the regulation of 
road practices, requirements for insurance, driving licenses and other control 
mechanisms imposed to regulate the automobile sector. 264  
Irrespective of the differences in their objectives and goals, the state 
and commercial transporters share an interest in having functioning 
transport infrastructure and services. The former needs roads and motor 
vehicles to enforce its will, secure its jurisdiction and to order the different 
universes of power within it. Transport infrastructure also helps the state to 
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enforce its extractive policies within its jurisdiction.265 Similarly, commercial 
transporters need transport infrastructure to achieve their entrepreneurial 
goals. Better roads reduce their operation cost, the wear and tear of their 
vehicles, time spent on the roads, fuel consumption and helps to increase 
their income or the returns on their investments.  
The fact that these two entities have some shared objectives implies 
they can cooperate in areas of mutual interest. However, the existence of 
different interests also means they can have rivalries between them. The 
clash of interests has made automobile transport a constant source of 
political and economic tension, especially during economic distress.266 
Economic conditions, technology and politics largely dictate developments in 
the transport sector and other societal systems.267 Hence, unstable 
economic conditions have contributed to why transporter- state, transporter-
transporter and transporter- society relations have been mixed and 
unpredictable in Senegambia. Fierce competition among transporters and 
expansion of the fleet size and in the number of operators in the cross-
border traffic contributed to the dwindling of wullere and dome-ndeye ethics 
in the sector (see chapters 1, 2, 3 and 5).268 
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The low adherence to deep-rooted social and religious values in the 
transport sector is also conditioned by the fact that scarcity of resources can 
cause unity to decline among social groups.  Renner has also observed that 
in Senegambian history “social breaches could be healed, but crisis over 
land and livelihood proved far less manageable.”269 Thus, economic 
hardship has had its toll on the cross-border transport sector, leading to 
rivalries, jealousies and dome-baaye behavioural practices (see chapters 1, 
2 and 5). 
Conflicts in the transport sector expand into interstate political 
tensions.  If the politicians fail to see eye to eye and use the border as 
barrier when expedient, transporters and other local actors at the border 
have been also well instructed in this game. This validates Nugent’s 
observation that local actors tend to exploit circumstances around the border 
to their own advantage.270  But cross-border transport conflicts showed that 
individuals and the state exploit the border in multiple ways. This process is 
constantly shifting based on the different logics that guide such a process at 
any given time.  It contributes to continuities and discontinuities in cross-
border and interstate relations, as evident in the next section, which is about 
conflicts around transport.271 
 
4.2: Senegambia Transport Conflicts: An Overview  
Dissatisfactions with domestic and cross-border transport are connected 
(see chapter 3). This indicates The Gambia-Senegal transport conflicts are 
complex. However, interstate transport conflicts have two dimensions.  The 
first dimension manifests as a conflict between the state and private 
entrepreneurs. This conflict has three dimensions: first, it unfolds as tensions 
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between Senegalese transporters and Gambian authorities. Secondly, as 
tension between Senegalese transporters and their own government and 
thirdly, it includes tension between Jakarta riders and Gambian communities 
located at the border. Gambian authorities are also drawn into this conflict 
through their interventions to protect their border communities from the 
menace of the Jakarta (see chapter 5). Together, these three aspects of 
tensions crystallised to shape The Gambia-Senegal interstate tensions. 
The second dimension of interstate transport conflicts can also be 
differentiated based on the actors that are involved in the conflict.  The first 
aspect of this second conflict transpires as intermodal conflicts and involves 
rivalries between Senegalese automobile transport and Jakarta motorcycles. 
Each of them claims to be the bonafide border transport. Private 
entrepreneurs are also caught up in this intermodal conflict.  This conflict 
also includes subtle rivalries between cross-border automobile transporters.  
But this has a twist to it.  Superficially, it can be described as conflict 
between Senegalese transporters and Gambian authorities.  However, 
according to Senegalese Transporters’ advocacy, the Gambian transporters 
who are caught up in the middle of this conflict are un-intended victims. 
Senegalese transporters always deny that their anti-Gambia government 
policies are designed to hurt Gambian transporters, their dome-ndeyes (see 
chapter 5).  But there is some caveat to their advocacy: they deny waging a 
war against Gambian transporters. But they’ve expressed dissatisfactions 
about the fact that Gambian cross-border transports have a greater carrying 
capacity than Senegalese ones. As such, Senegalese grievances against 
Gambian cars can be considered as part of the intermodal tensions. 
Irrespective of the identities of the parties to each type of conflict or 
tension, The Gambia-Senegal transport conflicts mainly arise from the 
effects of the colonial partition that fragmented Senegambia’s geography. 
Thus, Senegambia’s cross-border transport struggles validate White and 






historical legacy.”272 The colonial legacy and geography shaped continuities 
in interstate transport challenges from independence to the present day. The 
colonial legacy has also locked The Gambia and Senegal in a “territorial 
trap.”  The two countries share the same economic space and have rival 
national policies. Their national logics shape their responses to the border, 
transport and other related issues.273 This partly explains why interstate 
conflicts especially over the border and the common transport links have 
recurred from independence to 2015. As such, interstate conflict in 
Senegambia is connected to how each of the two countries tries to 
safeguard its national interests amidst the complexities of the border. The 
next section explores how domestic and interstate developments shape 
interstate tensions and cross-border transport crisis in Senegambia. 
 
4.3: Change, Tension and the Disintegration of the Common 
Transport Links 
When Alassane Ndoye, President Wade’s long-time political ally, was 
elected president of the Senegalese Workers and Transport Union in 2000, 
there was national economic distress in Senegal. Transporters complained 
of a rising tax burden on them. They were also dissatisfied with the intense 
competition in domestic and cross-border transport sectors. They also 
claimed that both The Gambian and Senegalese states were exploiting them 
and the transport sector needed reforms.  
President Wade supported Ndoye on the Transport Association’s 
reform agenda, which sought to change the institutional arrangements on 
the interstate routes, shared motor park facilities, and practices along the 
cross-border roads and at the ferry crossings (see chapter 3 and 5). The 
alliance with President Wade shifted the attention of the Association from 
dissatisfactions with its own state to their discontentment with the Gambian 
state.  
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Based on transporter agenda-setting in 2000, the Senegalese 
Transport Association mobilised its members to collectively oppose Gambia 
government policies on the interstate routes and ferries. They argued that 
non-tariff barriers that hinder cross-border transport flows existed on the 
interstate routes. The West African economic bloc, ECOWAS, had long 
identified that non- tariff barriers that exist in West African transport systems 
have hindered sub-regional transport, trade and capital or labour mobility in 
West Africa. ECOWAS’ policy observations strengthened Senegalese 
transporters resolve to challenge Gambian authorities.   
Transporters argued that between 2000- 2002, they encountered 
eleven checkpoints between Keur Ayib and Senoba, two points on the 
interstate routes. They also complained about informal road arrangements 
by which transporters allegedly bribed Gambian traffic police on the 
interstate routes 500 CFA francs or more.274 Their allegations focused on 
the Gambian side of the border, but corrupt practices on the interstate roads 
existed across both sides of the border and Transporters themselves 
contributed to entrenching such corrupt practices. Their one-sided claims 
bore the hallmark of dome-baaye behavioural tendencies as they faulted 
Gambian authorities and Gambian routes, while ignoring the overall 
problems on the interstate routes. This approach was politically expedient. It 
guaranteed them the Wade government’s support. Moreover, faulting 
Gambian authorities was a good way of attracting sympathy from other 
stakeholders with vested interests in cross-border transport. Consequently, 
the Association also whipped the sympathy of Senegalese citizens and other 
stakeholders before it formerly launched its fight against the Gambian state 
over cross-border transport arrangements. 275 
Unconvinced by the Senegalese Transporter’s agenda, Gambian 
transporters refused to join the former’s fight against their state. This 
disagreement pitted the two groups of transporters against each other. The 
struggle against Gambian authorities became a struggle between “us” 
                                                            







(Senegalese transporters) and “them” (Gambian state and transporters). 
The cooperative relations that defined interactions between the two groups 
of transporters turned into open rivalries. Wullere and dome-ndeye 
considerations receded as both groups aimed to protect their economic 
interests across both sides of the border.276 This process hurt interpersonal 
relations among transporters and between Senegalese transporters and 
Gambian authorities.  
The Association’s attempt to secure exclusive gains for its members 
over their cross-border Gambian colleagues reechoed Renner’s observation 
that in Senegambia, social breaches were easily healed but struggles over 
resources were difficult to tackle.277  This meant the economic concerns of 
transporters and the political pressures these concerns created in cross-
border and interstate relations redefined cross-border bonds and relations, 
even if temporarily. 278  As this conflict unfolded, it was clear that the close-
knit social bonds between Gambians and Senegalese are susceptible to 
economic competition. The tensions were an opportunity for both groups of 
transporters to adopt impersonal considerations.279 The Senegalese 
Transport Association swiftly moved forward to organise its first nation-wide 
protest against Gambian authorities at The Gambia-Senegal border.  The 
next section explores how the association mobilised and launched its anti-
Gambian Authorities protests at the border, giving way to the disintegration 
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4.3.1: Mobilising Against Gambian Authorities, 2002 
In March 2002, Alassane Ndoye used his popular support to organise the 
Senegalese Transport Association’s first nation-wide forum in Dakar. 
Members from all Regional Transport Associations attended the forum. The 
forum had the backing of President Wade, the Senegalese Ministry of 
Interior and the Armed Forces of the country. During the Dakar-forum, 
transporters compiled a host of grievances against The Gambian state and 
the interstate route to rally cross-border transporters for their planned joint 
protest against Gambian Authorities.280 But given that the ferry problems 
have become a source of major dissatisfaction to both the public and cross-
border transporters, the Association concentrated on these issues in this 
initial phase of its campaign. Specifically, it queried that ferry services have 
been perennially bad and this has affected the smooth flow of traffic, 
crossing fees have been increasing, bribery was endemic in the ferry sector, 
among other things.  
The ferries have been the heart of the cross-border transport network. 
They facilitated a unimodal transport system and the intermodal dependence 
between different modes of cross-border transport (see chapters 2 & 3). As 
such, the ferry issue was a concern to the general public in both The 
Gambia and Senegal and a good selling point to elicit support from the 
general public. 
Bachirou Ndiaye, the assistant Secretary-General of the Senegalese 
Transport Association noted in an interview that the ferry issue was an 
overriding concern to them. “From 2000-2002, there was plenty commotion 
about the ferry crossing. To cross, small cars paid 35,000 CFA francs, lorries 
and trucks paid 80,000 to 90,000 CFA and baggage fees were not 
standardised. The ferry crossing people did what they liked.” 281 Setting their 
dissatisfactions around ferries was strategic. In 2002, the ferries were 
                                                            







operating reliably. To ensure that the public considers their queries 
legitimate, transporters concentrated on ferry crossing fees instead of ferry 
operations as the core of their campaign. According to Ndiaye, after hearing 
the many criticisms against Gambian authorities, the ferries and the routes,  
Alassane replied that if they asked for a boycott of the borders, we will do it. This 
became a unanimous request. One morning, we drove in 15 cars on the road to 
Gambie. We took along rice, oil, other provisions and money. We went to Keur 
Ayib. Barbie Toure and his people lent us a huge compound for our lodgings, 
cooked lunch, breakfast and dinner for us. For twenty-two good days, we blockaded 
the border. For twenty-three days, no car crossed from Keur Ayib to Farrafenni and 
from Karang to Amdallai. The Gambia Government invited us for a dialogue. But we 
refused to enter their border. Eventually, they crossed to Keur Ayib. At 4.00pm, we 
had talks, with the following conditions put to them: first, the eleven checkpoints that 
the chauffeurs traversed must be removed, the porte baggage they randomly 
charged must end, and they must reduce ferry crossing fees. They agreed to the 
conditions. We signed a protocol of agreement and then we ended the blockade.282 
 
Ndiaye’s narrative showed how the Association’s leadership aroused 
members to adopt a confrontational approach to settling their grievances. 
They understood that closing the border was one of the most effective ways 
to pull Gambian authorities to the negotiation table. But doing that effectively 
required solidarity from the Senegalese state and from the general public. 
The existing bad relation between Presidents Wade and Jammeh was in 
transporters’ favour. As a non-state actor, the Association needed 
permission from Senegal to be able to close the border between the two 
countries. The bad bilateral ties at that moment and the good relationship 
and alliance between Wade and Ndoye provided the political leverage and 
the authority the Association needed, to close the border.  
The Association was also aware that even with the permission of the 
Senegalese government, closing the border was a sensitive issue and if it 
was not handled properly, it could attract public backlash. They initiated a 
media campaign to rally public support to their cause before they embarked 
on their project. They impressed upon the public that they were fighting the 
excesses all people suffer as a result of bad ferries, poor management and 








resort for them given the grave inconvenience this will cause to the public. 
They offered alternative route choices to the people who might need to cross 
the border for essential travels.  
By making transporters’ problems the problems of the public, it was 
easy for the campaign to attract public sympathy. They effectively used 
people’s need for reliable ferry services, smooth cross-border travels and 
cheaper crossing fees, to their advantage. 283 It was also easy to obtain 
support for all logistics that were needed for implementing their border 
closure project. With political support from the state and social support from 
the public, the Association could dictate to Gambian authorities the terms by 
which they would negotiate. 
The Senegalese state showed deference to transporters and it let 
them do what a state normally does—closing the border. This collaboration 
between the state and transporters mimicked the fabric metaphor, since the 
actions of both entities were required to subdue the Gambian state. The 
implementation of the border closure campaign further exposed how the 
state and people can seek out and use different resources to pursue their 
goals.  
The Senegalese government had an option to mediate the 
transporter-Gambian government tensions, but it chose an artful silence and 
withdrew from the limelight of this struggle.  But it provided transporters an 
instructive behind the scene firepower for using the authority it loaned to 
them. This stance was also dictated by state logics.  
Both The Gambia and Senegal are members of ECOWAS, the sub-
regional body that guarantees the free movement of people and goods 
among West African states. As such, closing the border between The 
Gambia and Senegal infringed on ECOWAS protocols for free mobility 
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among member states. It was therefore understandable why the Wade 
government swiftly disassociated itself from transporters border blockade. It 
argued that the border conflict was between Senegalese transporters and 
Gambian authorities and it had nothing to do with Senegal’s relationship with 
The Gambia.  
Gambian authorities were un-impressed with neither the Senegalese 
government’s stance nor its excuses.  But some observers of The Gambia-
Senegal relations (some intellectuals, media personnel and ordinary citizens 
on both sides of the border) argued that Senegal’s stance came out of its 
frustrations with Gambian authorities over Casamance and the Trans-
Gambia bridge project. But some people decried the Senegalese stance and 
argued it was using transporters as a proxy to fight the Gambian state, 
instead of honestly engaging the latter on its concerns. 
The border closure polarised people on both sides of the border. But 
it provided transporters the courage and support they needed to pursue pro-
disintegration policies to restructure the joint transport network, to effectively 
curb competition from Gambian transporters. Emboldened by the success of 
the 2002 border blockade and the Barra protests  (see chapter 3), the 
Association further exercised its newfound authority by suspending The 
Gambia Public Transport Corporation’s (GPTC) inter-state (Banjul-Dakar) 
buses from Senegalese roads. This embargo on GPTC buses crippled a 
competitive and convenient interstate bus service. The blockade created 
huge inconveniences for many passengers but Ndiaye argued the measure 
was justified. He noted:  
The Gambian public bus service was running twelve buses on the inter-state route 
from Barra to Dakar. This started before Wade came to power and continued until in 
2009. We told Gambians that we would now reduce the number of buses from 
twelve to four buses. Initially, the buses stood at their main stop in Barra and within 
a few minutes they were full. Fares were 5,000 cinq mille francs for each 
passenger.  80 passengers made up the full load of each trip. Ticket collections on 
each trip amounted to about 400, 0000 CFA. Fuel consumption was about 100,000 






buses made almost 1,000,000 CFA or at least 800,000 CFA. That was lot of money. 
We had to change that.284 
Ndiaye’s complaints about GPTC buses clearly show that economic logics 
also influenced transporters’ move to disintegrate the common transport 
links and to fight the Gambian state. The economic benefits Gambian 
authorities accrued from GPTC interstate buses were a source of jealousy 
for Senegalese transporters. Instead of exploring alternative means of 
effectively competing with GPTC in the market, they sought to kill or cripple 
its business in typical dome-baaye style. This rivalry re-echoes the 
Senegalese state’s attitude towards Gambian re-export trade. But unlike the 
transporters who sought to kill or cripple GPTC‘s interstate bus services, a 
viable source of income for the company, the Senegalese state tried to 
control Gambian re-export trade by futilely attempting to drag the country 
into a customs union before and during the Confederation.285 Transporters’ 
stance against the GPTC was therefore an extension of Senegal’s 
adversarial economic strategy against The Gambia.  
Ndiaye‘s statements below further revealed that economic jealousy 
hugely shaped Senegal and transporters agitations against The Gambia. He 
asserted that:  
Barra gained lot of benefit from our drivers. Our cars paid maanda to the President 
of the Gambia Transport Union and his team. The monies stayed in Gambia, no 
benefits came to Senegal. It benefitted their transport association and their country. 
We as Senegalese transporters also want to enjoy the benefits of maandas. We 
want the benefits from our drivers to end in Senegal, not cross the border. We also 
wanted to transform transport in our country. We decided that Gambians should 
stop at Amdallai. We will also stop at Karang. People will come off their cars and 
enter our territory. On our side too, people will come off our cars and enter Gambian 
territory using Gambian transports.286 
 
The above statements were an open confession that protecting economic 
interests were the defining force behind transporters’ anti-Gambia 
government campaign. The tensions over the border were therefore a 
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legitimate behind the scenes economic war against the Gambian state and 
its transporters. Ndiaye’s statements re-echoes complaints from other 
Senegalese that their country suffers significant economic loses as a result 
of The Gambia’s illicit free transit trade to Senegal (see chapter 2).287  These 
complaints about economic loses were fervent at the height of structural 
adjustment in the 1980s and during the Confederation. So, Senegal’s 
economic rivalry towards The Gambia continues two decades after the 
Confederation collapsed.  
 The statements also draw a pattern in The Gambia–Senegal 
economic policy conflict.  In fact, Pa Ibrahima Toure, a retired driver who 
lives in Keur Ayib, disclosed that Senegalese transporters’ attempt to fight 
Gambian authorities over the cross-border routes was a response to 
domestic economic difficulties in Senegal. He argued that their Association’s 
policy to no longer allow auto “étrangère” (foreign cars, referring to Gambian 
cars) to have unlimited route access in Senegal was valid because the droits 
(taxes or duties) Senegalese transporters paid in Senegal were higher than 
what Gambian transporters paid in their country. “Senegal has a bigger 
problem. There are no jobs in the country. As Transporters, we do not have 
anywhere to take our cars. Business is not working well. We cannot have 
another country bring its cars here when our drivers pay more than their 
drivers. The countries are different (rewi bukung).”288  
Both Toure’s and Ndiaye’s views highlight how The Gambia becomes 
an economic pawn for economic hardship in Senegal. They also expose 
how interstate economic relations were hugely reactionary. In fact, Toure 
further argued that Senegalese transporters’ attitudes towards The Gambia 
were also a reaction to Gambian authorities’ attitudes. He noted that for a 
long time, they attempted to expand the access of Senegalese commercial 
transport cars in The Gambia. But the country kept arguing that, “Our 
country is small. We have capacity to allow a few cars run there. If we allow 
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all Senegalese cars to come here, we would be over flooded with cars and 
that will not be good for us.”289 Evidently, The Gambia-Senegal economic 
struggles are connected to their geography and their shared economic 
space. 
Although the arguments highlighted here indicate that Senegal reacts 
to Gambian economic processes but the situation has not been that simple. 
The Gambia’s economic policies were also designed to gain edge over 
Senegal’s. So, both countries continuously react to each other’s policies. 
Each country is also on a constant lookout for new cross-border economic 
opportunities it can exploit, even if this means foregoing existing bilateral 
agreements. For example, Toure reported that transporters initiated the 
disintegration of the common transport network, but the two governments 
endorsed it. They said, “OK, since you the transporters have come up with 
this policy, from now on, each side should stop at their border. As 
governments, we want and need peace between us.  If this works for you 
and it can maintain cordiality, let’s do it.”290  
The stance both countries took on transporters’ disintegration 
initiative was similar to the Senegalese stance on transporters’ border 
closure campaign.  Instead of mediating the relationship to maintain a joint 
transport system, which was beneficial to populations in both countries, the 
two states opted to endorse transporters’ actions with the excuse that it 
would maintain peace between them. But this position ignored the fact that 
separation can cause misgivings and distrust as each party nurtures 
suspicion about the other. Moreover, disintegrating the transport network by 
no means ended the longstanding economic struggles between the two 
countries. What it did was to intensify that struggle, paving a way for each 
country to adopt some hardline stance towards the other, even on issues of 
mutual interest and benefit.  
But for analytical purposes, the endorsement of the disintegration and 
the subsequent bad politics between the two states show how kinship has 
                                                            







both benefits and risks, as both dome-ndeye and dome-baaye attitudes 
shaped relations at this time.  But it also shows that transport can be a 
serious source of tension in society. From the colonial times to date, 
interstate relations over it have been mostly uneasy. Examples from other 
areas of the world such as New York and its taxicab industry also highlight 
that transport, like trade, is an area of intense political concern for states in 
general.291 But transporter-state and transporter-transporter relations in 
Senegambia indicate the high politics of state is not discreet from the deep 
politics of society. Both systems mutually influence each other. 
Consequently, the economic rivalry among transporters mirrors the 
economic jealousies between the two states. Concerns for cost, price and 
benefits shifted dome-ndeye relational principles. Values for wullere receded 
and dome-baaye behavioural tenets took over interstate relations and 
transporter-Gambia government relations. Symbolically, the struggle over 
transport and the border manifest the complex nature of interstate and state-
society relations in Senegambia. However, border closures have both 
positive and negative outcomes. The next section therefore explores how 
the border closure affected interstate political relations.  
 
4.3.2: Implications of the 2002 Border Closure 
Transporters’ ability to hijack the sovereign authority of the state reinforced 
beliefs that there was an alliance between transporters and the Senegalese 
government. Other events that happened after the 2002 border closure 
strengthened such beliefs. For instance, in 2003, Senegalese Prime Minister 
Idrissa Seck visited The Gambia. GPTC officials met him to complain about 
the embargo on their buses. They urged transporters to lift the ban, citing 
how the action contravened ECOWAS protocols on free movement of 
people and goods. Seck returned to Senegal and engaged the Association 
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on behalf of GPTC and finally, the embargo was lifted. GPTC interstate bus 
services resumed.292 
Prime Minister Seck’s visit came at a time when relations were in 
serious jeopardy. Before his visit, on 7th June, 2003, fans of the Gambian 
and Senegalese national football teams had violently clashed in Dakar at a 
match. Shortly after this incident, Senegalese authorities delayed the transit 
of Gambian groundnut seeds destined for Senegal, causing outrage among 
Gambian lawmakers.293 Seck’s visit was therefore a political attempt to 
pacify the political ill-will between the two states. His visit was also both a 
dome-ndeye and a citizen’s diplomatic overture to cool down the political 
heat between the two states. He appeased both sides in the short term, but 
suspicion hung over interstate relations. Transporters’ attempt to proceed 
with the disintegration agenda confirmed to both sides that they were 
engaged in an intense dome-baaye struggle. Their plans to re-structure the 
joint transport network, as discussed in the next section, was a powerful 
statement to Gambian authorities that it was no longer business as usual. 
For transporters and their political allies, the game was about protecting their 
economic interests rather than cross-border social bonds. But this did not 
mean that they had abandoned cultural ideas about relatedness in 
Senegambia. Instead, as it would be seen in the rest of the sections and 
chapters that follow, kinship ideas are constantly reinvented and 
manipulated to sustain various relations in the midst of contradictory state 
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4.4: Restructuring Cross-Border Transport, 2004 
The Senegalese Transport Association embarked on restructuring cross-
border transport without consulting its Gambian counterparts or Gambian 
authorities. It started a new motor parks project in 2004. The first of these 
motor parks was established in Karang, where a sub-drivers’ association 
was founded under the leadership of Pap Dianko. 
We pledged: from this day, Senegalese transport will no longer cross over to Barra. 
By moving the gare routier from Barra to Karang, we blocked Gambians and all the 
financial gains made from us through the joint motor parks. Our next concern was 
how to make the gare routier dundu (alive and successful). In return, The Gambia 
took a position that Senegalese mini cars could no longer go further to Barra. We 
too decided to block their buses. Given the friendly accord our two governments 
signed, we agreed that instead of six buses, we will now allow only four on the 
interstate route, with two leaving from Dakar and two from Banjul, respectively.294 
 
Ndiaye’s words communicate transporters’ resolution to sustain their 
agenda. The Association’s economic concerns ignored cross-border 
relatedness (see chapters 1 & 2).  However, recognising the formal 
diplomatic accords the two countries signed indicate that they were 
prioritising political relations over social ones. Considering that the “friendly 
accord” was born out of Senegambian claims of one-ness, transporters 
indirectly acknowledged cross-border kinship bonds in their re-structuring 
plans.  Economic concerns weakened the strength of kinship discourses, but 
economic concerns have never effectively erased cross-border social bonds. 
Therefore, interstate relations can fit different forms of kinship bonds, without 
denying social claims about cross-border relatedness. Transporters’ 
restructuring process was rooted in both economic and social views, but 
economic concerns were paramount to them.  
When the Karang motor park started functioning, the Barra-Dakar 
route became Karang-Dakar. Although this new route eliminated cross-
border intermodal transit connections, however, it was aligned to 
longstanding cross-border points of contact and mobility. , In this new 
arrangement, passengers crossed the border on foot from Amdallai and 
Karang to change to the national transport of each country. This situation 
                                                            






created a boom for intermediate transport such as clandos and 
horse/donkey carts which found work transferring passengers from the 
border checkpoints to the new motor park located about a kilometer away. 
Under the new arrangement, passengers from The Gambia took three cars 
to get to their cross-border destinations from Barra. Banjul- bound 
passengers from Dakar travelled in two cars and the ferry to get to Banjul. 
The restructuring was a pain for passengers but it created more economic 
opportunities for transporters on both sides of the border.  
The restructuring was evidently a victory for Senegalese transporters, 
but it was a cost to their Gambian colleagues, irrespective of the new 
opportunities in the sector. Gambian cars made between 200,000 mille or 
250,000 CFA francs for their Barra- Dakar return trips. However, “our new 
policies completely embargoed them and Senegalese transport now feeds 
itself. Without authorisation or a laisser passer, Gambian cars cannot come 
into Senegal.”295  The restructured transport sector made Gambian 
transporters lose the gains they were making from the interstate routes. 
Under the re-structured system, vehicles of each of the two states were 
required to obtain official permission from border enforcement agents, if they 
wished to cross the border into the other country. Ndiaye noted that 
“Gambians come to Senegal the way they liked and left the way they chose 
to but now we control that.”296   Like in any change situation, some people 
won and other people lost in this new arrangement. Blocking Gambian 
transports from Senegalese routes was a victory for Senegalese 
transporters. They enjoyed new financial rewards from the situation. But it 
shaped new forms of resentment from across the border and also internally. 
Domestic transporters vied against each other to monopolise the gains. The 
next section explores the internal rift the restructuring caused among 











4.4.1: Initial Outcomes of the Restructuring 
Senegalese transporters’ plans gave them an effective monopoly on 
interstate routes located within their country. However, border communities 
vied against each other to host one of the new motor park facilities. 
Communities that had one, under the joint transport system, insisted on 
maintaining them. These rivalries were intense in Casamance. Seleti, 
Diouloulou and Kafountine struggled against each other as each of them 
claimed to be the appropriate site for a new motor park. Seleti finally won the 
contest and its new motor park serviced Zinguinchor, Kolda and over time, 
Diaobi at the Senegal-Guinea Conakry border.297  
Even after communities finally compromised on the locations of the 
new motor parks, the Senegalese Transport Association needed more effort 
on their project. Traffic around the new motor parks was slow to adjust. The 
Association claimed this was due to Gambian conspiracy to kill the new 
motor parks. In reaction to that conspiracy theory, it launched an arbitrary 
border blockade at the Amdallai-Karang border in 2004, to force all traffic to 
use the new motor park facilities. This arbitrary border closure was 
successful in re-directing cross-border traffic to the new motor parks. But 
there was no legitimate reason for it. It thus added a new complication to 
interstate relations.  
Interestingly, this arbitrary border closure implied that the Association 
was in full control of the authority they borrow from the Senegalese state.  It 
was willing to use its loaned powers for both legitimate and dictatorial 
reasons. It was also clear that the association was fully aware of the weak 
bargaining authority Gambian authorities have, given the new 
circumstances. They effectively exploited that for many years to come until 
when the Gambian state finally re-asserted its authority and met 
transporters’ bargaining firepower with equal firepower (see chapter 5 and 
6). 
                                                            






Furthermore, the arbitrary border closure signified that dome-baaye 
tendencies have taken over transporter-transporter and transporter-state 
relations. It showed deep-seated personal grievances, which were 
manifested with strong emotional undertones.  Dome-ndeyes are socially 
expected to use reason and consideration to deal with each other. But the 
association’s move was an outright, unjustifiable action, unbefitting for 
dome-ndeye ethics. Its action conforms to aggravated dome-baaye 
tendencies and shows how kinship is in fact a danger. It called for new 
approaches to interstate relations. Instead of using diplomatic channels to 
address this conflict, the two states needed to develop new strategies for 
handling it. For example, in 1972, the two countries had a disagreement 
over the border. But Toure reported that presidents Jawara and Senghor 
used diplomatic channels to settle the disagreements amicably:  
Papers and not a quarrel, a fight or anger caused the border closure that happened 
around 1972. Some accords signed by the Gambia and Senegal expired and both 
countries were slow in renewing them. This affected the Keur Ayib -Farrafenni and 
Karang -Amdallai borders. They did what was called “boundary”.  When people 
came, they stopped at their frontier (ku njuew emm sa frontiere). The border 
stopped until they renewed the accords. Another border closure I witnessed 
resulted from the difficulties the police and gendarmes inflicted on us. The 
Senegalese Transport Association decided to protest (fibpuu). They said, Gambian 
transporters cannot be paying 30, 000 CFA francs for twelve months and 
Senegalese paid 100,000 for the same period. In addition, Gambian cars carried 
eight passengers at a time. They travelled everywhere in Senegal. Our Senegalese 
cars carried seven passengers but they never went to all destinations in The 
Gambia. That was the reason for the other “boundary” incident. When that 
happened, again, they called us to negotiate and we came to terms.298  
 
Following Toure’s narratives, we can discern that Senegalese transporters 
have had longstanding grievances about cross-border transport 
arrangements. These concerned the carrying capacity of Gambian vehicles, 
differences in the fees and duties levied on them in each country, access 
permissions and even how Gambian police and Senegalese gendarmes 
treat them on the cross-border routes. They also have a history of using the 
border between the two countries to protest about their grievances. 
Arguably, targeting the border is an effective way of ensuring a speedy 
audience from the authorities and speedy resolution of any grievances. 
                                                            






Raeymaekers and Jourdan argue that the border is a meeting point, a space 
for daily face-to-face contacts, immediate economic and social relations and 
has potential to make and unmake politics.  It is also a space where “…order 
and disorder are constantly constructed and deconstructed, and spheres of 
authority are forged and intersect.”299  These descriptions of the border 
make it an invaluable space for launching protests. For cross-border 
transporters, the border is also the centre of their economic activities. 
Additionally, the border is located at the edge of the state but its political 
economy is intertwined with the centre. Halting economic production at the 
border affects life at the centre, and consequently national authorities are 
motivated to quickly contain the disruptive effects of disorder at the fringe of 
the state.   
Toure’s narrative also helps us compare and contrast the way political 
authorities like presidents Jawara and Senghor handled border crisis to the 
way transporters prevailed over border disagreements. The former favoured 
diplomatic resolutions whereas the latter mostly opt for outright 
confrontation. However, the different approaches political authorities and 
transporters use to settle border disputes do not discount the longstanding 
chaotic interstate relations over the border.  
The border closures that happened in 1972, 2000 and in 2004, used 
different approaches and had different motivations. But all these border 
closure incidences confirm a pattern: that there has been a lingering dent in 
interstate relations. In 1972, the two heads of states opted to close the 
border pending the renewal of the accords. This means even at the best of 
times when politicians in The Gambia and Senegal seemed to have cordial 
interpersonal relations, there was always a dark cloud of suspicion or 
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reluctance to cooperate, trailing their cordiality. This reasserts how the 
border has been laden with political dividends for both state and non-state 
actors in Senegambia. State logics and the economic opportunities of the 
border make it a fertile ground for forging different kinds of relations. These 
relations intersect and diverge and compel both state and non-state actors 
to negotiate and renegotiate their ambitions around the border.  
Transporters can use the border to ‘napp” or blackmail both the Senegalese 
and Gambian state. They secured monopoly over the cross-border routes. 
But this victory did not end cross-border and interstate economic rivalries. 
As such, for every border crisis, state authorities are forced to revisit existing 
policies to ensure economic and political situations at the border would be or 
remain at their advantage. The next section therefore explores Gambian 
authority’s reactions to the 2004 border crisis.  
 
4.4.2: Gambian Responses to the Border Closures 
When the Senegalese transporters closed the border in 2004, Gambian 
authorities showed mixed reactions to the incident.  They considered it a 
staged economic sabotage from the Senegalese state. An official of the 
Gambian Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs shared Gambian 
authorities’ assessment of the border closure incident. He noted that: 
The blocking of the re-export route during action by the unionists is of serious 
concern to us. Our position has always been that if Senegal wants The Gambia to 
open up its Trans-Gambia corridor, it should equally grant open access to The 
Gambia to its routes to Mali.  It should allow unfettered access to Mali –bound 
goods, which come through our Port. If Malian and Guinean Transporters can enjoy 
open access to Senegalese routes, we see no reason why Senegal should make it 
difficult for Gambian Transporters to equally use the same routes to go to other 
countries. Gambian transporters need to be given access to Senegalese routes 
both within and outside Senegal. Granting access to each other’s routes has to be 
mutual. Therefore, granting open access to each other will be a win-win situation for 
both countries. As a Government we do not buy into the Senegalese response to 
transporter border blockades. Transporters and the unionists are not government. 
They can only do certain actions if their authorities properly back them. We are not 
in competition with Senegal. The economic space is big enough to accommodate 
both countries in their respective search for benefits to their countries.  The ferries 






Government continues to do all it can to solve the problems we have with the 
ferries.300 
 
Gambian authorities viewed that the border closure incident was due to 
interstate rivalries over route access. The Trans-Gambia corridor is part of 
Gambia controlled domestic routes leading to Casamance. From this official 
account, Senegal desires unlimited access to the Trans-Gambia route, 
which was not being granted by Gambian authorities. Political insecurity in 
Casamance and the economic opportunities of the region provide legitimate 
reasons for Senegal to yearn for unlimited access to the Trans-Gambia. The 
Gambia’s request to share Senegalese routes to Mali, to enhance its 
economic lifeline, the re-export trade is also politically and economically 
justified. 
 Superficially, it seems the interstate trouble over the border is an 
easy one; both countries need to grant the other’s request and then with 
equal access the problem will be resolved.  But there are complex political 
and economic ramifications for acceding to each other’s demand. 
Consequently, both countries have to weigh the pros and cons of each 
decision they take regarding this matter to see if they can develop better 
strategies to achieve the “win, win” results the Gambian official envisaged. 
For example, if Senegal can use Gambian territory and routes to launch 
retaliatory military action against Casamance rebels, Gambians, especially 
neighbouring border communities to Casamance would pay a huge price for 
it. It would compound the insecurity these communities suffer as a result of 
hit and run attacks from the rebels. Additionally, aggrieving the Jolas of 
Casamance may potentially backfire and may spark a semi-insurgency in 
Foni, a predominantly Jola territory in The Gambia. As such, The Gambia 
government has no incentive to take sides in the Casamance conflict even 
though some people alleged that president Jammeh was secretly providing 
military and other assistance to Casamance rebels, especially after Senegal 
allegedly sponsored rebel soldiers (the Kartong attackers) to overthrow 
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Jammeh, which failed. Similarly, opening up Senegalese routes to Gambian 
re-export trade would bring significant economic loses to Senegal. Unless 
the two countries strategically work together to minimise the potential 
negative impacts conceding to each other’s demand may entail, there would 
be more resistance than cooperation in resolving these interstate dilemmas.  
Critically, Gambian authorities were convinced that the transporters 
were acting on behalf of the Senegalese state. Consequently, even after it 
negotiated with transporters to re-open the border, it remained suspicious of 
Senegalese intentions.  Interestingly, Gambian views of the causes behind 
the border closure do not focus on transporters’ claims of ill-treatment and 
economic exploitation on the cross-border routes.  
The Gambian official’s account about the reasons behind the border 
closure is a frank and non-evasive analysis of the complexities of interstate 
relations. It acknowledged that The Gambia-Senegal interstate relations 
have been a struggle and that deep animosities characterise it. This frank 
assessment contrasts with public statements officials of both governments 
bandy around about the enduring ethnic, social, religious and economic ties 
between the two countries. For example, in 1997, during The Gambia-
Senegal inter-ministerial conference in Banjul, The Gambia’s Major Bojang 
declared to the conference, “Peace in The Gambia is peace in Senegal.”301 It 
is common to hear politicians in both countries to make statements like 
Bojang’s. But interstate animosity is real and it fails to disguise itself, 
sometimes. 
 Even before transporters became deeply implicated in interstate 
crisis, there was always a lingering suspicion between leaders of the two 
states, and this has a colonial legacy (see chapters 1 & 2). The transporters’ 
involvement in interstate border disputes added a new layer to the 
complications over the border. They are a non-state actor with loaned 
sovereign powers and therefore can overexploit their powers to the 
detriment of interstate relations.  
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Describing interstate relations as an act of “diplomatique geographie,” 
Senegalese career diplomat, Ambassador Saidou Nourou Ba, who also 
served as the Executive Secretary of the Senegambia Secretariat in Banjul 
from 1978-1981, observed the mysteries of interstate relations. 302 He noted 
that: 
We are the same people who share the same culture and languages living 
in the same house but with two doors of entry. You can enter by The 
Gambia or Senegal. I think it is easier to be a diplomat elsewhere than to be 
a diplomat between neighbouring African countries. This is because 
everything is sensitive.303  
 
Ba’s statement that “…everything is sensitive,” summarises the complicated 
nature of interstate relations.  More recently, the shared transport links have 
been the most common subject in interstate tensions.  But there have been 
other ongoing problems such as the longstanding dispute over the 
ownership of Tranquil, a border village. The Tranquil problem remains an 
intractable tension between the two countries. Majority of Gambians and 
Senegalese do not know about the Tranquil issue, much more why the two 
states are fighting over it. Most of the fight over Tranquil is being 
intentionally held away from public knowledge.  More recently, when the 
Tranquil issue re-surfaced in the public domain, some citizens queried that 
the two countries have not been transparent about their relationship over the 
village.  One writer mimicked official statements on interstate relations and 
queried that: 
He urged understanding from both sides saying “there is no country in the sub-
region that is so closely related in everything, as The Gambia and Senegal.” I am 
tired of Hearing this Statement because it obscures the real animosities lingering on 
both sides of the border. The so-called authorities are at loggerheads and 
everybody else is acting as if we are best of friends. What is of paramount 
relevancy to both peoples on both side of the border is trade and economic 
integration. Therefore create a free trade zone and let the people in and out of 
these countries. Prosperity brings down borders and enhances understanding and 
brotherhood. Instead what we are seeing is proxy conflict over an irrelevant village 
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while countless other border issues like free movement of people and goods along 
the border remain unattended to.304 
The above statements are critical of why the two countries are fighting over 
Tranquil. However, it does not imply that the author understands the political 
relevance of this village to either country. The call for trade and economic 
integration seemed to offer straightforward solutions to interstate tensions. 
But as already indicated, there are diverse challenges to trade and 
economic integration in Senegambia. People who have vested interests in 
the border and its political economy are aware of the economic and political 
dilemmas it represents for both states.  
Some people belief that transporters’ involvement in interstate 
conflicts is politically expedient for both countries. They consider them as 
part of a broad strategy to distract Gambians and Senegalese from their 
domestic problems and to fool them about the complications in interstate 
relations.  
In a focus group discussion on the border held in Keur Ayib in 2013, 
Oumar, a Senegalese youth from Kolda, Casamance, and a cross-border 
trader at the Keur Ayib border argued that there is political capital in The 
Gambia-Senegal border. He concluded that the 2002 and 2004 border 
closures were self-serving. They “were planned by Wade. He was getting 
more and more unpopular in Senegal. He wanted to be re-elected. He gave 
the unions excessive powers and used the border to please them. All the 
most recent border closures have been under his leadership, too. He used 
the Transport Association to protect his reputation.”305 To what extent the 
borders were powerful enough to entrench Wade’s political career in 
Senegal remained to be seen, given that he lost his aggressive re-election 
bid to Macky Sall in 2011. But even with that, it is clear that The Gambia-
Senegal border carry political, economic and social power in Senegambia. 
The cross-border mobility of people and goods continue to develop new 
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trends and therefore we can continue to learn from these realities. The ferry 
problem, which has been mentioned in passing in the account of the 
Gambian Ministry of Finance official, has been another source of transport 
related conflicts in interstate relations. To further understand the full 
reactions of Gambian authorities to transporters’ border closures requires 
looking at the roles the ferries play in shaping transporter grievances and 
also in interstate politics. The next section revisits the ferry issue.  
 
4.5: The Ferries: A Perennial Dilemma for Cross-Border 
Transport 
Ferries mediate geographic and social mobility in Senegambia. Different 
nationalities among them Senegalese nationals (traders, truckers, 
automobile owners and ordinary citizens), Bissau Guineans, Conakry 
Guineans, Nigerians, Malians, European tourists cross from one bank of the 
River Gambia to the other. Different kinds of automobile vehicles also cross 
from one bank of the river to the other. In 2009/2010, a total number of 1.4 
million assorted vehicles and 22.5 million passengers used the ferries to 
cross the Gambia River.306 These figures show that the ferries are important 
means of transport for people and for vehicles. The statistics is also an 
implicit reference to the economic gains The Gambia makes from the ferries. 
But the economic values of the ferries conflict with their political significance 
in interstate relations, and this renders ferries a significant source of conflict 
in The Gambia-Senegal relations.  
The political dialogue about the ferries has been going on between 
the two countries from 1900.307 Ferries enhance cross-border mobility, which 
has political significance for both The Gambia and Senegal.  But each 
country places a different value on them. The ferries aid north-south mobility 
for The Gambia, but the country has not effectively resolved the many 
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impediments ferries posed to it. The ferries have faced perennial technical, 
managerial and financial constraints. More recently, it has also been beset 
with ferry personnel attitude problems. Most of the times, there is almost 
always something bogging down the ferries. This has made some people to 
advocate for bridging the ferry crossings, especially the Trans-Gambia 
Bamba Tenda- Yelitenda crossing. 
For many decades, and under both colonial and post-colonial 
governments, Senegal has continuously pressured The Gambia for it to 
bridge the Trans-Gambia crossing. However, since independence, Gambian 
authorities have felt much less sense of urgency in tackling the ferry issue or 
building the bridge. As already noted in chapters 1 and 2, Senegal has 
vested interests in the ferries because “Casamance is virtually partitioned 
from the rest of Senegal by Gambia, with road traffic forced to cross two 
international borders (and board a ferry) between Dakar and Zinguinchor, 
the region’s capital, or to make a long detour east around The Gambia.”308 
This geographic rupture constrained Senegal’s efforts to forge a sense of 
“one Senegal” or “a whole Senegal” with Casamance.  
 Senegal’s political obsession with having reliable transport 
connections to Casamance are similar to the need Brazil had in the 1920s 
and 1930s, “…to break down the barriers to national integration in a 
peaceful and orderly way.”309 To develop a shared vision for an integrated 
nation, Brazil resorted to the automobile, road-building, and technology to 
reach out to isolated territories. However, unlike Senegal, no country 
separated one part of Brazil from another.  The territorial rupture between 
Senegal and Casamance also motivated the region’s cessation struggles. 
                                                            
308Pierre Englebert, “Compliance and Defiance to National Integration in Barotseland and 
Casamance,” Africa Spectrum (2005), 40; The alternative route to Casamnce through 
Senegalese territory (Tamba Counda) is very long. Journeys through that route means 
greater financial cost, more time and more risk especially with the separatist war in 
Casamance. 
309But one could argue that 20th century state-building in Brazil has left some inland parts of 
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This has been a concern to politicians, intellectuals, business people and 
even artists in Senegal.  
Senegalese musicians like Youssou Ndour have used their songs to 
decry Senegal’s geographic woes. For instance, his Wollof lyrics “Senegal 
sunugal,” (Senegal, our boat) or “Senegal bena bopela,” (Senegal has one 
head) have both metaphorical and political significance for Senegal and the 
Casamance rebellion. The words warn about the impact rebellion can have 
on the territorial integrity of Senegal. If people on a boat (signifying Senegal 
and Casamance as one country) decide to divide it, then the boat will sink. 
Similarly, if the head is hatched into two, the individual dies. This means, as 
a nation, Senegal cannot afford to divide its territory, lest it should sink and 
die. The words are therefore a nationalist’s cry from an artist activist but they 
eloquently sum-up the geographic dilemma Senegal faces with Casamance 
and even The Gambia. Thus, Senegal has a major stake in the ferries, the 
Bamba-Tenda- Yelitenda crossing and in cross-border mobility in general.  
Ordinary people also have an important stake in the ferries. The 
ferries have been the heart of cross-border transport for both passenger and 
freight traffics. They provide rural-urban and interstate connectivity in 
Senegambia and beyond. They facilitate the services of other transport 
modes.  Even under the disintegrated transport network, they still maintain 
an intermodal linkage with other modes of transport on the cross-border 
routes.  
Five modes of cross-border transport operated under the joint 
transport network; public ferries, buses of the defunct Gambia Public 
Transport Corporation (GPTC), privately owned commercial automobile 
vehicle and horse/donkey carts. Under the restructured transport network, 
the Jakartas (motorcycles) became an additional mode on the cross-border 
routes. These transport modes were based on a dual transport agency 
system. Public and private agencies interacted within a multidimensional 






one mode were dependent on another.310 For example, the frequency of 
ferry trips from Banjul- Barra and at Bamba-Tenda- Yelitenda affected the 
length of travel and the demand for other transport modes on the cross-
border routes. These include automobile, bus, horse/donkey cart and 
Jakarta transport services at Amdallai-Karang and Farrafenni-Keur Ayib 
borders. Conversely, from Barra-Banjul and Keur Ayib-Farrafenni, ferry 
services affected the rapid flow and transit of traffic arriving from automobile, 
bus, cart and Jakarta sources.   
Clearly, poor ferry services affect demand for the other transport 
modes. But also other transport modes can affect ferry services. For 
example, congestions caused by motor vehicles affect ferries by causing 
poor ferry services, time lost, losses in passenger volume, revenue and 
these constraints have social costs to both users and the ferry operators. 
The delivery of ferry services is also affected by high passenger volumes, 
uncontrolled overloading, the presence of huge numbers of stranded 
automobile vehicles at the crossing terminals and the presence of huge 
numbers of heavy overloaded trucks on the ferries. These situations can 
cause occasional accidents on the ferry and contribute to the rapid wear and 
tear of the ferry craft. What happens to the ferries is not only important to 
Gambian authorities and ferry management but also to other users of the 
ferries. 
Cross-border transporters also have an important stake in the ferries, 
as users of the ferries. The ferries are a starting, centre and end points for 
cross-border traffic. They serve areas in Senegambia and beyond such as 
Guinea Bissau or Guinea Conakry.  Ferries foster overlaps between 
domestic and cross-border transport. Domestic cross-border transport starts 
from a specific border terminal location to an outer region within the 
domestic geography. Or, it originates from an outer location to the border 
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terminal. Hence, the ferries have made cross-border transport between the 
two countries a domestic, interstate and transnational concern.  
There is no doubt that the ferries’ issue is a legitimate concern for 
transporters as much as it is to Gambian and Senegalese authorities, 
ordinary people and the West Africa sub-region.  It was therefore politically 
expedient for members of the Senegalese Transport Association to set part 
of their agenda to disintegrate the common transport network around the 
ferries.  Ferries have for long suffered from different problems and therefore 
a rich source for transporter activism against Gambian authorities.  In the 
next section, I will discuss how initial complaints about ill-treatment and 
corruption on the interstate routes evolved to place the ferries at the centre 
of claims against Gambian authorities. 
Figure 3: List of ferries that operated on The Gambia River 
 
Name of Ferry Craft Type Service Route Operating Times 
BANJUL- BARRA ROUTE 
Banjul Steel Banjul-Barra 0800-2100hr 
Niumi Steel Banjul-Barra 0800-2100hr 
Barra Wooden Banjul-Barra Break periods of 
Barra and Niumi 
TRANS-GAMBIA ROUTE 
Saloume N/A Bamba Tenda- 
Yelli-Tenda 
N/A 
The Amang Kanyi N/A Bamba Tenda- 
Yelli-Tenda 
N/A 




Kerewan 5 Power Steamers Kerewan N/A 
Kaur N/A Kaur N/A 
Jarang N/A Jarang N/A 






Bansang 2 dumb ferries Bansang N/A 
Basse N/A Basse N/A 
OTHER FERRIES ON THE GAMBIA RIVER 
Lady Chilel Jawara Boat River 
steamer 
Upriver Weekly 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
4.6: Complaints Against Ferries: High User Fees and Conduct of 
Ferry Personnel 
In 2000, ferry services were reliable and the ferries operated as scheduled 
by The Gambia Ferries Department. However, the demand for services was 
higher than the supply.  Hence, the ferries were overloaded as many people 
and vehicles eager to cross, queue at the terminals.  Ferry authorities 
increased user fees and argued that this was in line with ferry reforms 
programme.311  The ferries were also privatised to increase efficiency in their 
management and services.  
Passengers and transporters were annoyed about the fee increases 
and also the inadequacy of ferry services.  The latter issue caused 
passengers stranded at the terminals to bribe ferry personnel for them to be 
given priority crossing on the congested ferries. It became widespread 
knowledge that people who want to circumvent the long queues waiting to 
cross on the ferries bribe ferry personnel to get on board the ferry. The ferry 
bribe–to-cross initiative developed into a network in which non-ferry 
personnel who hang around the terminal looking for any opportunity to make 
money became middle men between passengers and ferry personnel who 
were engaged in this bribery scheme.  Passengers pay to these middlemen 
who in turn pay ferry personnel on duty to let payees on board the ferry. This 
illicit pay and go service became popular and chaotic for the Ferries 
Department. Senegalese transporters were quick to see how they can use 
these widely known problems to their advantage.  
                                                            






Bachirou Ndiaye noted that the ferry issue was an overriding concern 
to them. “From 2000- 2002, there was plenty commotion about the ferry 
crossing among us. To cross, small cars paid 35,000 CFA francs, lorries and 
trucks paid 80,000 to 90,000 CFA and baggage fees were not standardised. 
The ferry crossing people did what they liked.” 312 There was general 
knowledge that ferry reforms seemed to be for the worse. Given the 
important roles ferries play in cross-border and interstate mobility, it was 
therefore a legitimate concern for transporters’ agitation.  They decided to 
advocate for an end to the use of ferries on the river Gambia. This 
automatically turned them into pro-bridge advocates and they joined the fray 
of the struggle over the bridge issue, as the ferry reforms veered off track 
due to problems we will discuss in the next section.  
 
4.7. The Ferry Reforms: A Case Study of Institutional Tension 
and Crisis  
 Generally, when institutions or businesses embark on reforms, they expect 
to create better and more efficient systems. But the ferry reforms were an 
antithesis of this expectation. For a long time, the ferries operated as a 
public transport system and fare prices were deliberately controlled to make 
them affordable to the public. There were also some ferries that operated 
free of charge to users because they were located at strategic places that 
needed welfare-based transport systems. This means two systems of ferries 
operated in The Gambia. The first types of ferries operated on two major 
crossing points, namely, Banjul-Barra and Bamba-Tenda- Yellitenda (Trans-
Gambia).  The former operated at breakeven points. The latter has been 
historically the most profitable ferry service in the country. Six other services 
operated in rural Gambia and the profits and income made from the Banjul-









The provision of welfare-based and low-cost ferry services were to 
ensure that people on both sides of the border can access affordable ferry 
services, to promote intra-state and interstate mobility, contact and trade in 
Senegambia. The search for affordable ferry services has been a 
longstanding quest that originated from the colonial period. The long search 
for affordable transport services is justified by Fitch’s study of the importance 
of transport systems and transport policies in developed world contexts. He 
noted that “…transport systems play so large a role in shaping the physical 
and social relations of…communities.”313 Transport is also important for 
securing “national defence, interstate commerce and protection of general 
welfare,” in every society. 314  It is therefore understandable that given the 
geographic pressures in Senegambia, The Gambia and Senegal interstate 
communication focused a lot on transport. It was also understandable that 
interstate dialogue on the ferries also centered on welfare-based pricing, 
service quality and management (see chapters 1, 2 and 5).  
The new ferry reforms programme, which was part of the World Bank 
and IMF sponsored public sector reforms package for The Gambia brought 
new management principles to the ferries sector. It employed concepts of 
joint public and private partnership management to ferry services. This 
concept was profit-oriented and deviated from the longstanding welfare 
values, which historically characterised the management culture and 
operations of Gambian ferries.  The decision to adopt a for-profit 
management principle for the operation of the ferries was aimed to make 
them more profitable and customer oriented.  But unfortunately, this 
worsened ferry operations. The pre-existing tolerable inefficiencies of the 
ferries became major inefficiencies.  The reforms became a complete failure 
from the word go.   
The reforms were not grounded in suitable professional, managerial 
and entrepreneurial principles. For example, the reforms minimised the 
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longstanding watchdog roles the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
and The Gambia Ports Authority (GPA) have had over the Department of 
Ferry Services. For a longtime, the Ministry of Finance and The Gambia 
Ports Authority supervised the Department of Ferry Services. But under the 
new arrangement, the Ministry of Finance became an investor and a 
shareholder in the ferry sector. GPA has been the overseer of ferry services 
since The Gambia Public Transport Corporation went out of business. But it 
also became a shareholder in the ferries venture.  
To further complicate the running of the ferry services, the new 
system allowed the President Jammeh family companies -The Kanilai Family 
Farms- to buy shares in the new venture. Foreign shareholders also had 
stakes in the ferries sector. This muddled-up, complex share-holding venture 
was further complicated by the bad management principles adopted for the 
running of the ferries.  
The new bosses running the ferries were mostly representatives of 
the foreign shareholders and were allegedly corrupt and inept. This belief 
that high-level officials at the Ferries Department were corrupt made low-
level employees to also engage in unstrained corruption. This situation was 
bad for the delivery of quality ferry services and for clients. But it served 
transporters’ agenda well. The reforms contributed to changing public 
attitudes and personal practices of transporters but also public officials in 
The Gambia. In other words, institutional reorientation caused institutional 
shifts in the management culture of ferry services, which affected the 
political economy of the ferries, causing serious tensions for The Gambia 
Senegal relations.  
Looking at some of the ferry finances during the reforms is instructive. 
In 2006, for example, ferry tariffs were increased 30 per cent. But ferry 
operations suffered financial instability. The total operating revenue for the 
year was D92.1 million. This contrasted with the annual gross profit, which 
was D73.8 million. Operating revenue increased to D115. 3 million in 2007, 






D154.3 million, and this increased to D167.8 million in 2010. Annual gross 
profits for both periods were D91.2 million and D85.7 million, respectively. 
The initial phases of the reform were able to achieve increases to 
ferry income by establishing strong internal financial controls in ferry 
administration and at all stations. They made improvements in ticketing and 
built a weighbridge, which priced vehicle fees based on their tonnage. But 
these good practices were not sustained in 2006, 2007 and 2008, when 
tariffs were revised upwards. 315 After tax revenue increased from D37.6 
million (in 2006), to D59.7 million (in 2007), but decreased to D13.1 million 
(in 2008). Again, it increased to D14.9 million (in 2009) and D54.5 million (in 
2010).  
Remarkably, increases in training costs, fuel costs, bad debts as well 
as slow moving, and obsolete equipment accounted for the figures for 2009 
and 2010.  Furthermore, the gross value of assets increased from D436.9 
million in 2006 to D576.8 million in 2010. Accumulated depreciation charges 
also rose from D115.3 million in 2006, to D212.9 million in 2010. This gave 
ferries a net book value of D363.9 million.316 
In 2010, The Gambia government and its foreign partners embarked 
on more reforms in the ferries sector without evaluating the mixed outcomes 
of ongoing reforms in the sector. On March 5th 2011, Gambian authorities 
signed a joint venture agreement with a Greek company, Gallia Holdings, 
Ltd., to establish, develop, manage and operate two ferry boats at two major 
crossing points across the River Gambia. The latter was also assigned to 
manage the existing fleet of ferries deployed throughout the country. This 
company owned 55 percent of the shares of the joint venture. Three other 
companies owned the rest of the shares. Social Security and Housing 
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Finance Corporation (SSHFC) owned 22.5 per cent. The Gambia Ports 
Authority (GPA) also owned 22.5 per cent of the shares.  
In a rather confusing business model, the joint venture established a 
separate management company to run the ferry services. Some of the 
stakeholders in this management company went by different names, but in 
reality, they were associates of the shareholders of the joint venture. The 
management company was called The Gambia Ferry Services Company, 
Ltd (GFSMC). The shares in the management company were distributed as 
follows: the GPA owned 80 per cent of the shares and the Ministry of 
Finance controlled 20 per cent. The new venture also established another 
company called the Aljamdu Ferry Company, Ltd. The majority shareholder 
of the venture, Gallia Holdings owned 55 per cent of the shares and the rest 
(45 per cent) went to SSHFC. Another sub-company Kansala Ferry 
Company, Ltd., was also formed.  Gallia holding controlled 55 per cent of its 
shares and GPA controlled the rest of the shares.  
The GFSMC had the overall task of managing all the other ferry 
companies. Its management personnel consisted of five directors, three of 
whom - the Managing Director, Director of Technical Services and Director 
of Finance - were officials of Gallia Holdings. The other two senior personnel 
at the company were the Deputy Director and Director of Operations –both 
were Gambian personnel. Activities of the management company were 
funded with a 15 percent levy from the operating revenues of the other three 
companies. The following support departments- Finance, Administration, 
Audit, Procurement, Revenue Generation and Marketing IT and Revenue 
Controls and Stores - assisted the directors in the day-to-day operation of 
the ferry services.317 Thus, even with marginal revenue increases in user 
fees for 2008/09, the reform increased the operation costs of ferries. It also 
decreased profit margins enormously.  Passenger crossing fees, lorry/truck 
crossing fees, motor vehicles crossing fees, crossing coupons and warrants 
and other charges/ fees amounted to D154.334 million in 2008. These figure 
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increased to D167.881 million in 2010. 318  But the operations cost was not 
sustainable to make the reforms a profitable one.  
 
 
 Figure 4: Ferry Income 2008/2009 
 31- Dec, 08 31-Dec, 09 
Item Amount in dalasis  
Passenger crossing fees D34, 727,000 D39, 763,000 
Lorry/Truck crossing fees D54, 826,000 D59, 295,000 
Motor vehicles crossing 
fees 
D54, 251,000 D58, 021,000 
Crossing Coupons and 
warrants 
D1, 577,000 D3, 426,000 
Other charges/fees D8, 953,000 D7, 376,000 
Total D154, 334,000 D167, 881,000 
Source: PK Accountants, Ferry Services Financial statement 2010 
 
In a blog comment posted on 7th January, 2014, Sidi Sanneh, a former 
Gambian Foreign Minister revealed that the ferry joint venture initiative 
required the procurement of “a new fleet of ferries” to “take over services” at 
the Banjul-Barra crossing.  Gallia Holdings reportedly bought two “new” 
ferries “Aljamdu” and “Kansala”, in 2011 at the cost of 6,345,000 Euros, or 
about 8.7 million US dollars. On 23rd July, 2011, both ferries were 
inaugurated to start service. Sanneh charged that: 
it became evident soon after the vessels' arrival that there was trouble. The vessels' 
size and type were inappropriate.  The roll on, roll off, vessels were incompatible 
with the existing ramps, suggesting that the vessels were not suitable for the 
purposes for which they were intended.  For instance, the entire front end of one of 
the vessels broke off and sank at sea off Barra in January last year, and the other 
has been mooring at the port facilities in Banjul or at the TransGambia crossing up-
river. 
                                                            






According to Sanneh, both vessels shared the same ID number: IMO 
8881577 and built date, which was January 1987.  “At least one or both 
vessels were registered in the Marshall Islands, presumably by the new 
venture company under a different name. While the beneficial owner or 
owners is/are unlisted, the registered owner is listed as Contess Navigations 
Inc., in the Marshall Island.  However, the registration of one of them was 
later transferred to Sierra Leone,” (Sanneh blog post).  
The information from Sanneh indicated that the ferry reforms has 
been a “shady” business and that personnel lied about ferry registration 
details as well as the age and condition of the ferries. Implicitly, corruption 
was entrenched across all sectors of the ferries reform programme. The 
imported vessels, which were supposed to be new ones, were actually 27 
years old, according to Sanneh. He also revealed that one of the vessels 
“Sophia P" had an accident record and it traced its last owner to one Mr. 
Alexandros Boufis of Spetses, Greece.319  
The reforms also highlighted institutional maladjustment.  The history, 
local and cross-border contexts of ferry operations in The Gambia were not 
well understood under these reforms. Management also misunderstood the 
political implications the ferries have for the country and for cross-border 
mobility in Senegambia. This lack of appropriate knowledge was worsened 
by pervasive and outright corruption in the ferries sector. For example, it was 
difficult to account for the 45 per cent share the Gambian government 
owned in the joint venture.  
Bad management practices were worsened by poor operational plans 
for ferry services. Sanneh alleged that “Meanwhile, the continued lack of 
regular ferry service between Barra and the capital city of Banjul, is causing 
major disruptions to the economy and the lives of ordinary Gambians.”320  
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The reforms were expected to make things better for all stakeholders. But 
instead, they had a reverse effect on everyone. 
Frequent breakdowns, rising operation costs, which included high 
fuel, administrative, and maintenance costs and significant revenue loss led 
to high indebtedness and poor services. Ferry services took loans to cover 
revenue shortfalls. New administrative and operational policies desperate to 
recover the full-cost of ferry operations revised tariff rates upwards. 
Increasing user fees at unreasonable intervals became the option for 
addressing the many problems that beset the ferries companies. In 2013, 
there was a 50 percent increase to the passenger fees on Banjul-Barra and 
the Trans-Gambia ferries. The tariff table below shows the different charges 
and increments to them under the 2013 cost recovery initiate. The figures 
appear in both currencies (Gambian Dalasis and Senegalese CFA Franc).321 
 
Figure 5: New Passenger, small vehicle and freight proposed tariff- Effective 1st April 
2013: The Dalasi Tariff 
 Banjul-Barra Transgambia 
 Existing New Existing New 
Passenger D10 D15 D5 D10 
Bicycle D20 D25 D13 D15 
Private vehicles 
Motor cycle (including 
Ridder) 
D25 D30 D18 D25 
Car D155 D190 D80 D100 
Jeeps and Double cabins D190 D240 D90 D110 
Car and Trailer D290 D350 D145 D180 
Commercial Vehicles 
1 to 7 Pax D155 D190 D80 D100 
                                                            
321There has been a long-standing practice of quoting ferry service user fees in both 
currencies and payments are acceptable in either of the currencies. See: The Gambia Ports 







8 to 14 Pax D190 D240 D90 D115 
15 to 20 Pax D310 D390 D155 D190 
21 to 35 Pax D475 D590 D230 D290 
36 to 44 Pax D790 D900 D475 D590 
45 and above Pax D945 D1190 D785 D900 
Others 
Rice, Groundnut, 
Cement, ETC (50kg) 




D20 D25 D20 D25 
Cattle D40 D50 D10 D15 
Sheep/ Goat D10 D15 D10 D15 
Source: The Gambia Ports Authority, New Tariff Scales, 2013. 
 
Figure 6: New Passenger, small vehicle and freight proposed tariff- Effective 1st April 
2013: The CFA Franc Tariff 
 Banjul-Barra Trans-gambia 
 Existing New Existing New 
Passenger 150 CFA  300 CFA 300 CFA 300 CFA 





800 CFA 1,000CFA 700 CFA 900 CFA 
Car 4,500 CFA 5,600 CFA 2,200 CFA 2,800 CFA 
Jeeps and 
Double Cabins 
5,200 CFA 6,500 CFA 2,700 CFA 3,400 CFA 
Car and Trailer 8,000 CFA 10,000 CFA 4,000 CFA 5,000 CFA 
Commercial Vehicles 
1 to 7 Pax 4,500 CFA 5,600 CFA 2,300 CFA 2,900 CFA 






15 to 20 Pax 9,000 CFA 11, 200 CFA 4,500 CFA 5,600 CFA 
21 to 35 Pax 13,500 CFA 16,800 CFA 6,800 CFA 8,500 CFA 
36 to 44 Pax 22,000 CFA 27,500 CFA 13,200 CFA 16,500 CFA 
45 and above 
Pax 









600 CFA 800 CFA 600 CFA 600 CFA 
Cattle 1000 CFA 1,200 CFA 300 CFA 300CFA 
Sheep/Goat 300 CFA 400 CFA 200 CFA 200 CFA 
Source: The Gambia Ports Authority, New CFA Franc Tariff Scales, 2013. 
 
The exogenous driven ferry reforms hurt many aspects of the 
country’s political economy and interstate and transporter-state relations. 
The Senegalese Transport Association opposed the reforms. It also 
opposed the long-standing practice of paying ferry fees in either currency of 
the two states. These fueled new cross-border, interstate and transporter-
state tensions. To put pressure on the ferries authorities and the Gambia 
government to abandon their so-called reforms, transporters embarked on 
frequent border closures.  They hoped that these would also force Gambian 
authorities to seriously work on plans to bridge the Trans-Gambia crossing.  
It set the stage for more mobilisation and protest against Gambian 
authorities.  
The bad management of the ferries supported and justified 
transporters plans to disintegrate the transport network. They also stepped 
up their pro-bridge advocacy (see chapter 5). Since the ferries affect the 
public too, transporters effectively used it to gain public support for their 
protests. In their reluctance to admit that the reforms were a failure, the 






reforms. Transporters also refused to back-down from their protest agenda. 
The ferries became an object of contention in cross-border and interstate 
relations in Senegambia.  
Bad ferry reforms, institutional shifts and corruption interfered with the 
informal processes that historically promoted cooperative relations in cross-
border transport. Dome-ndeye and wullere were completely ignored in 
interpersonal interactions. Competition over resources intensified conflict 
and dome-baaye behavioural tendencies in the transport sector, contributing 
to the disintegration of the common transport network. The disintegrated 
transport network created an opportunity for the emergence of new actors in 
cross-border transport. These new actors benefited from new economic 
opportunities that came from the disintegration of the transport network.  But 
the new economic processes compounded tensions in interstate relations 
(see chapter 5).  
 
4.8: Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed how cross-border transport was transformed 
since the start of the new millennium from an area of cooperation to a sector 
infested with conflicts. It identified how transport has played an important 
role in the recurrence of interstate political difficulties in Senegambia. It also 
identified the various interests in the transport sector and how different 
stakeholders creatively used the border to pursue their different goals. It also 
showed how economic concerns have been central to interstate political 
difficulties in Senegambia. This chapter therefore contributes to our 
understanding of the recurrence of interstate political difficulties between the 
two countries in recent years. It leads to chapter 5, which explores how 
changes in cross-border transport opened new avenues for growth and for 



















TACTICS FOR SURVIVAL–JAKARTA, CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
THE MEDIA 
 
“If you do not know what branch to hang on, stay on the ground.” 
 (A Mandinka proverb) 
 
5.0: New faces, New Tensions 
The Senegalese Transport Association became the “new sovereigns of the 
border,” after they’ve engineered the break-up of The Gambia-Senegal joint 
transport network (see chapters 3 & 4). They monopolised cross-border 
transport on Senegalese routes. However, transport services expanded to 
cater for new demands for services. By the end of 2009, new transport 
entrepreneurs used a new brand of motorcycle imported from Indonesia to 
provide intermediate border transport services at the Karang-Amdallai 
border. The locals named the motorcycles Jakarta, after the Indonesian 
capital.  
The Jakarta is the new rival to clandos and carts in the intermediate 
border transport business. Its drivers contribute to border transport market 
and intermodal conflicts. They also create tensions in the border 
communities. Some communities on the Gambian side of the border accuse 
Jakarta drivers of stealing their livestock. Jakarta drivers also constantly fight 
with the office of the Karang mayor over taxation and other issues. They 
also fight with Gambian authorities for banning them from Gambian border 
communities due to their alleged excesses.   
This chapter therefore explores how conflict can have both positive 
and negative outcomes for society. The break-up of the joint transport 






However, new economic opportunities exist side by side with new forms of 
conflict in the transport market.  Additionally, the chapter highlights other 
nuances of state-society relations and how state and non-state actors can 
use different resources at their disposal to enhance their interests. As part of 
these processes, the chapter also explores how different actors or even 
organisations can gain from conflict. Media and civil society groups boost 
their images or create work opportunities for themselves as advocates for 
The Gambia-Senegal interstate relations or Senegambian unity. This 
chapter also provides examples of relations where individuals are primarily 
motivated by economic incentives and not by social and religious values for 
cooperative relations.  It prepares us for chapters 6 and 7, which show how 
traders and talibee networks, unlike transporters, have been more interested 
in enhancing close connections between the two countries. The chapter also 
re-echoes Zartman’s observation that the behaviour and practices of parties 
to a conflict determine how easily a certain conflict can be resolved, 
transformed, managed or prevented.322 We will see how his statement is 
reflected in this chapter and from the chapter outline below. 
The first part of the chapter is the introduction, which is followed by an 
ethnography on the origins of the Jakarta transport in Karang, the kinds of 
conflict it creates and how its drivers’ activities are a co-extension of 
transporter border activism. It also looks at how it contributes to transporter-
state and transporter-society conflicts in Senegambia. The second part of 
the chapter deals with how other non-state actors like the media and civil 
society groups engaged with interstate conflicts and what benefits they 
derive from them. The type of language the media uses to frame interstate 
tensions and interstate relations give us other examples of how language is 
routinely employed to  (re) create and (re) enact social experiences of the 
border, the one-ness discourse and interstate relations in Senegambia (see 
chapter 1, 2 & 3). Pro-Senegambia unity civil society groups also use 
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language as a tool to support their Senegambia unity agenda. Civil society 
groups implicitly compete talibee networks, but they share a common 
agenda for protecting cross-border and interstate relations (see chapter 
7).323  The conclusion of the chapter leads us to chapter 6, which deals with 
modes of behaviour that foster more cross-border connections and less 
conflict in interstate relations.  
 
5.1: The Birth of the Jakarta in Karang 
The Gambia-Senegal restructured cross-border transport network gave rise 
to the need for intermediate transport that connects cross-border 
passengers bound for long-haul journeys, to transport at the new border 
motor parks (see chapter 4).  Some private car owners illegally used their 
cars as shared taxis to ferry people from the border to the motor parks.  This 
practice is termed “stealing the road” and denotes how people try to 
temporarily profit from the gaps in of the new transport situation. Such illegal 
underground /black market taxis are locally called clandos. From its urban 
origins, clandos have become an integral part of Senegal’s transport 
landscape. They found a niche in Karang and became an important part of 
the cross-border intermediate transport market. 
 Usually, a clando carries three passengers behind, two in front and a 
driver. Drivers have to have a full load before they start a trip. During low 
peak times, passengers’ time may be wasted in clandos since it may take up 
to thirty minutes or more before a clando gets a full load for a trip. This 
tendency to waste passengers’ time inspired some Karang youth to create 
alternative intermediate transport services using the motorcycle.  
Karang is the first border community to use the motorcycle as a 
commercial means of transport in Senegambia. Later, Keur Ayib and other 
border villages followed its footsteps.324 Karang borrowed its motorcycle 
commercial transport idea from the town of Kaolack, located about 74 
                                                            
323 This captures Kaldor’s views that parties to a conflict like the mediators may have 
different agendas, see Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global 
Era, Second Edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).  






kilometers from the Karang-Amdallai border and 88 kilometers from the 
Farrafenni-Keur Ayib border.  
Strategically located for both sides of the border, Kaolack is a major 
communication junction in Senegambia. It is considered “a frontier town,” 
with a dynamic, creative economic environment. It has a vibrant black 
market, which sells all kinds of things. It is notable for importing consumer 
goods from The Gambia through the Karang-Amdallai and Keur Ayib-
Farrafenni borders. It also “exports” its ideas and other local practices to The 
Gambia and to other parts of Senegal.  A highway connects Kaolack to east, 
north, south and west Senegal. It has a huge youthful population and most 
of them are economically innovative and work in the informal economy.  
Youth in Kaolack first started the use of the motorcycle as a low 
income and rapid commercial transport, amid widespread youth 
unemployment in Senegal.  For a fee, a rider of a motorcycle carries a 
passenger behind him and takes him to any destination within Kaolack. 
Ibrahin Nian, a youth and a native of Kaolack, relocated from Kaolack to 
Karang, to set-up an auto mechanic business there, following the 
restructuring of the cross-border transport network. Nian’s mechanic 
business was not profitable and so he brought a Cee, an Italian brand 
motorcycle from Kaolack, and began using it as a transport for hire at attaya 
vous.325  Youth, who knew how to ride, rented the motorcycle from him and 
returned it at the end of the agreed time.  
Nian’s motorcycle for hire business became prosperous and popular. 
He negotiated the hire price with the client and all transactions were 
conducted at attaya vous, a place for socialisation and friendship. Later, two 
of Nian’s friends, Oumar Low and Assan Badian, joined the business. “As an 
unemployed school leaver, I joined this hassle-free business. Daily, I sat at 
vous chatting with friends, renting my motorcycle to clients. It was 
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simple…no sweat at all.”326 Through these three friends, the motorcycle 
became an important commercial transport at The Gambia-Senegal border.  
Between 2008 and 2009, a new motorcycle brand called TVS was 
introduced in the market. Longer and faster than the Cee, the TVS 
comfortably carried a second passenger behind the rider. This gave rise to 
the idea of a rider who takes passengers to agreed destinations for a fee. 
Slowly, people in the community who wanted to avoid the delays clandos 
can cause patronised TVS drivers and paid them for quick rides to places 
within Karang and to nearby border communities. TVS was convenient for 
shuttling within Karang, between Karang and Amdallai, or to neighbouring 
border communities. It became the new deal for a growing number of people 
in the community, who considered it as a more cost effective and time 
saving alternative to clandos and carts. The motorcycle rental business filled 
a niche, transforming motorcycle entrepreneurship in Karang.  However, 
another model, the Jakarta, displaced the TVS. It was faster and more 
comfortable than the latter. As noted below in the next section, it would 
completely transform border motorcycle entrepreneurship in Senegambia. 
 
5.1.1: Competing Border Automobile Transport and Clandos: 
Structuring a New Niche  
By 2013, at the time of my fieldwork in Karang, Jakarta transport dominated 
the local intermediate transport market, almost displacing clandos. 
Interestingly, its per trip/ fare price was higher than that of a clando.  I asked 
people why they were paying more for Jakarta rides, when they could pay 
less for a clandos’ and I was told that: “People are now pressed with time. 
They prefer the fastest transport.  However, there are people in Karang who 
no one can convince to ride on a Jakarta. It scares them. Its accident 
records are high compared to other transport types.”327  People desire the 
fastest transport, irrespective of how much it costs them. But some people 
are more comfortable with getting to their destinations in a slow, safe 
                                                            







transport. Thus, the desire for fast travel versus the desire for safe travel 
made the Jakarta an object of controversy in Karang and in most border 
villages around Karang.  
Generally, most elderly people in these border communities were 
against the use of the Jakarta as a form of public transport. They reasoned 
that riders and passengers are exposed to frequent road accidents.328  They 
antagonise its presence and use in their communities. In contrast, it is the 
favourite transport for the youth and the younger generation. Jakarta is both 
supported and un-supported in the community and irrespective of this 
controversy around it, it has entrenched itself as a formidable border 
transport. It broke the monopoly of automobile transport in the border 
transport market and beyond. It has a growing market share in the 
intermediate transport market. The huge economic potential it has, 
encouraged the Karang mayor’s office to extend its taxation programme to it. 
The mayor’s office levies a 2000 CFA francs monthly tax on each 
commercial Jakarta in Karang.  These taxes appear in the regional treasury 
in Foundiougne, the administrative headquarters of the Saloum region and 
the national treasury in Dakar.  
I use the case study on the Jakartas in Karang to show how kinship 
discourses are irrelevant to some economic relations in Senegambia, to 
reinforce our argument that there are limits to the use of kinship discourses 
and this supports the neoclassical and Marxist thinking that culture and 
religion are subordinate to economic processes. Additionally, kinship 
discourses seemed to resonate less with youth, especially as they confront 
economic hardship. The case study also shows how different people use the 
resources they have in the border to advance their interests. It also shows 
how the border is both a source of tension and cooperation in relations 
between state and non-state actors. The next section looks at the 









5.1.2: The Mayor’s Office and the Jakarta 
Karang was upgraded into a new commune around 2008 and after that, it 
elected its first mayor Ousmane Sene, the son of a retired Gambian police 
officer. As a new commune, Karang needs to mobilise its own resources to 
finance most commune development initiatives.  The Jakarta’s viability as a 
significant source of income for its entrepreneurs makes it a potential source 
of tax revenue for the mayor’s office.  However, Jakarta youth entrepreneurs 
resist taxation, causing various kinds of conflicts between them and the 
Karang mayor’s office.  Berry argues that: 
In economic  (as in other forms of human activity) people are continually engaged in 
efforts both to influence and to understand the circumstances under which they 
produce, invest, exchange, and consume goods and services. Producers, for 
example, seek to bring power to bear on acquiring and using the means of 
production, on gaining access to income and wealth, and on increasing (or 
maintaining) their capacity to produce or earn income in the future. They also think 
about what they are doing and what they are up against.329 
 
Jakarta resistance to taxation has been motivated by the fact that most of 
the entrepreneurs are formerly un-employed youth whose economic 
frustrations led them to start Jakarta transport services.  They consider the 
commune’s tax agenda as exploitation from a commune, which failed to 
provide them with employment opportunities.  In contrast, the commune, like 
the state, considers Jakarta transport as an opportunity abound that can 
satisfy the commune’s extractive agenda.  Thus, Jakarta-commune tensions 
typify the struggles of the postcolonial African state to control the “creativity 
of the margins” and the transnational flows that thrive through the  borders of 
most African countries.330  
Notwithstanding, the Karang commune was bent on enforcing its 
regulatory authority on the Jakarta sector. It set market entry rules, which 
made it compulsory for commercial Jakartas to register with the mayor’s 
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Oxford: School of American Research Press, James Currey, 2004); Janet Roitman, Fiscal 
Disobedience, Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa. (Princeton and 






office. To register, entrepreneurs provided the mayor’s office with the 
following documents: 
 A copy of their national identification card. 
 The sache number, mark and product type of the Jakarta. This 
information was obtained from the manufacturers’ manual, which 
comes with all new Jakartas. 
 A 2000 CFA franc registration and processing fee  
The local gendarmerie office processes part of the registration paperwork 
before the mayor’s office confirms it by providing a registered Jakarta with a 
numbered plaque to affix on its back. This plaque, which cost 3000 CFA 
francs, differentiates commercial Jakartas from non-commercial ones.  
The more contentious tax programme is the monthly payments 
Jakartas have to make to the mayor’s office, after they start operations.  In 
March 2013, there were around 250 registered commercial Jakartas in 
Karang. But records from the mayor’s office indicated that only about 100 to 
140 paid taxes regularly.  Inevitably, the mayor’s office has to pursue tax 
evaders for them to pay up their taxes. However, this leads to fights that 
undermine Jakarta-commune relations. 
Renner has identified that social breaches are easily settled in 
Senegambia, but competition over resources endured.331 The fight over 
taxation, which ensued between the Jakarta and the commune provides a 
good example of how economic competition can cause serious breaches in 
Senegambian relations. Jakarta entrepreneurs struggled with the commune 
to avoid losing part of their income to taxation.332 
The mayor’s office was adamant that tax defaulters must pay up their 
arrears. Jakartas contribute to the wear and tear of the roads like 
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automobiles. They should therefore be taxed like the latter to pay for road 
maintenance costs, to recover the state’s investments on roads and to offset 
their economic and social costs to the commune. 333  The office further 
argued that: “People try to get satisfaction from their given resources. The 
government is like a person. It is an agent of society, responsible for 
providing public goods. It has to get resources to provide satisfactory 
conditions to society.”334  Moreover, the Jakartas are notorious for frequent 
involvement in accidents. Drivers engage in “risky road practices” while 
driving their motorcycles in the commune. They cause serious liabilities to 
individuals and to the commune. Therefore, Jakartas are both a social and a 
political risk to the commune. They must show “civism” to their commune by 
paying for their cost of doing business in the commune.335 But Jakarta 
drivers’ “civism” is with their communities, and not the commune. 
They argued that the monthly tax the mayor’s office levies on them 
was extortion and exploitation from a commune that fails to provide them 
with employment opportunities.336 Instead of the commune, their obligations 
lie with their poor families and underdeveloped communities, who survive 
from the income they make from their Jakarta entrepreneurship. In effect, 
their allegiance is with their social systems, which consist of their families, 
kinsfolk and other individuals they have social ties to, and not with the 
political system. Their differentiation of their social obligations from their 
political ones re-echoes Williams’ observation that political loyalty to the 
state (in this case, the commune), can be morally arbitrary and non- binding 
for individuals.337  
To some extent, we see Jakarta drivers use kinship affinities to justify 
their opposition to the commune’s tax policies. This resonates with Berry’s 
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observation that economic struggles “can play out in terms of culturally 
specific debates over age and gender roles, kinship and community 
relations, and changing conceptualizations of people’s relations to the 
environment and one another.”338 Jakarta drivers assert that before giving 
money to the commune, they should give it to their families and 
communities, who deserve their money more. However, culture and kinship 
are subordinate to their economic goals. Majority of them reply on carving 
out their own “market power in order to protect themselves,” and their 
economic interests.339 But their focus on kinship indicates that in 
Senegambia, social systems can be beyond the reach of the state.  
Therefore, kinship discourses can endure even if they outlive their political 
and economic relevance (see chapters 1 & 2). 
The mayor’s office considers the anti-taxation attitudes of Jakartas as 
“unpredictable and difficult to understand.”340  It recruits the gendarmerie 
office to adjudicate the tax crisis. At the end of each month, gendarmerie 
agents mount the commune’s highway and ask Jakarta drivers on the road 
to produce their receipt for that month’s tax payment. Defaulters are re-
directed to the mayor’s office, located about 500 meters away from the 
gendarme complex.341  
The gendarmerie is a force with both police and military 
characteristics. Using their coercive powers to force Jakarta drivers to pay 
their tax to the commune implies the commune uses extra-judicial pressure 
and implicit dictatorial powers to enforce its authority on Jakarta drivers. This 
hardens the Jakarta opposition to taxation and intensifies commune- Jakarta 
driver tensions.342 
The mayor’s office acknowledged that its plan B- tax collection-by- 
force was risky. It deepens commune-Jakarta confrontations.  Also, the 
success of plan B was short-lived. Initially, gendarmes have to ask only a 
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few Jakartas for their monthly receipts and those people inform their 
colleagues about the road check and the rest of them, would go and pay up, 
before they encounter the gendarmes. However, Jakarta drivers came up 
with counterstrategies to defeat monthly road enforcement checks.343 Some 
drivers withdraw from the market during anticipated road controls. Mostly, 
road checks last for a day or two since the gendarmes have more pressing 
duties than helping the commune mobilise its finances.  After that, those 
who withdrew, return to the market with their Jakartas.  
The mayor’s office was trying to understand why less money was 
being recovered from gendarme road checks. It conducted random road 
controls and realised that tax defaulters use a counterstrategy against its 
taxation-by–force initiative. It also found out that some drivers evade tax for 
two or three months and that a number of Jakartas were “trying the market” 
with no commercial registration plaques.  
Frustrated by its findings, the mayor’s office adopted a non-coercive 
approach for its tax recovery initiative. It invited Jakarta drivers to a dialogue 
about taxes. This ended up being a back and forth political debate on 
taxation. The commune challenged drivers to honour their overdue tax 
payments. But the latter argued that the mayor’s office should overwrite all 
tax arrears owed to it as bad debt. The commune insisted on recovering all 
tax arrears. Some Jakarta operators asked the commune to forgive all tax 
arrears. As neither of the two parties backed off from its position, Jakarta 
drivers resorted to “re-registering” their Jakartas on pretext that they were 
newly acquired.344   
Newly acquired Jakartas start paying taxes from the day of their 
registration. Drivers use the same sache numbers they initially provided to 
the mayor’s office, for the re-registration. Each sache number was unique to 
each Jakarta, but the fact that the numbers were very long and the office 
uses a manual accounting system made detecting re-registration cases 
difficult. With more pressing administrative duties waiting, the mayor’s 
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accountants found it tedious, monotonous and time consuming to go through 
a list of 250 sache numbers in order to verify the registration status of a 
particular Jakarta. To the delight of the operators, re-registration enabled 
Jakartas to make a fresh start on their tax payments and unilaterally write-off 
their arrears without the consent of the mayor’s office. Due to lack of enough 
administrative capacity in a newly formed commune, the mayor’s office 
could not improvise simple technologies to monitor the registration process. 
The drivers prevailed over the mayor’s office. 
The border aided the anti-taxation artifices of the Jakartas. Zeller 
argues that borders can erode the regulatory authority of the state since they 
provide opportunities for both illicit and licit trade.345  Cross-border socio-
ethnic networks and interstate commercial networks can redefine state 
policies from below as “new forms of territoriality” challenge the “official 
limits, norms and language of the state.”346 Consequently, Jakarta anti-
taxation artifices bear the foot prints of how African informal economies, 
contraband trade and migratory movements aspire to restructure state 
systems on their own terms.347 Their ambitions validate the observation Das 
and Poole made,  that African economic and social conditions work on their 
own terms.348 But this situation opens up various tensions in relations 
between the state and non-state actors like the Jakarta drivers.  
The mayor’s office reinforced its weak regulatory authority with the 
coercive might of the gendarme, which had both negative and positive 
outcomes. But using an outside resource like the gendarme to reinforce its 
taxation agenda is similar to how trans-national or cross-border networks 
use hybrid spaces to promote their economic and social agendas. It also 
relates to how Senegambian economic and socio-religious actors use 
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different resources at their disposal to navigate the complex context of The 
Gambia-Senegal border.  
The commune-Jakarta relations seemed to be largely confrontational, 
but there are bright sides to it.  At the time of my fieldwork, the mayor’s 
office’s records showed that about 25 to 30 Jakarta drivers were consistently 
up to date with their tax payments. These drivers mostly reside in Karang 
and are family men and heads of households. Most of them are also at least 
thirty-five years old or more.  Their relationship with the mayor’s office can 
be juxtaposed with those of defaulters.  
Drivers who habitually defaulted on their taxes are mostly unmarried 
youth, who come from neighbouring villages around Karang. They come to 
Karang in the mornings to work and in the evenings return to their villages. 
For them, if they pay taxes to the commune, it should in return provide 
development to their communities.  Otherwise, they see little or no link 
between them and the commune.  The development disparity between their 
villages and Karang, which has better infrastructure, justifies their resistance 
to taxation.349  But their refusal to pay their taxes impedes the development 
of their villages, as the commune needs money to fund its development 
initiatives.   
The attitudes of Jakarta tax defaulters partly derive from their 
economic circumstances and their location within the state of Senegal. As a 
border town, Karang feels neglected and detached from Dakar. It has limited 
development opportunities and public goods in the commune are usually 
sub-standard when compared to those in Dakar and other Senegalese 
urban centers. Tax defaulters therefore have reasons for being dissatisfied 
with conditions in their communities.  
Studying youth in Britain, Furlong and Cartmel discovered that “[I]n 
communities characterised by high unemployment and urban decline, some 
young people may develop an awareness that the group to which they 
                                                            






belong has been unfairly disadvantaged.”350  Similarly, youth in the Jakarta 
sector feel the need to reconceptualise their relationship with the commune 
and challenge what they considered inappropriate policies of the 
commune.351 The tax conflict between the two entities also exemplifies how 
economic concerns override cultural sensibilities in Senegambia. They also 
highlight to what extent economic innovations may alter people’s adherence 
to cultural values. Jakarta entrepreneurship undermined social values, but it 
brought new experiences to the border.  
Commune-Jakarta relations are both confrontational and cooperative 
like The Gambia-Senegal interstate relations (see chapters 1, 2 & 3). Hence, 
the two entities sometimes cooperate to advance their mutual interests. The 
mayor’s office supported Jakarta drivers to set up an association, which 
serves as a platform for protecting their interests in the commune. Elected 
representatives run the association, which now mobilises, expresses and 
channels its members’ concerns to local authorities in the commune.  It is 
also a lobbying front for members. For example, at one point, the mayor’s 
office increased the monthly subscription fee for Jakarta drivers to 2500 CFA 
francs. The association lobbied for it to be reduced to 2000 CFA francs. But 
the mayor’s office insisted on the new fee.  
The association unilaterally increased the fare for Jakarta rides, to 
protest this fee increment. This strategy resonates with how members of the 
Senegalese Transport Association protest ferry fare increases. The mayor’s 
office’s response to this situation was also similar to the ways Gambian 
authorities react to transporter fee protests. For example, anytime 
transporters closed the border, Gambian authorities negotiate with them to 
end the stalemate. Similarly, the mayor’s office invited Jakarta drivers and 
negotiated with them to drop their unilateral fare increase. In return, the fee 
was reduced in the following fiscal year. But this did not resolve the impasse 
on the payment of the monthly subscription. 
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As the tax dispute evolved, the mayor’s office employed other 
strategies to convince Jakarta drivers that the commune was a partner and 
not an adversary to them. It helped them adopt a common fare mechanism, 
which discouraged the free-floating fare system that existed in the Jakarta 
transport sector. Before the common fare system was introduced, fare prices 
were flexible. Jakarta operators fiercely competed against one another for 
passengers at their roadside “depots.” Drivers offered passengers different 
fare prices for the same ride to undercut competitors. A passenger could pay 
300 CFA francs for a ride another driver charged at 500 CFA francs. This 
transactional practice contributed to conflicts within the sector and with state 
and non-state actors affected by it. To the credit of the mayor’s office, the 
Jakarta sector is better organised now and it has a predictable fare policy. It 
brings more profit to drivers and minimises harmful interpersonal competition 
in the sector. The development of the fare policy is relevant for securitisation 
of market entry and the implementation of commune Jakarta tax policies. 
The commune-Jakarta relations are complex.  But they exemplify how 
changes in social processes and economic structures can have different 
outcomes for society.  Additionally, they show how conflict and cooperation 
can simultaneously exist in the same relationship. This embodies the 
nuanced nature of state society relations. Noticeably, the political economy 
of the border keeps evolving, as new economic structures grow and expand, 
old ones may be modified. This makes the border a dynamic site for 
economic and social relations.  In the next section, I use an incident I’ve 
witnessed to explore other forms of conflict the Jakarta created in the 










5.1.3: Demand for Jakarta Services and Jakarta-Society 
Relations 
Gamoos and ziarres are usually high peak travel periods at the Amdallai-
Karang border. Huge numbers of people cross from The Gambia into 
Senegal, to attend these religious events held at various religious 
communities. In January 2013, I witnessed Jakarta drivers increase their 
fares unilaterally to cash in from the high demand for border transport 
services during these annual religious events. The day in question was the 
day for the official opening of the gamoo in Sirmang.  
Sirmang is a border village in Senegal and home to Ma Ansou Niang, 
the popular, grand and revered marabout, religious leader and scholar.  Ma 
Ansou received part of his religious education in The Gambia. He has many 
talibees on both sides of the border and government officials from both The 
Gambia and Senegal attend gamoo proceedings at his home.  
It is the day for the official opening of the January 2013 gamoo. I am 
sitting on a bench on a veranda of a shop in Karang, waiting for a car ride to 
Sirmang where Senegalese government regional representatives are 
participating in the official opening of the gamoo. An eighteen-year-old girl 
shared the bench I sat on. She engaged me in a conversation about how 
Jakartas exploit passengers. Part of the conversation is reproduced below: 
 
Girl: “Are you going to Sirmang?” 
MK: “Yes. But I am waiting for a ride with some people. What about you?  
Girl: “I am going to our village. It is after Sirmang. But the Jakarta drivers 
have gone crazy again. They say the fare is mille deux cent (1200 CFA 
francs). Earlier, they said it was sept cent (700 CFA francs). They are crazy. 
They always do this when passengers are many.” 
MK: “How much is the regular fare?”  








The ambiguous fare policy the girl reported here resonates with, how 
commercial networks take advantage of complementariness between areas 
of production, especially borders and monetary zones, that differ from one 
country to another, to create markets that elude the state.352 In this case, the 
Jakartas capitalise on Senegambian habits for cross-border social and 
religious outreach to advance their economic goals (see chapters 1, 2, 3 & 
7).  When I asked the mayor Ousmane Sene about his views on the 
exploitative nature of Jakarta unilateral fare increases during peak demand 
periods, he explained that:  
Problems relating to Jakarta unilateral fare increases during high-peak travel events 
like gamoos happen in the automobile sector, too. You can see this in the news. 
The problem arises out of a lack of civism. A moral check on transporters should be 
that the people they are making illegal profits from, are going to seek God. As 
transporters, they too can seek God by keeping fare rates at their authorised 
rates.353 
 
The mayor’s moral reasoning eludes Jakarta drivers and transporters, who 
exploit passengers during high demand periods for transport services. It 
shares the moral values of the girl I conversed with.  For her, it is also about 
bad conduct during peak demand periods. However, the opinion of both 
people indicate that the transport sector operate with shared practices, 
values and attitudes.  We can also infer that society tacitly endorses 
exploitation from transporters (see chapter 3 & 4).  This arises from the fact 
that the demand for transport services is inelastic.  
From the point of view of passengers, transporters enjoy social power 
as “controllers” of mobility in society. Their monopoly over public 
transportation means they have power to challenge both state and society.  
People must move from one place to another and their mobility largely 
depends on transport services, which have become indispensable to 
society.  Transporters use their social power to justify their fare increments. 
For example, Jakarta drivers argued that their fare increases were 
legitimate. During high demand times, the traffic flows towards one direction, 
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like during the Sirmang gamoo when many passengers crossed from The 
Gambia into Senegal. The number of passengers who cross from Senegal 
to The Gambia, at that time, were very few. Drivers who bring passengers 
into Senegal have to wait for a longer time before they can get passengers 
heading towards the Gambian side of the border. Instead of the long wait to 
make the return trip, drivers opt to return to the border sooner, to get other 
passengers from the direction that generated the immense traffic flow.  Like 
most transporters, Jakarta drivers also consider unsold passenger space 
and long wait times for passengers as wasteful. As such, they charge more  
money for their fares, per trip, in order to recoup the monies they lost from 
the unsold passenger seats for their return trips.354 This reasoning has 
economic sense.   It depicts how transporters use creativity and contingency 
to enhance and protect their economic interests. But in this case, their 
creativity violates social expectations. 
 Senegambians tend to adopt strategic patience towards exploitative 
individuals. They believe that a Supreme Being of truth and justice (God, 
Yallah or Allah) will protect their rights that are willfully violated by an 
oppressive or exploitative person. The mayor’s use of secular principles of 
citizenship and religious ethics of good conduct to argue his views on the 
issue reveal another dimension of the practice in which state and non-state 
actors creatively use cultural, social, religious or political ideas to navigate 
complex relations. The practice of unilateral fare increases generates 
religious, economic and political debates in society. It helps us to understand 
how people creatively respond to different situations. It also highlights the 
complex nature of social, economic and political relations in society and at 
the border. However, it validates the argument that economic interests can 
re-define social, cultural and religious ones in society, even if temporarily.  
The political economy of the border shapes the different kinds of 
relationships that exist at the border and beyond. The border has multiple 
functions and it means different things to different people.  As such, it is a 
                                                            






fertile space within which conflict and cooperation can co-exist. The Jakarta 
drivers’ unethical fare increases constitute misdemeanor acts, however, they 
lead to debates about different understandings of Jakarta-commune and 
Jakarta-society relations. In the next section, we discuss how the commune 
of Karang tried to control transporters and how transporters resisted the 
commune’s attempt to control them, leading to struggles and tensions in the 
commune and across the border.   
 
5.1:4: Securing Road Practices and Communities:  Accidents and 
the Cost of Jakarta Road use in Karang 
The mayor’s office’s attempt to use its regulatory authority (through taxation) 
to control Jakartas was almost a fiasco.  But when it found out that monthly, 
Jakartas cause at least four to five road accidents in the commune, it saw 
another opportunity to exert its authority on them. These accidents include 
people falling off from a running Jakarta, two Jakartas colliding, a car 
colliding with/hitting a Jakarta, or, a Jakarta knocking over a child in the 
community.  The outcomes of these accidents range from serious bodily 
injuries, deep bruises and fractures and sometimes fatalities. Mostly, 
negative road practices among drivers cause these accidents. Since the 
accidents are avoidable, the mayor’s office sought ways to make Jakartas 
responsible for their reckless road practices.  
 Some observers argued that the high prevalence of accidents in the 
Jakarta sector has to do with the age of the drivers. Drivers are mostly male 
youth between the ages of 20-30 years. They get ‘intoxicated” by the 
freedom of the road and over-speed on the roads.355 Sometimes, they drive 
under the influence of cannabis or some other intoxicants. So, drivers 
generally expose the commune to some form of risk in their driving.  
Studies of motorcycle transport in Northern Ghana and in Britain 
resonate with the mayor’s findings that youth drivers are more susceptible to 
causing accidents. The two studies identified that risky behaviour causes 
                                                            






high rates of accidents among youth motorcycle riders in Ghana and Britain, 
causing public health, personal and economic hazards in society.356  
Jakarta drivers can be categorised based on their potential to cause 
accidents. It emerged that drivers who honoured their tax obligations are 
almost an accident-free category. Overall, the accident-free drivers comprise 
only about 10% of the number of Jakarta drivers in Karang.  The types of 
accidents this group involves in are usually minor ones, such as, the driver 
falling from his Jakarta. These accidents hardly involve second, or, third 
parties, according to the mayor’s office.357 On the other hand, 90% of drivers 
can potentially cause accidents in the commune.  
The Gendarmerie did a situational analysis of the transport sector in Karang.  We 
discovered that in 30 accidents, only one is not caused by a Jakarta. We had to call 
the Jakarta drivers to sensitise them on safe driving. If you ask them to stop using 
their Jakartas, the first response they will throw at you will be, you have stopped me 
from my work, now give me another work. This can be another challenge for us. 
The Jakartas help us by creating employment for actors in the sector. But again, the 
risk factors are present.358 
The high propensity for accidents gives the commune another opportunity to 
put its mouth in the business of Jakarta drivers. But this time, the mayor’s 
office is resolute that it would avoid confrontations with Jakartas.  It invited 
them to a meeting to discuss the economic benefits Jakartas bring to 
families and the commune, their road practices and accident hazards in the 
sector. This meeting was also designed to introduce a new policy on road 
practices, which was formulated by the mayor’s office in consultation with 
the gendarmerie. It required Jakarta drivers and the passengers they carry 
to wear safety helmets, which would be provided by drivers. 
 Drivers opposed the policy on grounds that it would bring further 
economic hardship to a people struggling for survival and to a community 
where poverty and youth unemployment were deep-rooted. They threatened 
that if they were forced to provide helmets, they would increase fares, to 
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recover the cost of the helmets. The authorities dropped the policy. Jakarta 
drivers’ victory against commune authorities further reinforced the growing 
power transporters enjoy over state authorities and the border. 
Jakartas became another invincible actor in the cross-border 
transport economy and tested the limits of the commune’s authority. The 
commune’s fickle ability to effectively regulate them within its territory 
encouraged them to expand their entrepreneurial adventure across the 
border in The Gambia.  But Gambian authorities were determined to 
exercise full control over what Jakartas can do or not do within their border 
communities.  Unlike the commune, Gambian authorities were firm with their 
regulatory policies for Jakartas, as they try to protect border communities 
that accuse Jakartas of causing economic and social havoc in their 
communities. They came up with a no-Jakarta policy that completely 
outlawed Jakartas in all Gambian territories. The commune-Jakarta tensions 
spilled over to the border. The Gambia-Jakarta tension was 
multidimensional and included different parties. In the next section, we 
explore how this tension manifested at both commune and cross-border 
levels in Senegambia. 
 
5.1.5: Rivalries Among Intermediate Transport and Their Local 
and Cross-Border Effects  
Prior to the coming of the Jakarta, donkey and horse carts transfer 
passengers from the border to motor parks at the Karang-Amdallai border. 
They safely socialise the road with automobile transport.  After the Jakartas 
came, carts, cars and motorcycles- share the road, causing congestion on 
the roads.  
Commune authorities drew up a new plan for road use on route 
nationale No. 5, to decongest the road and to avoid road accidents.359 This 
new plan gave Jakartas priority road use over carts, and asked the latter to 
use the unpaved back roads of the town leading to the border.  It made it 
                                                            






illegal for carts to ride on route nationale No.5, stretching from Karang’s 
main motor park to Amdallai. The strategy decongested the road. But it 
fueled intermodal rivalries and tensions in the border transport market. 
Cart drivers found allies in the clando drivers, who opposed the 
commercial use of the Jakarta as border transport.  Together, cart and 
clando drivers launched a campaign against the decision to give Jakartas 
priority road use. They argued that the carts were traditional border 
transport. Therefore, it was wrong for the Jakarta, the most recent mode to 
arrive in the commune, to displace them from the road.360   
This started an open rivalry between Jakartas, carts and clandos.  
During my fieldwork, I witnessed the three modes of transport aggressively 
compete to lure passengers from each other at their makeshift waiting areas 
by the border. Cart drivers tell passengers that using carts mean getting 
value money. Carts are cheap, safe and reliable. Clando drivers also try to 
lure passengers away from Jakartas.  They remind them of how unsafe and 
expensive Jakartas are. In return, Jakarta drivers taunt carts and clandos. 
They sneer to passengers that the Jakarta was the fastest of all these 
modes and they are no match for carts and clandos. The Jakarta is a 
flexible, quick transport that can take a passenger to any destination.   
The tense intermodal competition among intermediate border 
transport adds another layer to the border transport conflicts. However, each 
mode serves different passengers or travelers at the border. People looking 
to travel cheap and who carry substantial luggage, can take carts. People, 
who are concerned with safety, can take a cart or a clando. People, who 
want to get to their destination quickly, have a Jakarta available.  So, in fact, 
each transport serves the needs of a particular group of clients, but this 
reality is lost in the crazy maze of rivalries.  The unnecessary tension 
intermodal rivalries breed for border transport is similar to the unnecessary 
rivalries between The Gambia and Senegal. Both countries refuse to see 









especially, if they specialise in their economic activities based on their 
national strengths (see chapters 1, 2, 3 & 6).  But instead, and like the 
clandos, carts and Jakartas, the pressure of their rivalries weakens their 
strengths.  
The Jakarta tackles intermodal rivalries at the border. But some 
border communities are unhappy about its deep and successful penetration 
of their communities. They alleged that Jakartas aid theft and other criminal 
behaviour in their communities. They also alleged that drivers are involved in 
“snatch and run” stealing of livestock in many border communities. Stolen 
livestock was allegedly sold at Karang’s burgeoning roast meat market. As a 
result of these and other allegations, the Jakarta has become synonymous 
to stealing in some communities. This view is so strong and pervasive that 
when some border villages hear the sound of a Jakarta near their villages, 
they stand on guard to protect their livestock.  
Some Gambian border villages appealed to their government to 
protect them from Jakartas. Consequently, Gambian authorities outlawed 
Jakartas in all their communities at the Karang-Amdallai and Farrafenni-Keur 
Ayib borders. This drew ill-feeling from Jakarta drivers who condemned 
Gambian authorities for their un-cooperative stance.  The conflict between 
the Jakartas and the border communities has been between two local 
entities. However, The Gambia’s intervention in the conflict makes it a party 
to the conflict. The Gambia government-Jakarta tensions expand to include 
the Senegalese state, which considers Jakartas an innovative 
entrepreneurial initiative from unemployed Senegalese youth. Senegalese 
authorities were not happy with The Gambia’s decision to outlaw Jakartas, 
but the latter maintained its stance. To understand to what extent the 
Jakarta issue chilled interstate relations, it is important to identify the roles 
the sector plays in relieving youth unemployment in Senegal. 
As rightly reported by the mayor’s office, the Jakarta sector provides 






communities.361 Today, actors in the sector include out-of school youth and 
youth who have completed their Advanced Level Certificates (BAC). It also 
employs some university graduates with Bachelor’s Degrees. Additionally, it 
employs second or third year university students, who take a break from 
school or come during the school holidays, to make money in the sector. 
With increasing levels of youth un-employment in Senegal, the Jakarta 
sector is a huge help to the Senegalese economy. It creates livelihood 
opportunities for many youths. It is therefore understandable that Senegal 
frowns on The Gambia’s anti-Jakarta policies, which curtail economic 
opportunities for the sector. Notwithstanding, national security concerns 
justifies the Gambian position on the Jakartas.  
In effect, the Jakarta is a source of conflict for the commune and for 
interstate relations. It tests the mettle of both state and non-state authorities 
at the border and beyond. The Jakarta adds interesting dynamics to the 
cross-border transport sector. It reinforces the border’s role as a space for 
mix-motive games. It embodies how ideas for survival can be shared and 
explored across distances and mindsets.  Most of the drivers are youth. 
They belong to a social category that is highly predisposed to migration. 
Through cyber technology, they can closely follow developments in other 
parts of world. They can also follow existing practices in motorcycle 
transport from other countries like Burkina Faso and Nigeria.362  
As a social category that has a tendency to explore advancements in 
other parts of the world, these youth drivers may nurture liberal political and 
cultural perceptions, which would impact the way they perceive the border, 
their economic challenges and their political leaders. Their intransigent 
attitude towards the mayor’s office and its policies was driven by a sense of 
empowered entitlement.  
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These youth view their economic realities in ways that resonate with 
the experiences of disempowered youth in other African circumstances. For 
instance, the vous in Karang have been the incubatory site for the rise of 
Jakarta entrepreneurship at the border. This is parallel to how barbershops 
in Arusha, Tanzania, have become synonymous to the economic struggles 
of youth in Tanzania. 
As a site of business, the barbershop milieu bespeaks both the social crisis of neo-
liberal transition in Tanzania…as well as the meanings of these institutional shifts 
and the kinds of consciousness embedded in them that is the pervasive sense of 
rupture, and especially of unrealized expectations.363   
Sites for popular culture, work places, public places like vous and 
barbershops, are ideal spots from which youth can reconceptualise their 
social realities, dreams and ideals for economic emancipation. The Jakartas 
serve as tools for economic emancipation for youth in border locations like 
Karang, or, in big cities like Lagos, Nigeria, where Okada, the Nigerian 
version of Jakarta, long operated as a form of commercial transport.364  
The Jakarta drivers have learnt from both local and trans-national 
sources. Their impersonal tendencies mimic the transactional behaviour 
automobile transporters adopted in their campaign for changes in cross-
border transport. They tend to be more interested in advancing their 
economic goals, rather than preserving inter-personal relations.  Perhaps, 
the fact that majority of Jakarta drivers are youth can make us understand 
why they talk little about culture or even cultural norms of cooperation in 
their dialogues with other parties. There are other studies in other parts of 
the world that show that youth tend to be more transactional in their 
interactions with other people.  
Quoting Abrams on youth, labour market and political action, Furlong 
and Cartmel argued that impersonal tendencies in youth interpersonal 
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exchanges are linked to the fact that “…current trends in education and the 
labour market may actually have weakened the potential for collectivism by 
strengthening individualist sentiments”365 This shows how the obsession for 
economic security created barriers for social solidarity. Neagele also 
observes that in American culture, the search for security among youth 
condones moving away from “personal intensities in order to keep us sober 
and free enough for impersonal accomplishments.”366  Jakarta drivers 
therefore reflect what other youth in similar circumstances may do.  Through 
the various ways they express their economic, social and political ideals, 
they contribute to social progress and change. 
The main lessons to draw from the Jakarta case study are that 
tensions can have both productive and non-productive outcomes in society. 
Change can bring about new economic opportunities in society. Additionally, 
both state and non-state actors in Senegambia use different resources at 
their disposal to navigate the complex context of the border and their 
relationships. In the next section, I use the media and civil society groups to 
further show that both state and non-state actors can generate economic 
and other benefits from The Gambia-Senegal interstate conflicts. Thus, 
conflict in itself is not bad, except when it is associated with violence, which 
ends up causing harm to almost all involved parties.  
 
 5.2: Mediating the Fight: The Media and Citizens 
The case study on the Jakartas, reveals that the mayor of Karang borrows 
from secular and popular terminologies, to communicate his ideas, to elicit 
some desired responses from his audience. As a politician, he uses words 
like “civism,” to describe his understanding or lack of understanding of the 
attitudes of the Jakarta drivers.  As a social and religious being, he uses 
words like “God,” to support his statements, too. His approach to 
communicating his ideas is part of the broad use of language to (re) create 
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and (re) enact social experiences of the border, the one-ness discourse and 
interstate relations in Senegambia. The instrumental use of language also 
features in the way local media engages with The Gambia-Senegal 
relations. This section therefore examines the roles the media plays in 
interstate relations and how it directly or indirectly benefits from interstate 
tensions. 
Language is a major tool for the print media.  It makes the media a 
“channel through which alternative views, symbols, and meanings are 
expressed.” It also enables it to “frame issues for the public.”  The media 
also serves as “an arena in which groups struggle over the definition and 
construction of social reality.”367 Going by these roles of the media, it is clear 
that it can shape debates on interstate and cross-border relations in 
Senegambia. Their role in this regard continues to evolve.  In chapter one, 
the media features as a tool for pro-Senegambia advocacy. In the chapters 
that follow, it takes on a role as a social enquirer that tries to understand 
what is happening between The Gambia and Senegal. We also see it as a 
medium for spreading the viewpoints of transporters during interstate border 
conflicts. In this chapter, it acts as a political instrument and a nationalist 
medium that pursues what it considers to be the national interest.  
These shifting roles of the media are tied to the logic that shapes its 
debates at any given moment. As such, the way the media uses language 
can determine the effects that language has on interstate relations. For 
example, during one of the border closures, Gambia-based Foroyaa 
newspaper published dramatic details of the truckload of goods that were 
stranded at the borders and the millions businesses were losing as a result 
of the border crisis.  It urged for a healthy “people to people, state to state 
and state to people relation to ensure the two states, one people principle.368 
It reported the events as they were, but it also shared its views on how the 
border impasse should be resolved. Its use of language can be compared 
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with that of other media groups, as examples of how social reality is 
constructed and re-constructed and thus, like the kinship discourses, it can 
be subject to various shifts.  
The media’s role can be constructive, neutral or partisan. Its coverage 
of the 2014-border stalemate is an instructive example. A number of local 
Senegalese media outlets entirely blamed The Gambia’s President 
Jammeh, for the 2014 border crisis. Their views ignored the complex nature 
of the crisis.  In subsequent border crisis, other Senegalese media sources 
also maintained a similar line of thinking about the border crisis. “The 
Kouthia show,” a Senegalese TFM television comedy, parodied Jammeh on 
the crisis and gave the impression that Youssou Ndour, TFM founder and 
the mbalax superstar, prevailed on Jammeh to reopen the border.369   
The Kouthia show is a comedy show and nothing to take seriously. 
However, it seems to use the border crisis as a publicity stunt for Ndour, 
who has political ambition in Senegal and whose family has business 
interests in The Gambia. There was no evidence that the border was re-
opened as a result of Ndour’s intervention. It’s comedy, but there is no 
guarantee that some viewers will not consider it as reality. 
The show ignored serious sensitivities of the border. But its mindset 
features in other media sources. For example, Gambian dissidents in the 
USA and Europe used online media to urge Senegal to militarily intervene in 
The Gambia to end the border crisis and the regime of President Jammeh.370 
Their advocacy was incite-ful for interstate relations and it ignored the 
democratic ideals that modern society values as the bases for regime 
change in any country.  
The personal logic and interests of the people behind them motivated 
these media productions or publications. The editorial stance of recent 
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media reports reflect the vested interests some contributors to the media 
and some media personnel have in The Gambia-Senegal relations. For 
example, a Gambian protester wrote to the Standard newspaper about the 
2014 border blockade by Senegalese transporters, noting: 
Senegal cannot be allowed to play the bully and get away with it. The 
frequent border closures they orchestrate does not augur well for good 
neighbourliness…Where on earth can one man – the leader of a transport 
union – open and close an important international border whenever he likes 
it and reopen it when he likes it?... Macky Sall and his people should man 
up and take up their responsibilities or stop hiding behind the so-called 
transport union in their diabolical attempts to wreak havoc on the Gambian 
economy and make the people suffer. The problem can never be solved by 
the Gambian and Senegalese transport people, but rather by the two 
governments sitting in one room at one table and sorting out whatever is the 
problem. …Senegal should know that if it wants to hurt The Gambia, it will 
end up hurting its own people more. Senegal needs The Gambia than The 
Gambia needs Senegal.371 
 
The writer of the article used language in an interesting way that provides 
insights into the border crisis but also some strong nationalist views of it.  He 
calls Senegal a “bully.”  That infers The Gambia was weak and it was the 
innocent party in this crisis. This directly validates conspiracy theories that 
Senegal was using the border and its transporters for its anti-Gambia 
campaign. The writer raises a legitimate question about who is in control of 
the border. Senegal? Transporters? He concludes that it is only the two 
governments that can resolve the border problem.  He ends his analysis with 
a quack that Senegal needs The Gambia more.  This article directly feeds 
into other editorials from the Standard newspaper, which published this 
article. 
In an editorial, the Standard newspaper contributed to the debates on  
2014-border crisis. Its views reflected a nationalist’s unrestrained candor.  It 
wrote:  
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Since the period of early independence during the era of Senghor, Senegal 
has been playing the diabolical game of closing the border with The Gambia 
citing all kinds of justifications. Well aware of the importance of the re-export 
trade to the Gambian economy, they have used border closures and the 
threat of border closures to 'punish' us…  of recent, the closures have not 
only become more common, but the periods of closures have become 
inordinately long and they are unilaterally dictated by the Senegalese 
transport union... it defies all reason that they can repeatedly close 
important transit borders continually without their government lifting a finger 
to do anything about it... We understand the reasons that influenced the 
decision the Gambia government took last week when it closed the border...  
It shows that The Gambia too can play ball. If anything, it would only 
strengthen our hands in any future negotiations.  The border closures only 
result in mutually assured losses. No one wins…. It should also be realised 
that actions such as the perennial arbitrary closures of international borders 
do not just hurt governments but the ... people and they would only generate 
hate and other ill feelings in the populace. The Gambia and Senegal are tied 
by tradition and kinship. If anything was going to strengthen our 
relationships, it should be a sense of defiance against borders that were 
created by colonialists…The government of Senegal should put an end to 
this madness…372 
 
The Standard newspaper also uses interesting language to describe its 
impressions of the meanings of the frequent border closures. It describes it 
as “madness’ from Senegal, “a diabolical game” to “punish us,” (Gambians). 
It applauds The Gambia for showing that it too “can play ball.”  The editorial 
was no doubt a pro-Gambian struggle against Senegal’s frequent closing of 
the border on the country.  But it directly feeds into the intense 
communications Gambian authorities have made on the border closures. 
Interestingly, Sheriff Bojang, the founder of Standard newspaper, would 
become a Minister for Information and Communication in the Jammeh 
government.  (This is not to say he was appointed due to this editorial, 
Bojang was competent and qualified for this position).  The editorial also 
served another purpose- the pro-Senegambia debate. It dwells on the 
colonial legacy and the effects the partition has had on Senegambia. It 
argues, “The Gambia and Senegal are tied by tradition and kinship.” If 
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anything was going to strengthen our relationships, it should be a sense of 
defiance against borders that were created by colonialists…”  
The editorial was an eloquent exposition on the border crisis.  It 
borrowed the Senegambian practice of using metaphors and idioms to 
construct and re-construct social experiences.  It concludes that no one wins 
in the border crisis. But the game metaphor it uses implies there is a loser 
and a winner and that can potentially aggravate the interstate tension as 
both parties struggle not to be the loser. Hence, that statement deviates 
from dome-ndeye sentiments, and fosters a dome-baaye approach to the 
crisis. The use of the word “madness” expresses a sense of exasperation, a 
lack of reasonableness. The use of a mental health metaphor therefore 
dismisses the crisis as fictitious and unnatural.  
The editorial comes from a well-informed source; therefore it can also 
serve as a Gambian response to Senegalese stereotypes. For instance, 
some Senegalese have a social perception that Gambians are “cohn.”  In 
Wollof, that means someone who can be easily swindled or a fool. This 
comes from previous juvenile understandings of how the Senegambia 
Confederation was a struggle for political supremacy between Diouf and 
Jawara, Senegal and The Gambia. When it was formed, such views saw 
that “wise-man” Diouf fooled Jawara, and established the Confederation. 
However, when it collapsed some of these views changed to say in fact it 
was Jawara who outsmarted Diouf in the Confederation. These views are 
based on hierarchical understanding of interstate relations and are to be 
considered as part of insignificant social chitchat. 
However, the metaphors the editorial uses connect with 
Senegambian social stereotypes. In fact, the word “bully” is also connected 
to these stereotypes.  These words contradict Senegambian kinship 
discourses and the one-ness value.  But we can also see them as part of 
human perceptions that some members of a tribe can have about other 
tribes, or, some citizens of a country can have about other countries and so 






the truth about those particular people or tribe, but such views do exist in 
society.  In the Senegambia case, they are part of the variety of perceptions 
that shape different understandings of interstate relations.  
Following the border crisis, another Gambian Abdoukarim Sanneh 
published a long article on the Trans Gambia bridge project advancing both 
political and ecological perspectives on the project. He argued among other 
things that,  
Now that the government of Gambia has yielded to the pressure from 
Senegal and agreed to sign the bridge development project, what are we to 
gain and lose? We should take a nationalist stand as an independent and 
sovereign state since we have seen the attitude of successive Senegalese 
governments. More should be done to inform our citizens about the issues. 
A year ago, Senegalese transport union were boycotting the ferry crossing 
in protest for the new tax levy and that should not be a deal for the 
construction of the bridge project. Our government should also be aware 
that Bambatenda ferry crossing is an important revenue arm of our small 
economy and so requires cost and benefit analysis. In building a bridge, that 
revenue-generating venue should be maintained…The government of the 
Gambia should introduce a form of toll charges, if the bridge project is 
financed through a development loan from donor institutions… The bridge in 
Bambatenda ferry crossing should be built in such a way that will not 
prevent or constraint or serve as a barrier for future river transportation.373 
 
Sanneh’s educated opinion on interstate relations and the Trans Gambia 
bridge project has similarities with the Standard newspaper editorial.  It is 
pro-Gambian and it advocates for the protection of Gambian interests in 
interstate relations. However, it recognises the need for interstate 
cooperation, like the Standard newspaper’s editorial.  
We can identify three strands of arguments about interstate relations 
based on viewpoints expressed in the media or by the media. The first one 
is based on conscious nationalism, which aims to naturally protect the 
interests of either The Gambia or Senegal, depending on which direction of 
the border those views come from. The second one is cooperative 
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nationalism, which recognises the need for interstate cooperation and the 
third one is inciteful nationalism, which aims to pit the two countries against 
each other.   
These three variations of interstate discourse share the ability to 
structure personal thoughts or private grievances into collective thoughts or 
grievances. Using the media to express opinions on interstate relations can 
therefore shape the direction interstate relations take.  
The logic of the media’s work on interstate relations comes from what 
it is seeking to achieve. The media collects and publicises information and 
facilitates public communication.  The way it uses this power can also define 
the nature of The Gambia-Senegal interstate relations.  But again, what 
goals it seeks to achieve defines how it uses its power. 
Politicians in both The Gambia and Senegal recognise the power the 
media has to influence the direction of interstate relations. For example, in 
2014, as The Gambia-Senegal border stalemate raged on, it was rumoured 
that the Senegalese government had asked Seneweb, the popular 
Senegalese website, to pull a story on the border crisis off from their 
website. The story was considered damaging to interstate relations. But 
besides stories like that one, the media has also published information to 
indicate that The Gambia – Senegal border crisis are fictitious and are 
engineered by politicians who are in fact working for each other.   
Based on this conspiracy theory, the media, at some point, alleged 
that, General Pathe Seck, former Senegalese Interior Minister, and some 
top Senegalese government officials have been spying on Gambian political 
exiles living in Dakar and other places in Senegal. They collect information 
about them and pass it to President Jammeh and his government.  Reports 
also alleged that these Senegalese officials and security agents were 
involved in the abduction of Gambian dissidents, who went missing in 






political refugees who mysteriously died in Dakar.374  The media also 
claimed that these senior Senegalese government officials were on 
president Jammeh's payroll since the time of the Wade regime. 
The language the media uses to report on stories, which it believes 
are part of interstate conspiracy depicts the media to be “for the people,” and 
against “dishonest politicians,” who have neither the interest of Senegambia 
nor that of their respective countries at heart. This can be framed as a 
struggle between the media and politicians in both The Gambia and 
Senegal.  However, the struggle helps build the media’s image as the 
watchdog of the people. So, the interstate conflicts of the border can 
strengthen the media’s image.  
Politicians are reluctant to openly speak about The Gambia-Senegal 
interstate conflicts. But the media does it and consequently, it passes itself 
as the more transparent entity, when compared with Senegambian 
politicians.  The media’s provocative discussions of interstate relations 
allude to the complex nature of interstate relations. For example, political 
insiders have said that Wade and Jammeh and later Jammeh and Sall had 
low opinion of each other.   But the media claims that Senegalese 
government officials, the gendarmerie and other security agents of the 
country were part of a grand scheme supporting the political excesses of 
Yayah Jammeh in The Gambia. It also argued that Senegal was cooperating 
with Gambian authorities to subvert democracy in the country- to advance 
Senegalese interests.375  
Media reports or opinions expressed in the media concerning the 11th 
November 2014, signing of the Trans Gambia bridge agreement, implicitly 
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distrust interstate political relations. The 942-metre long bridge, which will 
cost US$65M to construct, is Senegal’s long-dreamed and the long-talked of 
bridge. It will connect the north and south banks of The Gambia through the 
Bamba-Tenda-Yelli-Tenda ferry crossing (see chapters 2 & 3).376   
Writers using pen names left comments below a Kairo newspaper 
story that reported the story of two Gambians who were arrested in Senegal 
for their anti-Jammeh campaign.  One comment noted that: “(don’t forget 
they are trying to build THEIR bridge across The Gambia!).” It directly linked 
the arrest of the two men to interstate conspiracy and political favouritism. 
Another comment, which is reported below also indicated that Senegal was 
in fact doing everything it can to appease Gambian authorities in order to 
advance its interests about the bridge.  
 
Senegal getting fed up with us or not is immaterial insofar as their wish to 
build the long dreamt bridge over Gambia is concerned. They have, in the 
past, appeased the idiosyncratic professor of idiocy, and ended up not only 
having 2 of their nationals murdered by him but could not even get their 
bodies. The main hindrance to the bridge may well be the professor.  
The comment implies Senegal tolerates president Jammeh’s political 
excesses. It furthers the theory that Gambian and Senegalese politicians 
care about themselves and each other, and not the people of Senegambia 
or even their citizens. It implies Senegal was indifferent to its two citizens 
who were executed in The Gambia for murder. We are not sure if Senegal 
has done any behind the scenes diplomatic engagements with The Gambia 
on the issue of its two nationals. But the comments firmly indicate these 
politicians are just for themselves. The comments of contributors to the 
media advances other theories from the media, which say that officials of the 
two countries watch each other’s back to mutually protect their political 
interests at all times.  It is perceivable that the politicians in the two countries 
at times cooperate to further their political interests, but it becomes difficult 
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to think of why they constantly have troubles over the border between the 
two countries.  
If the border serves the interests of Gambian and Senegalese 
politicians, it also serves those of the media, too. The latter can use its 
debates on the border and interstate relations to promote itself as the 
opposite of politicians. However, its ability to swing between two different 
political mindsets about Senegambia (pro-nationalist versus pro-
Senegambia) orients it towards some middle ground. When the pro-
nationalist and the pro-Senegambia arguments collide, they eventually move 
towards a centered approach to interstate relations. In that sense, the media 
can use the border to foster its adherence to certain universal norms such 
as independence, transparency and accountability. It can use the border, its 
audience society and the governments, its sources to foster that. In the next 
section, we share how like the media, civil society groups can also derive 
benefits from interstate tensions over the border. 
 
5.3: Mediating the Fight: Civil Society and Interstate Relations 
From the previous section, we see the media can use interstate issues and 
the border as tools that help it “perform” the universal norms that define the 
roles of the media in society. In this section, we will explore how groups that 
call themselves civil society groups also use the border and interstate 
relations to perform their roles. All these stories are about the use of 
creativity and contingency in pursuing different goals. The stories also imply 
that the border works for different people in different ways.  
Recently, groups professing civil society mandates have emerged as 
new negotiators of The Gambia-Senegal relations.  They are more active 
during interstate crisis moments, and less so during calm and stability. 
These groups are influenced by their own operational logic. However, they 
depend on resources from other “partners” to carry on the work they do on 






groups play during interstate crisis to see how their intervention come from 
using other means to make the interstate crisis over the border work to the 
advantage of individuals or organisations.  The ad hoc nature of these 
groups is related to how they seek to serve the moment or for the moment to 
serve them. Hence as soon as the crisis settles down, they “disappear” from 
sight and their programs and events stand-still.  
In 2014, as the border crisis reached climax, The Senegalese-
Gambia Association for Integration and Socio-Economic Development 
(SGAISD) organised “The Great Senegambia Conference and Symposium,” 
in The Gambia. SGAISD, describes itself as a grassroots bilateral civil 
society organisation, with a pro-Senegambia mission.  It seeks to foster 
political, cultural and economic integration between The Gambia and 
Senegal.  
From 31st May – 1st June 2014, SGAISD also organised a 
conference on the theme: “Can Senegambia integration be a necessary tool 
for the socio-economic development of its people?” High profile politicians 
from both The Gambia and Senegal attended both the symposium and the 
conference. For a self-declared grassroots organisation, SGAISD considers 
itself a non-aligned and non-political group. But its work seemed to be 
designed to appease political leaders in the two countries and to develop its 
own political capital that will give it legitimacy on both sides of the border. By 
receiving the endorsement of Senegambian politicians, it can access 
resources from national, regional and international organisations to fund its 
event. 
 Comaroff and Comaroff‘s concept of civil society implies that civil 
society struggles against the state.377  This means civil society acts as a 
restraint on the state and promotes good governance in Africa.378  It 
mobilises mass public opinion, attempts behavioural modification by civil 
action, protests, press conferences, demonstrations and petitions. Its ability 
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to manage and frame its concerns is critical to its successes as a platform 
for change.379   But SGAISD prefers to work as part of the state and not as 
an opposition to the state. Therefore, its ability to work as a proper civil 
society group that can hold the two governments accountable in a 
transparent way and for the benefit of the civil population is hindered. Also, 
we should think that during its events as a civil society group, it would 
prioritise the participation of ordinary people from the grassroots. But it 
attracted politicians and the media more than the civil population.  
SGAISD is not political but it uses political strategies to pursue its 
goals. For example at the end of its conference on 1st June, 2014, attendees 
to the conference signed a communiqué on interstate relations. The 
communiqué is a political tool that is usually used in interstate/bilateral and 
international political engagements to formalise and affirm political 
agreements among parties. Instead of using more civil-society apt 
communication strategies, SGAISD uses strategies and language that are 
familiar to politicians. As a group that wants politicians to endorse its 
legitimacy, the use of the communiqué was in order. Additionally, it was 
intended for high-level political authority in both countries. As such, it uses 
language as well as strategies that can attract its political audience and this 
sets it apart from other civil society groups who take on their full roles as 
proper civil society groups, whose mandates are formed and exist beyond 
the moment.  
In the communiqué, SGAISD praised the two states for their recent 
revival of the Senegal-Gambian Permanent Secretariat (SGPS). It declared 
support for policy decisions, which led to the creation of the Senegalo-
Gambia Border Management Commission and the Consultative Commission 
on Senegalo-Gambian Cooperation, respectively. It further declared that the 
people of the two countries need sustainable development.  It urged the two 
states to enforce interstate protocols on “road transit,” and other pro-
integration measures that are stipulated in the charters of UN, AU, 
                                                            






ECOWAS. SGAISD’ also declared: “We are committed to close cooperation, 
an uninterrupted cross-border trade and technology transfer between the 
two countries.”  It cautions the governments of The Gambia and Senegal to 
be cautious of non-state actors who seek to pursue interests that are not 
sensitive to the interests and welfare of the peoples of both countries.380  
The communiqué was therefore a tool to endear SGAISD to 
Senegambian politicians. It informs them it is their ally. It tries to monopolise 
political capital for itself by labeling other non-state actors as irresponsive to 
the needs of Senegambian people. 
 SGAISD uses what serves it best in Senegambian culture in order to 
maintain its legitimacy and to exploit power and the political economy of The 
Gambia-Senegal border. It reinforces Ake’s view that African political, 
economic and social forces selectively appropriate African traditional 
institutions and culture to advance their interests.381 As a civil society group 
and a non-state actor, it assumes that state agents were more interested in 
Senegambian unity. They are also more interested in the welfare of 
Senegambians. It ignores the fact that both state and non-state actors have 
contributed to the collapse of the Senegambia confederation, which sought 
to reclaim Senegambian unity.382  It also ignores the fact that conflict 
decisions in interstate relations generally come from the top. 
The conference provided space for Senegambian politicians to further 
share their usual political rhetoric on interstate relations. Dodou Bammy 
Jagne, the Gambian Ambassador to Senegal, told the conference 
“relationship between the two countries is very cordial.”  He also declared 
that both The Gambia and Senegal “…are very committed to the cause of 
Senegambia integration and [this forum] will further strengthen our work… to 
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meet the desired goals of the people of the two countries.” These words 
were not different from the words Babacarr Diagne, the Senegalese 
ambassador to The Gambia delivered to the same conference. Diagne 
expressed “gratitude to the leadership of the two countries for their 
commitment to the relations between the two nations.” Dodou Sallah Diop, 
the executive secretary of the Senegalo-Gambian Permanent Secretariat 
also noted that “…the two countries have had a very good relationship from 
time immemorial” and “the establishment of the Permanent Senegalo-
Gambian Secretariat, which is housed in Banjul, will further strengthen the 
ties between the two countries.”  Interestingly, these comments were made 
at a time when political disputes over the border have recurred several times 
during that year, 2014. At the end of the conference, too, participants signed 
“The Banjul Declaration of the Senegambia Integration 2014,” which was 
delivered to the foreign ministers of both countries, for onward transmission 
to Presidents Jammeh and Sall.383 Unlike the transporters and the media 
(see chapters 3, 4 and 5), groups like SGAISD can easily bring together 
politicians across both sides of the border to participate in their programmes 
since they are like an extension of state authorities.  
We can consider SGAISD as a group that tries to pacify political 
authorities in Senegambia. As a civil society group that explores a new 
frontier as an advocate in cross-border and interstate relations, SGAISD 
understands that for it to effectively get the ears of the two governments, it 
has to ingratiate itself to them.  It also understands that the success of its 
advocacy depend on how well it mobilises the political, economic and civil 
spheres of Senegambian society.384 As such, its stance offers an interesting 
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dichotomy to a general understanding of the roles of civil society in African 
politics. 
SGAISD seems to be a group that is trying to cash in on The Gambia-
Senegal interstate tensions. Working on the side of the two governments 
comes from a similar approach to how states and people work with kinship 
to advance their political, economic, social or cultural interests in Africa.385  It 
is therefore appreciable that SGAISD can use the resources it has in the 
state and in regional and international orgnisations to build its image and 
solidify its status as a legitimate mediator of interstate relations. Its non-
confrontational approach is valuable, however, the strategies it uses makes 
its identity as a civil society group debatable. It does not draw its legitimacy 
from the civil sphere, or from non-political indigenous sources.   
The persistence of interstate crisis has therefore created employment 
and funding opportunities for groups who can glean opportunities from 
interstate crisis, especially over the border. These groups are like Jakartas, 
they seek to fill the vacuum between the political and cultural space in 
Senegambia. Thus, civil society engagement has now become part of 
processes for dialogue on interstate relations. For example, in 2011, 
Senegal’s National Organisation for Human Rights (ONDH) decided to 
intervene to end a month- long border blockade. This was part of the boycott 
of Gambian routes, which was organised by the Senegalese Transport 
Association.   
ONDH received sponsorship from the EU, ECOWAS and UMAO. It 
organised a consultative forum in The Gambia on the theme: “Human Rights 
Approach in the Process of Regional Integration in West Africa.”  This forum 
was slightly different from SGAISD’s conference or symposium. It used a 
more critical approach to review interstate political difficulties over the 
border. It clearly identified the conflict dynamics and also the different actors 
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in the border crisis. Moreover, it reviewed the different claims that parties to 
the border conflict have used to justify their various actions.  For instance, it 
looked at the reasons why Senegalese Transport Association refused 
Gambian vehicles entry into Senegal. It also scrutinised if transporters’ 
queries about the number of checkpoints on the cross-border routes, 
behaviour of ferry personnel, ferry user fee increases and so on, were 
legitimate. 386   
By professionally engaging with the border conflict, participants in the 
forum unanimously agreed that the Senegalese Transport Association’s 
border blockades contravened ECOWAS protocols on the free movement of 
people and goods. The forum therefore recommended that the two countries 
should engage in constructive dialogue to reach sustainable solutions to the 
border crisis. This recommendation was similar to the recommendations 
from the Dakar-based Senegalese civil society organisation CAR-Leneen.  
CAR-Leneen has previously called for a joint stakeholder meeting to 
address the border crisis. The meeting was to consist of representatives of 
the two governments, members of the transport unions and representatives 
from civil society groups in both countries. Convening such a meeting would 
be a way to effectively negotiate ongoing border crisis as well as avoiding 
future ones.387  
Groups like SGAISD, ONDH and CAR-Leneen approach interstate 
political difficulties in different ways.  But the border crisis offers all of them 
opportunities to engage with interstate political difficulties and to access 
funding for their advocacy. Most groups like these ones work on interstate 
relations only during crisis moments and as soon as the crisis settles down, 
they are either out of business or they move onto other things.  Their ad hoc 
programming on interstate relations comes from a desire to contribute 
towards resolving the crisis and also to entrench their economic, political or 
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social interests. Thus, the border and border crisis work for these groups like 
they do for other state and non-state actors in Senegambia.  
These civil society groups have been effective in packaging 
themselves as “neutral” arbitrators during The Gambia-Senegal border 
crisis. They have been recognised by multilateral entities like ECOWAS and 
the EU as problem-solving advocates for Senegambia integration. They 
became de factor monitors of relevant international protocols supporting free 
movement of people and goods across the borders. They generally rely on 
the agenda of the international system and sub-regional or international 
partners to frame their cross-border agenda. Thus, they hardly mobilise 
around existing cross-border social structures, since they align their agenda 
to international policy goals in order to mobilise funding from multilateral 
agencies to sustain their cross-border social and political campaigns. As 
such, civil society groups in Senegambia have also learnt to use the 
resources they have in the border, in the state, in society and in regional and 
international bodies to advance their interests. This makes the border a mix-
motive game in society.  
 
5.4: Conclusion 
The chapter has shown how the border crisis, the restructured interstate 
transport sector and interstate political tensions created new economic 
opportunities for both state and non-state actors. The Jakartas found 
business at the border, the commune finds new tax resources, the media 
can boost its image and civil society groups also find new funding 
opportunities for their work and staff.  These new opportunities come with 
other forms of tensions.  Jakartas fight with the commune over taxation and 
other issues, they fight with border communities and Gambian authorities 
and they are engaged in intermode rivalries with clandos and carts. The 
media also plays both positive and divisive roles in interstate relations and 
civil society advocacy also include subtle rivalries. Thus, we can conclude 
that conflict is inherent in social, political and economic processes of society. 






they seek from engaging with that conflict. The chapter also provides into 
the nuanced nature of state-society relations, transporter-state relations as 
well media-state and civil-society state relations. It also identifies how people 
use contingency and creativity to navigate the complex context of the border 
and interstate relations to protect their interests. This chapter leads us to 
chapter 6, which shows how traders work with the border, the state and 


















CROSS-BORDER TRADE AND THE GAMBIA-SENEGAL 
RELATIONS 
When you share the same bedroom, the same lunch and the same cup even the way you 
have your breakfast can cause disturbance or the way you sleep. This is very frequent but 
you resolve those problems in a family way…. instead of going outside and saying what 
your wife told you or your husband. It should be a close family. (Ambassador Saidou 
Nourou Ba)388 
 
6.0: Cross-Border Traders and Social Interactions in Senegambia 
Although The Gambia and Senegal have had longstanding disagreements 
about cross-border trade between the two countries, it has always existed. 
Cross-border trade is part of Senegambian social life. It connects goods to 
people and people to people. It minimises social conflict and builds relations 
of trust among different individuals across distances.389  
However, Nugent argues that the existence of cross-border trade may 
not imply inter-communal harmony.390 But irrespective of its inherent 
tensions, cross-border trade between The Gambia and Senegal contributes 
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to cross-border harmony.391 This chapter focuses on the importance 
language plays in enhancing trading relations in Senegambia. Traders’ use 
of language has a performative quality to it.  But it is part of a broad practice 
in which Senegambians use metaphors and social idioms of relations to 
foster cross-border ties. 
The main question this chapter explores is: what are the cross-border 
trade practices at The Gambia-Senegal border? It also explores a subsidiary 
question, which is: How did traders integrate socio-cultural idioms of 
relations in their trading to foster a collective sense of harmony that has 
helped to de-escalate interstate political tensions in The Gambia-Senegal 
relations? The evidence used in this chapter mainly derives from an 
ethnography conducted on the cross-border trade money and commodities 
markets at the Karang-Amdallai and Keur Ayib- Farrafenni borders. The 
chapter identifies how traders use deep-rooted societal and religious 
principles to enhance their economic activities, navigate conflict and 
overcome the limitations of territory.  
The introduction of the chapter is followed by a discussion of how 
trade in commodities intersects social and religious values, to foster social 
bonds. After this, the chapter explores how Senegambian markets 
encourage solidarity, and sustains connections among people. This is 
followed by a survey of the trading and life histories of selected traders. The 
life histories are used to exemplify how traders navigate institutional 
constraints. They also highlight how traders tolerate and depend on the state 
as they follow the profit across the border. Next, the chapter explores gender 
dynamics and subtle tensions in the border currency trade at the Amdallai-
Karang border. This is followed by a discussion of the consumption patterns 
and attitudes in Keur Ayib. After this, the chapter discusses the cross-border 
fish trade and how it promotes interstate harmony. This is followed by the 
conclusion of the chapter. 
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6.1: Intersections: Cross-Border Commodity Trade and 
Senegambian Social Life  
 Historically, the most common commodities traded through the 
 Karang-Amdallai and Farrafenni-Keur Ayib borders can be broadly 
categorised into consumer and non-consumer goods. The first category 
included rice, oil, fishery products, cashew nuts, vegetables, fruits, tomato 
paste, medicaments, milk, textiles and clothes, shoes, cement, gas and 
electronics. In Senegambia, textiles, electronics, milk and fish are used for 
both consumption and to satisfy symbolic social functions.  
Textile symbolises endurance in relationships. It is also a symbol of 
social protection. It is used in weddings, initiation ceremonies, births and 
funerals, to strengthen interpersonal ties. It is also socially desirable for 
people to exchange textile gifts. Wearing a textile gift from another person is 
considered a deeply intimate act. Cloth or textile is also considered an object 
of beauty and love. It is also a symbol of wealth sharing and status. Dress 
expresses the economic status of its wearer. High value traditional cloths 
and some expensive modern textiles are used to communicate social status 
in Senegambia.392 
Textile is also a symbol of equity in Senegambia. Ashobi is the name 
of the common social practice whereby, groups of individuals or sometimes 
a village, wear identical clothing, to celebrate a social or religious event.  
Ashobi promotes friendship, a sense of belonging and equity among 
individuals with different income levels and social status.  So, Ashobi helps 
to create a sense of equality of status during a particular event.393 Thus, the 
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use of the fabric metaphor to signify The Gambia-Senegal relations derives 
from the important roles textile plays in Senegambian society (see chapters 
1 & 7). 
 Milk is another commodity that serves important cultural functions in 
Senegambia. Generally, it is used in naming, initiation and wedding 
ceremonies, and in religious events. It is also used to welcome guests, 
especially in rural settings.394  Radio sets also have social functions in 
Senegambia. They have been, until recently, part of the ensemble of gifts a 
bridegroom presented to his bride.   
Thus, cross-border trade in Senegambia involves trading in goods 
that symbolise kinship, mbokh or badinya.395 So, cross-border trading 
enhances Senegambian socialisation processes. Literature on West African 
trading networks and traditional markets commonly use the term “juula,” to 
identify the people behind West Africa’s legendary long-distance trade.396  
Juula comes from the Mandinka word “juulo,” which means “rope” or 
“connector.” The word is a metaphor for how traders travelled all the corners 
of the Mandinka Empire and beyond, bringing and taking goods to 
communities. In that process, they established and sustained various 
networks of ties in Mandeng and beyond. Through trading, they also created 
new settlements and political principalities that became vassal territories of 
the Mandeng king, and paid tribute to him.397  The term “ juulo” or “juula” is 
therefore a metaphor, for the roles trading and traders play in building 
relations and sustaining livelihoods through travel and the exchange of 
goods.  Hence, Senegambians consider trading as a vocation that is 
embedded in relational ties and develops best through compromise and, 
cooperation.  
However, trading is inherently full of tensions. The longstanding trade 
disputes between The Gambia-Senegal validate this statement (see 
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chapters 1, 2, 4 & 5).  But traders value stability, and therefore, they seek to 
establish cooperative relations with fellow traders and with other people in 
society.398 The encounter between Buckor Sano, a local Senegambian 
merchant and Richard Jobson, an English traveler and trader, illustrates the 
above point. Sano told Jobson that the two of them share more in common 
than either of them with the king. “I seek abroad as you do; and therefore am 
nearer unto you, said Sano.”399 This encounter confirms that trade is 
borderless and traders cross many borders to pursue their economic goals.  
In the next section, we explore how traders and trading practices navigate 
conflict and how markets build relations that help traders to access different 
resources that advance their trading goals.  
 
6.2: Senegambian Markets as Sites for Building Relations: Banjul 
From the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial periods, The Gambia’s 
island capital Banjul, has always been a center of commerce for local, 
regional and long-distance trade. Thanks to its commercial prosperity in the 
post-independence period, Banjul’s trade contributed to the successes of 
Gambian re-export trade. The Gambia cashed in on its liberal economic 
policies, which differentiated it from Senegal.400 It became part of the 
“coastal warehouse states” of West Africa.401 For many years, its re-export 
trade to neighbouring countries was the lifeline of its national economy.  
Nugent observed that competing economic regimes existed between 
most neighbouring African countries from the colonial period. Direct taxation, 
customs duties and labour requirements forced populations to migrate to 
border areas in order to escape from the extractive demands of the colonial 
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regime.402 As people participated in economic opportunities around the 
borders, smuggling, a consequence of national economic policy disparities 
between neighbouring countries, crept in. After the end of colonisation, 
these dynamics continued, and contributed to the existence of border towns. 
Populations and communities along the border developed transnational 
flows that largely escaped the grip of the postcolonial state. In some cases, 
local populations regarded themselves as the owners of lucrative border 
spaces, in competition with state officials.403 These outcomes from colonial 
economic polices shaped The Gambia-Senegal trade dynamics, and 
Banjul’s prosperity as a commercial center. 
 Historically, Senegal struggled to control both its internal trade and 
its trade with The Gambia. It intensively regulated its commercial sector, but 
different trading interests competed to dominate trade. It had a two-pronged 
commercial agenda: to protect peasants from traders and to protect foreign 
business interests.404 Senegalese businesses were subordinate to both the 
state’s commercial and foreign business interests. The pro-foreign 
investment policies of the state enabled European trading companies to 
monopolise and exclude local businesses, from the importation of consumer 
goods. Local businesses mainly operated in the informal sector. However, 
they leveraged themselves against foreign business interests and contested 
the state’s policies. 
Before and after independence, these businesses dominated informal 
sector transport and internal distribution networks and evaded the state’s 
regulatory authority.405 By the 1980s, these businesses were a force against 
the state and foreign business interests.  
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Senegal- Gambia contraband trading networks expanded dramatically as 
Senegalese peasants sought to evade the official peanut marketing board. 
Development of contraband circuits propelled the rise of powerful business groups 
connected to the Mouride Islamic order. Well-placed state agents and members of 
government also became involved in this business, as did large numbers of petty 
traders and transporters. These parallel or informal commercial circuits extended 
into Dakar as contraband goods found their way in urban markets. The process 
fueled a dramatic expansion of the “informal sector. 406 
Economic policy differences between The Gambia and Senegal enabled 
ordinary people to exploit cross-border economic opportunities in 
Senegambia. The Gambia is located on a major crossroad for population 
flows in West Africa. It was both a transit zone and a final destination for 
numerous groups of people during different periods of West African history. 
So, it has always been a fertile trading ground.407 Gambian re-export trade 
continued Banjul’s legacy as a fertile trading space.408 Banjul’s expansive 
commodity markets successfully attracted traders from Europe, Senegal and 
other West African countries. 
Under President Sir Dawda Jawara, Banjul was notable for its thriving 
diverse commercial community of Africans, Asians and European traders.  
Its re-export trade expanded in West Africa.409 Traders from the West 
African sub-region came to Banjul to buy goods and took them to different 
West African countries. A swiftly growing shipping industry, a viable road 
transport and reliable ferry systems aided the re-export trade. Thus, the re-
export trade built relations across several international boundaries and 
among multiple ethnicities. In the next section, we explore how textile-
trading activities at Banjul’s Albert market built inter-trader relations and 
helped them share the benefits of trade. Their relations can be contrasted 
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with inter-transporter relations under the restructured transport system (see 
chapter 4 & 5).  
 
6.3: Banjul’s Albert Market and Textile Sales at Roohe Diskett 
This section on the Albert Market and textile sales at Roohe Diskett is based 
on my personal recollections of growing up as a student who loved shopping 
in Banjul in the 1990s. It is also based on my own experience trading at the 
Brikama market, where I attended to my mother’s merchandise shop, which 
sold goods from Banjul, Kaolack (Senegal) and Guinea Bissau. The textiles 
market provides a good example of inter-trader relations and how traders 
share the benefits of trade, even amidst trading rivalries.  
 Albert Market is the central market in Banjul.  In the 1980s and 
1990s, at the apex of the re-export trade, it was a frontier of creativity. It 
embodied diverse economic interests, which competed against each other. 
Trading practices at the market typified deep-rooted social and religious 
values. But the economic geography of the market revealed how trading was 
a domain characterised by tension.  For example, N and N, a popular large 
Chinese store stood at the edge of the Market in those days.  WEDADS, a 
similarly popular large Lebanese store was further down the street from N 
and N.  The two stores engaged in both retail and wholesale trade in goods 
such as clothes, shoes, handbags and many other manufactured fashion 
items. They were favourite stores for urban Gambians and Banjul’s multi-
national cross-border traders. As obvious competitors, each of the stores 
invested heavily on advertisement to attract more customers. Despite their 
rivalry, they shared mutual concerns and a common interest to grow their 
investments in The Gambia, as expatriate investors working in the country. 
N and N and WEDADS stood amidst several large textile stores, which 
stretched along the main street of the Albert Market. These stores supplied 
local demands for textiles. They were also sources of re-export textiles to 







N and N and WEDADS were famous sources for readymade clothing. 
In contrast, the textiles stores specialised in selling just textiles. The 
possibility to choose between readymade clothes and textile (to be sewn into 
a desired style) meant the two goods were substitutes and implicitly, their 
sellers were competitors.410 However, the rivalry between N and N and 
WEDADS was more obvious, than the competition between the two stores 
and the textiles shops.  
N and N and WEDADS’ rivalry was implicit in what later happened to 
the two businesses. For example, N and N went out of business and its 
investors returned to China in the late 1990s.  In contrast, WEDADS was 
transformed into a high-income fashions store along the Senegambia Road 
in Kololi. It is situated in the Tourism Development Areas of the Kombos. To 
this day, it attracts high income Gambians, foreign customers and tourists, to 
its store.  The “end” story for these two vendors has something to do with 
bilateral relations and international politics. However, the nuances of trade 
rivalries have also played a strong part in determining how the fate of each 
of these stores ended in The Gambia.   
Similar to the N and N and WEDADS’ story, the textiles market had its 
internal rivalries.  The story of Roohe Diskett offers a good example of how 
that rivalry played out in the market. Roohe Diskett was a popular parallel 
textiles corner market that was established through Senegalese business 
ingenuity. It was located at the fringes of the Albert Market. The name 
comes from Wollof. It means “the corner for fashionable ladies.” Senegalese 
textile traders, who migrated to The Gambia for both long and short stays in 
the country, started Roohe Diskett.  
Roohe Diskett traders who had capital invested in and owned retail 
textile stalls at Roohe Diskett. These investor-traders allowed family 
members and friends (mostly male youth) to trade with them at their stalls. 
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The latter were usually people who were interested in doing business, but 
did not have capital to invest.  Most of them crossed the border into The 
Gambia looking for economic opportunities. Similar to the relationship 
between drivers and apprentices in the transport sector, Roohe Diskett’s 
stall owners were patrons to these relatives and friends (see chapter 3). 
Principles of mbokh and dome-ndeye shaped the business practices of 
traders, which derived from deep-rooted social and religious values.  Roohe 
Diskett had interesting internal trading arrangements that helped both 
investors and their aids to create wealth and expand their trading careers.  
 Stall owners functioned more like middlemen in the textiles trade. 
Usually, they bought their stock from the big textile stores in Banjul. Textile 
prices at these corner stalls were higher than textile prices at the main 
stores. While owners sat over their stalls, their sales agents walked the main 
street of Albert Market looking for potential textile buyers to lure to the 
patron’s stall. These agents were skilled salesmen. Their quick eyes and 
fast judgment helped them pick-out potential textile buyers from the crowd. 
The men also had an incredible knowledge of tailoring and women’s 
fashions. They effectively use their skills to lure customers to buy their 
wares.  And like Jakarta drivers, during high demand periods like the time for 
Muslim Eid prayers or Christmas, they increased the prices of their textiles, 
and encourage bargaining.  
Unlike the big textiles stores, Roohe Diskett had free-floating textiles 
prices, For example, the sales agent who lured a potential buyer to his 
patron’s stall tripled the selling price of the textile. His patron watched the 
transaction evolve. At times, he intervened by praising the quality of the 
textile to convince the potential buyer that the price the agent was offering 
him/her was “reasonable” for such good quality textiles. Stall owners paid 
commission to agents, from each sale. Patron and agent both hoped to 
make more profit and more commission on each textiles sale. Hence, they 
exploited customers who they perceived were ill-informed or ignorant about 






The systems of unregulated prices made the corner market a space 
for waahale. When used in the context of trading, the Wollof term, waahale, 
means price-dialogue or price negotiation. This practice is similar to the 
Jakarta drivers’ free-floating fare system (see chapter 5). But unlike the 
Jakarta drivers, the textiles traders supported rather than undercut each 
other. Generally, they successfully employed waahale to their advantage 
and thus, their profitable trade helped them advance their trading careers in 
Banjul. Most of the time, after making lot of money from their trade, traders 
or their sales agents returned home to start bigger retail or import 
businesses. Some of them stayed on in The Gambia. They became 
successful retailers, importers or re-exporters of various commodities.  
By pulling customers from the street to their corner stores, Roohe 
Diskett traders artfully intercepted traders who could have gone to the main 
stores and pay less for their textiles. But this competitive behaviour did not 
attract any obvious response from the big textiles stores. In fact, some of the 
big store owners loaned textile supplies to stall owners, and tacitly endorsed 
the trading practices at Roohe Diskett.  Stall owners paid store owners after 
selling their supplies. This arrangement confirms that traders had a more 
liberal attitude towards competition. In contrast to traders, transporters 
sought to cut off competitors in order to monopolise the market (see chapter 
4 & 5).411   
Roohe Diskett operated as a solidarity corner market at the fringe of 
the bigger textiles market in Banjul. The solidarity that existed in the market 
was similar to the inter-driver solidarity under the common transport network 
(see chapter 3). As “migrant” hustlers, Roohe Diskett traders operated in 
ways that were reminiscent of how other West African trading groups 
operated while trading in their host countries.412 Traders depended on each 
other. They navigated tension in productive ways, and advanced their 
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mutual interests, even if at the expense of customers who paid more for 
textiles they could have bought for less. Traders’ practices at Roohe Diskett 
sought to minimise uncooperative modes of behaviour, hence, the market 
encouraged bargaining even with customers they sought to exploit. They 
used language to their advantage. The name they gave to their market was 
attractive and drew many women to the corner market. They also created 
inclusive practices that fostered a viable informal system of social insurance 
for traders with capital and those without it. It can therefore be concluded 
that cross-border traders that traded at Roohe Diskett developed and 
sustained different forms of social and economic bonds in Senegambia. But 
the ability to successfully navigate tension and advance one’s trading 
interests is not unique to the Roohe Diskett traders.  In the next section, we 
explore the story of Marché Gambie and its trading practices, to show a 
second case where cross-border traders successfully navigated tension and 
conflict and created a multi-million CFA franc transnational textiles and 
garment industry in Senegal. 
 
6.4: Senegal’s Marché Gambie 
The creation of Marché Gambie, a cross-border and transnational 
textiles/garment industry in Senegal, is another example of how traders 
(women traders in this case) used deep-rooted social and religious 
principles to advance their trading interests and to navigate the border.  It is 
also an example of how traders adapt to social, political or spatial changes 
that affect their economic activities.413 Additionally, it shows the importance 
of language and how the name people give to things and to people matter in 
Senegambian social thought.414  
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The women traders who created Marché Gambie belong to the 
Mouride Islamic brotherhood, which comprises about 4 million followers in 
West Africa and in other parts of the world. Cheikh Amadou Bamba Mbacke 
was the charismatic spiritual founder of the brotherhood. His teachings 
valorised labor, worship and community. The Mouride brotherhood 
historically controlled Senegal’s groundnut basin, and nowadays, it has 
vibrant and prosperous commercial and trading networks in Senegal, other 
African countries, the US, Europe, China, Brazil and other parts of the 
globe.415  
Generally, women cross-border traders come from trading families. 
Most of them have husbands who trade, too. Some of them are also married 
to immigrants to Europe or the USA. They belong to wide trading networks 
and these networks help their members to advance their trading careers.416 
They also help traders to effectively adapt to socio-political and other 
changes that affect their economic activities.417 
Marché Gambie is in Colobane, a notorious “slum quartier”, which is 
located at the edge of Dakar. The history behind the founding of the market 
shows how trade is characterised by tension that can be both violent and 
non-violent. It further shows how social bonds can serve different ends in 
state-society relations and in interpersonal ties. It also shows how language 
shapes perceptions and social attachments in society.  
Marché Gambie was born from the ashes of a market called marché 
market-man. The latter’s name was from Senegalese youth slang. It derived 
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from the combination of the French word marché with two English nouns 
“market” and “man.” The word “market-man” refers to dispossessed and 
underprivileged youth from Colobane and other areas of Dakar, who sought 
survival from the marché, the market. The marché market-man consisted of 
a popular underground market, where illegal or stolen goods were sold.418 
In the 1980s, with widespread economic hardship and structural 
adjustment in Senegal, dispossessed youth and other Dakaroises flocked to 
Colobane and the marché market-man to buy various kinds of stolen or illicit 
goods - shoes, second hand clothing electronics and other items (see 
chapters 1 & 2). This unregulated economy attracted constant police raids, 
but traders who traded there persisted. Between 1980 and 1989, 
Mauritanian (Moorish) traders who wanted to escape from congestion at 
“upscale” Dakar and central city markets such as Sandaga and HLM, started 
trading at the market. Unlike in Sandaga and HLM, the Colobane market 
had enough space for new shops or stalls. Additionally, it was inexpensive to 
buy a stall or a shop from there.  
Mauritanian (Moorish) traders were the major traders in Senegal’s 
wholesale and retail commerce, at that time. They sold textiles, foodstuffs, 
petrol, gas and general merchandise. They dominated local markets, 
monopolised neighborhood shops and roast meat markets throughout 
Senegambia. 
Given the notorious reputation of the Colobane market, Moorish 
traders decided to relocate only their textiles stores there. Textiles were 
mostly available in thick, huge rolls that were difficult to steal. It was 
considered a low-risk commodity for a high-risk market such as the marché 
market-man.  
The Moorish traders obtained most of their textiles supplies from 
Mouride women traders, who mostly bought their textiles supplies from 
Gambia-based importers, for re-export to Senegal. When the Moorish 
traders relocated to Colobane, these suppliers also joined them. The arrival 
                                                            







of “honest” business at marché market-man created a market of many colors 
and this gradually transformed the market’s reputation. The textile market 
was named “marché Colobane,” or “Colobane,” in the short form. Its trade in 
licit goods existed side by side with trade in stolen goods.  
The relationship between the Mouride women who imported textiles 
from The Gambia and their Mauritanian customers in Senegal, made the 
textiles trade a largely gender segregated market. Mouride women supplied 
textiles to Mauritanian wholesale and retail textiles dealers in Dakar. Other 
Senegalese and non-Senegalese textiles buyers in Senegal obtained their 
supplies from the Mauritanian traders. This supply chain fostered a lucrative 
trade for the different people who were engaged in the textiles trade. 
However, in 1989, this trading chain was abruptly interrupted when 
the Senegal-Mauritania border conflict broke out (see chapter 1).419 At the 
time of the conflict, about 500,000 Mauritanians lived in Senegal.  But these 
Moors fled Senegal as the conflict raged, leading to the expulsion of 600,000 
Senegalese and Mauritanians from the Region de Fleuve area, where the 
communal violence that preceded the conflict erupted.420   
The sudden exit of Mauritanian traders who dominated the textiles 
trade in Senegal affected the textiles supply chain. It handicapped the 
market, disrupting Mouride women’s “sweet and prosperous Gambian 
import/re-export trade.”421 The market had to be rescued from collapse and 
Mouride women took up the task. The next section explores how the women 
reconfigured their textiles trade to create Marché Gambie. 
 
6.5: The Birth of Marché Gambie 
After the Mauritanian traders fled Senegal as a result of the 1989 border 
conflict, Mouride women textiles suppliers requested Dakar’s mayor to 
officially hand over the Colobane textiles market to them. The mayor granted 
their request and the women changed the market’s name to Marché Gambie 
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(market of The Gambia).  The new name derived from the fact that most of 
the textiles sold at the market was re-imported from The Gambia. The 
women were determined to change the face of the market and also to 
deepen their economic ties with The Gambia. They disbanded all temporary 
stalls and built new, attractive, fixed and durable structures in their place. 
They started both the wholesale and retail trading of textiles in their 
renovated market. They also expanded the range of textiles on offer at the 
market. 
When the Mauritanians were in charge of the textiles market, the 
most common types of textiles sold in the market were wax, mbazin, and 
hartum. These types of textiles were used to make traditional clothes. But 
the women introduced new types of textiles such as jeans and viscose. 
These materials were good for sewing Western-styled costumes. So, it 
attracted Male Guinean or Peul tailors, who specialised in sewing Western-
styled costumes for the West African market, to join the textiles trade. These 
tailors mushroomed around Marché Gambie. They imitated designs from 
American and European fashion magazines and sewed Western- styled 
garments such as skirts, trousers, shirts and dresses. They created new 
fashion trends for especially West Africans youths, which peaked from 1989 
to 1997.422 
The new trends increased business opportunities in Dakar markets. 
The Peul’s fashions creations were also exported to other West African 
countries. These tailors like other Peul Fouta traders mostly came to 
Senegal, to seek greener pasture and refuge from the rule of President 
Saikou Toure and his successor President Lansana Conte. Fulani political 
malcontent was transformed into a voracious trading spiritedness.423  
The local finished garments industry boomed. Traders in Senegal’s 
upscale city markets like Sandaga and HLM placed huge orders for finished 
garments from the tailors. Wholesale and retail garment dealerships 
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flourished with customers spread across most of West Africa. As space 
became more congested in Marché Gambie, some tailors moved out to 
other markets in Dakar, and some relocated to countries like The Gambia 
and Guinea Bissau, where they started garment shops and tailoring outlets. 
In both countries, local traders opened shops in urban markets, trading in 
finished garments. 
The success of the finished garments industry was anchored within 
the entrepreneurial activities of the women traders. The women’s wholesale 
and retail trading business also boomed. The number of trips they made to 
Banjul per week increased. Mame Hawa Saho recalled that as their trading 
boomed at Marché Gambie: “We bought goods from The Gambia, but we 
also explored the internal Senegalese market for goods.”424 Saho was a 
woman in her late sixties at the time of her interview with me. She was one 
of the founding women of Colobane’s Marché Gambie. She was also one of 
the foremost cross-border women traders of post-independent Senegal. She 
has engaged in cross-border trading for thirty-years. But now, she no longer 
goes on trading trips. Her children do the trading trips, and now operate her 
shops at Marché Gambie, too.  
As Marché Gambie became the center of the textiles trade nationally, 
the ingenuity of some of its founders was celebrated. For example, Saho 
earned recognition as the “Aunt” of the neighborhood and the market.  She 
recalled that as founders of the market, they were determined to make 
business more prosperous after the Mauritanians left.  And according to her, 
they achieved that. She noted that: “Business was better with the departure 
of the Mauritanians. We enjoyed the profits we got from buying the goods 
from The Gambia and also the profit of selling the goods to third parties in 
Senegal.” 425 The women’s ability to see the opportunity out of a misfortune 
was instrumental in shaping their trading successes. However, they also 
depended on deep-rooted societal and religious resources to advance their 
trading careers.   
                                                            







The commercial relations Mouride women crafted around Marché 
Gambie and across the border were transactional in nature. But they were 
grounded in Senegambian social and political processes, which valorise  
mbokh and dome-ndeye values, to sustain traders’ interpersonal relations. 
Given the symbolic roles textiles or fabric play in enhancing social relations 
in Senegambia, trading in the commodity bounded different individuals in 
close-knit business ties (see chapter 1 & 2).426  
Women traders were the bridge and the link among the different 
entrepreneurial groups in the textiles market. But the roles they played 
complemented deep-rooted societal and religious perceptions about 
womanhood. Senegambian society uses the “needle” as the metaphor for 
the woman’s social roles. She stitches together fragmented pieces of 
society. She connects people through marriages and other forms of social 
ties. She is a builder and a creator of social relations and community. She 
embodies trust, respect and serves the interests of the collective.427 This 
view sounds like a social stereotype of women. But it closely reflects the 
roles women traders played in creating a transnational garments industry in 
Senegambia following the ruptures the Senegal-Mauritania border conflict 
created for the textiles trade. They facilitated knowledge sharing across the 
border. They communicated to Banjul-based suppliers what their customers 
wanted. They informed customers in Senegal about market situations in The 
Gambia. Through these roles they played, the textiles and garments traders’ 
informal network of economic relations resembled a formal assembly line. 
Any interruption in one activity jeopardised other activities along the chain. 
For instance, if women traders failed to bring adequate material from Banjul, 
it was bound to affect production in the garment industry.  
                                                            
426On the interconnections between faith and trade in West Africa see Kate Meagher, 
“Trading on faith: religious movements and informal economic governance in 
Nigeria,”Journal of Modern African Studies 47 (2009): 397- 423. Also see Toyin Falola and 
N. A. Amponsah, Women’s roles in Sub-Saharan Africa. (California: Greenwood, 2012). 
427This comes from my own socialisation about womanhood in Senegambia; For more on 
women’s roles in other West African cultures see Gloria Chuku, Igbo Women and Economic 






The textiles trade can therefore be contrasted with the disintegrated 
cross-border transport sector. Transporters sought to cut-off other 
colleagues from the market, but textiles traders shared the market with 
various people (see chapters 4 & 5). However, some features of the textiles 
trade resonate with old practices among cross-border transporters. For 
example, the sales of textiles were largely based on cash. But like the 
transport sector under the integrated transport network, credit facilities also 
existed among different traders who were engaged in the trade (see chapter 
3).428 These creditor-debtor relations were embedded in Senegambian 
social processes and were reflections of mbokh and dome-ndeye bonds.429 
The same processes also served as guarantees in creditor-debtor relations. 
Compliance to credit obligations meant access to future credit. But default 
met with sanction. Consequently, the possibility of sanction may deter 
individuals from reneging on their debt obligations.430 The women traders 
and their trading associates used various resources at their disposal to 
create continuities across the discontinuity of territory. Their cross-border 
economic networks depended on both the states and society. In the next 
section, we explore how cross-border trading in Senegambia, made use of 
the state and the border, to advance traders’ economic interests amidst the 





















Figure 6: Textiles on sale in a textile store 
       Textiles re-exported from The Gambia and sold in a textiles store at Marché Gambie.  
Photo by the author, May 2013. 
  
6.6: Navigating Cross-Border Constraints: Trader Perceptions 
Like in most West African border settings, cross-border traders along The 
Gambia-Senegal border routinely interacted with administrative agents at 
the border. Consequently, they develop familiarity with border administrative 
procedures and the bahviour of border administrators. Their knowledge of 
border crossing issues shape their perceptions of the border, border 
administrative agents and the state.  Using their perceptions, this section of 






Gambia-Senegal border (see chapter 1).431 It uses the experiences and 
stories of individual traders who cross The Gambia-Senegal border for 
trading purposes, to identify the behaviour and motivations of border 
administrators. It also looks at how traders use kinship and other resources 
to navigate the border.  
I start with the story of Mohamed Sow. He is a Senegalese trader, who 
is in his early forties.  He trades goods across both sides of the border. To 
start his trading career, Sow bought charraah (flip flops) from N and N, 
WEDADS and from other shops at the Albert Market in Banjul, to sell them 
in Senegal. He later started buying tissu daroul hodus, a brand of textiles 
that is used for tie-dye. After dying the cloth, he sold it in Senegal.432  
Sow invests significant capital in cross-border trading. For example, he 
disclosed to me that he spends between 200,000 or 300,000 or about 
1,000,000 CFA francs during his trading trips. These amounts depend on 
the type of commodity he buys during each trip. He trades around growth 
centers like Tambacounda, where people have limited access to the supply 
of many goods, and where he can sell his goods at higher prices.433  
Tambacounda is located in eastern Senegal, about 476 kilometers from 
Dakar. It shares borders with both The Gambia and Mali. But it has no large 
daily markets, no access to a river, or port facilities. Residents of the town 
mostly obtain their goods from weekly markets locally called loumas.434 
Sow‘s goal is to sell his goods to residents of Tambacounda and to people 
who cross the border to come there, or to people returning to Mali, part of 
which shares borders with the town.   
As a trader, Sow follows the profit to wherever he considers it to be. As 
Nugent and Bach argued, differences in the cost of goods across the border 
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432 Tissu daroul hhodus- is a textile type used for showing free-flowing gowns. 
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boost traders’ zeal to engage in cross-border trade.435 Cross-border price 
differences for goods influence Sow’s trading choices, too. For example, he 
shared a story that on one occasion, there was a shortage of garlic in The 
Gambia. He decided to buy many bags of garlic that came from China to 
Senegal, and took them to Banjul. He recalled that: “I arrived at the Gambian 
Customs with one hundred bags of garlic. Each bag contained 20 kilos of 
garlic. Customs told me I had to pay D25 (about 4 US Dollars) for each bag. 
I paid and left with my goods.”436 When he arrived in The Gambia, he stored 
his garlic consignment in Faji-Kunda, a town located about 15 kilometers 
from Banjul and about 3 kilometers from Serekunda. 
Each morning I took samples of the garlic to different markets to propose it to 
condiment sellers in the markets. The following day, I returned with the garlic bags to 
supply them to interested customers on credit bases.  After a week, I returned to collect 
my monies from them. I had good returns. I had to do this because Dakar has lots of 
commodities. Sometimes you buy something and bring it there to realise that it was in 
excessive supply.  If you do not act fast you might incur losses in your trade.437   
Sow’s trading adventure is a fitting example of how the border effect has 
underpinned livelihoods of people like him. The border makes it possible to 
exploit economic opportunities that arise across the border.438 Tapping 
cross-border economic opportunities require knowledge of prevailing 
economic conditions in both The Gambia and Senegal. This knowledge has 
made it possible for Sow to buy garlic bags from Senegal and take them to 
The Gambia, where there was shortage of supply. Moreover, the ease with 
which he conducts his business dealings in a “foreign” country shows that he 
feels a sense of belonging to the country. He interacts with his clients, he 
has allies across different levels of society and he trusts to sell his goods on 
credit basis. His cross-border networks act as a source of information and 
security for his trading activities. But the padding his cross-border ties 
provide for his trading activities may be hindered, if he is unfamiliar with 
state authorities at the border.  For example, he recalls that at one occasion, 
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he bought huge quantities of Lipton tea from The Gambia and tried crossing 
with them into Senegal. 
 Senegalese customs insisted that I must have a health certificate issued by the 
Veterinary Department. The certificate authorised people to import foodstuffs into 
Senegal and ensured that no expired food come into the country. The Douanes 
insisted that without it my teabags will not enter Senegal…It was a tough one for me 
and I had to get the paper before I could cross with them.439 
Sow is a Senegalese citizen, but his trading ties seemed to be stronger 
across the border, as shown by the initial difficulty he encountered, when he 
tried to take his teabags to Senegal. We can compare the ease with which 
he took his garlic consignment from Senegal to The Gambia, to the difficulty 
he had bringing his teabags into Senegal, his own country. Like Senegal, 
The Gambia also requires people who want to import food into the country to 
obtain health certificates and clearance, in order to do so. But there is no 
indication that Sow had any prior authorisation from Gambian authorities to 
bring his garlic consignment into the country. He did pay tax on his goods 
before they were allowed entry into The Gambia.  But paying tax is different 
from obtaining authorisation to bring foodstuff into the country.  Given his 
adventurous trading pattern, it can be assumed that Sow may not always 
have the required documentation needed for the cross-border entry of his 
goods. But this was no obstacle to his trading activities in The Gambia. As it 
would be seen later, he has extensive ties with Gambian state authorities 
and consequently those ties help secure his trading activities across 
different levels of the state and in society. 
The interaction between Sow and the border agent who insisted on 
going by the rule is interesting. Perhaps, this particular state agent had the 
option to do an “under the table transaction” with Sow, in order to let his 
goods pass.  But he chose to follow the law. This example of ethical 








about the practices and motivations of African state agents.440 For example, 
when I interviewed some of the cross-border traders about corruption at the 
border crossing points, some of them shared interesting perspectives on the 
issue. Tamsir Dieng, a male Senegalese textiles trader at the Kaolack 
central market explained to me that many a times, border enforcement 
agents are motivated by cultural values, nationalism, or by some other 
consideration and not corruption. He explained that:  
Senegalese customs are good. When I am crossing with my merchandise, I do not 
necessarily have to know them for them to do their job right. Occasionally, they give 
you discounts on what you should pay.  You can negotiate with them. What poses 
as difficulty for us is not crossing the border with goods. Instead, it is travelling 
along the roads after crossing the border. You come across uncountable random 
checkpoints especially when going to Banjul. You drive into these checkpoints 
almost blindly. The people manning them ask you for your papers that are all valid 
and alright for passage. But they would make you pay some ghostly fee. They 
always find fault with something. They know you are a trader, you do not want your 
time to be wasted. So you give them whatever amount they asked for, just to make 
sure that you have a smooth passage. These people have a right to ask you to 
unload all your merchandise for verification. In order to avoid them from wasting 
your time, you just give them what they want and you go on your way.  I know the 
money does not go to government coffers. It goes to individual pockets.  You do not 
demand receipts for those monies. As a trader, I am willing to pay any reasonable 
amount that can give me smooth travel on the road.441  
Dieng identifies two kinds of state agents who have different motivations for 
doing their jobs. The first kind is the one who purely acts to ease cross-
border trade and border crossing in Senegambia. He uses his discretion and 
offers discounts on custom duties and eases border crossing rules (see 
chapter 2).  He does not make any financial gains from this discretionary 
enforcement of rules. The logic that motivates this person is that when 
traders pay less duty on their goods, society will also pay less on those 
goods, all things being equal. Unrestrictive border crossing increases cross-
border mobility and contact, which result to various social and economic 
benefits to society. 442 Border agents who show social consciousness in their 
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(New York: Routledge, 2015). 
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work are sensitive about cross-border bonds. They are different from 
colleagues who seek to advance their personal interests through their work. 
Dieng notes that those people are mostly stationed on the cross-border 
routes. They exploit cross-border traders to enrich themselves. The 
distinction between these two types of border agents alludes to variations in 
the practices of state agents and in society’s understandings of the practices 
of state agents.443 
As people interact with state institutions and state agents, corruption 
may mean different things to different people. For instance, when I asked 
Dieng’s mother to describe her trading experiences and her interactions with 
state border agents across both sides of the border, she noted that in her 20 
years of cross-border trading, she considers cross-border trading as simple 
and straightforward:  
It is about buying merchandise, taking them through customs and bringing them 
over to our shop here in Kaolack. Between The Gambia and Senegal we have no 
difficulties. It is expensive to get goods locally in Senegal. That is why we go to 
Banjul to make more profit. The main problem we encounter as traders is with those 
you meet along the road. They want to check your goods. If you do not want to be 
delayed, you give them something and then they check your papers and let you 
go.444 
  
Dieng’s mother’s response validates his views that state border agents on 
the cross-border routes are problematic. But her response also indicates a 
subtle complicity between state border agents and cross-border traders. The 
latter willingly bribes the former in order for their goods to have smooth 
transit. If the actions of traders are appreciated without any form of ethics, it 
can be argued that, by bribing the agents to let their goods pass, traders 
creatively respond to some of the risks associated with the cross-border 
transit of goods in Senegambia. These risks include unnecessary delays on 
the road that can harm perishable goods, general waste of time, or the 
confiscation of goods, among other things. 
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But this creative response to the hardships on the routes, created a 
host of challenges for interstate relations in Senegambia.  Transporters use 
corruption on the interstate routes as one of their major queries in their 
campaign (see chapter 3 & 4). Unlike transporters’ claims, the accounts of 
Dieng and his mother reveal that corrupt road practices exist on both sides 
of the border. This begs the question; what barred Senegalese transporters 
from complaining about corrupt practices on Senegalese routes, during their 
campaign about the cross-border routes? Transporters’ failure to fight 
corrupt road practices across the board intimates the complex nature of 
state-society relations and interstate tensions over the border.  
But as Dieng noted, there are other things that influence the attitudes 
of   both state and non-state actors on the cross-border routes. For instance, 
superstition can shape the way people behave in spaces like the border. 
Senegambians consider borders as part of the “wilderness.” Different people 
- “unknown” persons or “strangers”, the good, the mysterious, the vengeful, 
and charitable individuals all converge at such places.445 Falling foul of any 
of these individuals could sometimes have costly outcomes. Therefore, one 
has to take precautions in order not to fall prey to the dangers of the border. 
These precautions involve showing good behaviour, empathy respect, 
courtesy and consideration, to all people encountered in that “wilderness.” 
Both state and non-state actors can respond to these kinds of social 
prescriptions and adopt attitudes that may ignore state laws. 
The way superstitious beliefs can shape behaviour is similar to the 
effects behaviour restraining social prescriptions can have on an individual’s 
attitude in society.  Such restraints can make individuals in position of power 
or privilege, to adopt conciliatory attitudes towards rules or regulations, if 
they think their implementation can have adverse effects on individuals.  In 
that case, such an individual may undercut rules to lessen the perceived 
burden their implementation can have on individuals.  In turn, such a person 
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is considered to gain blessings, a divine reward, for his omission. However, 
that blessing may not come as an immediate reward, but it can be deferred 
for the future, at a time when one needs it most. 446 
Social thoughts that prescribe social attitudes are embedded in 
Senegambia social and religious values. They come from the belief that 
good behaviour is rewarded and a bad one is sanctioned, there is an 
afterlife, there is retribution, evil exists and the supernatural world is real. 
These forces can either positively or negatively affect the lives of individuals. 
Thus, state agents can bend rules for non-monetary incentives. They 
can be motivated by the desire to show hospitality (teranga), empathy 
(yeremandi) and assistance (ndimabal), especially if they interact with 
vulnerable people. Cross-border traders can fit the vulnerable category since 
they travel through isolated places and long distances in search of their 
livelihoods. Like social thoughts that prescribe hospitality to the displaced, 
these values can strengthen social relations and create wullere and dome-
ndeye ties in society.   
Irrespective of these social prescriptions and from various accounts 
about cross-border routes, there are state border agents who are not 
deterred by these social prescriptions. But that does not dilute the social 
significance of these prescriptions in Senegambian society. Instead, they are 
like the border; different people respond to them in different ways.  
Below, I re-produce Mam Hawa Saho’s educative description of some 
of the social and religious values that guide cross-border traders in 
Senegambia.  The values also help them to creatively respond to challenges 
on the cross-border routes and to trade-related tensions. Her narration starts 
with her memories of crossing into The Gambia from Senegal to buy goods. 
During the days I went to Gambie to buy goods, I left Dakar and travelled to Banjul 
mostly through Karang. But occasionally, I passed through the Keur Ayib- 
Farrafenni borders. As someone coming from Dakar and not going beyond Banjul to 
Casamance, the former route was shorter and better for me. The days I spent on 
each trip depended on the time of the month. For example, I spent more days in 








 I bought a selection of goods from different merchants including Lebanese 
and Mandinka traders in Banjul.  When the merchandise was enough for a full 
truckload, I hired a truck to cross with them on the ferry before taking them to 
Karang. But sometimes, it proceeded with them to Kaolack. I used to take Gambian 
transport from Banjul to cross the goods and take them to Karang. From Karang, I 
used Senegalese transport to take them to Dakar. I was also using Senegalese 
trucks that routinely travelled to Banjul taking concrete (beton and stones for 
construction) to Serekunda. On their return to Dakar, I hired them to transport my 
goods. I knew these truckers from the ferry. So anytime I saw them around, I 
approached them to check if on their return journey, they could take my goods to 
Dakar.  We negotiated the price, I gave them the goods and they travelled with 
them to Dakar.  
At Karang, I obtained what we called an “escort” and a declaration of the 
merchandise I had with me from the Douanes, which enabled the goods to travel all 
the way to Dakar without being stopped or inspected by other douanes along the 
road.   
I was dealing mainly in textiles. However, occasionally people asked me to 
buy them shoes. Or sometimes, they gave me cartons of shoes to transport along 
with my goods back to Senegal. But I was paid for including their goods in mine. 
The people who gave me their things to transport for them trusted me like the way I 
trusted that the truck drivers would deliver my goods in Dakar by themselves. One 
thing you learn as a cross-border trader is that you don’t need to have much prior 
information about an individual to trust him with your goods.  This is because they 
dared not take your things like that. They know that they can have problems over 
stealing or being dishonest with people’s goods. No one wants problems. For 
example, at the least you can take someone to the police for inappropriate action 
with your goods. This could delay someone’s time.  
The way goods were transported was very reliable and fast.  But this is no 
longer the case. Younger people have replaced our generation of cross-border 
traders to Banjul. These people still bring truckloads of textiles from Banjul but 
things have been different with them.  These people are also Senegalese and some 
of them are based in The Gambia doing business. But things are generally different 
now as you can see that the ferries constantly break down and transporters 
constantly block the borders. But as traders all we need to do is to negotiate these 
constraints well in order to be able to carry on our trade. 447 
 
The border makes cross-border trading a reflective process for traders.  
Based on different realities, a trader has to make conscious decisions on 
various aspects of his or her trading initiatives.  Saho uses different routes to 
go to The Gambia based on route realities at any given moment. 
Additionally, she had to make decisions on the ideal time and duration for 
each travel. She also had to strategise on how to bring her goods from 
Banjul to Dakar through the border.  She has to collaborate with people for 
every aspect of her trading. Therefore, if she achieved her final goals of 
                                                            






getting her goods to Dakar without any hardships, then it means her 
collaboration with people has been successful. This collaboration means 
making use of state and non-state resources to navigate the different 
challenges associated with cross-border trading. She uses creativity and 
contingency to opt for what works best for a given moment. 448 
Other people also depend on Saho to advance their trading. They 
entrust her with their goods for her to transport for them. Similarly, she 
entrusts her goods to transporters and they take them for her. The traders 
she carries goods for, are her competitors. They all buy the same goods 
from the same sources for reselling to the same market. But Saho and her 
competitors learn to accommodate each other’s business interests. She 
views that unethical practices on the trading routes can be punishable 
through the intervention of the police. But in fact, when she says: “no one 
wants problems,” she alludes to the possibility of using supernatural means 
to punish dishonesty. This implies traders can develop trust-based relations 
as they self-regulate in their trading encounters. Self-discipline is therefore 
another important value in cross-border trading, especially where 
intergenerational dynamics can potentially affect what different individuals 
value, given their circumstances. 
Trading is a dynamic process and intergenerational dynamics affect 
trading practices. The younger generation that has taken over from Saho’s 
generation faces new challenges, such as, frequent ferry breakdowns and 
frequent border closures. But they creatively respond to these challenges. 
Instead of the ferry, they use boats to carry their goods. They go to Mali and 
other West African countries instead of depending on goods from The 
Gambia alone.   
From accounts by Sow, Dieng, his mother and Saho, cross-border 
trading requires dynamism, compromise, knowledge and willingness to 
depend on both state and non-state actors, to advance one’s trading 
                                                            






interests. Consequently, traders are not interested in perpetuating conflict or 
tension. Cross-border traders are avid strategists. Hence, they can switch 
their trading goods, routes or even the people they work with, at any given 
time. But even if they routinely change their strategies, they endeavour to 
maintain existing relations for future needs. Irrespective of inter-trader 
competition, they accommodate each other’s interests and they become 
both allies and competitors in their vocation.  Unlike transporters, cross-
border traders view the state as an ally and they seek to lobby it to foster 
their interests.  In the next section, we explore other aspects of trader –state 
relations.  
 
6.6.1: Tolerating and Depending on the State  
The state of the ferries on The Gambia River affects cross-border trading 
and mobility. Consequently, Senegalese transporters’ dissatisfactions with 
the ferries and the interstate routes lead them to close the border on The 
Gambia, as they seek a resolution to their queries (see chapters 3 & 4).  But 
traders found new ways of circumventing Banjul’s bad ferries, without 
antagonising The Gambian state.  
Ndeye Sagarr Mbaye is a middle-aged cross -border textiles trader 
from Kaolack. Her husband, who lives in the USA, provided the capital for 
her trading. Trading helps her adjust to his absence. It also energises her 
roles as a mother and home carer.449 She travels to The Gambia “every 
week, or twice, or thrice in a week to buy goods from there.”450 She makes 
significant profit from cross-border trading. Like other traders, she depends 
on her family’s trading networks to advance her trading interests. Trader’s 
networks help them to find new ways of handling situations that challenge 
their interests.451 
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 Mbaye and her colleagues opted to use wooden canoes and labour 
hands called Baranyinis to transport their goods from Banjul to Karang, to 
avoid bad ferries. Baranyini is a Mandinka term for men who do hard, 
manual tasks for other people, for an agreed fee. They come from different 
ethnic groups and from different West African countries. Some of them also 
work as boatmen, who transport people from Banjul to Barra. According to 
Mbaye, Baranyinis collect their textile stocks, pack them in huge sewn 
bundles, load them on the boats and transport them from Banjul to Barra. 
From Barra, hired trucks escort the goods to the border crossing poste in 
Karang. Then, they are cleared through customs and the Baranyinis’ 
porterage services end. 
 This “new” way of transporting cross-border trade goods implies 
traders tolerate the failures of the state to provide adequate and reliable 
ferry services to the public.452 This derives from the fact that cross-border 
traders are more disposed to establishing patron-client relations with state 
authorities than transporters, since good trader-state agent relations serves 
traders’ interests.453  
Cross-border traders trade in goods that have substitutes and elastic 
demand. They make profit from their trading by buying goods cheaply on 
one side of the border and then selling them at a higher price, usually below 
the market price, on the other side of the border.454 It is reasonable that they 
can deal with state agents on their own terms, to advance their trading 
careers.455 Unlike traders, transporters’ services have inelastic demand and 
are indispensable in society. Mobility is part of people’s everyday existence.  
Therefore, transporters have power and can flex their muscles to state 
authorities without hurting themselves. So, it is logical that traders use their 
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creativity to navigate their relationship with state authorities, even if those 
relations leave untidy impressions of their ties to state authorities. Sow’s 
trading activities sometimes indicate what seems like a questionable link 
with state authorities. However, as a typical patron (state)-client (trader) 
relationship in Senegambia, it has some instructive lessons about traders’ 
and state agents’ behaviour.   
Through his adventurous, calculative cross-border trading strategy, 
Sow has become a vendor for state institutions in The Gambia. As his trade 
in different goods evolved, he started selling fashionable traditional clothes 
to government employees in The Gambia, on a credit basis. “These are 
mostly women’s clothes. But in each consignment, I include few clothes for 
men. I buy textiles and contract some tailors in Senegal to sew them, for 
sale in Banjul.”456 At a minimum, he took about 50 clothes per trip to Banjul, 
where his Gambian business partners sold the clothes on credit in 
government offices and other places. At the end of the month, they collect 
the payments, take their commission from the amount and return the rest of 
the money to Sow. His relation with his Gambian partners is dependable. 
They can do their business transactions via intermediaries. For example, he 
can send clothes to them through third parties from Dakar and they can sell 
them in Banjul, take their commission and return the rest of the money to 
him through an intermediary. Sow’s clothing business was successful. He 
diversified his trading activities to become a vendor of office supplies, for 
various government departments and public institutions.  
This is how Sow became a government vendor. Once, The Gambia 
Ports Authority (GPA) was contracted by The Gambia Government Printers, 
for them to produce calendars for them.  The Government Printers sub-
contracted part of the work to Sow. Subsequently, he received another 
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contract to produce calendars and diaries for Kanilai Bakeries, a subsidiary 
branch of President Jammeh’s Kanilai Family Farms Company.  
Sow is officially a sub-contractor for the Government Printers, which  
sub-contracts part of its printing contracts to him. At the time of my interview 
with him, Sow, who now describes himself as a cross-border Marketing 
Communication vendor, was in the process of registering himself as a 
government vendor and contractor in Banjul.  As part of that job, he does on-
demand printing jobs for government offices, supplies them with office 
supplies and computer hardware and printers. He also runs a sign-shop.  
Sow’s logic for registering a trading company in The Gambia is that: 
“Offices in the Gambia have been doing business with me for some time 
now. They have advised me that, in order for me to have better business 
with them, I need to register as a local company.”457 The Gambian state has 
become his major client. His associates were guiding him on how he could 
circumvent national laws that can limit his ability to set up the kind of 
business he wanted to set up. He is going to be resident in The Gambia and 
plans to marry a Gambian wife, to strengthen his trading ties with the 
government.  His trading company will also work as contractors to supervise 
construction projects. It will also expand its information technology and office 
equipment and supplies trading.   
There are many things that The Gambia does not have. My company can provide 
most things they need to get from outside the country.  I usually bring samples for 
the orders that are placed with me. Then the buyer is given the choice to select the 
item that best suits his needs and then I would go back to Senegal to get the supply 
for the chosen item.458 
Sow considers himself as a “saviour” who provides or can provide many 
things that The Gambia government needs, but cannot find in the country. 
Ironically, Senegalese businesses like Sow’s have reversed The Gambian 
re-export fantasy. 
Sow’s patron-client links with The Gambian state resonates with 
Mbembe’s view that in Africa, individual business people establish 









from the state. 459 Sow’s business feeds from the Gambian state.  His 
associates insulate him from competition. However, he disagrees that the 
monopoly he enjoys with the Gambian state is corruption. He argues that 
“trading has no borders. A trader cultivates different clientele bases. That is 
where success comes from.”460 For him, trading with The Gambia 
government is the same like trading with individuals. A trader’s concern is 
finding a market and getting profit from his activities. Where a trader finds a 
market, does not matter, according to him. 
Irrespective of his close ties to the Gambian state, Sow has been 
affected by The Gambia’s bad ferries problem. According to him, from the 
year 2000, developments in cross-border transport have hindered cross-
border trading. But as a trader, he aims to lessen the negative impact these 
problems can create for his clients.  
The unified transport link created a convenient transport system, which made 
Senegalese and the Gambians to interact intimately. You found both Senegalese 
and Gambian cars at Barra garage. I remember in those days when I get off the 
ferry I took my transport from Barra, right there near the ferry terminal. The 
interstate bus service was also wonderful for cross-border travelers especially for 
those who did not travel with merchandise. I boarded the bus service from Banjul to 
Dakar. If you crossed with even the first ferry of the day in the morning you found 
the bus waiting for passengers from the ferry. The bus people called to passengers 
“here is the bus to Dakar,” and passengers flocked to the bus in their numbers. 
Sometimes it waited for the second and third ferries of the morning before it 
departed for Dakar. Once, I took the bus and when we arrived at the border 
customs had to inspect the goods I was carrying with me on the bus. It left me there 
even though I paid my fares to Dakar. The bus company had a policy that they 
would not delay other passengers if one passenger happened to be held up by 
customs at the border. That was why they did not like carrying traders with goods 
on the bus. In fact, before you got into the bus, the conductors would announced 
that people who had goods to be declared at customs must not join the bus 
because the stop over at customs was brief and there was no time for long customs 
procedures. People like me ignored their warnings and got into the bus. However, if 
you ran into difficulties with customs, it left you behind. That was the risk we took. It 
was a very fast transport system, which if there were no problems along the route 
took five to six hours to get to Dakar from Banjul. For my journeys to Banjul from 
Dakar, I went to the Dakar ports around 7am to take the 8am bus to Banjul. 
Sometimes, you got to your destination under five hours. But all that changed from 
the year 2000 onwards when The Gambia-Senegal borders were repeatedly closed 
for reasons no one understood. And now here we are, Senegalese cars load 
passengers from the Senegalese border.  Gambians cars end at their border too. 
                                                            
459Achille Mbembe, “At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in 
Africa” (translated by Steven Randall), Public Culture 12 (1) (2012). 






As cross-border traders, transportation has become our greatest nightmare 
between The Gambia and Senegal.  I celebrated the former system when it was in 
place.  I was very sad to watch it break-up and now we traders bear the full burden 
of that break- up. But we found ways to make our customers happy by getting them 
the goods they needed on time.461 
Sow’s nostalgic account of how the joint transport network made life easy on 
both sides of the border, considers traders as the greatest victims of the 
break-up of that convenient transport network. However, traders like Sow 
would rather let other people to challenge government on cross-border 
transport complications. Like Mbaye and other traders, Sow explores other 
ways of reliably transporting his goods across the border. He will not take 
any chance to antagonise the Gambian state. Therefore, he uses private 
transport companies to transport his goods. 
A cross-border merchandise transport company opened an office at 
the Tefess area of the Albert market. Interested customers or traders contact 
the office, for them to move their goods across the border. The merchandise 
company has a fleet of lorries and trucks for this purpose. It also handles the 
customs clearance of goods for clients. Upon arrival in Dakar, the 
transported goods are delivered to their owners. Traders can either pay their 
service fees upfront or upon the delivery of the goods.462  
Various other business opportunities also germinated from cross-
border transport tensions, the ferry problems and the interstate border 
disputes. For these businesses, interstate tensions over the border, is 
productive. The border conflicts create new needs and new ways of 
satisfying such needs. There was a need for something like the Jakarta at 
the Karang-Amdallai border and it was fulfilled (see chapter 5). In fact, as 
border disputes recurred, delays with the ferries and ferry breakdown 
became more common, people usually get stranded at the border at night.  
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Such stranded travelers need sleeping spaces since they cannot cross the 
border after allowed hours. Businesses opened to respond to their needs.463   
From 1994, there were political restrictions on the time people can be 
allowed to cross the border at night. When running on its normal schedule, 
the ferry stops its services by 10.00pm daily. On its longest runs, operations 
cease at mid-night. Additionally, border customs services close at night. 
Some Karang residents bought mattresses and put them up for hire, for the 
night, at the border post. Since the offices of the border administrators are 
closed during these times, people who hired mattresses, to place them in 
front of these premises, to sleep on them. A mattress can be hired for about 
500 CFA francs, for the night. At dawn, they were collected and stored for 
the day, until the following night.464 A male relative of mayor Ousmane Sene 
who lives in Portugal, stretched further Karang’s mattress for hire by night 
business idea. He constructed a motel by the border. It has many small huts, 
which are rented out to border crossers and other people who want more 
privacy than the mattress for hire option offered, for sleeping at the border. 
The cost for a hut was between 2500 to 5000 CFA francs.465  
Other informal trading opportunities also cropped up in both Karang 
and Farrafenni, where small catering businesses that sell roasted or cooked 
meat operate. Eating meat on cross-border routes becomes a ritual for many 
hungry travelers. The meat sellers are mostly male youth, who carry in 
charcoal-powered ovens and mobile metal cooking stoves, their cooked or 
roast meat delicacies.  
Karang’s roast meat market shares some features with the trading of 
textiles at Banjul’s Roohe Diskett. Meat sellers work with sales agents who 
run after travelers, who arrive at the border. Like the sales agents at Roohe 
Diskett, they use flowery language and hound travelers through the maze of 
other competitors, to a patron-meat seller’s stand.  But like most of these 
trading initiatives I’ve already discussed, even the selling of roast or cooked 
                                                            








meat at the border, depended on the state. State authorities have the power 
to control or outlaw many activities around the border, but they let them be.  
The border fosters co-existence and creativity.  It carries a special 
attraction for businesses, people and state authorities. It is a growth area 
and as such, businesses can mushroom around the border, especially if it 
has good road networks and transport facilities. Senegambian businesses 
tend to set up around border areas with proper garage facilities and a 
highway that runs across both sides of the border.  The presence of good 
road networks helped businesses like cashew trading in Karang, to grow.466 
Women of the town sell roasted cashew nuts in plastic bags of different 
sizes for different prices. These nuts are also a popular delicacy at Banjul’s 
Albert Market, where traders sell them, too. Mayor Sene noted that the 
cashew trade has been a long-standing feature of cross-border economic 
exchange between The Gambia and Senegal.  He stated that: 
I spent twenty-two years in Karang but even before my family’s arrival here, 
the cashew trade has been long in existence. Our women take roasted 
cashew nuts from here to Banjul. After selling them, they buy other goods 
from Banjul to bring them to Karang for their mothers to sell in small stalls. 
Alternatively, the women themselves could sell them in those stalls.467 
As Sene viewed, the cross-border movement of goods has been part of the 
daily existence of border communities, who survive from the “integrated 
cross-border economy.”  This economy keeps flowing even if The Gambia-
Senegal bilateral relations are frosty.468  
Traders who trade in both licit and illicit goods shun confrontations 
with the state. They navigate political constraints with less adversarial 
tendencies towards the state or towards fellow traders. They follow the profit 
and they establish and sustain inter-personal connections. They value 
compromise. From the individual logics of the trader, stability is important for 
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them to advance their trading interests.  And if stability is at the cost of 
redefining their beliefs to accommodate other people, then so be it.  
Cross-border trading is like an art. As such, traders have to 
continuously exercise their creativity in order for them to tackle the everyday 
challenges of their occupation.  This is why traders exhibit a liberal attitude 
towards some deep-rooted social practices.  For example, trading activities 
like meat selling modify gender roles. To have a man cook food, for other 
people, is uncommon in Senegambia. However, at the border, male cooking 
has become an acceptable norm to the cooks themselves and to travelers 
who buy their food. Women control the cashew nut trade. In the textiles 
trade, they also control the major trading activities and men depend on them 
like in Marche Gambie. These realities make cross-border trading a dynamic 
enterprise. Traders creatively respond to economic and other forms of 
constraints. They exploit the tools they have in the state, in culture, trade 
and in other resources, to advance their trading. The next section explores 
currency trading at The Gambia-Senegal border, to give more examples of 
how traders effectively manage conflict, depend on the state and forge 
partnerships, to advance their trading interests across the border. It also 

























Figure 7: Inside a typical trading store 
Shoes and textiles sold in Dakar with both local and cross-border clientele base, source: 







6.6.2: “Friendship with Border Agents”: Informal Currency 
Exchangers 
The Karang-Amdallai and the Farrafenni-Keur Ayib borders sustain many 
homes, families and individuals in Senegambia. Borders have benefits and 
endless business ideas can grow from them.469 Since the year 2000, traders 
in the informal sector managed to establish an illicit foreign currency parallel 
market at both the Karang-Amdallai and Farrafenni-Keur Ayib borders. 
These foreign exchange traders change both local and international 
currencies right before the very nose of the border police. They co-exist with 
other border economic actors, such as, men with push-push, who carry 
loads for a fee, the Jakarta drivers, clando taxi drivers, water sellers, 
cashew-nut traders, meal sellers, cell phone sim card and credit sellers, 
shops and canteens sitting right on the border line. 
I explore the life story of Mohamed Diop, a male foreign currency 
trader at the Karang-Amdallai border, to reveal how the border foreign 
currency trade works and depends on the state and how traders productively 
deal with conflicts and use various resources to advance their illicit foreign 
currency trading. 
Diop is a Senegalese citizen. He started his border currency trading 
in 2003. He started trading in foreign currencies in 1994. He trades in the 
following currencies: The Gambian dalasi, Senegalese CFA franc, the US 
dollar, British Pound Sterling and the Euro. He also sells mobile phone 
credits for Orange, Tigo, Africell and Gamcel.470  
Diop acts as an “another eye” for the Senegalese border agents at 
Karang.  As a spy, he gathers information and pays attention on behalf of 
the police, while trading currencies or going about other businesses at the 
border. The police give him protection in return for his services. For 
someone who moves at the border with huge amounts of cash stuck in his 
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pockets and bag, Diop needs that protection. His spy services to the police 
partly influence his work schedule. He works two shifts daily, from 8.00am to 
8.00pm and from 2.00am to 6.00am, respectively. The first shift falls within 
the “high flow” traffic period at the border.  At the end of that shift, he returns 
home to Barra, where his Gambian wife and child live. He takes a two-hour 
nap and then returns to the Karang border at 2.00am, for the second shift. 
Diop rents a room in Karang, and in-between his two shifts, he uses it for 
breaks and to rest.471  
Throughout the days I spent at the Karang border, I watched and 
listened to Diop as he shared stories, jokes and lunch with the Senegalese 
border police.  I enquired from him why he and other currency dealers and 
shopkeepers at the border, seemed to have a close friendship with both 
Gambian and Senegalese border agents at Amdallai and Karang. He replied 
that the border could be a very insecure place. As traders who have lot of 
cash on them, they need the police’s protection. “Shops that you see here at 
the border operate twenty-four hours. They sell day and night. All of us need 
the police to protect us from bandits that frequent the border.”472  
 It was intriguing that border police tolerated and protected the foreign 
currency dealers at the border. The official policies of both The Gambia and 
Senegalese governments outlawed the operation of non-licensed foreign 
exchange businesses like Diop’s. Both governments have a history of 
uncompromisingly clamping down on these informal parallel money markets 
in urban parts of their country. However, right in front of the Amdallai-Karang 
police and customs border agency premises, moneychangers looking for 
customers, roam up and down the vicinity with small leather bags clutched 
under their arms or tightly belted around their waist.473  I further interrogated 
Diop on why the police seemed to deliberately ignore state policy on the 
operation of unlicensed foreign exchange businesses at the border. He 
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replied that the police action was based on a humanitarian and practical 
understanding that, “these was what these people do to survive, feed their 
families and take care of their other responsibilities in life.”474 This resonates 
with Dieng’s view that border customs agents show solidarity to traders and 
they sometimes bend the rules for them, for purely humanitarian reasons.  
 This anecdote on the good relations between traders and the border 
agents did not mean that cross-border trading at The Gambia-Senegal 
border was a conflict -free venture. The next section touches on some of the 
rivalries and tensions I observed during my fieldwork. But traders creatively 
contained the tensions to advance their mutual interests. 
 
6.6.3: “Women are a Hindrance:” Currency Dealers in Karang 
Diop has hinted that the cross-border currency trade was a risky venture, 
hence, traders lobby protection from the police.  Traders depend on the 
state authorities at the border to carry on their trade. But the relationship 
between the two actors is not conflict-free.  The police get drawn into 
tensions that come from inter-trader competition. They also get involved in 
other forms of interpersonal tensions at the border. The border foreign 
currency market is therefore rife with tension, like the cross-border transport 
sector (see chapter 4 & 5).   
For Diop, some of the tensions in the cross-border currency market 
have to do with the women currency traders. According to him, when he 
came to the border in 2003, to start trading there, he met a handful of 
women moneychangers already in business. By 2013, their numbers 
increased to between eighty to a hundred women. Male currency dealers 
like Diop, describe their female counterparts as overly aggressive in their 
trading.  The women are accused of being in the habit of ignoring “fair” 
trading norms and they intercept male traders’ customers.   
Male currency dealers fault their women colleagues but they may 








engage in a profession that has traditionally been a domain for men.  What 
they see as an over-aggressive stance from the women may actually be the 
women’s attempt to stand up to them, to prove that they fit the job and can 
even do it better.475 But whatever truth lies behind the gender battles at the 
border currency market, male currency dealers feel the women push them to 
a corner and they have no choice, but to cope with the latter’s trading 
attitudes: 
Any work that men have to share with women is always difficult. From our 
experience here, sometimes you see a client and you start negotiating with 
him/her and then a female currency dealer comes along to snatch him or 
her from you. When you have a trade argument with her, the client goes to 
her because she is a woman. We are men and you know God has given 
women some special gifts … 476  
 
Diop’s complaints about the women’s ingenious negotiation skills resonate 
with the skills Jakarta transporters used to undercut each other during their 
free-floating fare system. Socially, too, the fact that the women trade in a 
precarious trading environment attracts social sympathy. There is social 
awareness that dysfunctional social and economic systems in society have 
pushed women to become the sole breadwinners for their families. As such, 
part of the “special gifts” women have is to use that social sympathy to 
advantage. This has been part of the reasons why the women traders at 
Marché Gambie were unstoppable in their trading. Male traders like Diop 
recognise the economic and social power women have and therefore, 
ensure that, their resentment of the women, does not obstruct their ability to 
collaborate with them, to advance their mutual trading interests. He 
disclosed that:  
Occasionally, we do collaborate with them. You can share clients with some 
of them. By sharing clients, I mean when I happen to have a customer who 
needed more currency than I have at hand, I can ask one of my colleagues 
to supplement the short fall from their money. In return, we share the profit 
                                                            
475For African women’s social and economic ingenuity see Falola and  Amponsah, Women’s 
roles …2012. 






we made from that exchange. This is a common practice here. But some of 
these women are so difficult that you cannot share clients with them. 477  
Male traders prefer to share clients among themselves and the same applies 
to women traders, too. The latter constituted a solid solidarity group. 
Nevertheless, when economic opportunities demand it, both genders 
willingly cross gender lines to collaborate and make more profit for 
themselves.  This resonates with Guyer’s observation that trade or the 
exchange of goods can create alliances among unlike social groups.478 By 
saying that some of the women moneychangers were difficult, Diop 
expresses his gendered views of the women as well as his distaste over 
their presence at the border. The women “invaded” what was for a long time 
considered a male terrain. This has created discomfort to male traders like 
Diop.  But other kinds of divisions also prevail among the traders, which also 
helped entrench rivalries. For example, majority of the female currency 
dealers were Senegalese women. But male currency dealers were of a 
mixed nationality:  Senegalese, Gambians and Guineans. 
The solidarities and rivalries in the money-exchange business were 
symbolic of the divisions of the border.  The way these two groups of traders 
occupy their trading space or even move about their trading space indicate 
subtle tensions in their relations. Women moneychangers tend to converge 
on a section of the road, away from the offices of the border administrative 
agents. In contrast, male traders assemble close to the border administrative 
offices. Some members of the group sit right on the invisible Amdallai-
Karang borderline, which separates The Gambia and Senegal. This 
separation of the genders reinforces social and religious values for the 
segregation of the genders during social functions, such as funerals, 
weddings, naming ceremonies, etc. However, the separation between the 
two groups lacks that social and religious ethos. From their separate 
location, one could feel the hostility and tension between the two groups, 
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hence, their separation lacks the respectful distance gender separation 
during social and religious events, communicate.   
Their trading activities and the way they occupy their trading space 
have turned the border area into a balkanised frontier-trading zone. Inter-
personal suspicion and competition are rife as members of the two groups 
point fingers at each other as the spoiler of the trade they share. Below I 
share a story demonstrating how these rivalries could be both intense and 
threatening for members of the two groups.  
 
6.6.4: “Call Us Not “Femmes De La Rue.”   
On March 17th, 2013, an angry female Senegalese teacher returned to the 
Karang border, to lodge a complaint with the Police. According to her, when 
she crossed to Amdallai on March 16th, 2013, a female and a male 
moneychanger duped her of three thousand Gambian dalasis.  The teacher, 
who was returning to her post at the French School in The Gambia, changed 
CFA currencies into Dalasis. After she arrived in Banjul, she realised that 
she received less money from the two people.479 
The Police escorted her to the crowd of moneychangers and the 
woman identified one of them as the culprit.  That person was invited for 
questioning at the Police station but she denied the allegations.  However, 
the police detained her. News of her detention spread fast and a group of 
women moneychangers invaded the Police station, demanding her release. 
They informed the police that the “drunkard Peul money changer” who 
shared the client with the detained woman, was the culprit. 
The police asked the women to bring the culprit to them, if they want 
their colleague released. The women dispersed into Karang, to search for 
the “drunkard Peul money changer.” After a futile search for the man, they 
returned to the Police station to inform the police that the friend of the 
Peulman, who was at that time at the border, should be arrested for him to 
                                                            








turn in his friend, the suspect.  The police obliged and the man took them to 
his friend’s hiding place. The suspect was arrested and his friend was freed. 
A troop of male moneychangers also came to support their arrested 
colleague, who confessed to the crime. The suspect folded some of the 
banknotes he gave to the teacher twice, so that both ends of the notes faced 
upwards and got counted separately as different notes of the D100 bank 
note.480The unsuspecting teacher received the change and left. After his 
confession, the police asked him to return the balance of the money. He also 
refunded the teacher’s fares to and from Banjul-Karang. The police warned 
the man and then released him. 
Feeling vindicated, the women moneychangers who loitered around the 
Police station while the case was being settled, taunted the teacher for 
daring to accuse one of them-“the hard-working women feeding on their 
sweat.” In the ensuing war of words, the teacher called the women, “femmes 
de la rue.”481The group of irate women asked the teacher to “return those 
words where they came from.” There was pandemonium and the female 
moneychangers shouted back at the teacher saying: “call us not femmes de 
la rue.”  
The police intervened, shooed away all parties from the station and as 
the women dispersed, one police shouted after them: “the Peul is guilty toda, 
but tomorrow, it will be your turn. This is all you do here.”482 Infuriated by the 
words of the police, the women accused the police of being bias in favour of 
the teacher. They noted to the police that they should thank them, instead of 
ill-treating them, for they helped them to capture the accused. Meanwhile, 
the teacher crossed back to Amdallai, to return home. Behind in Karang, 
people grouped in small numbers, discussing the incident. The freed man 
went away to nurse himself from his “bad day “with the police.  
The anecdote on how the Senegalese teacher recovered her money 
from a fraudulent moneychanger offers interesting nuances into state-
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society relations and inter-trader cooperation and rivalries.  On the one 
hand, the Police allow an illegal money changing business to flourish at the 
border under their watch.  At the same time, it intervenes to protect a citizen 
from a fraudulent practice that is associated with that illicit economy.483 It 
protects moneychangers from potential risks, but the way female and male 
moneychangers accosted the police to show solidarity to one of their 
members, implied that, there is a tacit distrust between moneychangers and 
the police.  
The mixed relationship between the two sets of people indicates the co-
extension between traders’ experiences of the border and the police’s 
understanding of it. Notwithstanding of the contradictions in the relationship 
between the police and the moneychangers, border communities routinely 
depend on the state in their day-to day existence. Similarly, state agents at 
the border also routinely compromise in their work, as their existence also 
depends on their relationship with border communities.  In the next section, I 
further explore how border communities and even state authorities creatively 
use various resources at their disposal to navigate the complex context of 
The Gambia-Senegal border, in an attempt to create continuities across the 
limitations of territory.  
 
6.7: Consumption and Attitudes Towards the Border 
The relationship between border communities and border customs agents 
offer insightful details about the nuances of state-society relations and the 
practices and norms of the state.484 The cross-border exchange of goods at 
The Gambia-Senegal border depends a lot on creativity and contingency.  
Below, I share some observations on how state agents interact with border 
communities and traders at the Keur Ayib customs post.  
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On my first day at the Customs office in Keur Ayib, I had to wait to 
see the Chef de Bureau of the Douanes. People streamed in and out of the 
main doors of the bureau, with noticeable leisure. Some of them exchanged 
social bantering and jokes with the customs agents. A man walked into the 
office, singing a religious song to himself. I watched piles of haphazardly 
folded papers clutched in the hands of different individuals, who were 
processing their commodities through customs. The rustling noise of papers 
being spread out, the constant movement in and out of the office, the 
dragging feet on the floor, a small laughter here and there, all gave a sense 
that people were well acquainted with the douanes and they were “happy” 
with the nature of things at The Gambia-Senegal border. There was no way 
to differentiate who was Gambian from who was Senegalese, except when 
they speak in the different local dialects, which were interspersed with words 
from either French or English. The interactions and the mood within the 
office also gave a sense that people truly “love” paying taxes and bringing 
goods from across the border.  
Border agents at The Gambia-Senegal borders implicitly recognise that 
Gambians and Senegalese have developed consumption patterns and 
preferences linked to cross-border production and exchange. State officials 
were aware that Senegalese consumers prefer tomatoes, cooking oil, sugar, 
milk and other products re-exported from The Gambia, to the ones locally 
produced in Senegal. These goods were routinely “brought” into Senegal. 
Border enforcement agents “tolerated” or paid a blind eye, as these goods 
crossed the border. This has been particularly true in Keur Ayib, where 
livelihoods are tied to the border.  
Trading is the main source of livelihood for the majority of people in Keur 
Ayib. Chef de Village Gueye, the chief of Keur Ayib, described the patterns 
of livelihoods as being: “buying goods from Gambie, come to the douanes 
pay duties and bring them over for reselling. Or buy from here, do the 






happens in both directions of the border—it has sans contrarier.”485 The idea 
that border residents derive economic and social benefits from the border 
comes across from Gueye’s description.486 The “everyday dimensions of 
border life” are articulated in the two main channels people use to cross with 
goods from one side of the border to the other.487  
There is yunni kaw which means the road up or the official crossing point 
for goods. Some people pass through this way only. There is also yuni suff 
or yunni aalla which is the back-way, tor the bush path, the unauthorised 
routes smugglers use. People who deal in goods with restricted entry into 
Senegal love using the back way. They run with their goods until they arrive 
at some place, sell them and then go their way.488 
 
The recognition of both legal and illegal routes of entry for goods shows the 
border is a social practice. It is also an economic strategy for residents and 
the state, which makes economic returns from its border policies. Out of this 
recognition, Gueye negotiates with state authorities for the release of 
apprehended smugglers and for the temporary lifting of the band on the 
entry of controlled, essential goods from The Gambia.  
People come to me when their goods are confiscated by the Douanes to 
ask me to appeal to the douanes for them to return the confiscated goods. 
But I have a policy on this; I tell them always, if you need something that is 
found in the Anglais come inform me. And then we can check with the 
Douanes to see what things among the list of goods you want to bring in 
they could let you bring in and what things you may have to pay duties on. 
Then, I go with them to the border and they list all that they need and then I 
ask the douanes to help them.  But if people violate this understanding I 
cannot intervene on their behalf. I make people to be aware of this. 489  
Gueye’s close relationship with border enforcement agents limits the 
extractive dimensions of the border. Thus, it is considered as the significant 
socio-economic lifeline of Keur Ayib village.490  The rent concessions Gueye 
receives from border agents support his villagers’ livelihoods.  These 
concessions recognise the value of the cross-border shared economy and 
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cross-border connections. El Haj Ndiaye, a youth electrician who works in 
Keur Ayib argued that the border and the customs concessions embody the 
soul of the shared cross-border economy. As a technician, border residents 
rely on Ndiaye, to get the electronic goods they need from across the 
border. They give him cash to purchase items like car batteries, solar 
panels, solar lamps, wires, tools, screwdrivers, TV sets, radio sets and other 
electronic goods from The Gambia. After buying these goods, Ndiaye 
negotiates with border agents, to take the goods to their owners. The 
“toleration” from customs, makes smuggling such expensive goods 
unnecessary, since individuals like Ndiaye can pre-arrange permissions for 
the cross-border transit of these goods.491 Ndiaye argued that:  
The douanes are not a big issue. What they dislike is going to buy your 
things without taking permission from them.  You ask permission to go but a 
TV set and they will tell you, you can go or you may buy this paper as 
permission, daggal,kieti bi. It has been ten years since I started buying 
these goods in The Gambia.492 
 
The practice of “toleration” derives from the co-extension between the lives 
of border residents and those of state border agents. The latter are 
integrated in the border environment they live in. They procure meals, 
laundry, housekeeping and other services from local people. Their needs 
are closely linked with the needs of the community. Consequently, there is 
also a personal logic to the border agents’ humanitarian considerations that 
enabled residents of Keur Ayib, to bring controlled goods from The Gambia 
into Senegal.  
Toleration is also accorded to religious communities at the border, for 
them to bring in in-kind donations for religious events. Most of the goods that 
cross the border for religious events are generally for consumption during 
religious events. From the perspective of both complicit border agents and 
beneficiaries of toleration, the act was not smuggling, but rather, recognition 
of the blood and kinship ties between Gambians and Senegalese.   
                                                            







But toleration has exceptions. There was zero tolerance for the entry 
of medicaments from The Gambia into Senegal. The cross-border 
movement of medicaments from The Gambia into Senegalese towns and 
villages has had a long history. The former has lax rules on the import and 
export of medications and thus, it is a good supplier of medicines for cross-
border use.  
Pain medicine (for external use like balms and orally-dispensed 
tablets or syrups), sex stimulants, multivitamins and antibiotics are the four 
types of medicaments commonly smuggled across the borders. These on- 
the- street- medical supplies have a huge demand and trading in them is 
lucrative. Premiaton, for instance, has had a long history of circulation in 
Senegambian street-markets.  It is used for bodybuilding and weight-gain. It 
has social significance for a society, where, the good life is measured by the 
plumpness of one’s body. Women commonly use it, too. It is also popular 
with Wrestlers, who need their weight for their sport 
 
 Figure 8: List of seized smuggled Commodities at the stores of Keur Ayib Douane 
2013 
MEDICAMENTS OTHER ITEMS 
Ibuprofen 400 mg Different kinds of electronics 
Paracetamol 500mg 6 bags of cannabis 
Hokzole- Mebendazole tables 100mg Cooking Oil 
Premiaton 4mg Tomatoes paste 
Stoppane- General Painkiller Cloths 
Buta Tablets 100mg Flour bags 
Dicloparl 550mg Sugar 
Superpepti, Cyproheptadine Energy 4mg Shoes 
Cold Caps 100mg Matches (boxes) 
Puregrey  sildenafil citrate 100mg Batteries 
Vegerra 50mg  







Picap capsules 20mg, Piroxicam 
capsules U.S.P 
 
Amoxillin 200- Antibiotics  




The strictness with the passage of medicaments implied the limits to 
“toleration.” Where the social consequences for the unrestricted entry of 
certain goods is high, state border agents exercise prudence and are 
inflexible with the law. Thus, state border agents observe creativity and 
contingency in implementing the state’s territorial agenda in Senegambia. In 
the next section, I further explore how toleration works in the fisheries 
sector, to highlight that there are a variety of areas where state agents and 
ordinary people cooperate, to enhance their cross-border economic or social 
agenda.  
 
6.8: Cross-Border Fish Trade: a Gateway to Interstate Political 
Understanding 
The Gambia-Senegal cross-border fisheries sector is another area where, 
individuals and the state use different resources at their disposal, to mediate 
the border. The sector feeds from The Gambia-Senegal bilateral relations 
and it reveals different nuances of state-society relations. 
Since 1968, cross-border fish traders, fishermen and women and 
fishing communities reach out to each other and establish strong partnership 
collaborations. Through their cohesive relationships, these people effectively 
lobby the two states to collaborate on cross-border projects, which include 
the construction of the Kaolack fish market in Senegal and the Brikama fish 
market in The Gambia. The two governments and the Japanese 
Development Cooperation (JICA) funded these projects, under a joint-






Gambia and Senegal. Consequently, members of the communities have 
equal access to both markets and they collaborate in their fishing trade.  
Constructed at the cost of about 4 billion and 500 million CFA, The 
Kaolack fish market supplies the fish needs of the region of Sine Saloume. It 
also supplies other parts of Senegal and The Gambia, when fish is scarce in 
the country. The secure market also distributes fish from The Gambia to 
Senegalese markets. It opens at 4.00am and closes at 12.30pm, daily.  
The fish trade largely depends on traders’ ability to forge a 
cooperative relationship with both states. Consequently, they enjoy certain 
concessions from the state to facilitate their cross-border fisheries trading. 
The mobility of fish supplies across the border exemplifies how fisheries 
people use the resources they have in the state and in their communities, to 
advance their cross-border economic interests. For example, fish is a highly 
perishable commodity. So, fish trucks coming from both sides of the border 
enjoy priority crossing on Gambian ferries. The trucks also enjoy priority 
crossing at the Amdallai-Karang border. The usual time these fish trucks 
arrive in Kaolack is 5.00pm or 10.00pm, after the market closes. However, 
as part of the special concession given to them, Gambian fish trucks are 
allowed to access the market to store their supplies upon their arrival. After 
arrivals, the fish-trucks and supplies wait until 4.00am, the time the market 
opens daily, to sell their stock. After the end of the market day, the trucks 
return to Banjul the same day.  
Fish is an important part of the breadbasket of both The Gambia and 
Senegal. It is a major nutritional resource and key ingredient in the diets of 
the two populations. It sustains livelihoods and human health on both sides 
of the border. The fisheries sector is also an enormous source of income for 
various communities. 
In most West African countries like The Gambia and Senegal, the 






national economy.493 It was estimated that The Gambia-Senegal cross-
border fish trade was worth over one billion CFA francs annually.494 
The cross-border fisheries sector encourages cross-border fish 
trading. But transporting fish requires special forms of transport. Thus, the 
sector attracts significant donor support, which provides capital-intensive 
investments for it. Fish traders have access to both state and donor 
sponsored project-based credit facilities run by financial centres in both 
countries. They also benefit from government in-kind assistance, which 
provides equipment and other material support to fishing communities. 
Through cross-border projects, fish traders can access loans to buy fish 
trucks, instead of hiring transport to move their stocks, from one side of the 
border to another. These loans are repaid by installments. 
Cross-border fish traders consider themselves as “one” people. They 
share sociality, a trade, kinship bonds and other ties and are a cohesive 
community. According to Laity Ndoa, a fish trader and the President of the 
Kaolack Regional Fish Market, the journey of the fish in the rivers and lakes 
of Senegambia is an apt metaphor for the interdependence of the cross-
border fishing community. 
There is a natural pattern to the movement of fish in The Gambia and 
Senegal rivers. As such, fish supplies in the two rivers alternate, depending 
on the direction of fish flows.  Based on the ecology of both The Gambia and 
Senegal rivers, fish stocks arrive at these waters from Morocco and 
Mauritania.  The fish flows into the Senegal river first, before proceeding 
upriver in Gambian waters.  
As fish entered the Senegal river, it goes up to Ndar, then to Kayaar before it moved to 
Jaol and Mbour and from there it enters The Gambia river. But the fish may not spend 
a long time in the Gambia river before moving into the waters of southern Senegal. 
From Casamance, it goes to Guinea Bissau before re-routing itself back. Fish goes as 
far as the end of its journey before returning to its source.495  
                                                            
493 Christophe Béné and Lawton Rebecca “Global Change in African Fish Trade: Engine of 
Development or Threat to Local Food Security?” IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings, 
WorldFish Center, 2008. 
494Interview with Laity Ndoa, president of the Kaolack Fish Market and Fisher Folks 
Association, Kaolack, Senegal, 16th May, 2013. 






As a result of country size and geography, Senegal has a larger fishing zone 
at sea than The Gambia. Hence, Senegalese fishermen can catch fish that 
is yet to arrive in The Gambia River. Their ability to intercept the fish before 
they get into Gambian waters, can cause temporary shortages of fish 
supplies in Gambian waters.  
Ndoa uses the metaphor of the fish to depict the cross-border 
interdependence of livelihoods and to justify the need for stronger bilateral 
cooperation between The Gambia and Senegal. He also uses the fish trail 
as a symbol of the inseparability of the two countries. The metaphors he 
uses are also part of a widespread practice in which Gambians and 
Senegalese use metaphors and social idioms of relations, to describe their 
cross-border ties. The metaphors Ndoa uses are a co-extension of the 
textile metaphor religious circles use to describe The Gambia-Senegal 
relations (see chapters 1, 2 & 7).  He argued that, 
 
The people are more important than the political border. The governments should 
ignore the border and follow the people. The two countries share the same father 
and the same mother. Socially, there are no barriers for any of us for integrating 
within one community or another on both sides of the border.  It should be the 
responsibilities of both governments to strengthen the people by recognising the 
ties between the two countries.496  
 
Ndoa views that Gambians and Senegalese live in a co-extended social and 
economic environment, which makes the border an ill-fitting barrier, the two 
states have maintained. He draws from the metaphor of the mother and the 
father, to emphasise the close-ties between the two populations. Thus, he 
re-echoes the views of Imam Dembo Mane of Karang, who stated that 
mbokh ties between the two countries are beyond the reach of politics (see 











The fisheries sector uses deep-rooted social and religious narratives 
about cross-border kinship ties, to foster its economic interests. For 
example, they develop a cross-border agenda for their members and then 
present it to state officials.  They use the Ministries of Fisheries in both 
countries, to channel their collective interests and lobby for policies that can 
advance their mutual interests. Also, they directly communicate with policy-
makers and other relevant government officials, to advocate for their 
interests. Thus, individuals who work as fish traders see their trade as being 
interdependent on the work of other members of their community. This fact 
is evident in the way fisher folks understand their community and the work 
they do. Below, I explore their profiles and trading experiences to highlight 
how their economic activities and social structures are embedded in 
community.   
 
6.8.1: A General Profile of Cross-Border Fish Traders 
The people engaged in the fish trade can be categorised into the sea-going 
folks and the post sea-going fish dealers. The first group comprises 
fishermen. They’re mainly male youth, aged between 25-35 years. This age-
bracket is suitable for their occupation.  Fisher folks consider fishing as an 
art for the youthful. Sea faring and the long hours spent at sea impose huge 
physical demands on the individual. This is why able-bodied younger men 
are considered more suitable for active sea duty.  
The sea going fishermen identify a captain among themselves. He 
leads their fishing excursions. At the end of their fishing expeditions, they 
return to the shore, to sell their harvests or hand it over to the second group 
of people –the post sea-going fish dealers.  Laity Ndoa belongs to this latter 
category of traders. He joined the fishing sector in 1968. As a young 
apprentice, he hanged behind fish trucks and accompanied the master 
fishers to sea on their fishing boats. He has retired from sea adventures and 
he now works as a full-time fish dealer. 
Ndoa has his own truck. He takes fish supplies on both sides of the 






supplies, at given times. As a fish dealer and like most cross-border traders, 
he, too, follows the profit across the border.  
Similar to cross-border trading in Senegambia, ethnicity, unlike capital, 
has no significant value in the fish trade. However, most people who go to 
the sea are Sereres, Lebous and / or Wollof. “Between fishing and trading 
there is no tribe. You don’t’ have to be this tribe or that, to go to sea or to be 
a fish seller. If you come to the fishing sector looking for work, you will 
certainly work, irrespective of who you are or where you come from.”497  The 
fishing sector is ethnicity blind, but the sector has gender specific roles for 
members of its community.  
Women hardly go to sea. They are active in the fish trade and some of 
them invest in trucks and cooling facilities in order to engage in large-scale 
cross-border fishing entrepreneurship. But most women are engaged in the 
dry fish trade, rather than in the fresh fish one.  
Dry fish supplies generally come from The Gambia, Casamance or 
Senegal.  The trade in this commodity has been popular in Senegal, 
Mauritania and in Gambian lumos.498 Rural communities situated far away 
from rivers generally find it difficult to get regular supplies of fresh fish 
because of transportation constraints. They use dry fish as substitute for 
fresh ones. Dry fish has been a delicacy in both The Gambia and Senegal. It 
is added to most dishes and it is cooked with fresh fish, to enhance the taste 
of the food.  
There is a subtle gender dimension to the fish trade, but the choice 
individuals make on whether to engage in the fresh fish or dry fish trade has 
more to do with financial ability, than gender. Women who can afford a truck, 
cooling facilities and other capital-intensive materials to engage in the fresh 
fish trade, can do so. Some women also engage in the retail fresh fish trade, 
which requires less capital. As a sector that sometimes experiences 
abundance or scarcity of supplies, the fisheries sector is subject to the 
vagaries of maritime fish life and therefore community members provide 
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informal social insurance for each other. They tend to settle together in 
communities that are known to have great sources of fish supplies, as 
demonstrated in the next section. 
 
6.8:2.Gambian Sources of Cross-Border Fish Export 
The two Gambian coastal villages of Gunjur and Tanji, are the major 
sources of the fish that go to the Senegalese market. Huge fishing 
communities live in both settlements. Fishing has been the main source of 
livelihood for residents in both places, too. Bakau, another major fishing city 
in The Gambia also supplies the cross-border market. The most popular 
varieties of fish in the cross-border market are locally known as yabou, 
sharka and sedda.  
Trading in fish demands lot of strategic thinking, according to Laity 
Ndoa. For example, at any given time, fish sellers have to decide on the 
market they would sell their fish at, except for those who sell at local levels 
for the daily consumption of local people. There are factors, which influence 
a fish traders’ decision to sell his stock in Kaolack or in Dakar. Fish stocks 
that arrive in Kaolack are usually sold in the town and its environs. Part of 
the stock can also be transported further to Dakar. But this depends on 
whether that stock is for export through the Leopold Sedar Senghor Airport 
in Dakar, or for Dakar markets. This depends on the goals of the trader. For 
example, if a trader wants rapid, fast turnover in order to return to The 
Gambia on the same day, or the following day, he/ she will sell his stock in 
Kaolack. In contrast, those who seek to make more profit, take their supplies 
to Dakar. They usually sleep over in the city, and return to Banjul the 
following day. Irrespective of the destination of cross-border fish supplies, 
cross-border fish traders thrive through community and cooperation. Cross-
border communication is core to their trading successes and the thriving of 









Figure 9: Inside a fishing truck at the Kaolack Fish Market 
 
A fish truck unloading some of its stock, Kaolack, Senegal, 16th May, 2013. Source: author’s 
field work photos. 
6.8.3: Community and Responding to Interstate Political 
Difficulties 
The fisheries sector thrives on a network of cross-border relations.  Daily, 
traders share several phone calls across the border. “Every day I talk to my 
friends and colleagues in The Gambia several times over the cell phone.”499 
Through cell phone communication, fish traders keep each other informed 
about the status of local fish supplies across both sides of the border.  This 
enables them to rapidly respond to demands for fish supplies, from either 
side of the border. For instance, as soon as Ndoa learnt about fish scarcity 
                                                            






in The Gambia, he loaded his truck with supplies and asked his son to take it 
to his partner in The Gambia. “My Gambian partner sells the fish when it 
arrives there. I reimburse his incurred expenses, he takes his mandaar 
(commission) and then he sends the rest of the money to me.”500 If fish was 
plenty in The Gambia, Ndoa’s contact sends fish to him in Kaolack and the 
same reimbursement procedure is followed between the two. “Hey, we know 
each other very well. We have each other’s phone numbers. Through 
telephone, we update each other on what is happening in the market, what 
stock is available, and so on.  It is a collaboration.”501  
Fishing communities communicate daily and this habit cements their 
cross-border ties. The cross-border contacts also help them to develop 
problem-solving structures that can help them tackle the challenges of the 
border and other issues that affect them. They also established a 
consultative forum called the Association Cooperation Senegalo-Gambie, 
which gives each side better access to the other’s fishery resources.  This 
forum first met at The Gambian coastal fishing settlement of Tanji. Since 
then, it has strengthened the ground for future collaborations..502  
The cross-border partnership among Gambian and Senegalese fish 
traders and fishing communities is considered as one of the best practices in 
West African fisheries communities.  Other communities from other countries 
visit them to study how they work and learn from their practices. The 
cooperation between Gambian and Senegalese fish traders and fishing 
communities has also been praised in both countries as an ideal cross-
border partnership, which should be replicated in interstate relations and in 
other parts of West Africa. This is why the Malian fish traders embarked on a 
study tour, to study the working of this cross-border partnership. 
 This cooperation should be extended to other sectors between the two countries given 
that the populations share the same mother and father. Many more things could be 
facilitated through such cooperation. Even Ivory Coast and Burkina are trying to copy 
                                                            








us. (His cell phone rang and he picked up the call). This phone call is about a fish truck 
that just arrived from Casamance. They are big fish.- sharka. We will send them further 
to Dakar. Some of our fish are for export.  We use to have some Gambian partners 
who come here, get fish and then put them on board flights in Dakar for export.503 
Traders in the fisheries sector view border closures between The Gambia 
and Senegal as “a no win for both sides.”504 They also view transporters’ 
militant stance on the border as a case of transferred aggression. They 
argue that when transporters and the state disagree over the border, and 
close it, they hurt the majority, who did not play any role in the events that 
occasioned the border closure.  
I recalled a border closure when they refused Senegalese transport from entering 
Gambian territory. It paralysed our work on both sides of the border. It was tough on 
both countries. We are people of the same parents. We have had a long history of 
interaction, so stopping it suddenly becomes costly for both countries. We could not 
do much. We waited for them to have a dialogue to resolve it. We prayed for an 
amicable resolution because that is best for the two populations. The populations 
voted for the Presidents, so we listened to them expecting that they will pursue our 
desire on the border.505 
Aware of the inherent tensions in The Gambia-Senegal relations, cross-
border fisheries actors see themselves as a unified group who must remain 
together, irrespective of bad interstate politics. They developed strong 
institutional frameworks that used both cultural and economic principles to 
advance their trade, community and interests, in ways that are beyond the 
reach of the state and interstate politics in Senegambia. Thus, cross-border 
fish traders creatively navigate the border, they depend on various 
















This chapter explored how cross-border traders dealing in various goods 
use creativity, contingency and various resources at their disposal, to 
navigate the complex context of the border, to promote their cross-border 
economic interests. The chapter also highlighted how inter-state conflicts 
can have productive outcomes and yield new economic opportunities for 
traders on both sides of the border. Irrespective of the schemes that 
politicians can play on the border to foster the logics of their respective 
states, the borderland residents will always make the border work for them. 
As state agents perform statehood, they also manifest their belonging to the 
sociocultural landscape of the borderland. This process has inherent 
tensions, but it is part of the authentic reproduction of everyday experiences 
of the border. This leads us to chapter 7, where I explore how cross-border 
religious networks work with the border, state authorities and among 











SENEGAMBIA’S TALIBEE NETWORKS, THE STATE AND 
CROSS-BORDER EXCHANGE 
 
“Relations are a merchandise of God.” 
(A saying among Senegambian religious communities). 
 
7.0: Faith, Language, Community and the Border 
The cross-border religious networks that straddle The Gambia-Senegal 
border belong to different Muslim groups. The Mouride brotherhood is the 
most extensively studied among these groups. It has a transnational 
following and its members are prominent politicians and powerful state 
actors in Senegal. They also have a great deal of power in transportation, 
manufacturing and retail trade. There are Mourides in The Gambia, but 
majority of the country’s population follow the Tijanniya or the Quadirriya 
brotherhoods.506 These two religious groups manifest forms of attachment 
and practices that are distinct from those of the Mourides. However, 
Mourides, Tijannis and the Quadirrs all belong to the same World community 
of Muslims, the ummah.507 This chapter studies how cross-border religious 
networks that mainly follow the Tijanniya sect practice their ideas of 
community that transcend The Gambia-Senegal border.  It also looks at how 
they use the different resources at their disposal to navigate conflict and to 
sustain cross-border community values.  
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Senegambian religious and social ideas about community work hand 
in hand. Consequently, people profess multiple identities and affiliations, 
which create a network of connections and ties that transcend particular 
spectrums of identity. This is why I consider ethnicity as a narrow description 
for discussing the identities of Gambians and Senegalese. There are various 
markers of community, which serve as legitimate bases for grouping people 
into a community. Even if people profess different religious beliefs, they can 
still enjoy other connections that can validate their sense of sharing some 
kind of community tie. Due to the fluid nature of Senegambian social 
relations, if people do not share a culture, they may share a religion, a place 
of origin, language, or other solid experiences that can shape feelings of 
community in people. Language accommodation and language shifts are 
also common in Senegambian societies. Hence, people can nurture flexible 
multi-ethnic identities.  This is why the framework used in this work moves 
away from ethnicity but concentrates on other more relevant markers of 
identity in Senegambia (see chapter 1).508 
 Senegambian society has been reproduced from longstanding social 
contacts, outreach and exchange that happened within different transition-
zones. Social entities tend to be interdependent on one another. For 
example, in Senegambia, a greatness of a ruler is dependent on the 
greatness of his bard, who is of a lower caste. The eloquence of the oratory 
skills of the jali or fena, is dependent on the heroic deeds or exploits of his 
patron.509 The retelling and recounting of social histories generally focus on 
how different elements of society have been interdependent on each other 
or on one another. Most stories also show how society works in cooperation 
and not in antithesis. For example, the upper and the lower caste had 
always relied on each other, irrespective of their different social status. 
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term Perspective: The African Experience (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2010). 






Social protocols around caste are designed to create continuities rather than 
barriers in social relations.510  
Like social actors, religious actors also employ different socio-
religious ideas, metaphors and social idioms of relations, to validate and re-
validate local histories about Gambia- Senegal ties. Consequently, the use 
of language is central to processes that create an enduring sense of 
relatedness among Senegambians, irrespective of the limits to the use of 
language. For example, Mam Abodul Aziz Sy‘s fabric metaphor signifies that 
The Gambia and Senegal are inseparable (see chapter 1). The right side of 
the fabric is nonexistent, if there is no back or wrong side. Right and wrong 
are used here, as a descriptive essence for   identifying different parts of the 
textile. They do not articulate moral principles about the good or the profane. 
They reinforce a sense of solidity in social relations. But when used in a 
provocative sense, the textile metaphor is symbolic of the colonial partition 
of Senegambia; the ruining of a once unified polity and the disintegration of 
a society to different segments. Sensibilities about the fractious colonial 
history question the resilience of social relations amid the significant 
institutional and language (official) barriers between the two countries. 
However, the dogged insistence on the validity of cross-border relations 
 re-invent the colonial history and thus, minimises the ability of that political 
experience to reduce the strength of the social one.511   
Oral histories are used to recount different stories about social and 
religious experiences of the past. This process helps to solidify social 
relations and contribute to a sense that cross-border relations are cohesive.  
For example, Cheikh Mahe Niass used stories of past encounters between 
Senegal’s Niassens and Gambians to conclude that the relationship 
between the two is a “natural link- a relationship woven by God.”512  When 
Niass’ grandfather, Mam El Haj Bai Niass, a well-loved man of God, lived in 
exile in The Gambia, Gambians voluntarily adopted them as their beloved 
                                                            
510 See Thomas A. Hale, Griots and Griottes: Masters of Words and Music (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1998).	







spiritual guide and leader. They reportedly consulted him on both spiritual 
and non-spiritual matters. Garba Jahumpa and Dawda Jack, two popular 
anti-colonial Gambian leaders, became talibees of Mam El Haj Bai Niass. 
This connection has endured between the Niassens and Gambians, and is 
celebrated even today, through retelling, prayers and other kinds of spiritual 
outreach.   
Religious authorities in both The Gambia and Senegal have a 
tendency to remember the two populations in their prayers. There are 
numerous audio recordings of religious authorities offering prayers to the 
populations of both countries. In fact, during my fieldwork, I witnessed Mam 
Ansou Niang of Sirmang, praying for both countries, during the official 
opening of the Sirmang gamoo. Additionally, Mam Ansou implored the 
Senegalese officials who attended the event, to always keep The Gambia in 
mind. Using traditional references of solidarity and cooperative relations, he 
entrusted politicians to pay heed to each other and jealously protect the ties 
and good will that have historically existed between populations of the two 
countries. Senegambian religious leaders like Mam Ansou use deliberate 
measures to socialise people to value the bonds between Gambians and 
Senegalese. 
Curtin observed that post-colonial West African Muslim societies have 
modes of behaviour that derive from pre-colonial and colonial Islamic 
ancient socialisation processes.  Their socialised patterns of behaviour 
maintain and sustain a “tradition of friendships” and “alliances” which have 
been integral to the theology and the spreading of Islam, from the Arabian 
Peninsula to the Maghreb, and to West Africa.513  
In Senegambia, this tradition of friendships and alliances are shaped 
by wullere, a Wollof word that means remembering or paying heed to and 
reliving past ethical relations between or among individuals (see chapter 2). 
Wullere constitute an important part of religious communication where, 
retelling becomes an important spiritual and social tool for spreading faith, 
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enhancing human relations and deepening ties with God. This chapter 
demonstrates how the retelling of the social experiences and the life 
histories of selected Islamic spiritual leaders in Senegambia help to reinforce 
cross-border and interstate relations. These processes are part of the broad 
social practice that uses language-metaphors, social idioms of relations and 
other oral descriptions to entrench fellow-feelings between Gambians and 
Senegalese. 
Wullere is an intergenerational relation that derives from past 
alliances and relations of assistance or mutual aid established during social 
contacts like religiously motivated displacement (searching for God), 
educational pursuits or even trading encounters among different individuals 
in Senegambia (see chapter 2). Such intergenerational social capital shapes 
followership ties between maraboutic families and religious communities. 
Therefore, religious attachments weave a network of ties between the 
various clerical establishments, which consist of Mouride, Tijanniya, 
Quadirriya and other maraboutic families. These senior level attachments 
become an interrelated network of attachments among their followers.514 
Thus, Senegambian religious networks are embedded in long duree 
intergenerational family and followership ties (see chapter 2).  This partly 
explains why social communication among the different religious sects is 
characterised by the use of affective terms like dome-ndeye, mbokh and 
wullere. For example, the head of the Mourides, or Tijannis or Quadirrs 
would use these words to refer to the leader of one of the other groups. 
Similarly, they expect their followers to interact with the followers of the other 
groups with decorum, respect and affinity.  
The code of conduct for inter-sect interactions partly explains why in 
both The Gambia and Senegal, the practices of talibee networks transcend 
the border and promote social and political equilibrium in society. 515 They 
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legitimacy these religious institutions enjoy in society. 	
515Talibee is the name given to a member of any of the Islamic brotherhoods in 






use language and social idioms of relations to foster community, entrench 
socio-religious and cultural “theories” about Senegambian social bonds and 
use intergenerational solidarity to sustain cross-border and interstate 
relations (see chapter 1).  Therefore, their practices can transform conflict in 
The Gambia-Senegal relations and can foster cross religious, inter-sect and 
cross-border harmony. Consequently, the Tijannis like other West African 
Islamic sects accommodate values for creating “wealth in people.”516  Their 
religious practices embody “unifying codes” that aim to be beyond 
community, trade, homeland, tribe and tongue, beyond confrontation and 
crisis, confinement, jihad and politics.517  
We concentrate on the religious practices of the Tijannis mainly 
because they constitute a sect that is part of Islamic pacifist groups who 
continue a longstanding clerical vocation promoted by religious masters who 
aim to distance themselves from the state.518 As a faith community that aims 
to be less embedded within the state, they provide an interesting case for 
identifying the complex nuances of state-society relations in Senegambia. 
They also provide an interesting example of how religious communities have 
effectively used the border to pursue their religious, political and economic 
concerns.  
The chapter aims to answer the question: what are some of the 
religious ideas, habits and practices that sustain The Gambia-Senegal 
relations? It also seeks to answer how do religious communities navigate the 
border and the nuances of state-society relations in Senegambia? These 
questions are related to the concerns of the previous chapters.  
The first part of the chapter is the introduction. This is followed by an 
exploration of the religious tendency to draw lines of continuities across 
different spatial and social entities. This is followed by a discussion of the 
intersection between religion, the state and community.  The next section 
                                                            
516 See Sara Berry, No condition is permanent: the social dynamics of agrarian change in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). 







provides the life history of El Haj Taib Diallo, a Senegambian spiritual leader, 
and this serves as an example of how religious leaders’ lifestyle, 
educational, worship and other practices are embedded in cross-border 
contexts. This is followed by an exploration of religious clerics’ views on 
smuggling and interstate conflicts. It also looks at how transporters share 
clerics’ views on interstate issues. This is followed by an example of how 
religious networks can mobilise to de-escalate conflict in interstate relations. 
This is followed by the conclusion of the chapter.  
  
7.1: Senegambia’s Islamic Spiritual Leaders and De-bordering 
Space:  a Shared Heritage 
In colonial and postcolonial Senegambia, all the major Islamic religious 
leaders have lived their lives on both sides of the border. For example, 
Sheikh Mass Kah, one of Senegambia’s venerated spiritual leaders was 
originally Senegalese but lived and founded settlements in The Gambia.519 
Mam Abdoulaye Niass, father to Bai Ibrahima Niass of Kaolack lived in exile 
(from the French) in The Gambia for eleven years.520 A more recent 
example is Sheikh Mam Ansou Niang of Sirmang, Senegal, who lived in The 
Gambia for many years as the student of the grand marabout Siffoe Kanteh 
of Siffoe, Kombo South.521 The cross-border life experiences of these 
venerated spiritual leaders weave intergenerational cross-border social 
bonds. Their habits of displacement models the hijra of the Prophet 
Muhammad (SAW) and early Muslims’ flight and exile from persecution.522 
Their travels were also part of the educational and spiritual habits of Islamic 
scholars and the faithful. They “gathered” knowledge through learning from 
different authorities across different spaces. Islam therefore cultivated 
spatial norms that established lines of continuities and connections among 
different spatial and social entities.  
                                                            
519Interview with Saihou Ba, grandson of Mass Kah, 2012. 
520Interview with son Cheikh Mahe Niass, Kaolack, Senegal, May, 2013. 
521I held several discussions with Alhagi S. Sarr, a follower of Mam Ansu Niang, during my 
fieldwork in 2013. 
522 Hijra- Islamic term for the migration of Prophet Mohammad (SAW) and his followers from 






There are various practices that spiritual leaders used to connect 
different spatial and social entities. From the seventh century to 
contemporary times, it has been a common practice for Islamic spiritual 
leaders to form new settlements from which to practice their faith (see 
chapter 2). Sanneh’s description of the life style of the pacifist clerics of 
West Africa is relevant here:  
Without a homeland to claim or to defend, pacifist clerics adopted pastoral 
itinerancy as a way of life: the dispersion trail provided a defense against danger 
and an instrument of expansion. Spread out over a wide acre, the pacifist trail 
embraced towns, villages, and hamlets. As a result, clusters of settlements 
emerged as a network of teaching centers and contacts.523  
 
The case study on El Haj Taib’s life experience in Senegambia is another 
good example of how accomplished religious scholars cultivated the habit of 
establishing new faith communities away from the land of their birth. This 
aspect of clerical dispersion connects different spatial and social worlds—
towns, villages and hamlets, urban and rural centers. The practice is also a 
conflict avoidance strategy. Dispersion and the creation of new settlements 
helped newly accomplished clerics to avoid interference with pre-existing 
cleric-talibee loyalties in their community of origin. An accomplished cleric of 
notable erudition and elevated spiritual standing generally attracts new 
followers, who visit him to pay homage and to seek spiritual guidance.  If he 
stays in his community of origin, he can draw talibees of other clerics in the 
community to him and thus cause rivalry and divisions in the community. To 
avoid rivalries and divisions, he settles in a new community, set up his own 
educational facility to teach the Quran to other people, he preaches people 
and serves as an Imam in his community. However, he maintains ties with 
other spiritual leaders including those in his community of origin. Sanneh 
validates that dispersion has always been integral to the core values of 
Islam. He noted that: 
Pacifist groups spread in many parts of West Africa where their reputation won 
them disciples and supporters. These groups stayed within the Muslim community, 
rather than becoming sectarian splinter groups. They added to the experience of 
                                                            






diversity, not only of cultural practices but also of the spiritual values of behaviour 
and conduct.524     
Sanneh further noted that: 
The clerics formed a distinct religious community by specialization in educational, 
religious, and legal scholarship. With the support of the wider religious network of 
clerical settlements, this scholarship enabled them to appropriate and promote 
Islam’s heritage of peaceful transmission, work that came to define the clerical 
identity.525  
New settlement creation was therefore a means of developing new relations 
while strengthening old ties and avoiding conflict. It is also an opportunity to 
spread one’s reputation as a godly person, which helps to cultivate pools of 
followers (see chapter 2).  
 Additionally, the family building practices of Senegambian spiritual 
leaders aim to widen social ties, peace and solidarity in society. For 
instance, a good number of major Senegambian religious leaders have 
Tukulour/Fulani origins as a result of both or one of their parents.  However, 
they develop inter-ethnic family ties by marrying with other people outside 
their ethnic group. Hence, some of them and their descendants have mixed 
multi-ethnic and inter-caste backgrounds.526 Their mixed lineages and their 
levels of spiritual standing help them to cultivate pools of followers that 
transcend ethnic, caste and state borders.  They become legitimate, populist 
spiritual guides, who favour community beyond the political barriers of the 
state.  
Arguably, from independence to date, Senegambian Islam has been 
more inclusive, than exclusive, more binding than divisive and more 
engaging than disengaging. However, controversial religious figures like 
Ndigal have emerged in Senegambia and caused controversies among 
Muslims in both The Gambia and Senegal. He founded a community at the 
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followers. But Ndigal and his self-made doctrines of faith eventually 
disappeared from public attention.527  
The Gambia has also experienced some disagreements between the 
Muslims and the Ahmadiyya Muslim sect over issues relating to religious 
ritual in the country.  But these disagreements are always swiftly settled and 
the different communities continue to co-exist in their communities. The 
presence of the Ahmadiyya or the emergence of numerous Pentecostal 
churches in the country has not also undermined inter-religious tolerance in 
The Gambia.528  Senegal also has high levels of inter-religious and 
intersects tolerance like The Gambia.  But The Gambia-Senegal experience 
is distinct from that of Nigeria, where religious pluralism is under threat.529  
Senegambia’s religious experiences contradict how most Western 
societies misunderstand Islam and equate the religion with jihad and 
violence. Robinson argues that: “Europeans and North Americans have had 
difficulty understanding Islam, even greater difficulty understanding Muslim 
societies and individual Muslims, and even more comprehending Muslim 
societies in Africa and in African history.”530 For him, the miscomprehension 
of Islam in the West is not about a “clash of civilization.” The hostility and 
stereotype that Islam is slammed with, endures from the crusades. 531 
Esposito and Mogahed also note that the average person from the West 
sees Islam as a divisive religion.532 These misconceptions of Islam are far 
from the authentic teachings and values the religion seeks to inculcate in its 
followers. As such, this chapter on the habits, attitudes and spiritual 
practices of Senegambian religious networks is relevant to The Gambia-
                                                            
527 Ndigal was a marabout in the Kaur area along The Gambia and Senegal borders who 
started a new Islamic religious order but which was later rejected by the community. 
528On the resurgence of Pentecostal Churches in Africa see Ogbu Kalu, African 
Pentecostalism: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
529For more on religious interactions in Nigeria see Akintunde E. Akinade, ed. Fractured 
Spectrum: Perspectives on Christian – Muslim Encounters in Nigeria (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2012). 
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Senegal relation and to the rectification of the misconceptions some people 
in the West have about Islam.  
 We acknowledge that both Muslims and non-Muslims have 
contributed to sustaining different misunderstandings of Islam. Some people 
have used Islam to pursue various political and ideological goals, like others 
have done to other faiths.  The manipulative use of religion has been 
mentioned in the Islamic holy book, the Qu’ran, which forewarned that some 
people “traffic” with religion and the words of God.533 This misuse of religion 
has been true of all the major religions of the world and even for other faiths 
with lesser numbers of global followers. Notwithstanding, Lamin Sanneh’s 
book Beyond Jihad: The Pacifist Tradition in West African Islam, offers a 
rich, advanced scholarly exploration of how Islam spread and took hold in 
West Africa without jihad and what the peaceful assimilation of Islam in the 
region “means for ongoing religious and social change” in Senegambia and 
in West Africa as a whole.534 The next section therefore explores the 
intersections between religion, community and the state in Senegambia. 
 
7.2:  Religion, Community and the State  
In The Gambia, Senegal and in other African countries, people continue to 
believe in religion. This reality defies predictions that as “democratic culture” 
and “modernity” gain foothold in society, religion would be less important to 
people.535 The way Africans continue to embed themselves in different faith 
traditions also contrasts with how religion and religiosity is rapidly declining 
in the West.  In the African experience, both elites and populations have 
strong religious attachments, which includes believe in the occult. 
Consequently, religious beliefs like culture influence African political 
behaviour. However, the influence religion has on politics is different from 
one African country to another. For example, religious brotherhoods wield a 
significant political clout in Senegal. But they do not do so in The Gambia, 
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Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Sierra Leone, Mali and Ivory Coast.536 
Religion has no outcome on the electoral process in these countries. 
Generally, the clerical establishments in these countries follow “a centuries-
long tradition of piety and enterprise as civil activities. Muslim traders and 
visitors operated independently within West African societies, though they 
had recourse to officials of the state in Mali in case of fraudulent or unjust 
treatment.”537 In observing principles of clerical neutrality, most religious 
establishments in Senegambia aim to set themselves apart from the rulers 
and desire to ensure “fidelity to religious teachings over cooption by 
rulers.”538 But there are nuances to this ambition as most of these religious 
centers have talibees who work for the state. 
 Historically, Islamic clerics’ attempt to separate themselves from the 
state was a nuanced process.  For example, in the kingdom of Mali and in 
other West African polities, Islamic scholars were in charge of state records; 
they were also involved in inter-state diplomat exchanges inside the 
continent and beyond.539  
Muslim clerics who rendered religious services to Islamized chiefs became 
integrated into the socio-political system of the state by playing roles similar to 
those of traditional priests. Like Traditional priests, Muslim clerics were politically 
neutral and could therefore act as peacemakers.540  
 
This nuanced relationship between clerics and the state system is part of the 
co-extension between society and the state.  If state authorities are also 
religious followers, then the state and religion may not appear as discrete 
entities.  If religion is an interrelated dimension of the social process, and 
clerical establishments are valorised through their practices and their 
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followership, then the fluidity in clerical neutrality is justified by the 
multidimensional nature of social relations. Berry’s assertion (below) is 
instructive for understanding cleric-state relations in Senegambia.  
 
In many African societies, a person’s status and influence depend directly on his or 
her ability to mobilize a following. If access to resources depends on the influence 
one brings to bear in negotiations over property rights, production, or exchange, 
and influence is enhanced by having followers, then it is not necessarily 
advantageous to exclude people from social networks, even if these networks also 
serve as channels of access to resources or frameworks for organizing production 
and accumulation.541 
 
The focus of the relationship between clerical establishments and their 
followers are first about faith and spirituality. However, Berry’s assertion 
helps us identify the linkages between religion, community and the state in 
Senegambia. Religious networks aim to preserve social life.542 They embody 
unifying codes. In particular, Sanneh notes that West African pacifist groups 
have policies of religious and inter-ethnic accommodation and therefore they 
maintain social equilibrium and serve as sites for peace and co-existence.543 
Fred-Mensah studied conflict management among the Buem located 
in the Ghana–Togo borders and found that traditional structures were conflict 
mediators in the community. Since religion is deep-rooted in Senegambia, it 
is considered as part of such traditional structures. Hence, it borrows 
culture-situated metaphors and idioms of relations like the fabric metaphor to 
describe The Gambia-Senegal relations (see chapter 1).544 Additionally, 
West African trading networks have used their membership in religious 
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groups to strengthen systems of “good-faith economy and protect trading 
relations and social bonds.”545  
Talibee networks have used The Gambia-Senegal border to enhance 
interpersonal and intercommunity bonds, structure mobility, trade and social 
outreach beyond the reach of the state. In the next section, we revisit how 
these networks work and the influence they have on the border, on society 
and on the state and how they solidify The Gambia-Senegal ties.   
 
7.3: Talibee Networks and Religious Events: Solidifying Cross-
Border Bonds 
Senegambia’s talibee networks facilitate significant cross-border contacts 
through organised religious caravans (fleets of cars, buses and vans), which 
take people to ziarres, gamoos and other public religious ceremonies. These 
talibee or religious networks have diverse centres of affiliation. For example, 
Tivoavone (in Senegal) is the spiritual headquarters of some Tijannis, while 
Touba, is that of all Mourides.546  
Talibees are the religious audience of the man of God. They visit 
clerical establishments to express their belonging to a particular religious 
“house” or community.  They pay homage to the spiritual leader or holy man 
of that house. The “house” or “community” symbolises a spiritual and social 
sanctuary and shapes the community’s social and religious agenda. Talibee 
is about a conduct, an aspiration towards the pristine. It also means a 
seeker. The cleric who embarks on religious displacement is also a talibee 
of sorts (see chapters 1 & 2). But when he functions as head of a clerical 
establishment or the marabout or khalifa, he is a spiritual leader.  
The Khalifa General is the supreme leader of each clerical 
establishment. He heads the house and provides spiritual support to the 
talibees of the house. He also conducts prosperity prayers for them. When a 
follower has any infractions with state authorities, the Khalifa General may 
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intervene on his or her behalf, to get relief from state authorities. In this 
sense, he plays a role that is similar to the roles chief Gueye of Keur Ayib 
plays in chapter 6, as he lobbies state border agents to make certain 
concessions for members of his community (see chapter 6).  
Clerical establishments seek to redeem the individual, to make 
him/her a better person. Their worship practices and rituals promote 
religious codes of conduct. They provide directives to talibees, who consider 
them as their affective parent. The marabout-talibee relations are 
represented as a relationship in which the talibee breastfeeds from the 
marabout or the khalifa.547  The use of the maternal metaphor 
communicates intimacy between the two people. It is fundamental to Islamic 
core values for keeping and maintaining family and social ties. It also 
connects to the concept of ummah, which considers all Muslims of the world 
as members of a global community. Consequently, clerical establishments 
foster social relations that are beyond social and physical barriers.548 
 Quinn observed that in Senegambia religious fellowship or  
fellow-feeling displaces tribal or ethnic or political allegiances.549  In 18th and 
19th century Senegambia, people mobilised around their Islamic faith to 
protest against the pillaging of traditional ruling aristocracies.550 This was 
made easy by the fact that Islam encourages people to cultivate relations 
within and outside the family. Visits to relatives, attending religious events 
and social rituals such as naming ceremonies, weddings, funerals, coming 
of age ceremonies and so on, are fundamental to Islamic practices as they 
maintain social attachments. Islamic values for relatedness complement 
social values for maintaining ties. The Mandinka proverb which says, 
“empathy is rooted in social acquaintance,” re-echoes values for social 
outreach. This resonates with the Wollof proverb, which says that, “relations 
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are the work of the feet.” Aptly, the mobility metaphor used in this proverb 
also values interfamilial social contacts, which include contacts between 
religious leaders and their followers. Thus, there are various religious and 
social events that help Senegambians to maintain various social ties and 
where applicable, religious attachments, in society. 
Gamoo and the ziarres are two popular religious rituals that 
strengthen social ties and religious attachments. These events provide 
opportunities for physical and face-to-face contacts between talibees, 
marabouts and their household.551 In Senegambia, gamoo is Maulud Al-
Nabi, the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW), 
which is usually held in all community mosques and at maraboutic 
centers.552 In both The Gambia and Senegal, gamoo is recognised as an 
official national holiday. The evening and nightlong event is marked by 
public recitations of the holy Quran and lectures on Islam, and the life of the 
Prophet (SAW).  Clerical establishments use the opportunity to also revisit 
the religiosity and devotional practices of their founding elder or elders. It is 
expected to renew people’s faith and morality.  
Ziarres are also popular for both their devotional and family reunion 
aspects. Ziarre means paying homage and it is usually held at clerical 
establishments or maraboutic centres. It is rooted in an Islamic-Arabic term 
zihada, which means adding, or complementing.553 In Wollof,  it means 
“doleku.”554 It is marked by public recitations of the holy Quran. Religious 
scholars also take turns to preach attendees on different religious issues. 
Unlike gamoo, which is an evening and nightlong event, ziarres last for a 
couple of days.   
Many people in Senegambia look forward to ziarres. It is an occasion 
for nabangteh ak warante—preaching and advising one another.555 
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It reunites families and friends. Attendees reconnect with childhood 
friends, relatives and other people they may have missed from the previous 
year or so.  It is common for people who live outside their native 
communities, or in Europe, or in other parts of the world, to return to their 
communities to participate in ziarre events. The event also serves as an 
opportunity to discuss community projects or issues.556 Consequently, 
ziarres and gamoos help build community, renew old ties and establish new 
ones. These religious events and the religious and social philosophy of 
talibee networks solidify inter-personal, intercommunity and cross-border 
social bonds in Senegambia.  
The next section explores how the life history and the spiritual journey 
of El Haj Taib Diallo, who hailed from Lamin, Nuimi, The Gambia and Keur 
Sainey Gueye, Senegal, embodied forms of cross-border outreach and 
connections that solidified The Gambia-Senegal social relations. His life 
history is also a good example of how religious ideas, habits and attitudes 
transcend The Gambia-Senegal border. It also shows how religious 
practices sustain Senegambian kinship discourses and can transform The 
Gambia-Senegal political disputes over the border.  
 
7.4: El Haj Taib Diallo- His Life, Teaching and Status as a Holy 
Man of Senegambia 
“El Haj Taib Diallo was Senegambia.” El Haj Bun Diaham, the clerical 
bard/griot of the Diallo clerical establishment in Keur Sainey Gueye, stated 
in an interview with me. El Haj Taib Diallo was a grand marabout. He was a 
follower of the Tarikh Cheikh Ahmad Tijan or the Tijanniya. 557 He was born 
in Bambugarr, a neighbouring village to Sokone, Senegal. His father, El Haj 
Modou Jallow, and his grandfather, Sheikh Ebrima Jallow, were both from 
                                                            
556Interview with El Haj Bun Diaham, Keur Sainey Gueye, Senegal, 22nd January, 2013. 
557 Interview was conducted in Keur Sainey Gueye, Senegal on January 22nd, 2013, in a 
place El Haj Bun Diaham named Darou Salaam, in the compound of El Haj Muhammadou 






Njapto, a village in The Gambia.558 His mother, Ramatoulie Jallow, was born 
in Alberdar (Albreda or Juffure) in The Gambia. But she lived in Keur Sainey 
Gueye, Senegal, with his half-brother Sainey Gueye, a grand marabout and 
founder of the village, which is located close to the border with The 
Gambia.559 Gueye conducted the first gamoo in his settlement in 1941. He 
died on 4th September, 1976. 560 In 2013, my visit to Keur Sainey Gueye 
coincided with the 76th year anniversary of gamoo celebrations in the 
community. 561  A huge influx of people from both The Gambia and Senegal 
came to attend the event.562 
El Haj Bun Diaham narrated that in 1940, El Haj Taib Diallo, returned 
home from his search for God and for knowledge (see chapter 1 and 2).  On 
the advice of his mother, he settled in his Uncle Sainey Gueye’s settlement. 
This was based on a prediction that his spiritual destiny was tied to that 
community. He continued learning the Quran on his own. People gave him 
their children and he taught them the Quran. Majority of these students- 
talibee darras- were from suuw -Gerew, Popenguine, Mbour, Sibicoutane, 
Dakar,  and other places in northeast Senegal.563 
El Haj Bun Diaham observed that, “Each person’s life and place of 
residence is predestined. God directs the individual to that location by 
inspiration or putting it in other people’s minds who advised him to go 
there.”564 When El Haj Taib arrived in Keur Sainey Gueye, 
Faith and religion were scarce in the community. Through his teaching, practices and 
lifestyle, he revived Islam in Keur Sainey Gueye. A relationship of honour and dignity 
thrived between him and the community. El Haj Taib was more knowledgeable than the 
people and the elders in the community acknowledged his knowledge. But the people 
showed him that he was not more honourable than them, oppa nalen xamxam wai 
                                                            
558The spellings on the last names “Diallo” and “Jallow” reflect the Francophone and 
Anglophone spellings for the same family name. 
559 Ker Sainey Gueye in Wollof means the home of Sainey Gueye. 
560Gamoo is an Islamic feast which celebrates the birth of Prophet Muhammad (SAW). It is 
also called Malud- El- Nabi. 
561 Dairas-(singular: daira) - Islamic community-based organisations attached to clerical 
establishments in Senegambia. 
562Gamo observed through The Gambia, The Gambia Weekly, October 13, 1989, 4. 
563 Talibee darrsu- is a term used to distinguish between students he taught and the people 
who he did not necessarily teach but who declared themselves as his students and 
followers. Suuw means the east in Wollof. 






oppu tolin ngorr.565The community followed his teachings and lifestyle with dignity and 
honour. They appreciated his roles in their community. Life situations were better off in 
Sokone than in Keur Sainey Gueye. But El Haj Taib remained in his adopted 
community and faced all the hardships life came with there.566 
 
With time, El Haj Taib’s devotional practices and his desire to reconnect with 
his Gambian heritage took him to the community of Lamin, Nuimi, North 
Bank Region of The Gambia.  This was the place where his grandfather 
Sheikh Ibrahima Jallow was buried, too. Most of his family members had 
already moved to other areas of Senegambia. Community elders in Lamin 
guided him to his grandfather’s grave in the village and also showed him the 
family compound, which he revived and used as venue for his worship 
practices in The Gambia. He started conducting ziarres in Lamin and 
eventually, he spent more and more time there and it became the main 
venue for his many other acts of worship. 567  
He loved Keur Sainey Gueye but part of the divine plan was he would later spend 
more time in Lamin. This switching of spaces based on spiritual guidance can be 
traced to Prophet Muhammad (SAW)’s life. He loved Mecca more. But God decreed 
for him to go to Medina. “He implored “God You have taken me away from the place 
I love best, please take me to the place You love most.” That was how the Prophet 
came to Medina. For any good person to fulfill a destiny to greatness, he must face 
displacement. These journeys away from home are unavoidable for a destiny to 
greatness.568 
Overtime, El Haj Taib’s popularity as a holy man of faith grew and became 
widespread in both Senegal and The Gambia. People were impressed with 
his knowledge, his lifestyle and his asceticism. They sought him out 
requesting prayers from him. Other people came to him to ask him to give 
them the Tijanniya “wirrd”.569A new set of talibees cultivated themselves 
around the holy man. They became self-declared followers and students of 
the tarikha.570 Majority of these students were Gambians. 
                                                            
565 The Wollof term means “he was more knowledge but the people were equally 
honourable like him.” 
566Interview with El Haj Bun Diaham, Keur Sainey Gueye, Senegal, 22nd January, 2013. 
567 Ziarres- spiritual renewal events held annually in Senegambia.  
568 Interview with El Haj Bun Diaham, Keur Sainey Gueye, Senegal, 22nd January, 2013. 
569 Wirrd- is the daily invocations followers of Tijanniya sect do. For someone to start doing 
it, the person must obtain permission from someone with distinguished spiritual standing.  
570 Talibee tarikha- students of the sect. Students who were taught by him were also called 







El Haj Taib never called anyone to say “come be my talibee and follower.” But 
people realised the virtues in him and requested the “wirrd” from him. Wirrd are acts 
rather than words people follow. Among the elders of past generations, through 
divine inspiration someone may discover some body of knowledge and practice. As 
he used it and benefits accrue from it, he passes it to someone who could also 
practice it and as everyone who become devoted to those acts see the benefits in 
them, the acts and practices become institutionalised as acts of worship. People 
who wished to improve their character and their religious practices search for a 
model they wished to emulate. They come to him, spread their palms before him for 
prayers. The holy man gave them the rules, dos and don’ts of the tarikha. The 
person feeds on that, feeds his family on that and together they develop a 
commitment to the source of that. They visit, they bring adiya and they keep in 
close contact with the holy man, elders around him and the family.571  
The devotional practices of these followers are important to understanding 
the resources Senegambian religious leaders have at their disposal to 
positively influence interstate political relations. El Haj Bun Diaham noted 
that there were two kinds of talibee devotees; those from rural settings and 
those from urban areas. The former were based in rural communities. 
During farming seasons, they lent hands to the farm work of the house and 
contributed part of their farm produce to the house, as gift to the holy man 
and his family. The latter group of talibees largely comprised traders based 
in urban settings like Banjul.  They provided most of the material goods the 
house required for hosting community events. They generally have 
economic wherewithal and through contributions in cash and kind, they 
helped support the worship practices of the house.  El Haj Diaham described 
the contributions of this set of talibees as jemal Keurgi, glossing the 
community, compound or residence of the clerical establishment.572 
In contemporary times, during events like gamoo and ziarres, both set of 
people contribute towards the event by providing food, drinks, sleeping 
facilities and other logistics needed for hosting several hundreds of people 
for such religious gatherings. The fact that people on both sides of the 
border contribute to and attend such events means that, all sorts of goods, 
                                                            
571 Interview with El Haj Bun Diaham, Keur Sainey Gueye, Senegal, 22nd January, 2013. 
Adiya means gifts to holy men for their prayer and pastoral services. 






including those with restricted entry, find their way to these events, thanks to 
“toleration” the state accords to religious communities, too (see chapter 6).   
The Diallo clerical establishment, like the many other religious 
communities, around the border or that host events with cross-border 
participation, enjoy customs privileges from the state. This privilege enables 
restricted goods destined for religious events and religious communities to 
freely pass through the border. This is very similar to the privileges 
residence of Keur Ayib enjoy from state border agents in the village (see 
chapter 6). State authorities could also make personal contributions to the 
hosting of these religious events as talibees, in addition to providing the 
institutional backing to ensure that these events were held smoothly.  
According to El Haj Bun Diaham, the tolerance religious communities 
enjoy from the state has historical underpinnings. “The elders conducted 
their religious events from their own resources and people attended them 
without making little or no contributions. The elders never stretched their 
palms to anyone. During the events, they lived in the remembrance of God, 
they celebrated the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and then dispersed.”573 But 
overtime, some talibees, who attended these events felt they must 
contribute towards these events and this was how their involvement in the 
financing of such events started.  Since they bring both cash and other 
goods such as bags of rice, cooking oil, bags of sugar, most of which are 
controlled goods in Senegal, it was necessary to get permission from state 
authorities to allow the passage of these goods. Religious communities were 
granted exemptions for the passage of such goods partly because the elders 
who were in the forefront organising such religious event shunned political 
leadership. Their roles did not conflict with that of state authorities. It was 
also common for state employees to be members of these talibee networks.  
The relationship spiritual leaders and political figures shared was a 
mutually reassuring tie.574  For example, the elders desired to remain in the 
                                                            
573 Interview with El Haj Bun Diaham, Keur Sainey Gueye, Senegal, 22nd January, 2013.  
574 For other perspectives on this see Donal B Cruise O’ Brien, Saints and Politicians 






religious realm while leaving secular power to the politicians.  El Haj Bun 
noted that the elders had a fervent prayer which was “yalnanyu bur nyamal 
be nyu muna jamou Yalna.”575 The desire to separate religious and political 
leadership was a founding principle of the clerical establishments. The 
elders believed that “Bour ku buka bukacmoum nguurrram mu hanjn la sa 
jamm.”576This understanding of the relationship between the clerical 
establishments and the state was also structured by a religious-cultural 
notion that “Kuu jupp tedah,” which implies non-interference in secular 
issues, which did not concern the religious realm.577 For example, El Haj 
Bun stated that irrespective of the extensive social support religious 
authorities enjoyed in society, they deferred to state authorities on matters of 
the state.  
Every year before the gamoo season starts, we make a courtesy call on the border 
authorities in Karang to formally inform them about the coming events. We also renew 
our request for their toleration of the people and the goods coming to our events. No 
matter how difficult times are, these authorities grant our requests. For example, last 
year 2012 the border was closed but they allowed the people and the goods coming to 
us to pass. They allowed no cars in but the people were free to come in. They came, 
did their ziarres and then they returned to The Gambia. The government has never 
given us any difficulties over this. We cannot say that we are Senegalese. We cannot 
say that we are Gambians. We are between the two countries. We live in both milieus. 
The huur at the other end of the community was completely destroyed and cut-off by 
the rain last year.578 No one could pass there. We reported this to the Senegalese 
government to help reconstruct it. But God destined that their assistance would be slow 
in coming. But on my own accord, El Haj Bun Diaham, I went to the anglais and 
informed our well-wishers about it.579 From the anglais I got about one thousand and 
two hundred bags of cement as assistance to reconstruct the huur. The same anglais 
helped me to bring the cement over to Keur Sainey Gueye. Now people can pass 
thorough the huur without any problem.580 
The above narrative highlights Senegambian discourses of oneness. 
However, there are subtle references to the divisions, which occasioned 
interstate political difficulties between the two countries. For example, a 
religious community like Keur Sainey Gueye considers the description si 
anglais bi, as a reference to the international boundary. It signifies the 
                                                            
575 In Wollof, may the ruler give us peace for us to render well our devotion to God. 
576 A sovereign denies peace to the one seeking to share his sovereignty/power. 
577 The person of virtues reaps grandeur 
578Huur means thoroughfare. 
579Anglais- is a reference to The Gambia.  






political separation between the two countries, which implies a separate 
destiny for the people of the two countries.581 The reaffirmation that the 
community lives between two milieus and that they are not of here or there, 
they belong to both countries, was representative of the fabric metaphor that 
maraboutic families and their devotees use to communicate the mbokh and 
dome-ndeye ties between Gambians and Senegalese (see chapters 1 and 
2). The perception that cross-border communities share identities and a 
sociality signifies that people are more loyal to their social system than to the 
state. These perceptions in Keur Sainey Gueye can be considered as the 
general perception in other maraboutic houses in Senegambia, irrespective 
of the divisions implicit in the term si anglais bi.  
El Haj Bun’s explanation of how a network of close ties was woven 
around the personality of El Haj Taib Jallow is representative of the general 
practice through which strong social bonds were developed and maintained 
between clerical families and other people in Senegambia. Talibees and 
followers of El Haj Taib Diallo, like talibees and followers of other 
Senegambian holy men, live in cross-border situations which interconnect 
them based on the past ties or interactions between the different clerical 
families they are devoted to (see chapter 2). Given that the “word” talibee 
refers to a fluid concept denoting an attachment a student demonstrates 
towards his religious teacher and any form of attachments a person has 
towards the teachings and life styles of a certain holy man, it is symbolic of 
social networks that bind different individuals into a community. The 
networks interconnect different communities and enables religious 
authorities to enjoy influence beyond their devotees.  Using a principle like 
wullere, they could claim the loyalty and respect of followers of other 
Senegambian spiritual leaders. These cross-cutting ties can transform 
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The narrative on the life of El Haj Taib Diallo and the clerical 
establishment he created in Keur Sainey Gueye, Senegal, and Lamin, 
Nuimi, The Gambia, are a microscopic representation of religious and social 
ties among Senegambia’s religious communities. The lives, teachings and 
followers of religious leaders intimately crisscross the international 
boundary. Thus, Keur Sainey Gueye has links to the clerical family in 
Sokone, Senegal, and Lamin, The Gambia.  Through Sokone, it is also 
linked to the Niass clerical family in Kaolack and other clerical communities 
like Tivaoune, Senegal. 
 The Niassens of Kaolack are closely connected to the Nema Nassiru 
community in The Gambia. Ties between the Niassens and the Mourides 
are also obvious.582  The latter proudly recall Sheikh Bamba Touba 
Mbackeh’s visit to The Gambia and the establishment of active Mouride 
communities in the country. So, religious and social connections that exist 
among Senegambia’s religious communities consist of a dense network of 
clerical relations, which include relations with the Quadirrya sect dominated 
Pakau areas of Casamance. Some communities at this Mandinka holy land 
trace their origins to founders from Fouta Toro, Senegal, and to other clerical 
establishments in Senegambia.583 
Clerical establishments appropriate the borders as a line of continuity. 
Proximity to the border was desirable to facilitate easy access by the 
different constituencies that seek them out. This was why El Haj Taib 
Diallo’s live and spiritual practices revolved around the border. Like him, 
other Senegambian spiritual leaders utilised the border as a bridge, defying 
the barrier functions of the border. Hence, it can be argued that they created 
continuities beyond the limits of legal territory. The legitimacy such populist 
cross-border religious leaders enjoyed derived from their abilities to forge a 
network of various ties that enhance their views and goals of community.  
 
                                                            
582 Interview with Cheikh Mahe Niass, Kaolack, May, 2013. 
583 This is from sources in my own family who traced our family connections from Fouta 






They work to preserve a sense of community across different social and 
religious groupings. Their roles contrasts with how transporters obstructed a 
sense of community, as they dismantled the joint transport network (see 
chapters 4 and 5). The cross-border practices and attitudes of the different 
spiritual leaders and their followers in Senegambia, can also be explored in 
terms of their goals for human welfare and security, as explained in the next 
section.  
 
7.5: Islamic Discourses: Human Welfare and Security 
In Senegambia, politicians, transporters, traders and other members of 
society routinely consult clerics for different spiritual services, which include 
officiating marriages, funerals, naming ceremonies, prayers of good fortune 
and protection from supernatural forces (see chapter 3). This need for 
spiritual and prayer services shapes the bond between clerics and the rest 
of society. In particular, transporters and traders commonly seek out clerics 
for charms, to protect themselves in their frequent long distance travels. 
Long distance travel is considered a liminal affair in most Senegambian 
cultures. Therefore, people need protection from supernatural forces, during 
long distant travels or for other purposes.584  The huge social dependence 
on clerics has psycho-cognitive effects. Individuals generally trust that the 
clerics they associate themselves with, always have their best interests at 
heart. They are reliable people. Therefore, devotees can confide their 
innermost secrets to the clerics. They also show deference towards them. 
It is common that transporters, traders, politicians and other people in 
society self-regulate in their interactions with clerics or with anything 
associated with them. For example, the Senegalese Transport Association 
was careful about closing the border during religious events such as gamoo 
and ziarres. They made sure that cross-border religious rituals or exchanges 
                                                            
584See Geert Mommersteeg, Diane Webb (translator), In the City of the Marabouts: Islamic 
Culture in West Africa (Long Gove, IL: Waveland Press, 2012); Rudolf T. Ware, The 
Walking Qu’ran: Islamic Education, Embodied Knowledge, and History in West Africa 
(Islamic Civilization and Muslim Networks) 1st Edition (North Carolina: The University of 






were not hindered by their border blockade acts. In fact, some observers 
noted that anytime there was crisis over The Gambia-Senegal border, the 
intervention of religious authorities led to a quick re-opening of the border 
and the resolution of the crisis.585 El Haj Bun Diaham also confirmed that 
state border agents allow their talibees to cross the border in order to attend 
events at the house during border closures. However, spiritual leaders 
strategically use their influences to mediate border closures or interstate 
political tensions. Their first preference in such situations is to let politicians 
politically resolve any conflicts. But if the tensions persist and bring hardship 
to more and more people, then they can choose to intervene. This strategy 
is motivated by the clerical neutrality principle, and a desire to let politicians 
resolve political problems politically.586   
When spiritual leaders intervene to resolve border or interstate 
tensions, they use socio-religious language. It is common for them to invoke 
and retell stories of cross-border blood and social ties, instances of mutual 
help, interdependence, companionship and knowledge sharing between 
Gambians and Senegalese (see chapter 2). They use metaphors like dome-
ndeye, mbokh, or wullere, to communicate long-standing blood ties, 
alliances, friendships and companionships between Gambians and 
Senegalese.587 Thus, a metaphor like the fabric metaphor is a central idea 
religious communities can use to create and re-create a sense of solidarity 
among different community groups and politicians in Senegambia. 
However, the roles spiritual leaders play sets them apart from 
politicians. For example, generally, people think that they can depend on the 
spiritual leader and that he is genuinely interested in the well-being of the 
individual and society, as a whole. Therefore, spiritual leaders have a social 
mandate and power to speak to power on behalf of society.                    
                                                            
585 L.A. Villalon, “Charisma and Ethnicity in Political Context: A Case Study in the 
Establishment of a Senegalese Religious Clientele, “Journal of International African 
Institute. (1993): 80- 101. 
586 On clerical neutrality, see Sanneh, Beyond Jihad: The Pacifist…2016.	
587	Curtin	noted	that	the	use	of	traditions	of	friendships	and	alliances	have	been	important	in	






Their ability to act as advocates for society comes from their understanding 
of people’s needs and social realities. 
Marabouts socialise with ordinary people on the streets, in their 
homes and in religious centres. They are accessible to everyone. They 
educate people and they guide them. The cleric-society relation is a longue 
duree’ abiding love and therefore transcends the opportunistic juggling of 
relations that can come from politics. In contrast, the political elites, 
depending on their seniority and their political authority, are considered to be 
“hiding” from ordinary people. One has to sometimes follow strenuous 
protocols before seeing them. For example, it would be easier for an 
ordinary citizen or a complete stranger to have an audience with the khalifa 
general than with the Gambian or Senegalese head of state.  
However, comparing the cleric-society relationships to the state 
authority-society relationships is problematic in the sense that the two 
relationships come from difference sources and have different motivations.  
For instance, the relationship between citizens and the state or political 
authority is based on a social contract, which is conferred through electoral 
processes. This social contract can be changed, modified or altered. It is a 
terminable relationship.588  In contrast, the cleric-talibee or cleric-society 
relationship is not from secular, democratic or political presumptions. It is a 
voluntary submission to spiritual inclinations and its personal and social 
aspirations generally relate to God, godliness and faith.589 This relationship 
is deeper as it embodies both the worldly and the hereafter. In contrast, 
political ties are not generally expected to go beyond the worldly. These 
differences strengthen the legitimacy clerics have, to advocate for people 
and for society. In the next section, we use smuggling and transportation as 
case examples where clerical authorities intervene for social causes and 
thus, infringe the political mandates of the state.  
 
                                                            
588On the social contract Jean- Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Penguin 
Books, 1968). 
589 For more on this see Stephen Ellis, and Gerrie Ter Haar, Worlds of Power: Religious 






7.6. Smuggling and Transportation: Holding out for the People 
Senegambia’s religious networks constitute power blocs. They have 
members who are cross-border traders or transporters. Their activities, like 
their religious affiliations, are intertwined with The Gambia-Senegal border. 
Traders generally desire stability in order to enhance their trading 
interests.590 Interstate disputes over the border do not serve their interests at 
all. The entry restrictions for some goods like rice, cooking oil and so on, do 
not also serve traders’ interests. When traders are held for smuggling goods 
across the border, they appeal to their clerical guides to intervene with the 
state for their unconditional release.  
Irrespective of the clerical neutrality principle, clerics intervene in such 
cases to secure the release of their talibees. Cheikh Mahe Niass, the 
Kaolack-based spiritual leader and scholar, viewed that when the state 
accuses citizens of smuggling, it is being irresponsive to their needs.591 The 
attempt to punish smugglers comes from Senegal’s desire to protect its 
economy. But Niass argues that that process is a complete 
misunderstanding of what the economy should mean for citizens of a 
country. He asked: “What is the economy of the country?” It should mean 
individuals can adequately feed their families, house them and provide for 
their welfare and wellbeing. This is what a good economy does for ordinary 
citizens.”592  
Part of the clerical duty is to help individuals to live secure and 
fulfilling lives, especially through trading and migration.593 The widespread 
prevalence of poverty in both The Gambia and Senegal makes this duty 
even more necessary and thus, clerics have to act “nger Yallah” (for the 
sake of God), to protect accused smugglers from the wrath of the state. Anti-
smuggling policies are considered self-interested and not pro-citizens.   
                                                            
590Sanneh	describes	this	statement	better	with	a	conversation	between	the	West	African	trader	
Bouckar	Sano	and	the	English	trader	Richard	Jobson.	See	Sanneh, Beyond Jihad: The 
Pacifist…2016	
591Interview with Cheikh Mahe Niass, Kaolack, May, 2013.  
592Ibid.  






They bar citizens from seeking alternative sources of livelihood, and 
therefore, they are politically incorrect. The debate on whether Senegalese 
anti-smuggling laws are politically correct raises questions like: how can a 
state that is run by corrupt political leaders accuse citizens of smuggling? 
What roles should the state play in providing alternative sources of livelihood 
for its citizens?  Niass stated that:  
When government accuses citizens of smuggling, we should ask: is government 
itself doing the right thing? Is government free from corruption and the 
mismanagement of resources? A smuggler is the person who takes the country’s 
resources and hides them in European banks. Cross-border trade between The 
Gambia and Senegal is trade among Africans, among people from the same 
historical circumstances and heritage. Inter-African trade should not be 
smuggling.594  
Niass was speaking as both a cleric and a scholar, who speaks different 
European languages. By comparing the corrupt financial practices of some 
African states to the survival tactics of cross-border traders and 
communities, he reveals some inherent failures in governance. He reifies the 
border and maintains the cleric’s role as a voice and advocate for the 
people.  
Niass’ view resonates with those of traders and communities that 
survive from cross-border trader.  But even transporters who allegedly 
execute the Senegalese state’s backdoor policies on The Gambia-Senegal 
border, share clerics’ views on these issues (see chapter 4). All of them view 
that, if Gambian and Senegalese politicians aim to pursue the interests of 
the two populations, they would avoid the disruptive political disputes they 
engage in. Using interstate political disputes over football as an example, 
Niass observed that a football match is not worth the risk of destroying 
relations between families, populations, or states.595  Hence, the two 
countries need political leaders who understand the sensibilities of the 
border, cross-border blood ties and other shared bonds, which must be 
protected and safeguarded for posterity.596 
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595 Ibid. 
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At the time of my interviews in 2013, it was observed that, so far, 
Senegal’s president, Macky Sall, seemed to be aware of the sensibilities 
between the two countries. But under his leadership, The Gambia-Senegal 
border has been closed more frequently.  The border closures that 
happened under Sall were more than the border closures that happened 
under presidents Wade, Diouf or Senghor. Transporters were usually behind 
most of the border closures, however, they blame politicians for their 
occurrence.597  
The debate on how different actors contribute to border closures is as 
complex as The Gambia-Senegal relations. However, the clerics’ views of 
the border resonate with that of the population.598 Thus, like traders, talibee 
networks have little or no interest, to see The Gambia-Senegal border 
closed, even though conflicts on the border can have positive economic 
outcomes for some individuals. Historically, religious networks play roles in 
mediating border conflicts. They affect their values for community and their 
economic opportunities they can exploit for their survival. In the next section, 
I explore how religious communities mediate border conflicts, instead of 
fueling them, to give other examples of how clerics serve as champions of 
cross-border solidarity and peace in Senegambia. 
 
7.7: Clerical Establishments and Transforming Inter-state 
Conflicts  
The way Senegambia’s talibee networks value community is shown in the 
roles they played in appeasing victims of the 1989 Senegal-Mauritania 
border conflict (see chapters 1 & 6). During the conflict, Islamic networks 
mobilized urgently, to provide humanitarian services to the 600,000 
Senegalese and Mauritanian,  who were expelled from the Region de fleuve 
and to other victims of the conflict.599 This conflict was unlike the Gambia- 
Senegal border conflicts. Hence, its barbaric nature shocked Senegambians 
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598For more on this see Donal B Cruise O’ Brien, Symbolic Confrontations: Muslims 
Imagining the State in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 






and talibee networks. Parties to the conflict ignored longstanding traditions 
of friendships, educational and other ties between Senegambians and 
Mauritanians. Many Senegambian Islamic scholars have for long or brief 
periods, studied at Mauritania’s prestigious Centres for Islamic Education.  
Many considered that this reality should have made individuals involved in 
the conflict to exercise restraint. Additionally, they were shocked that the two 
countries failed to honour Ramadan, the Islamic holy month, which was 
traditionally a period when the first Muslims made peace with any existing 
conflict partners. However, some observers observed that the border war 
was inspired by racial prejudice, which ignored the Islamic heritage Senegal 
and Mauritania shared. Religious communities were therefore seriously 
concerned about the conflict and it became the focus of all religious 
messages for the two Eids of that year.600  
On Sunday 7th May, 1989, Muslim communities in The Gambia 
prayed for peace in the Senegal-Mauritania conflict, as part of Eid-ul Fitr 
prayers. Nationwide, the sermons were on peaceful co-existence and good 
neighbourliness. Banjul held its Eid prayers for the first time in the newly 
built King Fahad Mosque, and there too, the Imam’s sermons were on the 
conflict.  It has been a tradition that on every Eid prayer, Muslims leaders 
make a courtesy call on the Gambian President at State House. In the 1989 
courtesy visit to state house, Alhaji Abdoulaye Jobe, the Imam Ritab of 
Banjul also reflected on the need for peace and cooperation among 
Muslims.601 The other leaders who joined him were, Daud Hanif, the Amir of 
the Ahmadiyya mission in The Gambia, Alhagi Bora Manjang, elder and 
representative of the Mandinka community, Alhaji Cherno Jallow, elder of 
the Fula community and Alhaji Mahmoud Sillah, elder of the Serahuli 
Community.602  
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wanted sacrifice his son Ismail to God. 
601 Imam Ritab – means the supreme Imam of the country. 






This interfaith and inter-ethnic meeting was an example of how 
countries should create lines of continuities, instead of political barriers like 
the border. The conflict lingered in the minds of religious communities for a 
considerable time. Three months after Eid ul Fitr, religious communities 
renewed their public reflections on brotherhood and tolerance, major ideals 
of Islam. The Eid ul Adha sermons of the Imam of Serekunda, one of the 
most populous cities of The Gambia, also focused on peace. He asked 
worshippers to pray for peace for The Gambia, for neighbouring countries 
and for people in conflict situations. This was also at a time when civil 
conflicts started in some sub-regional countries like Sierra Leone. He noted 
that it was only in peace and goodwill that individuals could seek time to 
serve God, do their prayers and go about sorting out their daily businesses.  
 The effort religious leaders and communities made to mediate the 
Senegal-Mauritania border conflict affected different social groups in The 
Gambia. It showed in the national mood for the Eids for that year. For 
example, usually, Eid was a big joyous celebration in all communities. But 
that year’s Eids were celebrated low key and were less social. Families and 
friends stayed indoors and quietly observed the feast, instead of celebrating 
on the streets. It inspired one of the newspapers to write an editorial, asking: 
“Is Tobaski Changing?603  
Pre-Eid activities like the popular tobaski ram sale in The Gambia, 
was also affected by the conflict. The ram sale brought rams from 
Mauritania, Mail, Senegal and Guinea Bissau, into The Gambia, for sale. But 
livestock supplies for that year were low, as the conflict made it difficult to 
bring livestock from across the borders. This led to high ram prices for that 
year. Thus, the conflict affected an important religious ritual. Additionally, the 
usual wanteer (sales) that come with religious feasts were largely absent. 
 Trading was quiet, with few sales reduction events offered in 
markets.  It was observed that the usual crowd of different buyers who 
assailed Banjul markets to shop for religious feasts was absent. Crowds that 
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overflow the footpaths and choke traffic in and around the McCarthy Square, 
one of the busiest areas of Banjul, were absent, too. Instead, people went 
about their “business with determination”. 604 On the day and day after 
tobaski, which were normally days for vibrant street celebrations in 
communities, the main highways in the country were swept clean of traffic. 
This led many people to speculate that perhaps a petrol shortage might also 
be lurking on the way. 
 Notwithstanding, the different speculations about the somber mood 
over tobaski, underlined to what extent the border conflict affected Muslims 
in The Gambia and their cross-border co-religionists. Different local 
communities collaborated to raise donations for victims, provide medical 
supplies and offered protection to victims in their homes. This large 
humanitarian effort came from empathy and the sense of community that 
defined talibee networks. The fact that the Gambia’s president Jawara was 
also in the forefront of the humanitarian effort point to the ways religious 
networks could partner with state authorities, to work towards the common 
good and preserve values for community. The Gambian Muslim 
communities felt obliged to help victims of both countries since they share 
with both countries, longstanding religious affiliations. Socio-religious 
attachments in the Senegambia can therefore be described as proactive and 
abiding relations that can exist beyond the reach of the state. They ensure 
the kind of fellow feeling Gambian Muslims demonstrated during the  
Senegal-Mauritanian crisis.   
Values for community shape the reconciliatory roles religious 
networks aim to play in cross-border and interstate relations. They 
understand the various social sensibilities that shape interpersonal, 
intercommunity and interstate relations. They integrate non-religious tools in 
their religious work, to enhance social and political relations in Senegambia. 
Hence, the textile metaphor aptly describes how people experience 








The recurrences of interstate conflicts over the border provoke the 
question, if religious leaders can successfully intervene in The Gambia-
Senegal border conflicts then, why do interstate political difficulties recur? 
The simplest answer to this question is that, conflicts are part of human 
existence. This truth is reflected in the wisdom of the Mandinka proverb, 
which says that, the tongue and the teeth are in the same mouth, they clash, 
but they must learn to live together (see chapter 1). This proverb 
acknowledges that conflicts are present in society. They are part of everyday 
experiences. However, the aim of actors in a conflict should be to get the 
most productive outcome from it, and to avoid violence, which can be 
detrimental to the whole of society.  
The ability of religious networks to intervene and ensure that a conflict 
does not degenerate into violence, to become harmful to society makes 
them successful in their enterprise, to promote cordial interstate ties in 
Senegambia. Religion has caused violent conflicts in places like Nigeria. 
However, Senegambia shows that religion can play harmonising roles in 
society. Thus, Islam promotes social integration in Senegambia. The use of 
memory, language, education, ethics and sacred space maintains cohesion 
and continuity across time and space.605 Religious networks neutralise the 
barrier functions of the border. They also force political authorities to 
recognise cross-border social sensibilities. They can do this effectively 
because religious and social alliances endure better than political ones.   
 
7.8: Conclusion 
This chapter on religious networks has established why The Gambia-
Senegal interstate political difficulties have not degenerated into violent 
conflicts despite the recurrence of interstate tensions. It explored how the 
attitudes, practices and habits of talibee networks promote social and 
political cohesion in Senegambia. It also identified the complex nature of 
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state-society relations and how the domain of religion generally serves 
popular interests, rather than political ones. It also showed how religious 
networks use the different resources at their disposal to navigate the 
complex context of the border and how they seek to transform conflict. Thus, 
the chapter makes further conclusions to arguments that, transport has been 
more divisive in interstate relations.  Trade and religious networks (as 
domains also fraught with tensions) tend to enhance social solidarity and 
transform The Gambia-Senegal interstate political difficulties into a more 
























The various chapters of this work have identified the complex nature of The 
Gambia-Senegal border, interstate relations and the relations that happen in 
the domains of transport, trade and among religious networks. They’ve also 
shown how the meaning of culture is fluid and how social thoughts are 
continuously constructed and reconstructed in society. The selective use of 
cultural resources works hand in hand with the selective use of other 
resources that help both state and non-state actors, to navigate the complex 
context of The Gambia-Senegal border. 
The chapters also show how the use of language shapes 
Senegambian social and political processes. Cultural ideas like dome-
ndeye, dome-baaye, and wullere help negotiate the dilemmas of interstate, 
cross-border and interpersonal relations in Senegambia. These ideas 
structure how kinship is perceived, used, applied or reconstructed under 
different contexts. These metaphors and idioms of social relations can 
transform interstate conflicts in The Gambia-Senegal relations. But their 
effectiveness is limited by the fact that people can use them when they work 
for them and they can abandon them, whenever necessary.  
There is lot of agency in the way relationships between people and 
between entities are handled in society. Generally, the decisions of 
politicians tend to be shaped by their political logics and the logics of the 
state. These logics include the economic policies the state identified as the 







Like the state, transporters also want to secure their economic 
interests. They want to avoid most of the taxes the state levies on them. This 
makes them oppose those policies of the state. However, they can also 
develop alliances with the state, even if they consider it exploitative. 
Transporter-transporter relations fluctuate between phases of good and bad 
relations, just like The Gambia-Senegal relations. But they consider 
themselves victims of the same exploitative state. Similarly, traders compete 
with each other and yet they willingly share the benefits of trade. Unlike 
transporters, they do not seek to antagonise the state, even if it fails in its 
obligations to them and to society. They condone illicit practices from state 
agents as long as they do not interfere with their trading activities. Traders 
also use the state to advance their trading interests either by creating 
businesses that feed from it or that are sustained through protection from the 
state, like the border currency trade at the Amdallai-Karang border.  
Religious networks adhere to their community values and lessen the pain of 
the border by creating continuities across the discontinuity of territory. They 
nurture strong cross-border identities and through constant outreach 
between religious houses, their talibees and religious communities, they can 
transform conflict or avoid conflict in interstate or inter-personal relations. 
They wish to distance themselves from the political; however, the nature of 
state-society relations makes that effort a difficult one.  The politician is a 
talibee, a follower and therefore engages with the religious leader the same 
way other members of society engage with him.  Hence, there is no tidy 
separation between the political and religious.  
The relationship between Gambian and Senegalese authorities is an 
interesting one.  It swings between different moods. They are allies. They 
are rivals. They can bend the rules for each other and yet they may also 
work to undermine each other. However, politicians are adept at using 
different social resources to foster their political interests and ties in both 
The Gambia and Senegal.  But sometimes, social networks like some 






Consequently, the state has to negotiate with particular actors and entities in 
order to achieve its ambitions. This implies the authority of the state may not 
necessarily be supreme within its territory.  
It is not only the state that has to negotiate its way through social and 
political systems to achieve its aims. Non-state actors and non-state entities 
also have to negotiate with others, to achieve their goals.  Religious 
communities negotiate with state border agents for them to provide them 
and their followers, unrestrictive border crossing privileges. Traders 
negotiate among themselves to help each other in their trade. Senegalese 
transporters negotiate with the Senegalese state to fight Gambian 
authorities.  The Jakartas negotiate with the commune of Karang to 
establish a common fare mechanism even though they fight with the same 
commune over taxation.  The community of Keur Ayib negotiates with 
Senegalese border agents for them to allow them bring in controlled goods 
from The Gambia.  The police at Amdallai-Karang negotiate with foreign 
currency traders and watch them engage in their illicit trade. Male currency 
dealers fight with women currency dealers but they negotiate to share clients 
between them.  
The relationships that happen around the border and in interstate 
relations are characterised by both harmony and conflict.  The political 
economy of the border is also subject to constant shifts and as such 
relations formed around it keep evolving.  Whatever gimmicks politicians 
play on the border to foster the logics of their respective states, ordinary 
people and border communities will always make the border work for them 
(see chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & &). State agents recognise that. This is why as 
they perform statehood through border administration, they also manifest 
their belonging to the socio-cultural landscape (chapter 6). This process has 
inherent tensions, but it is an authentic reproduction of everyday 
experiences of the border, for state agents and for ordinary people. This is 






The Jakartas find new economic opportunities from the disintegrated 
transport network.  The fisheries sector builds on its cross-border economic 
networks and creates livelihood security for its members. The media can 
build its image from border closures and from The Gambia-Senegal 
interstate political difficulties. Civil society groups can also develop new 
programmes to mediate interstate political difficulties. They can also attract 
funding for their programmes.  
Religious principles of community extend beyond the border. 
Religious networks have followership that helps them sustain their cross-
border community values beyond the reach of the state. Religious practices 
and attitudes also maintain Senegambian kinship discourses.  
The border is a medium for achieving various kinds of objectives. As 
such, interstate political difficulties can bring new economic opportunities for 
people, for entities and for the state.  In effect, The Gambia-Senegal border 
works for everyone.  This is why, as interstate political difficulties recur, they 
do not degenerate into violent conflict.  The border needs just some little 
condition of conflict for the growth of the many interests tied to it, but 
conditions of violent conflict may break many of those interests. The states 
or the people are not interested in that. Hence, they can use all resources, 
especially cultural ones, to avoid the escalation of interstate conflict to that 
harmful level. As such, Senegambian kinship discourses redeem the political 
economy of the border and sustain the reasonable level of conflict 
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